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SUMMARY
This thesis is concerned with assessing the current relevance of the concept of state sovereignty 
to the study of international relations in the context of contemporary systemic changes, European 
integration and globalization. It engages with two central questions. First, given that it is said that 
the above changes significantly undermine sovereignty, to what extent does sovereignty actually 
continue to constitute an important concept for IR? Second, and more challenging, what is the 
most appropriate way to conceptualize sovereignty in the context of these changes?
This research engages with the above questions from the vantage point of the English School 
theoretical approach, exploiting its three traditions spectrum. In doing so, it develops the 
application of the three traditions by both reflecting on a new subject area and also recognizing 
fresh perspectives from within its traditional sphere of activity. On the one hand, it considers 
economics (a subject largely ignored by the School), developments in relation to which are 
central to the contemporary systemic changes under consideration. On the other, it highlights 
relevant unidentified perspectives residing in a traditional area of engagement, theology, which is 
rendered increasingly important in the context of globalization and the so-called La Revanche de 
Dieu.
The thesis argues that, appropriately applied, sovereignty continues to be an important concept 
for the study of international relations. In making this case, however, it contends that if 
sovereignty is to clarify rather than obscure, it must be handled in a way that means it can 
competently engage with change. The thesis contends that the English School carries the latent 
potential to rise to this challenge and that in a significant sense this makes the three traditions 
more important today than at the time of their initial formulation, thus endorsing the current 
renaissance of interest in the ES theoretical approach.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years some of the most engaging debates within the international relations 
discipline have been on the subject of the meaning and relevance of state sovereignty. 
Transnational flows, both economic and civic, seem to be transforming the world into 
a ‘global village’ in which the notion of a closed, boundaried, sovereignty is no longer 
tenable. Rather than helping us analyse more effectively, sovereignty is increasingly 
felt to obscure and confuse.1 Furthermore, critics point out that those who do hang on
to sovereignty appear to do so primarily for emotional reasons of tradition and
t 2 
identity, apparently preferring the certainties of the past to the flux of the future.
Having supposedly served as the point of departure for the modem study of
♦ • • •  • 3international relations and having been a key assumption of this discipline, many 
scholars now question the role of sovereignty, some suggesting the need for major 
conceptual adjustment, either downgrading it to practical insignificance or jettisoning 
it altogether. In this environment, some argue that there is a real need for international 
relations as a discipline to rise to the challenge of developing new, post-sovereign 
categories that provide a better conceptual frame through which to come to terms with 
contemporary world politics.4
Hardt and Negri for instance contend that sovereignty must be rejected altogether. 
Attempts to hang on to it, they maintain, are misguided because ‘the decline of the
1
nation-state is not simply the result of an ideological position that might be reversed 
by an act of political will: it is a structural and irreversible process. The nation was 
not only a cultural formulation, a feeling of belonging, and a shared heritage, but also, 
and perhaps primarily, a juridico-economic structure. The declining effectiveness of 
this structure can be traced clearly through the evolution of a whole series of global 
juridico-economic bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World 
Bank, and the IMF’.5
Camilleri and Falk are similarly dismissive of attempts to maintain sovereignty. 
‘[SJuch attempts at conceptual flexibility may be activated by any number of motives, 
including intellectual habit, practical convenience or the official desire to preserve and 
justify the coercive and administrative apparatus of the state. Yet they are unlikely to 
escape for long the mounting tensions inherent in the discourse. It is the cumulative 
or quantitative impact of these tensions which makes it both feasible and advisable to 
attempt a qualitative reassessment of that discourse’.6 This position is further clarified 
by the final sentence of their text on the subject: ‘Though the state will continue to 
perform important administrative and other functions, the theory of sovereignty will 
seem strangely out of place in a world characterized by shifting allegiances, new 
forms of identity and overlapping tiers of jurisdiction’.7
Bauman, meanwhile, who defines the sovereign state in terms of a ‘tripod’ of military, 
economic and cultural roles,8 maintains, ‘All three legs of the “sovereignty” tripod 
have been broken beyond repair. The military, economic and cultural self-sufficiency, 
indeed self-sustainability, of the state - any state -  [has] ceased to be a viable
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prospect’.9 Given the power of global financial markets, ‘the crushing of the 
economic leg has been most seminal’.10
It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst the developments that are 
thought to threaten sovereignty such as regional integration and globalization 
(systemic changes) can be said to have resulted in the curtailment of sovereignty, 
there nonetheless remains an important conceptual job of work for it to perform.11 
Indeed this thesis suggests that those who are encouraging international relations 
either to jettison sovereignty altogether or to downgrade it to practical insignificance 
run the risk of obscuring and confusing every bit as much as those who think that 
sovereignty can be deployed today in exactly the same way as in years gone by. In 
light of this, the central challenge is to develop an approach to sovereignty that can 
successfully engage with ‘systemic change’ which this thesis defines generically as 
profound change that results in the redefinition of ontology (intra-ontological change) 
as opposed to merely change resulting from a different kind of 
arrangement/interaction within a given ontology (inter-ontological change). Both 
regional integration and globalization - as the thesis will demonstrate - present a form 
of intra-ontological change but whilst regional integration results in new sovereign 
jurisdictions (change by extension), globalization has the general effect of eroding the 
ontology upon which sovereignty depends (change by erosion). In engaging with 
these kinds of change the objectives that this thesis seeks to address are two-fold. 
First, it endeavours to demonstrate the ongoing need for a concept of state sovereignty 
despite systemic change. Second, it develops a conceptual framework within which to
consider sovereignty in the context of these systemic changes, both regional, as in the
1 0case of European integration, and universal, as in the case of globalization.
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CHAPTER STRUCTURE
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 defines the methodology of this thesis in 
the light of the challenges that it seeks to address, before Part 2 then considers the 
argument of the thesis, providing an overview of each chapter.
PART 1: METHODOLOGY
This chapter’s consideration of method is divided into three sections. Section 1 
defines the logic for examining the fate of state sovereignty in the context of systemic 
changes by employing a form of spectrum analysis and selects the English School 
three traditions approach as its preferred spectrum. Section 2 goes on to develop 
understanding of the three traditions spectrum, and its capacity to engage with 
international relations in the context of systemic change, by investigating debates 
regarding the relationships between the three traditions. Finally, Section 3 sets out 
how this thesis seeks to develop the use of the three traditions in its quest to engage 
with state sovereignty in the context of contemporary changes.
SECTION 1: SELECTING A SPECTRUM
The successful prosecution of this research depends upon the development of a 
framework that can effectively consider sovereignty in the context of the two kinds of 
systemic change that it has in view. In order to construct a conceptual framework with 
the capacity to deal with the impact of systemic changes like regional integration and 
globalization, it is the contention of this thesis that one should adopt some form of 
spectrum analysis. Utilizing a spectrum is beneficial for the following reasons:
4
First, and most obviously, a spectrum provides one with the possibility of being able 
to engage with change across a range of positions embracing state sovereignty both 
before and during regional integration/globalization. This approach has the benefit of 
not just providing an account of where sovereignty is now but of where it has been, of 
where it could go, and of how journeying across the spectrum impacts upon its 
integrity.
Second, the spectrum is also important because the fact that different states have 
different strengths and resources and respond differently to changes like regional 
integration and globalization means that they affect different states in different ways. 
Any conceptual frame, therefore, that rises effectively to globalization’s challenge 
must be able to cope with the fact that at any one time the 192 polities of the world 
will be differently affected by it and thus best serviced by a flexible model of 
sovereignty. A spectrum approach rises to this challenge by facilitating a 
conceptualization of sovereignty which can vary ontologically, within certain 
parameters, from one place on the spectrum to another.
The third and final rationale for selecting a spectrum approach relates narrowly to the 
challenge of globalization. Globalization is defined as a ‘time-space compression’, the 
term developed to describe the manner in which growing interdependence has altered 
human experiences of the basic dimensions that are constitutive of reality, namely 
time and space. Specifically, globalization touches these basic dimensions, giving rise 
to a spatio-temporal revolution in which it is said that the closure (fixedness) of given 
space is transcended (as the thesis will demonstrate) by the openness (potentiality) of 
time, giving rise to a new ontology.13 This does not result in the demise of the old
5
ontology but rather in its coexistence with the new. Thus, there is a need to keep in 
view both the new and the old ontologies at the same time. Once again, therefore, 
there is a need to cater for a breadth of conceptual space that can only be met by a 
spectrum.
SPECTRUM PRECEDENTS
In adopting a spectrum approach, this thesis assumes a model with good intellectual 
credentials. Keohane and Nye’s path-breaking work on ‘Complex Interdependence’ in 
the mid ‘70s was based explicitly on the understanding that it was a description of a 
pole or ‘ideal type’ which worked in tandem with an opposing pole, realism, thus 
defining a spectrum.
‘We do not argue ...that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political 
reality. Quite the contrary: both it and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most 
situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes realist 
assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex 
interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality’. 14
In a special edition of Political Studies, entitled Sovereignty at the Millennium (1999), 
Georg Sorensen, meanwhile, recognising the reality of both continuity and change 
within sovereignty, suggested the need for a similar approach.
‘Is it possible to find ways of synthesising that complex entity which is sovereign 
statehood in a way which respects both change and continuity[?] ...Instead of looking 
in vain for one synthesis which will never be empirically accurate, I suggest the use of
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Weberian ideal types. The ideal type is not an accurate description of historical 
reality; it is a construct which elucidates typical features of that reality so as to bring 
out their essential elements’.15
Whilst gaining inspiration for the spectrum approach from Keohane, Nye and 
Sorensen, however, this research differs from both. In the first instance it contrasts 
with Keohane and Nye in the sense that it takes the role of ideas very seriously and 
does not subscribe to a uniformly positivist, social scientific framework. This 
facilitates the development of an appreciation of the role of construction within the 
spectrum. In the second instance it contrasts with Sorensen in that, whilst he points to 
the wisdom of a spectrum through the development of three distinct sovereignty 
games, this thesis will employ different ideal types and strategically focus on the 
spectrum that they define as a whole.
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUM
In rising to the challenge of developing a spectrum approach, this thesis -  as noted 
above -  actually draws its primary methodological and ontological inspiration from 
the English School. Boasting a fine pedigree that stretches back to the likes of Martin 
Wight and Herbert Butterfield, the English School is defined at its most basic level by 
a methodological and ontological pluralism.16 This pluralism is manifest in a 
simultaneous commitment to three traditions which might seem, prima facie, to be
• •  17conceptually incompatible: Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism.
The ‘three traditions’ were primarily developed as a framework through which to 
understand political thought. Realism expresses a conservative belief in original sin
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which, in the absence of a global government, means that the international arena is 
characterised by anarchy. From this perspective, the international arena as a whole is 
referred to as the ‘international system’.18 Rationalism, meanwhile, is similarly 
committed to the notion of original sin but, recognising coexisting progressive 
tendencies, contends that it would be wrong to characterise humanity simply by 
reference to human fallenness. In this context, whilst the international arena is still 
defined by conflict, it is also defined by a measure of sociability which finds 
expression through commerce and diplomacy. From this perspective, the international 
arena is referred to as the domain of ‘international society’.19 Finally, revolutionism 
contends that it has the capacity to “abolish sin” and create an international arena 
characterised by peace and harmony on the basis of a global federation of states, a one
90world government/empire or a global, cosmopolitan society of individuals. From 
this perspective, the international arena as a whole is referred to as the domain of
9 1‘world society’.
As an ontological spectrum, the three traditions thus passes from realism, positing a 
closed, state-centric view of the world, to rationalism which transforms the previously 
discreet ontology of the states into something altogether more connected through the 
presence of transnational societal structures. Finally, revolutionism posits a holism in 
which the enduring closure that sustains the divisive state-centric ontology is 
ultimately exchanged for some kind of global connectedness. This self-conscious 
ontological pluralism informs the rationale for the selection of the three traditions 
since it provides the required capacity to consider the sovereign state in the context of 
profound changes, even - as this thesis will demonstrate - the spatio-temporal
• 99revolution that is globalization.
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SECTION 2: THE THREE TRADITIONS AS A SPECTRUM
Having defined the need for a spectrum and having selected the English School three 
traditions spectrum specifically, it is now methodologically important to develop a 
detailed understanding of the way in which the three traditions constitute a spectrum. 
This will be achieved by addressing some key questions pertaining to the relationships 
between the three traditions (I) and by confronting their critics (II).
I) THREE TRADITIONS RELATIONSHIPS
The fact that the English School is characterised by three traditions prompts questions 
and debates about how one should understand their inter-relationship. Specifically, it 
has been suggested that the middle tradition, rationalism, defines a via media which 
might provide grounds for ultimately distancing the English School from realism and 
revolutionism and thus the reality of the spectrum.
Martin Wight certainly lent some weight to the notion that rationalism is the most 
important English School tradition. At the conclusion of his Three Traditions lectures 
he admitted that he was primarily attracted to rationalism and that, in the process of 
refining his thinking in preparation for the lectures, he had found the appeal of realism 
eroded. ‘You will have guessed that my prejudices are Rationalist, but I find I have 
become more Rationalist and less Realist through rethinking this question [the 
question of the relationship between the three traditions] during the course of these 
lectures’.23
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Wight’s stated preference for rationalism has almost certainly been the inspiration for 
other suggestions that the purpose of the three traditions approach is to present a 
rationalist synthesis. Jackson, for instance, asserts: ‘His [Wight’s] triad ...seems to 
operate in a dialectic manner, with realism as thesis, revolutionism as antithesis and 
rationalism seeking some kind of synthesis . . . ,24 Linklater, meanwhile, used the three 
traditions to call into being his own dialectic wherein revolutionism, rather than 
rationalism, was the point of synthesis.
The notion, however, that Wight’s work provides a basis for the assertion that the 
three traditions constitute a dialectic, positing a synthesis through one tradition, does 
not stand up to scrutiny. One can appreciate this fact by carefully re-reading Wight’s 
above admission of his rationalist prejudices. Wight does not say that he has ceased to 
be realist but rather that he has become less realist. Thus Wight clearly was not 
setting up rationalism as a synthesis but merely as what he judged to be the most 
useful of the three traditions. As Hedley Bull observes, ‘it would be wrong to force 
Martin Wight into the Grotian pigeon-hole. It is a truer view of him to regard him as 
standing outside the three traditions, feeling the attraction of each of them, and 
embodying in his own life and thought the tension among them’.26 Richard Little 
submits a similar observation: ‘It is an oversimplification to suggest, therefore, that 
the English School is synonymous with the study of international society. Certainly 
the English School has acknowledged the importance of rationalist ideas but this is 
not to the exclusion of realist and revolutionist ideas. From an English School
perspective, a comprehensive understanding of international relations must embrace
0 1  * all three traditions’. Sheila Grader, meanwhile, contends; ‘To reduce Wight’s
theorizing to a simple dialectic is seriously to misconstrue the nature of his
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contribution to the study of international relations’.28 Thus, for the purposes of 
sustaining the spectrum, the English School crucially does not seek ultimate 
resolution between the three traditions. The whole point is that coming to terms with 
international politics, in all of its diversity, cannot be achieved through a single, 
synthesized, neat and conceptually self-sufficient lens -  hence the importance of the 
spectrum. This point can be clarified by the following two perspectives.
First, the notion that the three tradition’s role must be regarded as a gradually 
changing whole (which is a result of the fact that it services a constantly flowing 
spectrum), rather than as a synthesis, is demonstrated by a number of English School 
metaphors. Wight’s contention that the three traditions are related to each other, not as 
three discrete railway tracks running in parallel, but rather as three streams joined to 
each other by tributaries, makes the point very clearly.29 Bull, meanwhile, eloquently 
expressed the same idea through a light metaphor. Wight ‘saw the three traditions as 
forming a spectrum, within which at some points one pattern of thought merged with 
another, as infra-red becomes ultra-violet’.30 Whichever way one chooses to play it, 
therefore, discussing the three traditions as a dialectic misses the point because it loses 
sight of their capacity to define an ontological and methodological spectrum, 
sustaining an ontological and methodological pluralism rather than a synthesis.
Second, the commitment to seeing the three traditions as a whole is also reflected in 
the injunction to adopt a tentative approach to the divisions between them. As a result 
of his commitment to seeing the three traditions in terms of a constantly flowing 
spectrum, Wight warned against the reification of any of them and even went to great 
lengths to draw attention away from/soften their boundaries by identifying sub­
11
emphases within each tradition.31 If the three traditions constituted three reified 
positions rather than a constantly flowing spectrum, then, whilst recognising the 
reality of changes between traditions, the spectrum itself would provide no 
commentary on those transformations. In approaching the boundaries tentatively, 
however, the sense of the importance of the three traditions as a whole is greater than 
that of the three traditions taken individually. From this uninterrupted perspective, one 
can appreciate that the spectrum accommodates many different spatio-temporal 
combinations from absolute closure to absolute openness, not just those that lie 
classically at the centre of each of the three traditions. In this sense the three traditions 
can be thought of as illuminating the spectrum by providing tentative markers which 
describe the classic characteristics of the different zones of the spectrum.
Thus, according to the English School, one can only sustain conceptual rigour in 
approaching international relations - and therein the sovereign state - through the 
three traditions on the basis of a dynamic assessment that is informed by a certain 
conceptual messiness and tension. In the words of Buzan, it ‘is this explicitly pluralist 
(or multiple rather than competing paradigms) methodological approach that 
underpins the distinctiveness of the English School as an approach to the study of 
IR’. Thus there is no synthesis in one tradition but a spectrum of three tentative, 
heuristic traditions whose boundaries are strategically blurred.
II) THREE TRADITIONS AND THEIR CRITICS
In suggesting that the English School three traditions approach has an important 
contribution to make, it is important to engage with critics who have suggested, 
contrarily, that it has little or nothing to offer. This provides further opportunity, as
12
this section will now demonstrate, to clarify the relationships between the three 
traditions and the role of the three traditions as a whole.
One of the bluntest criticisms of the English School regarding its use of the three 
traditions comes from Roy E. Jones in an article which, although calling for the 
closure of the School, seems to have been more significant for strengthening its 
identity by giving it a name. Political theory, Jones claims, ‘is not simply classifying 
and commenting on the actions and dicta of statesmen and others’. Clearly suggesting 
that classification was the extent of Wight’s achievement, he dismisses the Wightian 
system as an ‘historical dictionary’ and a ‘pedagogical device’.33 As such, Jones 
maintains that Wight’s frame of reference was ‘particularly cold and lifeless’.34
A more recent example comes from David Boucher’s observations regarding the three 
traditions. ‘They see each of their traditions as mutually exclusive and autonomous 
categories, without adequately explaining the relations between them, or between the 
traditions and the thinkers who are said to exemplify them. The traditions are little 
more than classificatory categories into which thinkers are forced irrespective of the
35embarrassing elements which appear to be ill at ease in their putative homes’.
There are two central accusations in these observations. First, that the three traditions 
provide nothing more than a form of classification. Second, that, as such, they are 
lifeless, not very useful and sometimes even counter-productive. These contentions 
can be easily dismissed by referring back to Wight’s warning (noted above) against 
reifying the traditions, illustrated both by his claim that they are not three discrete 
railway tracks, but streams linked by tributaries, and Bull’s suggestion that the three
13
traditions flow into each other as in a spectrum of light.36 It is useful, however, to 
reflect in greater detail on the problems with the characterizations provided by Jones 
and Boucher because this presents the opportunity for developing a fuller 
understanding of the actual relationship between the three traditions and of the 
spectrum which they construct.
Perhaps Wight’s boldest statement against reification of the three traditions, 
contradicting both Jones and Boucher, is found in International Theory. ‘In all 
political and historical studies the purpose of building pigeon holes is to reassure 
oneself that the raw material does not fit into them. Classification becomes valuable, 
in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks down. The greatest political 
writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the 
traditions, and most of these writers transcend their own systems’.37 In this fluid 
context, Porter observes, one can see ‘the Wightian categories not simply as co­
existing, but in a state of dynamic relationship one to another. And from the clash of 
categories, from their mutual criticism, their modification and transmutation,
38important insights can be gained into ...what is going on in the world ...’ As a 
consequence of this process Wight ‘was always experimenting with the new ways of 
assembling ...[his]... material’,39 defining an approach that makes significant 
demands of the theorist.
In order to fully appreciate the tentative character of the three traditions one must 
recognize that they were developed in the context of a wide-ranging critique of 
Enlightenment optimism. They were never supposed to be a scientific device into 
which data could be fed at one end and analysis extracted automatically at the other.
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As Bull observed, ‘Theoretical inquiry into International Relations ...does not lead to 
cumulative knowledge after the manner of natural science. Confronted by a 
controversy, like the great debate which Wight explores among the three traditions, 
we may identify the assumptions that are made in each camp, probe them, juxtapose 
them, relate them to circumstances, but we cannot expect to settle the controversy 
except provisionally, on the basis of assumptions of our own that are themselves open 
to debate’.40
Grader similarly stressed the tentative nature of the three traditions, reflecting 
specifically on their relationship to history. ‘In the case of Wight, to take the form of 
his thinking for his view of the development of the history of ideas, is to substitute for 
experimental and tentative theorizing a dogmatism which he did not possess. Wight 
did not teach his themes historically but analytically’. Wight’s theories were thus 
‘tentative and embryonic’.41
A further account of the fluidity of the spectrum from the perspective of history can 
be drawn from Roger Epp’s observations about how Wight used it to come to terms 
with past events. ‘In keeping with this position [his criticism of modem social 
science’s quest for inexorable laws in/of history], he criticized those who regarded 
history as a storehouse in which to find examples to buttress laws and maxims’. In 
Wight’s mind history presented the scholar with ‘a vast canvas upon which irony, the 
play of chance, human wills and circumstance were interwoven, and which offered 
not off-the-shelf maxims but a sense of the unpredictability, the limits and the 
possibilities of political action’.42 History in Wight’s view, therefore, was anything 
but cold and lifeless.
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To summarise the conclusions of the above sections, before proceeding to Section 3, 
this examination of the three traditions makes it plain that they form a constantly 
flowing spectrum of positions. Demonstrated both through their rejection of the 
notion of a synthesis and also through their tentative, interacting identities, they define 
the framework within which this thesis will examine sovereignty in the context of 
systemic change.
SECTION 3: DEVELOPING THE THREE TRADITIONS
One of the consequences of the three traditions being far from static and lifeless is the 
fact that there is always the possibility, as Porter observed, for revision. ‘We might 
also have further to refine or subdivide the categories. For Wight’s “International 
theory” was never just a response to the problem of ordering thought; it was 
perpetually a challenge’.43 Bearing in mind this potential for change and development, 
this section will now consider how this thesis seeks to develop the spectrum to help it 
rise to the challenges of conceptualizing sovereignty in the context of the systemic 
changes that are of interest to this research.
- THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND ECONOMICS
The specific examples of systemic change that this thesis will examine, regional 
integration and globalization, both involve economic processes to a very great extent. 
This is significant developmentally because the English School’s preferences for 
history, law and philosophy have meant that it has, until very recently, only made 
passing references to economics. As Richard Little observes: ‘Despite acknowledging 
the importance of economics, there has been a reluctance by the English School to
16
embrace this sector wholeheartedly’.44 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, 
maintain: ‘The principal weakness of the English School is its relative disregard of 
economic and technological factors and the various types of international cooperation 
that these factors either induce or necessitate. If the characteristic feature of the 
Grotian conception of international society is continual international intercourse such 
as trade, as Wight held, then it is quite an omission for the English School to largely 
ignore the growth of trade and other economic relations in their account of the 
evolution in of international society’.45 More importantly, in his call for the 
reconvening of the English School, Barry Buzan identified economic/globalization 
challenges as an important gap, requiring future research.46 Indeed, Buzan has since 
started the ball rolling with the provision of the first detailed reflection on 
globalization from the perspective of globalization: From International to World 
Society : English School Theory and the Social Structure o f  Globalisation 41
In considering the impact of economic changes on IR from the English School 
perspective, this thesis will seek to address the general failure of English School 
theorists to seriously engage with this increasingly important dimension of IR. This 
will identify - in a way that differs from Buzan - the very significant latent conceptual 
potential of the three traditions for the purpose of coming to terms with economic 
changes, especially globalization. In so doing it will provide a fuller appreciation of 
the significance of the revolutionist tradition. Although Wight employed the three 
traditions, there is a sense in which his reflections on revolutionism, whilst carrying 
an ontological implication, were largely confined to the realm of ideas in that most 
forms of revolutionism remained merely aspirational. Neither Jacobinism, Calvinism, 
Lutheranism, nor Communism got anywhere near to taking over the world
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ideationally, let alone govemmentally. Having said this, however, the ideas of 
Cobden, which also informed Wight’s model of revolutionism, have been - especially 
in the context of globalization - much more successful. From Wight’s perspective, 
therefore, the point must be made that the development of revolutionist ontology has 
greatly accelerated since the time when he developed the three traditions approach 
and indeed even since his death. This makes the three traditions approach far more 
relevant today - as this thesis will critically demonstrate - than was ever the case at the 
time of its initial formulation.49
- THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND THEOLOGY
Another key feature of the era of globalization has been the renaissance of religion50 
which plays rather more obviously to the strengths of the English School, given the 
fact that the likes of Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield and Donald Mackinnon were 
very interested in international relations and theology.51 Indeed, under their influence, 
theological sources made not insignificant contributions to the definition of the three 
traditions.52 It is the contention of this thesis that such sources are actually also useful 
for renewing the traditions today, helping them come to terms with state sovereignty 
in the context of contemporary systemic change. Identification of this latent 
potentiality is significant not just because of the renewed interest in the English 
School frame of reference but also because IR generally is currently experiencing a 
renaissance of interest in theology.53 Demonstrating the significance of the English 
School theological grid at the very time when scholars are talking about the return of 
theology to IR after a ‘three hundred year exile’ makes the contribution of this thesis 
that much more relevant.54
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CONCLUSION
Thus, in summary, this thesis seeks to consider the fate of sovereignty - both its 
endurance and transformation - in the context of contemporary systemic changes, 
European integration and globalization, whose conceptual challenge is such that they 
call for the use of a spectrum. In responding to this need, this thesis selects the 
English School three traditions spectrum, demonstrating its great, and largely 
untapped, capacity to deal with state sovereignty in the context of regional economic 
integration and the pressures of globalization. This is significant first because coming 
to terms with these changes, and the conceptualization of sovereignty therein, is a key 
challenge for any contemporary assessment of international relations. It is also 
significant because the English School is currently experiencing something of a 
renaissance and a fresh demonstration of its capacity to rise to such a challenge 
further justifies the basis for this renaissance.55 Having defined the methodology of 
this thesis, this introduction will now outline its central line of argument.
PART 2: THESIS STRUCTURE:
The argument of this thesis is divided into three main sections, each of which 
examines sovereignty in the context of systemic change (regional 
integration/globalization) from the perspective of one of the three traditions. In 
determining exactly how to approach the three traditions it is important to appreciate 
that Wight made it plain that there was no set format for doing so. On some occasions 
he began in the middle with the rationalist tradition and then went out to the realist 
and rationalist traditions,56 whilst on other occasions he went across the spectrum 
from realism to rationalism to revolutionism57 and at other times from revolutionism
CO
to rationalism to realism. The particular approach adopted by this thesis begins by
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focusing on the two polar traditions, realism (chapters 3 and 4) and revolutionism 
(chapters 5 and 6) and then turns to rationalism.59
The initial focus on the polar traditions adopted by the selected approach is helpful 
when working in the context of globalization - which, as noted earlier, has given the 
breadth of the ontological spectrum new relevance - because it emphasizes the actual 
ontological parameters within which our study must be located and the challenge 
presented by those parameters for the definition of sovereignty. Having clarified the 
polar traditions, the thesis then moves on to consider the middle ground set out by the 
rationalist tradition (chapters 7, (8) and 9). This thesis considers to what extent, if any, 
rationalism, as the linking tradition, might provide the basis for a conceptualization of 
sovereignty that can come to terms with something of this challenge, not only holding 
the spectrum together but also providing a privileged perspective on it. Consideration 
of rationalism provides the opportunity for this thesis - benefiting from reflection on 
some theological sources - to develop a model of what it describes as ‘open 
sovereignty’. Engaging with systemic change, this will provide for a model of 
sovereignty that effectively engages with both continuity and change.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY
Before embarking upon assessment of the two polar traditions, defining either end of 
the English School three traditions spectrum and then rationalism, it is first important 
to seek to gain a better understanding of the conceptual services of the three traditions 
spectrum ontologically and epistemologically, highlighting their capability to engage 
with change. Given that the most demanding form of systemic change in view will be 
globalization and that it is in relation to this challenge that the thesis argues that the
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three traditions spectrum has a special contribution to make, the chapter will 
commence with this particular challenge. This will demonstrate that the three 
traditions can provide a framework for confronting not only an ontological but also an 
epistemological spectrum. Thus it is possible, the chapter will contend, to draw 
conclusions about ontology both directly by assessing the ontology in question and 
also indirectly through the epistemological commitments of the operative 
methodology. More importantly, though, this relationship between epistemology and 
ontology puts one in a strong position to translate ontological change conceptually 
through the lens of epistemology. Demonstration of the importance of this approach, 
however, will also provide the opportunity for highlighting its limitations and lead 
into the presentation of an alternative and rather more conventional interpretation of 
the spectrum which the thesis will apply to European integration. Either way, as an 
ontological and methodological spectrum, the three traditions provide a framework 
that can cater for the dynamic conceptualization and reconceptualization of 
sovereignty over time as it engages with the processes of ontological change that are 
definitive of systemic change.
OPERATIONAL QUALIFICATION: CHAPTERS 3-6
Having defined the ontological and methodological services of the spectrum in greater 
detail, the thesis then moves to the actual definition of the spectrum by reference to its 
traditions. In considering the two polar traditions it is imperative to remember that 
their perspective, although valid, is only partial. As such it is not their purpose 
individually to provide a rounded and qualified appreciation of sovereignty in the 
context of systemic change. Moving away from the English School, specifically, 
while remaining within the tradition of polar analysis, it is vital to remember Keohane
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and Nye at this point; ‘We do not argue ...that complex interdependence faithfully 
reflects world political reality’. 60 Thus in reading chapters 3 and 4 one will find that 
they are open to criticism for their lack of engagement with the reality of the global 
flows that characterise globalization. Symmetrically, chapters 5 to 6 are open to the 
criticism that their single-minded endeavour to make the case for post-sovereignty has 
caused them to forget something of the enduring territorial ‘givenness’ of the 
sovereign state seen in chapters 3-4. This is intentional, for Wight did not provide his 
basic definition of realism whilst seeking to account for the arguments upholding 
rationalism and revolutionism or vice versa. Each was first defined separately and 
only later were they brought into ‘conversation’ with one another. Thus the realist 
tradition is a lens that must be used alongside the rationalist and revolutionist 
traditions, just as Keohane and Nye argue that ‘complex interdependence’ is a lens 
that must be used alongside ‘realism’. Rather than courageously seeking to collapse 
the bases for realism and revolutionism into an enlightened synthesis, the thesis 
argues that - in line with the approach of the English School and Keohane and Nye - it 
is actually more helpful to view the world from a position of conceptual tension, 
deploying different lenses simultaneously.
REALISM & THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE (CHAPTERS 3-4)
This thesis commences its exposition and definition of the spectrum by examining the 
definition of sovereignty through the realist tradition in chapter 3. In providing this 
definition, the chapter examines the key roles played by territory, the realist group 
imperative, constitutional independence and spatial commitments in the definition of 
an ontologically closed account of sovereignty. The chapter then subjects this 
definition to criticism, however, in an attempt to develop a renewed English School
22
realist account of sovereignty that can engage with systemic change.61 Chapter 4 then 
moves on to apply this model of sovereignty to change in the form of the changing 
boundaries of economic nationality,62 manifest in the context of European integration. 
After deploying a confederal model, drawing on Murray Forsyth’s Unions o f States 
and Carl Schmitt’s theory of the Bund,63 the chapter suggests that, in the context of 
European integration at least, the sovereignty sustained by some forms of realism 
exhibits some ability to adapt by extending its boundaries on a supranational basis.64
REVOLUTIONISM AND POST-SOVEREIGNTY (CHAPTERS 5-6)
Chapter 5 then defines the revolutionist tradition and its contemporary application, 
contending that the most powerful manifestation of revolutionism today is found in 
the phenomenon of globalization. In developing this argument, the chapter refers to 
the two agents of revolutionism identified by Wight, ‘the commercial spirit’ and ‘the 
spirit of enlightenment’.65 The former is unpacked in terms of economic globalization, 
whilst the latter relates to a growing willingness on the part of states to intervene in 
the affairs of other states particularly in the name of global humanitarian values. 
Given that it has often been observed that, although the English School makes passing 
reference to economic factors, it fails to fully engage with them66 and given - as 
chapter 5 will demonstrate - that economic globalization provides a stronger 
foundation from which to point to the erosion of state sovereignty than does 
intervention (which in any event has enjoyed significant English School attention ), 
this chapter will focus the greater part of its energies on examining the role of the 
‘spirit of commerce’. Specifically, it will argue that the transnational economic 
flows68 which are central to contemporary globalization have given rise to a time- 
space compression which erodes the reality of sovereignty on a very fundamental,
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ontological level. The chapter will conclude that economic globalization, buttressed 
by the impact of the new interventionism, is calling into being a new global connexity 
that is undermining the boundaried closure upon which sovereignty depends, creating 
the need for new post-sovereign categories.
Having considered how economic globalization and increasing intervention contribute 
to contemporary revolutionism in chapter 5, chapter 6 then moves on to examine how 
this has been further authenticated through the development of global governance in 
response to these challenges and reflects on the implications of this revolutionism for 
the actual conceptualization of sovereignty/post-sovereignty. In rising to this 
challenge, the chapter trades particularly on the relationship - mentioned above in the 
account of chapter 2 - between ontology and epistemology, examining the 
development of revolutionist post-sovereignty first from an ontological and then from 
an epistemological perspective. The former approach focuses on the deconstruction of 
sovereignty and the development of networked governance,69 before the latter turns to 
consider how to accommodate global flows and governance conceptually by 
developing revolutionist conceptualizations of post sovereignty. It demonstrates that 
contemporary revolutionism defines the location of an increasing number of scholars
• • 70who are suggesting that sovereignty is not really compatible with globalization.
RATIONALISM AND OPEN SOVEREIGNTY (CHAPTERS 7 - 9)
Having defined and examined the two polar traditions of the three traditions spectrum, 
the thesis then turns to the middle tradition, rationalism. Chapter 7 considers the 
capacity of rationalism to engage with systemic change first in the context of regional 
integration and then globalization. In the case of the former the chapter argues that,
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providing a significantly (partial) ontologically open model of sovereignty, 
rationalism has the best credentials of any of the three traditions (including wider 
realism, see chapter 4) for the purpose of providing an account of sovereignty coming 
to terms with regional integration understood as a form of ‘change by extension’. In 
the case of the latter, meanwhile, the chapter contends that rationalism again provides 
the most useful account of sovereignty in the context of globalization and the 
demands of ‘change by erosion’, balancing recognition of the partial unbundling of 
sovereignty with the reality of its endurance.
Inspired by rationalism chapters 8 and 9 then embark upon the task of providing a 
sharper definition of ‘open sovereignty’ drawing on what, in the context of 
globalization, is the increasingly relevant theological perspective within the English 
School. In the same way that, through the influence of Wight and Butterfield, 
theology contributed to the original definitions of the three traditions, so too can it 
contribute to the renewal of these traditions, especially rationalism, as English School 
scholars consider the challenges of twenty-first century systemic changes.
Chapter 8 begins by examining what has to date been the English School’s primary 
source of theological reflection on state sovereignty, Christian Realism.71 The thesis 
will contend that this makes moves in the right direction, accommodating a measure 
of openness that presents an improvement on neorealist accounts of sovereignty. At 
the same time, however, it will make it plain that this accommodation is limited and 
does not really rise to the full extent of the ‘open sovereignty’ challenge defined by 
chapter 7.
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Chapter 9 contends that there are other theological sources that are more helpful for 
the purpose of rising to the challenge of open sovereignty that seem to have been 
eclipsed by the enthusiasm of Wight and Butterfield for the venerated Saint 
Augustine. Specifically, it points to the Protestant theology that defined Welsh proto­
nationalism72, the aspirant polity of which provides an engaging correlate to open 
sovereignty. In turning to this theological source, however, it is important to be clear 
that it is not the purpose of this chapter to suggest that it necessarily has a unique 
contribution to make to IR. To be sure, there may be other national traditions with 
similar commitments, but the interrogation of these would demand many more 
theses.73 The purpose of referring to theologically disclosed Welsh proto-nationalism 
is to deploy a cultural/literary lens that further clarifies the model of ‘open 
sovereignty’ and does so in a way that taps into, and critically builds on, the new 
interest in theology and IR - which is partially informing the new interest in the 
English School74 - which has always been distinctive because of its interest in 
theology.75
CONCLUSION
Finally, chapter 10 draws together the implications of using open sovereignty in the 
context of the spectrum serviced by the three traditions. First, it reflects on the fact 
that as an ontological spectrum, the three traditions posit an excellent framework 
through which to come to terms with IR in the context of systemic changes like 
globalization, making it more relevant today than at the time of its development. 
Second, in assessing sovereignty through this framework, it presents the concept of 
‘open sovereignty’ which, particularly inspired by rationalism, can engage with two 
kinds of change resulting from the transformations in view in the form of ‘change by
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extension’, associated with regional integration, and ‘change by erosion’, associated 
with ‘globalization’. Third, it demonstrates how the conceptualization of ‘open 
sovereignty’ within the rationalist tradition can benefit from further development by 
drawing on the repository of theological thought that has always been associated with 
the English School and which is of special relevance today, not just because of the 
renewed interest in the English School, but also because of the more general renewal 
of interest in the role of religion and theology in IR. The result is an approach that 
neither obscures change by hanging on to a dated understanding of sovereignty nor 
one that, in its enthusiasm to engage with the reality of change, jettisons, or virtually 
jettisons, the concept of state sovereignty. It proposes instead a model of sovereignty 
that can accommodate continuity and change.
In defending the model of open sovereignty in the context of systemic change this 
thesis provides a critique of those scholars, such as Negri, Hardt, Walker, Camilleri, 
Falk (J), Falk (R), Guehenno, Ohmae, and Bauman, who seek either to jettison 
sovereignty or to relegate it to practical insignificance.76 Their radical unbundling 
strategy, the thesis argues, provokes a distorted view of the international arena. 
Sovereignty must be retained as a concept/category if we are to gain a proper 
perspective of the international arena. In recognising the impact of global flows, 
however, this thesis critiques those who defend sovereignty without properly 
recognising the ontological implications of those flows which make the challenges 
posed by globalization conceptually different from those pertaining to earlier 
definitions of interdependence. This will include those committed to defining 
sovereignty as a closed, category such as James, Laughland, Waltz and 
Meirsheimer.77 The chapter will highlight the failure of these writers to appreciate the
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ontological significance of globalizing power flows with their associated 
ontological/constitutional diminishment of sovereignty, demonstrating that this 
appreciation requires a more nuanced ‘power -  law’ distinction than they recognize.
In closing it is interesting to note that in his controversial plea for the closure of the 
English School, Roy Jones suggested that part of the reason for its failure to engage 
with economics was the result of the incompatibility of global economic flows with a 
commitment to the concept of sovereignty. Sheila Grader responded to this with 
skepticism. ‘But surely it is possible to recognize the important influence of outside 
factors, particularly economic ones, without abandoning the concept of “sovereign 
state”. If the concept of sovereignty is indeed outdated and too entrenched to 
comprehend the present state of economic reality, then there is an anomaly to be 
explained -  but mere rejection or substitution is not explanation. More case studies 
are needed to show in what way the idea of sovereignty will no longer do, even as a
no
working hypothesis’. This thesis responds to this challenge from the other 
perspective of seeking to demonstrate precisely how sovereignty, properly handled, is 
indeed compatible with global economic flows, even whilst these flows will, on 
certain occasions, result in its partial erosion.
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CHAPTER 2
ONTOLOGY,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
Having introduced the concept of the three traditions spectrum in chapter 1, 
demonstrating its relevance to the challenge of engaging with the dynamic 
environment of systemic change, it is the purpose of this chapter to consider in detail 
precisely how one should use the conceptual services of the spectrum when seeking to 
come to terms with the sovereign state in the context of contemporary systemic 
changes. Specifically it will engage with the two forms of systemic change identified 
by the previous chapter: accounts of European integration which for the purposes of 
this research affect sovereignty with what the introduction defined as ‘change by 
extension’ and accounts of globalization (and indeed some of European integration) 
which affect sovereignty with what the introduction termed, ‘change by erosion’. 
Although committed to examining both the above changes, given that: a) the most 
radical form of change under consideration is globalization, b) regional integration 
takes place in any event in the wider context of globalization and can be understood in 
terms of it and c) it is in relationship to globalization that there is the greatest need 
and opportunity for the latent conceptual potentialities of the three traditions with 
respect to change to be spelled out, this chapter will define its baseline interpretation 
of the three traditions’ capability to engage with systemic transformation in terms of 
the more extreme demands of globalization. Whilst examination of international
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relations from the perspective of this interpretation of the spectrum will register both 
‘change by erosion’ and ‘change by extension’, however, demonstration of some 
limitations of this approach and the desire to obtain a better perspective on ‘change by 
extension’ will prompt consideration of the deployment of an alternative 
interpretation of the three traditions spectrum later in the chapter which will provide a 
complementary, sideways perspective on the subject matter. Having developed a clear 
appreciation of the services of the three traditions spectrum, both in terms of the 
baseline interpretation and the alternative complementary view, it will then be 
possible for subsequent chapters to embark upon their reconsideration of sovereignty 
in the context of systemic change from the perspective of these traditions.
CHAPTER STRUCTURE
Part 1 will consider the relationship between ontology and space and time and 
ontology and epistemology and the implications of these relationships for the three 
traditions spectrum. This will provide a clear appreciation of the conceptual potential 
of the three traditions spectrum as a means of engaging with sovereignty primarily in 
the context of ‘change by erosion’. Part 2 will then consider the weaknesses 
associated with viewing the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum and 
suggest ways of addressing these concerns through developing the complementary, 
alternative approach to the spectrum - noted above - which will be particularly useful 
for the purposes of coming to terms with ‘change by extension’.
PART 1: ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND SPACE & TIME
Part 1 is divided into two main sections: Section 1 will define the relationship 
between differing ontological profiles (fixed and fluid) and space and time through
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consideration of the ontological impact of globalization, applying this perspective to 
the definition of the three traditions. Section 2 will then examine the means for 
translating this systemic change and its ontological implication into a conceptual 
frame through reference to epistemology, applying it to the three traditions spectrum. 
(Adopting this line of analysis will have the benefit of further clarifying the 
relationship between the differing ontological profiles and space and time).
SECTION 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONTOLOGY, SPACE AND 
TIME AND THE THREE TRADITIONS
In turning to consider the relationship between ontology, space and time and the 
challenge of relating this to the three traditions spectrum, this chapter will adopt two 
approaches. The chapter will first consider the relationship between space and time, 
ontology and the definition of the three traditions from a narrowly IR perspective 
focusing on the challenge of globalization (Sub-Section I), before it then seeks to 
confirm its findings by very briefly reflecting on the relationship between space, time 
and ontology as set out in general terms by evolving philosophies of science (Sub- 
Section II).
SUB-SECTION I: THE IR PERSPECTIVE
Whilst the notion that globalization should be defined as a revolution in space and 
time has not emerged from within IR but from other disciplines in the form of the 
work of Harvey,1 Jameson2 and Virilio,3 to name but a few, International Relations 
theorists have not been slow to buy into this definition, as seen in the work of e.g. 
Walker,4 Der Derian,5 and Ruggie.6 In simple terms, the revolution in space and time 
involves the rise of what is best described as a new ‘temporality’. Specifically this is
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manifested through the transnational flows that typify globalization, e.g. flows of 
money, information, services etc, the movement of which has the effect of eroding 
boundaries such as those of the sovereign state. Characterised by movement, and 
even speed, rather than stasis, theorists seek to explain these phenomena in terms of 
their temporal rather than spatial extension.
Walker for instance engages with the new temporality by noting that it was always 
said that modernity was ‘a process of historical acceleration, ...o f all things solid 
melting into air’. Moreover he continued, 4Many have argued that such processes o f
n #
activist development imply the eventual erasure o f old spatial demarcations'. (Italics 
added). Later he defines in greater detail the relationship between ontological stability 
and the hegemony of closed spatial categories, on the one hand, and ontological flux, 
i.e. boundary erosion and a rising temporality, on the other. ‘The clean lines of state 
sovereignty, it will be said, are less impressive than the startling velocity of 
contemporary accelerations. Temporality, so much recent analysis seems to suggest, 
can no longer be contained within spatial coordinates. Given the history of thinking 
about concepts of space and time since Isaac Newton stopped underwriting the 
guarantees for modernity, this should not be surprising. But given the extent to which 
modem political thought has depended on the claim that temporality can indeed be 
tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign states, it is undoubtedly quite
Q
perplexing, even threatening’. In this context there is a real sense in which flows are 
more appropriately characterised by time than by space, ‘by processes of temporal 
acceleration than by spatial extensions . . . ,9
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James Der Derian concurs. ‘New technologies are elusive because they are more real 
in time than in space, their power is evidenced through the exchange of signs not 
goods, and their effects are transparent and pervasive rather than material and 
discrete. They do not fit and therefore elude the traditional and the reformed 
delimitations of the international relations field’.10 To underline the challenge of the 
new temporality, Der Derain went on to quote Paul Virilio: “Space is no longer in 
geography -  it’s in electronics. Unity is in the terminals. It’s in the instantaneous time 
of command posts, multinational headquarters, control towers, etc ...There is a 
movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of territory becomes the 
distribution of time”.11 In this context Der Derian claims that any attempt to come to 
terms with the new environment must ‘elevate chronology over geography, pace over 
space, in their political effects’.12
Finally, for the purposes of this chapter, the challenge of the new temporality is also 
recognized by John Gerard Ruggie who identifies its relationship with fundamental 
(see his reference to ‘stage’ in the quotation below), i.e. ontological, change. ‘This 
[post-1989] world exists on a more extended temporal plane, and its remaking 
involves a shift not in power politics but of the stage on which that play is
1 'Iperformed’.
SPECTRUM ANALYSIS
Thus, in light of the above, it is clear that the spatio-temporal revolution of 
globalization, which calls into question existing identities, is manifest through a 
phenomenon referred to variously as ‘temporality’,14 ‘temporal accelerations’,15 or an 
‘extended temporal plane’.16 From the perspective of defining the spatio-temporal
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profile of the spectrum, therefore, this suggests an association between globalization 
and a new temporal orientation that this thesis - drawing on the above expressions - 
refers to as the ‘new temporality’. On this basis, given the above ontological 
description of the three traditions, there would seem to be a correlation between 
revolutionism, which champions the erosion of the boundaried sovereign state 
ontology, and a temporal orientation. In deference to this logic one can also infer a 
symmetrical relationship between realism, representing enduring boundaries, and a 
spatial orientation. Indeed, as Walker observes - commenting on the time before 
globalization - ‘modem political thought has depended on the claim that temporality
• 17can indeed be tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign states ...’. In 
this sense, then, it would seem that the impact of globalization is to transpose given, 
fixed ontologies from the domain of the realist tradition, characterised by a spatial 
orientation, where they are apparently stable, to the domain of the revolutionist 
tradition, characterised by a temporal orientation, where they become fluid.
SUB-SECTION II: BEYOND IR
The above observations regarding the relationship between space and time and 
ontology are useful. In an effort to gain more evidence for, and greater clarity about 
them, however, it is helpful at this point to step back from the confines of IR theory to 
reflect on some of the more fundamental philosophical and scientific developments 
that inform the conceptualization of space and time and upon which IR theory 
implicitly depends. Specifically, it is helpful to turn to figures like Newton, Aquinas 
and Einstein, to note something of their contributions to fundamental debates about 
space and time because this helps to further clarify the bases for the associations 
between the spatial orientation and stasis, and the temporal orientation and change
43
which were identified above. The chapter now briefly turns to these discussions, 
therefore, not to make a contribution to fundamental debates about space and time, 
but rather to further elucidate the spatio-temporal profile of the spectrum wherein the 
fate of the sovereign state is to be considered.
PRE-MODERN AND MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF SPACE
The chapter will first briefly examine pre-modem conceptions of space through 
Aquinas and Boethius, and then modem conceptions of space through Newton, to 
confirm the spatio-temporal commitments of ontological stability cited above:
The medieval system, John Polkinghome contends, detached God from the experience
of time such that, in Aquinas’ view, ‘God does not foreknow the future, he simply 
1 &knows if . Since God stands outside of time, all of history can be seen by him in a 
single sweep. A vivid expression of this approach is found in the writings of Boethius 
who stated that God had ‘the complete and perfect possession at once of an endless 
life’. Reflecting upon this statement Polkinghome maintained that ‘[i]n talk of this 
kind time is being assimilated into space, so that the complete history of the universe 
is thought of as laid out on a four-dimensional space time “map” for instant pemsal by 
God’.19 The key phrase here is ‘time is assimilated into space’. It communicates the 
idea of space becoming absolute and thus time, and the related potential for real 
change, being erased. ‘Time does not elapse; the world line is not traversed. It is 
simply there. Space time diagrams are great chunks of frozen history’.
Moving to the seventeenth century one can see that the early modem system had 
similar consequences. Newton contended that beneath the relative space and time of
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our inherently limited experience was a really existing, absolute space and time. To
obtain real time within this framework one must go to this underlying layer of
absolute time. The absolute character of this time, however, Gunton contends,
actually testifies to a loss of its truly temporal nature. Thus, in actuality, one must
conclude that, in Newton’s view: ‘Because absolute time is not temporal, time does
not belong to the inner essence of things’. This results in a view of time’s relationship
to space that is actually very similar to that of Aquinas and Boethius. ‘[F]or
91Newtonian science time is spatialised, in the sense that it is considered reversible’. 
Whenever time becomes absolute it loses its finiteness, and thus its temporal character 
is ‘spatialised’ and dies. Time is thus again assimilated into space.
SPECTRUM IMPLICATIONS
Consideration of the relationship between IR theory and space and time, in the first 
part of Section 1, suggested a relationship between the spatial orientation and stasis. 
The two conceptualizations of space and time considered above, apart from IR theory 
(the medieval views of Boethius and Aquinas and the early modem Newtonian 
perspective), reiterate the notion that ontological closure is secured by a spatial 
orientation and the denial of time. In defining the three traditions as an ontological 
spectrum, therefore, this again suggests that the realist tradition, representing the 
enduring stability of the sovereign state ontology, should be related to the spatial 
orientation.
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POSTMODERN HYPERSPATIALISATIONS
The chapter will now briefly examine the revolution in conceptions of space and time 
associated with the new physics to confirm the spatio-temporal commitments of 
ontological flux cited above.
Whilst some eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers sought to rebel against the 
closure implied by the Newtonian position, it was not until Einstein’s breakthroughs 
in the early twentieth century that the notion of absolute space was superseded. In the 
same way that modem conceptions of space were informed by scientific 
breakthroughs in the seventeenth century, those of postmodemity have been similarly 
influenced by scientific breakthroughs which occurred in the early twentieth century. 
The revelation that behaviour within the most fundamental component of reality, the 
atom, was radically indeterminate constituted a major threat to the conventional 
mechanical, determinist view of the world. This open image was soon strengthened 
by developments in quantum mechanics which posited an indeterminate wave-particle 
duality. Furthermore, the advent of dynamical systems theory (chaos theory) 
reinforced this new and radically indeterminate view of the nature of reality. This 
suggested - in total contradiction of the perspectives of scientists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries - that the world did not reside upon/in an absolute space, 
generating a closed, determinist order in which the apparent reality of time, sustaining 
openness (as opposed to spatialised Newtonian time), was an illusion. Instead it 
posited a radical temporality according to which every ontology, no matter how solid 
it may appear, was actually a construction. The foundational openness sustained by 
the temporality of the new era was/is such that there could/can be a number of
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potential spatial ontologies at any one time, hence the reason why some scholars have
00come to refer to such ontologies as hyperspatial.
SPECTRUM IMPLICATIONS
Consideration of the relationship between IR theory and space and time in Sub- 
Section 1, suggested a relationship between the temporal orientation and change. 
Specifically, the conceptualizations of space and time considered above, apart from 
IR theory, reiterate the notion that ontological openness is secured by a temporal 
orientation/new temporality and the denial of closed, modem space. In approaching 
the three traditions as an ontological spectrum, therefore, this again suggests that the 
revolutionist tradition, representing change and a fluid global connexity that is 
deconstructive of ‘given’ ontologies such as the sovereign state, should be related to 
the temporal orientation.
SECTION 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY,
ONTOLOGY AND THE THREE TRADITIONS
Having clarified the relationship between the spatial orientation and closure/stability 
and the relationship between the temporal orientation and openness/change and 
unpacked their implications for sovereignty in terms of the poles of the three 
traditions spectrum, it is now possible to consider how this ontological frame can be 
viewed epistemologically, providing further clarity about the conceptualization of 
sovereignty within the three traditions spectrum. Turning to epistemological reflection 
also has the benefit of providing yet further clarification - as the chapter will 
demonstrate - regarding the relationship between spatio-temporal commitments and 
ontological stability/change defined in Section 1.
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Recent years have witnessed the third (some say fourth) great debate of modem 
international relations theory (the first such debate having been between realism and 
idealism and the second between traditional and ‘scientific’ approaches) which has
* • 23been an epistemological debate taking place between rationalists and reflectivists. It 
has resulted in IR theory becoming both very much more epistemologically self- 
conscious and also in its embracing a far greater diversity of epistemological 
positions. Some scholars have sought to account for these developments in English 
School terms by demonstrating how the three traditions spectrum accommodates an 
epistemological spectrum. Andrew Linklater contends that the three traditions are 
definitive of an epistemological spectmm extending from positivism - the 
epistemology servicing realism - on the right hand side, to interpretivism - the 
epistemology associated with rationalism - in the middle, to critical theory - the 
epistemology associated with revolutionism - on the left hand side.24 This view is also 
endorsed by Richard Little. ‘A comprehensive assessment of the work of the English 
school’, Little maintains, ‘makes it clear that they rely on interpretivist, positivist and 
critical assumptions’.25 In order to be sure that the spectrum can deal with the full 
array of epistemological positions, moreover, Ian Manners has endorsed the above 
approach and suggested the provision of a fourth tradition called ‘Relativism’ (whose 
figurehead he suggests should be Nietzsche) to accommodate a more extreme,
• Of*postmodernist expression of post-positivism than critical theory.
In considering the epistemological services of the spectrum one must engage with the 
challenge that, as Little observes, the epistemological services of the spectrum remain 
very implicit. ‘But although members of the English school have been relatively
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explicit about their pluralistic orientation, they have certainly not discussed it in any 
detail or examined all of the consequences of following such a route. By attempting to 
map out the implications of adopting a pluralistic approach to international relations, 
it becomes apparent that there are substantial lacunae in the extant work of the 
English school’.27 In unpacking those lacunae epistemologically, in relationship to the 
challenge of globalization, the chapter seeks to contribute to the quest of making the 
implicit, and not obviously relevant, explicit and very obviously relevant. This will 
demonstrate how English School theory can introduce the new temporality to 
conceptualization of state sovereignty through appropriate epistemological 
adjustment.29
UNPACKING THE EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE THREE TRADITIONS
In the context of the rationalist -  reflectivist debate, the previously little used word 
‘ontology’ has become very important in IR theory. The exact nature of the 
relationship between epistemology and ontology is highly contested and it is in no 
sense the purpose of this thesis to seek to make any contribution to this particularly
• • • ID •contentious theoretical discussion. Having said this, however, whilst the precise 
nature of the relationship between epistemology and ontology is the subject of much 
debate, some general points can be made without controversy.
Whilst ontology and epistemology are not exactly two sides of the same coin, they are 
interrelated. In ‘Positivism and Beyond’, Steve Smith makes this point 
unambiguously. ‘As to the separation of epistemology, methodology and ontology the 
three are indeed fundamentally interrelated’.31 In a quest to identify the central 
characteristics of this interrelationship the chapter will now consider the ontology
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associated with a) positivism, b) strong post-positivism (critical 
theory/postmodernism) and c) mild post-positivism (the interpretivist/hermeneutic 
approach). It is by appreciating the relationship between particular epistemologies and 
ontologies in this way that one can begin to see how to express ontological changes 
conceptually through appropriate epistemological adjustments:
a) POSITIVISM
Positivism (embracing neorealism within the Linklater -  Little framework), exists 
alongside a certain ontological stability (or, if you prefer, closure) commensurate with 
that of modem natural science. Secured by the fact that there is a division between the 
subject and object, the knower and the known, this ontological stability enables 
positivism to focus on the impact of forces on the ontology in question rather than 
change within that ontology. It is this that makes positivism ill-equipped to deal with 
the fundamental developments (systemic changes) that are not about the implications 
of the movement of forces between the actors of a particular ontology but rather 
changes within that ontology itself.
This approach, and its historical dominance in IR, is reflected on by Smith. ‘[I]n 
international relations positivism has tended to involve a commitment to a natural 
science methodology, fashioned on an early twentieth century view of physics before 
the epistemologically revolutionary development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, 
which fundamentally altered the prevailing view of the physical world as one that 
could be accurately observed. Accordingly, positivism in international relations, as in 
all the social sciences, has essentially been a methodological commitment, tied to an 
empiricist epistemology: together these result in a very restricted range of permissible
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ontological claims’.32 Referring to this reluctance to engage with change, Cox 
observes that, from the perspective of positivism, the ‘state of the social whole can be
- IT
taken as given ... ’ (Italics added)
To the extent that the ontology associated with pre-quantum physics is often identified 
with Newtonian mechanics, it is not uncommon to hear theorists, usually post­
positivist critics (of varying degrees, see below), referring to ‘Newtonian’ ontological 
assumptions in IR (Euclid and Descartes are also regularly invoked) in order to berate 
their impact on the capacity of theory to engage with systemic i.e. ontological, 
change.
Ruggie makes the point in the following terms. ‘As for the dominant positivist posture 
in our field, it is reposed in deep Newtonian slumber wherein method rules, 
epistemology is often confused with method, and the term “ontology” typically draws 
either blank stares or bemused smiles’ (italics added). There is a real need, he argues, 
to move beyond implicitly Newtonian assumptions if IR is to come to terms with the 
changes of the post-1989 world.34
Similarly, R. B. J. Walker critically draws attention to the ontological closure 
introduced by positivist Newtonian assumptions and emphasises their 
inappropriateness, highlighting the fact that other disciplines have moved on from the 
seventeenth century. As noted earlier, but now in the light of his post-positivist 
epistemological commitment, Walker observes: ‘Temporality, so much recent 
analysis seems to suggest, can no longer be contained within spatial coordinates. 
Given the history of thinking about concepts of space and time since Isaac Newton
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stopped underwriting the guarantees for modernity, this should not be surprising. But 
given the extent to which modem political thought has depended on the claim that 
temporality can indeed be tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign 
states, it is undoubtedly quite perplexing, even threatening’ (italics added).
Walker also refers to the ‘Cartesian coordinates’ in positivist international relations 
theory to describe the same ontological closure that he attributes to the sovereign 
state. We ‘find it exceptionally difficult’, he maintains, ‘to renounce the security of 
Cartesian co-ordinates, not least because they still provide our most powerful sense 
of what it means to look over the horizon’ (italics added). In the same vein he also 
refers to Euclid. ‘[B]ut we are no longer so easily fooled by the objectivity of the 
ruler, by Euclidean theorems and Cartesian co-ordinates that have allowed us to 
situate and naturalise a comfortable home for power and authority’ (italics added).
Finally, for our purposes, it is worth noting that Camilleri and Falk also invoke 
Newtonian and Euclidean (and Galilean) references to describe the ontological 
assumptions of much of positivist IR theory and its approach to the sovereign state. 
‘The Hobbesian view of the state, which still colours the modem understanding of 
sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial consciousness implicit in Euclidean 
geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian physics’ (italics added).
ANALYSIS
In light of the above one can be clear that positivist epistemology is useful on two 
counts. First, it enables one to see again, this time through an epistemic lens, the 
relationship between a spatial orientation (seen for example in Newtonian ontology)
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and a denial of change. Specifically, it demonstrates that ontologically closed 
categories are serviced epistemologically in ways that deny change. Positivism 
assumes an absolute subject/object duality, i.e. it provides no room for the object to be 
changed by the subject. The object, the known, stands as a reified given and there is 
nothing that the knower can do through his/her knowing that will result in the 
transformation of the known. Second, by observing the relationship between the 
spatial orientation and the denial of change through an epistemological lens this 
section demonstrates positivism’s potential to be used to conceptualize ontological 
continuity. In terms of using an epistemic lens to facilitate the translation of the 
conceptual demands of ontology, positivism’s capacity to service stability clearly 
associates it with realism. From the perspective of the first one-third of the ‘three 
traditions spectrum’, therefore, it is argued that the dominant epistemology, as 
suggested by Linklater and Little, is indeed positivist.39
INTRODUCING POST-POSIVITISM
The chapter now comes to those epistemological positions, united by their rejection of 
positivism and realism, which can generically be described as post-positivist. This 
grouping, however, is extremely broad, providing approaches to epistemology that 
apply to both rationalism and revolutionism. In light of this, the chapter will 
introduce a distinction between what it will describe as a moderate post-positivism, 
associated with rationalism, and a strong post-positivism, associated with 
revolutionism. Given that moderate post-positivism provides a qualified expression of 
strong post-positivism, and given the structure of the remaining chapters of this thesis 
(which involves examination of the two poles before rationalism), the chapter will
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first examine positivism’s (realism’s) polar opposite, strong post-positivism, and then 
moderate post-positivism.
b) STRONG POST-POSITIVISM: POSTMODERNISM ETAL
Like positivism, strong post-positivism also makes methodological assumptions that 
are related to ontological assumptions.40 In strong post-positivist thought there is no 
quest to understand the movement of forces through a given ontology, for the 
ontology is not given. Unlike positivism, wherein the knower and the known confront 
each other as two closed categories, in the context of strong post-positivism the 
underlying sense of ontological openness means that the knower’s act of knowing has 
the effect of constructing or reconstructing what is a fluid ontology (the known)41 
The world stands in a state of flux and the knower is able to confront this with his 
created concepts which help to generate new, and, he hopes, more relevant ontologies. 
In providing a means for translating the new temporality and its attendant ontological 
fluidity into a conceptual frame, therefore, post-positivism provides an important, 
epistemologically disclosed, conceptual function.
In suggesting that revolutionism is associated with strong post-positivism, however, 
one runs into the difficulty which has prompted Manners to suggest the introduction 
of a fourth tradition. Since critical theory, associated with revolutionism by Linklater 
and Little, does not completely give up on Enlightenment aspirations, although it 
constitutes a strong form of post-positivism, it certainly does not describe the post­
modern polar opposite of a confident positivism.42 There is thus a need, Manners 
contends, for a fourth tradition of ‘Nietzchean Relativism’ which gives the English
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School spectrum the capacity to define the full breadth of potential epistemological 
diversity.43
This thesis fully recognizes the wisdom of the above point but, rather than sacrifice 
conventional references to the three traditions, suggests a slightly different solution. 
Given that whilst it does constitute a strong form of post-positivism, critical theory 
does not completely give up on Enlightenment aspiration (making it less of a polar 
representation of post-positivism than Manners’ post-modern, Nietzschean position) 
this thesis would suggest that critical theory should not be used to define the whole of 
the revolutionist tradition. Instead, exploiting the conventional distinction within 
revolutionism between its moderate Kantian and strong Dantean expressions, this 
thesis associates critical theory with the first, Kantian part of the spectrum and the 
postmodernist, Nietzschean approach with the final Dantean section.44
EXAMPLES
The objective of all forms of strong post-positivism - Critical or Relativist - is to 
critique positivism and its attendant ‘essentialisf ontology at the centre of which is 
the closed, rigidly boundaried, modem, sovereign nation-state that gains its clearest 
expression in neorealism. Defined largely against ontological stability (completely in 
the case of the stronger post-modem forms of strong post-positivism, those occupying 
the Dantean section of revolutionism), it is the contention of this thesis that strong 
post-positivism provides a key role in rising to the conceptual challenge of the new 
temporality with its hyperspatial implications. Seeking to make good the problems 
defined by Jameson when he observed that, we ‘do not yet possess the perceptual 
equipment to match this new hyperspace ...in part because our perceptual habits were
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formed in that older kind of space I have called the space of high modernism’45, these 
approaches, which we will now consider in detail, have responded by seeking ‘a 
reconfiguration in social space time experiences to a degree not witnessed since the 
Renaissance’.46
Eloquently articulating this reconfiguration project, Robert Cox, a critical theorist, 
contends that the ontology of the international arena is not a given but is the fruit of 
construction. This means that when the dominant constructed ontologies no longer 
seem to work, because the world has moved on, there is a need to create new ones. ‘In 
such periods, certainties about ontology give place to scepticism’. In the context of 
the demise of ‘old Europe’, Cox observes, this gave rise to Pyrrhonism. Today it is 
calling upon strongly post-positivist epistemology.
Cox’s epistemological approach contains two steps, both of which depend on an 
ontological openness within which the ontology can be changed, namely, the 
deconstruction of the old ontology and construction of the new. First, deconstruction: 
‘To deconstruct the ontological constructs of the passing present is a first step towards 
a more pertinent but still relative knowledge’. Second, construction: ‘Structures are 
socially constructed, i.e., they become a part of the objective world by virtue of their 
existence in the intersubjectivity of relevant groups of people. The objective world of 
institutions is real because we make it so by sharing a picture of it in our minds quite 
independently of how we value it, whether we approve or disapprove of it’.47
John Gerard Ruggie also seeks to come to terms with radical physical flux by 
explicitly seeking to engage with post-positivist epistemology.48 ‘Accordingly,
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understanding that transformation -  and presumably any analogous shift that may be 
taking place today -  requires an epistemological posture that is quite different from 
the imperious claims of most current bodies of international relations theory’ ,49
James Der Derian’s post-structuralist strategies for coming to terms with the radical 
ontological flux inaugurated by the new temporality, meanwhile, adopt a similar 
epistemic posture ‘[CJhronopolitical in the sense that they elevate chronology over 
geography, pace over space ... ’ they are post-positivist.50
Yosef Lapid also contends that it is essential to embrace post-positivist epistemology 
if one is to engage with fundamental change. In seeking to rise to this challenge 
through the lens of the new interest in culture and identity,51 Lapid suggests that IR is 
responding to the ‘broader perception that “a new, somehow profoundly globalized 
era is being bom’” . In engaging with the world today, he contends (with the 
assistance of John Shorter), that IR theorists “‘have a choice: either to think of it as 
based in invariances (fixed things) and to treat change as problematic, or, to think of it 
as in flux (as consisting in activities) and to treat the attainment of stability as a 
problem”. For too long the IR theoretical enterprise has ignored this choice, investing 
itself almost exclusively in the former possibility’.53
The feminist, V Spike Petersen, similarly argues that a post-positivist epistemology 
will be essential if one is to engage with fundamental change. In the current context it 
‘is increasingly unlikely’, Petersen maintains, ‘that a territorial unit can continue to 
preserve its distinctiveness on the basis ...of delinking, ...there is an increasing 
probability that distinctive identity may be formed as a unique crossroad in the flow of
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people, goods and ideas’. In this context feminist epistemology, with its rejection of 
positivism’s subject/object duality, gives rise to ‘multilevel, multidimensional analytic 
frameworks that are less likely to generate reductionist and/or static accounts’.54
Marlene Wind also champions the capacity of reflectivist IR theory to engage with 
systemic change and highlights the failure of rationalist research programmes to rise 
to this challenge. They are ‘unequipped’, Wind contends, ‘to conceive of structural 
transformation in the international system’.55
BEYOND EPISTEMOLOGY?
Before providing an overall assessment of the uses of strong post-positivism and the 
three traditions spectrum, it is at this stage helpful to refer back to the approach of 
Section 1 to develop a clearer expression of the relationship between the spatio- 
temporal revolution and strong post-positivism. Specifically, the ontological 
implications of the annihilation of distance resulting from globalization’s time-space 
compression can be seen as having, in an important sense, the socio-epistemic effect 
of eroding the distinction between subject and object by collapsing them into each 
other. The fact that at the same time that post-positivist epistemologies are seeking the 
abolition of the distinction between subject and object, globalization is physically 
providing a basis for this same end (or something like it) through the abolition of the 
distance (and even the matter) between subject and object that secured their 
distinction, is of great relevance and interest.56 This annihilation can be seen in the 
following examples.
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Reflecting on military technology, Virilio provides one of the most eloquent 
expressions of the impact of the time-space compression on the subject/object 
distinction, demonstrating not just the transcending of space in the sense of distance 
but also space in the sense of matter through his use of the concept of penetration. 
‘The instantaneousness of action at a distance corresponds to the defeat of the 
unprepared adversary, but also, and especially, to the defeat of the world as a field, as 
distance, as matter. Immediate penetration, or penetration that is approaching 
immediacy, becomes identified with the instantaneous destruction of environmental 
conditions’57
Economically, meanwhile, the impact of globalization manifest in Tate capitalism’ 
similarly has the effect of abolishing the distinction between subject and object 
through movement. In his ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, 
Frederic Jameson characterises postmodernism as a ‘waning of effect’ wherein the 
relationship between subject and object, and the related distinction between inside and 
outside, is extinguished. The depth manifest through this distinction is replaced by a 
simple surface. This is a function of the logic of late capitalism in which the 
importance of exchange transcends that of those facilitating the exchange, replacing 
the centred economic actor with what Guehenno described as the decentred ‘fleshless 
cipher’. It is a society in which ‘exchange value has been generalized to the point at 
which the very memory of use value is effaced’.59
ANALYSIS
Strongly post-positivist epistemology is useful on two counts. First, it provides 
another context within which to see the relationship between the temporal orientation
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(manifest in ontological openness, flux) and the celebration of change. Strong post­
positivism abandons the absolute distinction between subject and object (as does the 
effect of the annihilation of distance), and its attendant reifications, clearing the 
ground for the object to be changed by the subject. Second, in providing an 
epistemological perspective on the relationship between the temporal orientation and 
the celebration of change, it demonstrates how epistemology can be used to confirm, 
engage with, and seek to shape, change, translating its implication into the 
conceptualization of an appropriate ontology. In terms of using the epistemic lens to 
facilitate the translation of the conceptual demands of ontology, strong post­
positivism’s capacity to service radical change clearly associates it with 
revolutionism. From the perspective of the last one-third of the ‘three traditions 
spectrum’, therefore, it is argued (also in Section 3) that the dominant epistemology is 
strongly post-positivist.60
c) MODERATE POST-POSITIVISM: INTERPRETIVISM
Again, like positivism and strong post-positivism, moderate post-positivism makes 
methodological assumptions that are related to ontological assumptions and is defined 
very much in the tradition of a via media between positivism and strong post­
positivism. Moderate post-positivism does not present one with the knower seeking to 
know a reified reality which his knowing cannot change - as in the case of positivism 
- nor does it present one with the knower confronting an inessential world which his 
knowing can make - as in the case of strong post-positivism. Instead it defines a 
knower whose knowing can inform and construct reality to an extent but without this 
being predicated on a commitment to a radically inessential world. Although 
ontologies can be subject to change through inter-subjective construction and
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reconstruction (partially open), this does not make them inessential (completely open) 
and beyond the reach of what might be described in common sense terms as a realistic 
epistemology.
Moderate post-positivism is best understood as a form of pre or anti-positivism that 
tends to go by the terms interpretivism, the hermeneutic approach and/or moderate 
constructivism.61 In turning to this interpretivism, the chapter addresses the 
epistemological posture that Linklater and Little have associated with the tradition 
which, as chapter 1 observed, is often said to be definitive of the true English School 
position, rationalism. In light of this it will come as no surprise that those who have 
sought to identify the School with one particular epistemology have tended to select 
interpretivism. As a consequence of this fact, it is also important to seek to define 
interpretivism from within the English School as well as from outside.
One of the most detailed investigations of the balance of intrepretivism made from 
within the English School is presented by Roger Epp, who seeks to define it by 
referring to the work of Gadamer. ‘Employing the elements of language, prejudice 
and tradition, Gadamer resists in a particular way the sharp subject-object dichotomy 
that is central to modem epistemology and to classical hermeneutics. His 
understanding of a text, an event, a practice, or a face-to-face interlocutor, is neither 
subjective (where meaning is idiosyncratic to the knower) nor objective (where 
meaning inheres in the known and remains only to be discovered by a detached 
knower). Instead, understanding is denoted metaphorically as a fusion of horizons that 
changes both knower and known’. His dialogical to-ing and fro-ing between the 
knower and the known ‘represents his attempt at a theoretical grounding that is
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neither foundationalist nor radically subjective. For interpretation is tempered by an 
accountability to the “thing itself” .63
Another English School scholar, Tim Dunne, concurs, claiming that the English 
School is defined by ‘a broadly interpretive approach to the subject...’.64 This he 
locates in the widespread scepticism about the possibility of international relations 
being scientific which he claims was present long before Hedley Bull’s celebrated 
‘International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach’.65 Given that the subject 
matter of international relations depends on ideas like the balance of power and 
diplomacy, it cannot be treated as an arena of reified facts that exist independently of 
what people think about them. The ontology of the international arena must thus be 
seen as partially but not wholly constructed.66
One can actually obtain a particularly clear appreciation of the ontological and 
epistemological characteristics of the rationalist tradition by referring to a scholar 
from outside the English School with whom Dunne, and indeed many other English 
School scholars draw parallels (Hidemi Suganami, Ole Wasver and Barry Buzan), 
Alexander Wendt.67 Wendt eloquently expresses the balanced commitment of a 
mildly post-positivist constructivism, engaging with both ontological openness and 
closure. On the one hand, in demonstrating that his approach incorporates sensitivity 
to the ‘given’, spatially oriented aspects of the subject matter, Wendt is careful to 
recognize ‘the material substrate of agency, including its intrinsic capabilities’. In the 
case of human beings this material substrate is the body. In the case of ‘states it is an 
organisational apparatus of governance’. Specifically, he is clear that ‘the raw material 
out of which members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society
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before states enter the constitutive process of international society’ (italics added) and 
thus the constructed state is in no sense a malleable, hyperspatial, extra-territorial reality. 
On the other hand, having been clear about this foundation of givenness, this material 
substrate, Wendt is also clear about the reality of construction, manifest in the process of 
inter-state recognition which informs his definition of sovereignty.68
Ole Waever interestingly provides an account of the interpretivist/constructivist 
English School approach, by reflecting on its similarity to the work of Alexander 
Wendt and claiming (like Linklater) that it should embrace a stronger form of post­
positivism. There are, Waever contends, two forms of constructivism. In the first 
instance there is that which pertains merely to structure, ‘constructivism part of the 
way down’, of which the work of Alexander Wendt is perhaps the best example. This 
is symptomatic of the partial openness that is definitive of the rationalist tradition. In 
the second instance there is the rather more thorough constructivism that pertains to 
both units and structure, ‘constructivism all the way down’, typified by the 
scholarship of Erik Ringmar.69 This demonstrates a rather more radical constructivism 
that, for the purposes of this thesis, pertains to an equally radical openness and is best 
associated with revolutionism. Specifically, Waever claims that the English School 
epistemology fits in with the former Wendtian approach ‘which operates only on 
outside-in constructions of meaning, not inside-out. Thus, English School advocates 
might find points of convergence with the “really existing” American constructivism, 
but’, Waiver is keen to point out, ‘this is not the only possible form of constructivism, 
nor even the most obvious form to give it on the basis of its own critique of 
mainstream international relations’.70
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Having demonstrated the distinctions between radical, ‘all the way down’ 
constructivism and partial, ‘part of the way down constructivism’, demonstrating the 
similarity between the Wendtian and English School positions, the point should be 
made that Wasver actually entertains the possibility that English School 
constructivism may be rather more limited than that of Wendt. The latter, Waever 
observes, has parallels with critical theory in the sense that, when engaging with 
structures, it adopts the position that ‘this is not given by nature therefore it could be 
different’ which Waever suggests is not the case with the English School. ‘ [T]he new 
American constructivism seems to portray the rules of international society as much
* 71more malleable and open to reformulation than the English School typically has’. 
Waever, however, whilst not rejecting his commitment to radical constructivism, then 
reflects that there may be some wisdom in this position in the sense that some 
structures are more malleable than others, suggesting that there is perhaps a need to 
develop a multi-layered approach to constructivism, drawing on something of the
79wisdom of the English School approach.
ANALYSIS
Thus interpretivism depends upon a relationship between the subject and object that 
can neither be described as one of complete division, as in realism, nor as one of no 
division at all, as in post-modernism. It thus exists alongside both a measure of 
ontological stability, which means that it never celebrates radical flux, but also a 
measure of openness which means that the interpretivist ontology does not amount to 
the reified units accompanying positivism. Rationalist ontology is thus neither wholly 
essential, as in pure forms of positivism, nor wholly inessential as in pure forms of 
strong post-positivism. Embracing a hybrid epistemology and a hybrid ontology,
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rationalism is post-positivist to the extent of criticising the closure associated with 
neorealism but not to the extent of the strong post-positivism which this thesis 
associates with revolutionism. Interpretivism thus provides an epistemological means 
for translating a measure of change and a measure of continuity into a conceptual 
frame. In terms of using the epistemic lens to facilitate the translation of the 
conceptual demands of ontology, interpretivism’s capacity to service continuity and 
change clearly associates it with rationalism. From the perspective of the middle one- 
third of the ‘three traditions spectrum’, therefore, it is argued (also in Section 3) that 
the dominant epistemology is interpretivist.73
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, whilst the ontological assumptions made in the context of the 
deployment of a positivist epistemology suggest an associated ontological closure, 
those made in the context of a strong post-positivist epistemology suggest an 
associated ontological openness, and those associated with interpretivism suggest 
continuity and change. Thus positivism rises to the conceptual challenge of the spatial 
orientation, strong post-positivism to that of the temporal orientation, and 
interpretivism to that of a spatio-temporal balance. The theorist must obviously be 
fully aware of the implication of the above distinctions when seeking to conceptualize 
ontologies in the context of globalization. In light of the above, Smith’s conclusion to 
his wide ranging critique of positivism is very relevant. ‘[E]pistemoIogy has had 
enormous ontological effects, and these have affected not only the study but also the 
practice of international relations. In positivism’s place international theory needs to 
develop strong post-positivist theories based on a variety of epistemologies because a 
lot more than epistemology is at stake’. (Emphasis added)74
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Having sought to make the epistemological services of the three traditions spectrum, 
and their relationship to the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization more 
explicit, Part 1 will now close with some final refinements and the provision of a fresh 
perspective. First it will seek to contribute to the development of the three traditions 
through the provision of further analytical distinctions. Second, it will locate the 
wisdom of the spectrum in a wider context.
1. DEVELOPING ANALYTICAL DISTINCTIONS
It is important to deploy the three traditions in a manner that highlight the gradually 
and constantly flowing character of the spectrum from closure to openness, 
demonstrating that in representing a third of the ontological spectrum, revolutionism, 
for example, is not an ontologically homogenous unit, bumping into the different but 
equally homogenous rationalist unit. This thesis consequently seeks to soften the three 
tradition boundaries by introducing a sub-division within both realism and 
revolutionism. First, realism is divided between a category at its extremity, 
representing complete ontological closure, and a category that, whilst primarily 
closed, does embrace a measure of construction which develops as one moves 
towards the rationalist tradition. The place of complete ontological closure is defined 
as the sovereign state pole and relates to neorealism, whilst that which engages with a 
limited measure of construction is defined by what this thesis terms ‘Augustinian 
realism’ (of which more in chapter 8). A similar sub-division is introduced to 
revolutionism between a category at the extremity of revolutionism, representing 
complete ontological openness, and a category that, whilst primarily open, engages 
with a limited measure of closure which develops as one moves towards the
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rationalist tradition. The place of complete ontological openness is defined as the 
post-sovereignty pole and represents the neo-Dantean, ‘Nietzschean’ section of 
revolutionism, whilst that which engages with a very limited measure of closure 
defines the neo-Kantian, ‘Coxian’ critical theory component of the revolutionist 
tradition. Having highlighted the tentative nature of the three traditions boundaries it 
is important to point out that the exact relationship between the sovereign state pole 
and realism per se and the post-sovereignty pole and revolutionism per se will 
become clearer in the following chapters.75
2. WIDER PERSPECTIVE
In a context where ontological diversity is giving rise to significant epistemological 
and methodological fragmentation, the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological pluralism of the English School has an important contribution to 
make. Indeed it is interesting to note, in closing, that scholars from beyond the School 
intimate the wisdom of a methodological pluralism (see below), even whilst - in some 
cases - apparently failing to recognize/engage with the possibilities offered by the 
English School in this regard.
After reflecting on the notion of a synthesis between positivism and reflectivism, 
James Der Derian (who has been very consciously influenced by the English 
School)76 rejects this avenue. ‘ [I]t is not a synthesis but by learning to live with 
irreconcilable differences and multiple identities - in high theory and in everyday 
practices - that we might find our best hope for international relations’.77
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Ruggie, meanwhile, infers the need for a methodological tension by first praising a) 
the capacity of neorealism to deal with ‘the endogenous logics of the relations of 
force’, b) the capacity of the microeconomics of institutions to deal with strategic 
behaviour and c) the ability of reflectivist theories to address the role of spatial 
imageries, and then making the important point that none of these bodies of theory are 
‘in any sense additive’.78 Once again there is no synthesis, just the option of a 
methodological pluralism.
Cox, meanwhile, also celebrates pluralism, endorsing the role of positivism even 
whilst embarking upon a post-positivist attempt to re-conceive the world in the 
context of globalization. Rather than affirming the importance of embracing different 
methodologies at different levels at the same time, however, he argues that there are 
epochs of stability during which positivism is most helpful and then epochs of 
transformation during which post-positivist, reflectivist approaches are most helpful.79
PART 2 PROBLEMS WITH EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM?
Having defined the baseline ontological and epistemological interpretation of the 
three traditions spectrum that will be used by this thesis as it seeks to come to terms 
with systemic change, it is now important to pause to reflect on critiques of the 
suggestion that one should use the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum. 
This will provide an opportunity for a defence of epistemological pluralism but it will 
also pave the way for the presentation of an alternative account of the three traditions 
spectrum that will be rather more appropriate for coming to terms with certain 
accounts of regional integration. The chapter will engage with this opportunity by 
way of considering recent contributions made by Barry Buzan and Ian Manners.
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Although Buzan has in the past associated himself with the idea that the three
80traditions can be associated with an epistemological as well as ontological pluralism, 
he breaks away from this position in his latest major contribution to English School
o  1
theory. There are a number of rationales for this decision. In the first instance 
Buzan notes that there are some forms of revolutionism, e.g. Marxism, that cannot be
* 89reconciled with post-positivist, critical theory. In the second instance, Buzan argues 
that all English School theory is, in any event, best approached from a single 
constructivist epistemological perspective. This epistemological monism can be seen 
in the fact that Buzan jettisons both the polar traditions of the spectrum. On the one 
hand he rejects pure closure in the form of the ‘international system’ on the basis that 
this provides narrowly mechanical accounts of change that are not true to life.83 On 
the other hand he has never entertained the possibility of associating the English 
School with the pure openness of narrowly socially constructed accounts. Whilst his 
theory is concerned to cater for a measure of social construction it also seeks to cater 
for an element of physical givenness.84 Operating within this framework, Buzan has 
always demonstrated a clear preference to a ‘systems approach’ that is committed to 
the provision of explanatory value through structure whose delivery capacity depends 
upon a measure of closure. In rejecting both extremes ontologically and 
epistemologically - even whilst maintaining the language of the three traditions - 
Buzan moves to the middle ground of rationalism where he draws very extensively on 
the work of Alexander Wendt.85 This thesis would respond to the Buzan critique first 
by defending epistemological pluralism but then by affirming a key component of his 
argument.
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- DEFENDING EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM
The suggestion that epistemological pluralism should be replaced with a universal 
constructivism is problematic firstly because the rejection of epistemological 
pluralism raises questions about the integrity of methodological pluralism. 
Specifically, given the relationship between epistemology and ontology, it would 
seem possible that Buzan’s rejection of epistemological pluralism might translate into 
at least an erosion of ontological pluralism and that this might negatively impact the 
capability of his theory to maintain methodological pluralism.86 To this one might 
respond that Buzan’s ontological pluralism remains intact in that, although he rejects 
the international system (realism) he replaces world society with two new traditions 
thus maintaining three in total: international society, transnational society and 
interhuman society.87 Although in Buzan’s thought these renewed traditions appear to 
secure an enduring methodological pluralism, however, the point must be made that, 
restricted to structural concerns,88 what these three traditions actually do is to 
articulate a commitment to three levels of analysis. When bearing in mind the 
suggestion that all three should be carried out in the context of what might broadly be 
characterised as a Wendtian, moderately constructivist, systems theory form of 
analysis, it would seem that, like so many others, Buzan effectively adopts the 
ontology and epistemology of an international society, rationalist synthesis, albeit 
across three levels of analysis. Whether this provides the basis for a methodological
O Q
pluralism in the English School tradition seems less than clear.
The suggestion that epistemological pluralism should be replaced with a universal 
constructivism is problematic second, and more importantly, however, because it fails 
to engage with a significant opportunity. The quality of the three traditions spectrum
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that makes it so relevant and so undervalued in relationship to globalization is the fact 
its identity as an ontological and epistemological spectrum render it an ideal 
framework for coming to terms with the conceptual challenges of globalization as a 
spatio-temporal revolution. Its spatio-temporal capability arguably makes the three 
traditions spectrum more relevant today than at the time of their development.
- CATEGORY ERROR?
Having rejected the notion that the three traditions should be approached in uniformly 
constructivist terms, however, this thesis would endorse the point that Buzan makes 
about Marxism, prompting the question: what solutions are available? One scholar 
who supports the idea of engaging with the three traditions as an epistemological 
spectrum but also recognizes that there is a problem with associating Marxism with 
post-positivist revolutionism is Ian Manners. Highlighting this difficulty, however, the 
main innovation presented by Manners is the introduction of a fourth tradition. If the 
suggestion is that revolutionism can cater for positivist globalism, like Marxism, 
whilst relativism (the fourth tradition) caters for post-modernist globalism, one 
encounters the difficulty that, in order to maintain the integrity and coherence of the 
ontological spectrum, positivism should correlate to the realist tradition and come 
before rationalism let alone revolutionism. In response to Manners’ approach, the 
spectrum would move from positivism and ontological closure, to interpretivism and a 
greater measure of openness, back to positivism and ontological closure and then, in 
one move, on to its post-positivist opposite and complete ontological openness. Any 
sense of moving in a gradual and orderly manner from a strong positivism and 
ontological closure at one pole, towards ever increasing openness, culminating in a 
radical post-positivism and ontological flux at the other, would be lost.
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MULTIPLE SPECTRUMS?
The desire to update the three traditions spectrum in order to make it sensitive to the 
rationalist -  reflectivist debate is very understandable and is the basic approach 
supported by this thesis. One must recognize, however, that the consequence of 
developing a sharper understanding of the epistemic lens such that one associates 
realism with positivism, rationalism with interpretivism and revolutionism with 
strongly post-positivist theory, is that the positivist versions of revolutionism no 
longer fit and cannot be made to do so without placing the ontological and 
epistemological coherence of the spectrum in jeopardy. Far from solving the problem, 
the introduction of a fourth tradition to enable the spectrum to accommodate Marx, 
has the effect of destroying its ontological and epistemological coherence. In light of 
this, it is the contention of this thesis that the solution to the dilemma that Buzan and 
Manners rightly identify, is not the rejection of epistemological pluralism or the 
introduction of a fourth tradition, but rather, in true English School style, recognition 
of the validity of holding alternative accounts of the spectrum in tension.90
The application of the traditional approach to the three traditions which is not 
epistemologically self-conscious, and which does not make revolutionism dependent 
on strong post-positivism and the breakdown of the traditional relationship between 
the inside and the outside, provides for detailed engagement with a more limited form 
of systemic change. Although when viewed narrowly in terms of the 
epistemologically plural model of the three traditions there is a capacity to engage 
with the reality of ‘change by extension’, the perspective provided on this form of 
change is necessarily truncated. Specifically, whilst European integration presents a
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form of change that is consistent with a transformation from realism (several 
sovereign states creating an international system) to revolutionism (a single 
supranational sovereignty creating one large domestic arena) on the traditional three 
traditions spectrum, when viewed from the perspective of an epistemologically plural 
spectrum this form of transformation is potentially consistent with a constant 
epistemological posture and thus need not involve a change of traditions. The three 
traditions spectrum, thus construed, would be able to locate the point of ‘change by 
extension’, e.g. six separate states coming together to form a supranational 
sovereignty in the context of a constant Augustinian realism, but not the process of 
change. One can, however, compensate for this shortcoming by superimposing the 
traditional spectrum upon the epistemological spectrum of this thesis, making it is 
possible to see with greater clarity the impact of that change and thereby obtain a 
more sophisticated appreciation of sovereignty and systemic change.
Given the opportunity to better accommodate regional integration, this thesis suggests 
that two accounts of the three traditions spectrum should be related in the manner of 
Figure 1. The epistemologically variable spectrum is represented by the horizontal 
axis which proceeds from positivism and the realist tradition on the left hand side, 
through to the interpretivism of the rationalist tradition, in the middle, and on to 
strong post-positivism and the revolutionist tradition, on the right hand side. The 
traditional Wightian spectrum meanwhile cuts vertically through the horizontal axis. 
The manner of its bifurcation, however, is complicated by the fact that, whilst the 
traditional Wightian approach is not self-consciously epistemologically variable in the 
sense of embracing the entire epistemic spectrum, disclosed in a less than technical 
and rather more common-sense, historically variable manner, it would not be
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appropriate to collapse the Wightian account into one point on the Linklater -  Little 
spectrum. To the extent that it would perhaps make most sense to associate the 
classical English School with a form of pre-positivist interpretivism, this thesis 
suggests that the centre of this spectrum is located in rationalism. This is 
communicated diagrammatically by the fact that the central line representing the 
Wightian approach cuts through the epistemologically variable spectrum via the 
centre of rationalism. To the extent, however, that it would be wrong to set the 
classical approach in this one position there is a sense in which the traditional 
Wightian tradition must be seen as moving vertically but potentially from an array of 
epistemological (horizontal) postures with the exception of those defined by the 
sovereign state pole part of the realist tradition and those defined by the post­
sovereignty pole, Dantean part of the revolutionist tradition.
CONCLUSION
In attempting to employ the English School three traditions spectrum as a means of 
considering sovereignty in the context of systemic changes that include globalization 
and regional integration, this thesis employs two interpretations of the spectrum that 
service the two kinds of change that these developments embrace, namely ‘change by 
erosion’ and ‘change by extension’. Given that globalization is defined as a spatio- 
temporal revolution with profound ontological and (therein) epistemological 
implications, it is important to examine the fate of the sovereign state in the context of 
this revolution in terms that are sensitive to both the ontological and epistemological 
parameters of sovereignty, on the one hand, and globalization, on the other. The 
Linklater-Little interpretation of the three traditions is consequentially selected and 
made basic in light of the facts that globalization: a) is the most profound systemic
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change in view and b) can be said to incorporate regional integration. This provides 
the research with its perspective on ‘change by erosion’. Given, however, that, 
although it is possible to locate the point of ‘change by extension’ on the Linklater- 
Little interpretation of the three traditions spectrum, it is not possible to unpack the 
process of that change on that particular spectrum, the thesis also employs the 
traditional interpretation of the three traditions in a complementary role. This provides 
the research with its perspective on ‘change by extension’. The relationship between 
the two accounts is given diagrammatic expression by Figure 1.
INTO THE SPECTRUM!
Having defined the spatio-temporal profile of the spectrum, and having defined how it 
must be deployed in relationship to sovereignty in the context of globalization, it is 
now possible for the thesis, armed with the requisite distinctions and definitions that 
have been developed in this chapter (openness and closure, spatial and temporal 
orientation, the new temporality, essential and inessential, given and constructed), to 
move to the detailed definition of sovereignty in the context of the three traditions. 
The thesis turns first to the realist tradition.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE REALIST TRADITION &
THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE: 
DEFINITIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to define sovereignty narrowly in terms of a critical 
appraisal of the realist tradition and therein the sovereign state pole. In reading the 
chapter it is important to remember that it defines a tool that, along with the other two 
traditions (and therein the other pole) and in deference to the methodology of the 
English School, will prepare the way for developing a distinctive perspective on the 
role of state sovereignty in the context of the contemporary systemic changes 
addressed by this research, European integration and globalization.
The chapter begins with a brief introductory definition of the realist tradition, paving 
the way for Part 1 which develops (from English School, neorealist and other sources) 
a realist account of sovereignty defined by reference to ontological closure. Part 2 
then goes on to criticise the utility of this narrowly closed understanding of 
sovereignty, highlighting implicit bases of openness and thereby building up a realist 
understanding of sovereignty that can accommodate a measure of change. The end 
result will be a broad-based conservative definition of sovereignty, albeit one that is 
internally self-critical, explicitly allowing for an element of construction. The model 
of sovereignty that this chapter defends thus does not actually reside in the sovereign 
state pole but rather in the broader realist tradition.1
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INTRODUCING REALISM
In answer to the question ‘what is international society?’ Martin Wight stated, realists 
claim that it is: ‘Nothing. A fiction. An illusion. Non esf .2 Perhaps the most 
celebrated expression of this commitment comes from Hobbes, who likens the 
international arena to the state of nature, which he characterizes as a domain of 
anarchy, the war of all against all. Whilst individuals have contracted together to form
•  3  •society within limited territorial areas, giving rise to sovereign states, this has not 
happened on a global basis between the resulting sovereign states. There is no global 
Leviathan and thus no global society. ‘Thus the international scene is properly 
described as an anarchy -  a multiplicity of powers without a government’.4
According to this Hobbesian-realist account of state and society, wherein the Leviathan 
enforces order and civility, power is necessarily anterior to law, society and indeed 
morality. As Morgenthau observed; ‘There is a profound and neglected truth hidden in 
Hobbes’s extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there is 
neither morality nor law outside the state ...for above the national societies there exists 
no international society so integrated as to be able to define for them the concrete 
meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their individual members’.5 
Thus construed, there is no effective form of morality residing simply in human 
conscience, in natural law or any form of international law. In their rather gloomy 
understanding of the human condition, realists contend that morality must be both 
constructed and enforced via contract if there is to be any possibility of creating any kind 
of ‘society’. Therefore, where power has not been used to generate society - in the space 
between societies, the anarchical, international arena - it must be used by the
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independent sovereign states to forcibly and selfishly advance their own national 
interests, articulating the distinctive realist modus operandi.6 Thus construed realism is
n
about sovereign states expressing their national interest through power.
PART 1: SOVEREIGNTY AS ONTOLOGICAL CLOSURE
Having provided a definition of realism, the chapter now turns to consider the 
ontologically closed nature of realist models of sovereignty. In doing so, whilst 
having a particular interest in the English School account of sovereignty, and using 
the approach of one of their foremost scholars to provide the structure of much of 
Part 1, it will also seek to demonstrate the ontological closure associated with other 
forms of realism beyond the traditional English School, especially neorealism.
Perhaps the most prolific writer on sovereignty issues associated with the English 
School has been Alan James.8 In seeking to define sovereignty James suggests that the 
most obvious point of departure is that sovereign states consist of three basic 
elements: territory, people and government but he is eventually forced to turn 
elsewhere in order to locate sovereignty’s central characteristic, constitutional 
independence.9 This chapter will examine each of these components in turn 
considering how they contribute to an ontologically closed model of sovereignty. It 
will then proceed to consider the further bases for closure manifest through 
conceptualizations of space about which James, and certainly the pioneers of the 
English School, were not particularly theoretically self-conscious. The end result will 
be the presentation of a model of sovereignty characterised by ontological closure. 
(As noted above, Part 2 will then provide a critique of the positions presented in Part
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1 and so the following consideration of those positions by this chapter should not 
necessarily be interpreted as an endorsement of them).
i. REALISM AND TERRITORY: ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE
There is, James observes, no sovereign state without territory.10 The territorial nature of 
sovereignty is widely recognized by all, from those who are its staunchest supporters to 
those who are its fiercest critics. Robert Jackson, who contends that sovereignty still has 
an important role to play, maintains that ‘[a] sovereign state is a territorial jurisdiction:
i.e., the territorial limits within which state authority may be exercised on an exclusive 
basis’.11 At the other end of the spectrum, critics Camilleri and Falk claim that the 
sovereign state is a ‘national territorial totality . . .’. In order to fully appreciate the 
territorial ontology of the sovereign state, however, one must return to its apparent point 
of origin, the Reformation, and the order that it defined itself against, the medieval
1 TRespublica Christiana.
In medieval Europe political boundaries had a certain fuzziness. Loyalty was not to a 
boundaried state upheld in the name of a ‘the people’, of which all its inhabitants were a 
part, but rather to regional networks of kinship and interpersonal affiliation. In this 
context space was organized concentrically around affiliation rather than through 
territorial plates coextensive with the jurisdictional reach of boundaried polities.14 The 
sense of boundaries, moreover, was also crucially weakened by the fact that community 
identity, and its relationship to territory, was qualified by the reality of a transnational 
identity manifest through the Christian Church and empire. It may have included 
different communities but Europe crucially constituted the supranational Respublic 
Christiania, embracing a sacramental view of space and territory, which meant that all
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medieval European territories were crucially part of the same territory with a similar 
sacramental function, incarnating the same numinous. In an important sense, therefore, 
it was all of a piece.15
The coming of the Reformation resulted in the break-up of the Respublica Christiana, 
the development of national churches and the advent of the sovereign state which was 
from the beginning territorially defined.16 The centrality of territory to the definition of 
the sovereign state was facilitated by two developments. First, the Reformation reduced 
territory to its material components by draining off any sense of sacramental numinous 
which meant that European territory could be broken into discreet chunks rather than 
being held together as a whole. (This perspective, moreover, was also greatly enhanced 
by developments in science that followed the Reformation. Whilst the Aristotelian 
cosmology of the medieval world placed the earth at the centre of the universe, the 
discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo dethroned the earth, rendering it an 
insignificant speck in a massive universe. Any sense of specialness, attending to the 
earth and its crust, not jettisoned by Protestant territoriality’s rejection of medieval 
sacramentalism, was thus finally expelled by these men of science. Once again, 
therefore, territoriality was increasingly reduced to its material nature). Second, the 
application of governmental divisions to this newly material understanding of territory 
meant that European territory could readily be broken up into units representing the 
jurisdiction of the sovereign states. Thus construed, politically territoriality was first 
determined by its physical givenness and then by its relationship to a state. It was broken 
down into the discreet chunks of boundaried res extensa which are so central to the 
definition of the modem sovereign state, endowing it with that very basic sense of being
1 n
ontologically closed.
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Thus in terms of the definition of the ontological spectrum, whose parameters were set 
out in the previous chapter, the territorial perspective locates sovereignty at the place of 
ontological closure, the sovereign state pole. However, whilst the modem territorial 
aspect of sovereignty does constitute an important part of its definition, it certainly is not 
sufficient given that closed territorial units are not necessarily sovereign, although (with 
the exception of Antarctica) they will none the less inform at least part of the foundation 
of a sovereign state at a different territorial level. Having considered sovereignty in 
relationship to territory, therefore, the chapter now turns to examine the ontological 
closure of sovereignty via government and the social contract principle.
ii. REALISM AND GOVERNMENT: ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE
It was in the context of having been released from the medieval model of government 
that modem political theory embarked on its quest for an account of political obligation 
and the legitimacy of the state. Whilst the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel 
disagreed about a great deal, they were united by the fact that their theory of political 
obligation was resolutely state-based. Specifically, modem political theory sought to 
devise a model of political obligation and state legitimacy by deploying the notion of 
the social contract or some kind of constitutive act.
Realism bought into the state project, as demonstrated earlier, through the Hobbesian 
frame of reference which asserts an imperative to escape the anarchical implications 
of the state of nature through the creation of a civic group, a ‘civil society’ secured 
through the Leviathan.18 One can see how this contributes to ontological closure from 
the way in which it deals with the issue at the heart of the anarchical challenge posed
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by the Hobbesian state of nature - the realist belief that humankind is evil - both in 
terms of the manner of its development and in terms of its character.19
First, in terms of the manner of its development one must appreciate that in realism 
the move from the state of nature into a civil society is the result of a law-like 
imperative which means that the generation of the civic group (which in the 
modem/early postmodern era is the state) is a given and is as such the most basic
90political unit. ‘Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political
9 1analysis. Once it was the city state, now it is the sovereign state’. It does not matter 
who you are or where you live, everyone faces the problem of human evil and the 
need to create islands of civility to make life manageable and thus the state, or some 
form of polity, becomes a basic foundational unit of human existence. As a result of 
the basic and foundational role of the state in the provision of order and civility, the state 
is seen as ‘existing prior to and as a container of society. As a consequence, society 
becomes a national phenomenon’.22 To the extent that the law-like imperative for the 
construction of the state or the polity is basic, so too is the development of
• 9^  •sovereignty. ‘For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its 
distinguishing trait’.24
Second, and more importantly, in terms of the character of the sovereign state, one must 
recognize that the successful generation of society through the state depends on shutting 
out the anarchical outside. In realist theory, therefore, the sovereign state has become 
completely identified with a civility and progress that was strategically secured by its 
ontological closure, whilst the spaces between these fixed state territorial jurisdictions 
became associated with anarchy. R. B. J. Walker clearly demonstrates this imperative for
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ontological closure, and its implications for conceptualization of the international arena 
in the following statement: ‘Inside particular states we have learned to aspire to what we 
like to think of as universal values and standards - claims about the nature of the good 
society, freedom, democracy, justice, and all the rest’. But the purchase of these norms 
‘depends on tacit recognition that these values and standards have been achieved only
•  • 25because we have been able to isolate particular communities from those outside’. 
Modem politics and progress, therefore, was only possible on the basis of creating a 
closed, boundaried territorial polity that shut out the anarchy of the state of nature 
beyond.
Thus in terms of the definition of the ontological spectrum, whose parameters were 
set out in the previous chapter, the realist group imperative perspective on sovereignty 
locates sovereignty at the place of ontological closure, the sovereign state pole within 
the realist tradition. However, as in the case of territoriality, whilst the group 
imperative provides an important ontologically closed perspective on sovereignty it is 
not, as the next section will make plain, sufficient.
iii. REALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: 
SOVEREIGNTY DEFINED & ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE
Having considered the way in which territory and the realist group imperative inform 
the ontological closure of the sovereign state, the chapter now reaches what is 
certainly, in James’ view, the key feature of the English School approach to 
sovereignty which not only provides perspective on the closure of the sovereign state, 
but also on its definition. Whilst embracing territory and government and therein a 
people, James, as noted earlier, thought them less important than constitutional
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independence. Considering territory, people and government he claimed that, whilst 
all are involved in the definition of the sovereign state, none of them is distinctive:
TERRITORY + PEOPLE + GOVERNMENT = SOVEREIGNTY?
Whilst sovereign states are territories wherein the people are subject to a common 
government whose jurisdiction is defined by those territorial borders, James observes 
that territory + people + government does not necessarily make for a sovereign state. 
In the case of Sri Lanka it does, but in the case of California it does not. This is of 
course particularly interesting given the fact that the wealth of California, and thus 
one would assume its power, far exceeds that of Sri Lanka. Thus, whilst sovereign 
states have a territory, a people and a government, it is clear that they must also have 
something else. Given this difficulty, Alan James suggests that the best way to come 
to the correct definition of sovereignty is to analyse the passage of a polity from non­
sovereign to sovereign status. To unpack this approach he turns to the example of the 
Solomon Islands, a British Protectorate from 1893 until 1978.27
SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
As a Protectorate the Solomon Islands did not enjoy independent statehood or make 
any pretence at being sovereign, despite having territory, people and government. 
Once, however, their constitutional ties to Britain were cut they became fully 
independent and were thus free to seek membership of the international community, 
becoming the 150th member of the UN, a privilege only available to sovereign states. 
Sovereignty, James claimed, is thus the result of legal constitutional independence. 
‘Sovereignty ...consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, 
however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme’. It is in short, a matter of
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‘constitutional separateness’,28 of not being legally subservient to a higher authority.29 
Reflecting back on Sri Lanka and California this certainly makes sense. Whilst Sri 
Lanka enjoys constitutional independence and thus sovereignty, California, subject to 
the federal constitution of the United States, does not.
In defining sovereignty as constitutional independence, James was of course 
reasserting what Hans Morgenthau had already written about sovereignty in his 
Politics Among Nations. ‘Independence signifies the particular aspect of the supreme 
authority of the individual nation which consists in the exclusion of the authority of 
any other nation. The statement that the nation is the supreme authority - that is 
sovereign within a certain territory -  logically implies that it is independent and that 
there is no authority above it’.30
In this judgement, James and Morgenthau are widely supported. ‘[Sjovereign 
legislation’, claims HWR Wade, ‘depends for its authority on an “ultimate legal
n i
principle”, i.e., a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be given’. 
The political fact in question, Laughland claimed, is constitutional independence, 
state sovereignty. ‘Sovereignty, indeed, is constitutional independence’.32
In his conclusion to Sovereignty at the Millennium, meanwhile, Georg Sorensen 
asserts: ‘the constitutive rule content of sovereignty is constitutional independence... 
The history of sovereignty from then [the seventeenth century] until now is a history 
of the victorious expansion of the principle of political organization embodied in 
sovereignty: constitutional independence’. The implication of this is clear; if there is 
an imperial constitution behind a polity then that polity is not sovereign.34
92
In developing an understanding of the ontologically absolute/closed character of 
sovereignty as constitutional independence, it is important to define it against power 
which is relative (1) and in terms of the foundation of law which is absolute (2).
1) RELATIVE POWER.
The fact that sovereignty is about legal constitutional independence means that a 
polity actually does not need to join the United Nations or actively engage in 
international relations to be sovereign. To make this point James referred to another 
ex-colony, the island of Ellice (subsequently renamed Tuvula), which also gained its 
independence and thus sovereignty in 1978.35 Whilst the Solomon Islands used their 
sovereignty to become part of the international community, joining the United 
Nations and actively pursuing a foreign policy, Tuvula declined to enter the 
international arena. Constituting nine islands, spread over some half a million square 
miles and sustaining a population of merely eight thousand, at that time it simply was
-j/:
not in Tuvula’s interest to make active use of its sovereignty on the world stage.
The issue at the heart of state sovereignty, James thus contended, ‘is not what it [the 
sovereign state] will do but what it is eligible to do ...[and]...being sovereign, it is
* • T7 •eligible to do much’. Sovereignty is not about having a capability to do x, y and z, it 
is rather about being free from any legal restraint that says you cannot do x, y and z.
ID
It is fundamentally about making a polity legally at liberty to act as it sees fit.
Thus, according to this view, critically, sovereignty has nothing to do with power. ‘In 
point of status there is, in fact, now nothing to choose between Tuvula and Britain or
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any other sovereign state’.39 In other words you may be the United States of America, 
a weak state that has made use of its sovereign status by entering the realm of 
international politics (e.g. Solomon Islands), or a state that is so small that it has not 
even bothered to do this (e.g. Tuvula). It makes no difference; each is sovereign.
Again Morgenthau made this distinction in Politics Among Nations. ‘The actual 
inequality of nations and their dependence upon each other have no relevance for the 
legal status called sovereignty. Panama is as sovereign a nation as the United States, 
although in the choice of its policies and laws it is much more limited than the United 
States’.40
F.H. Hinsley in his seminal text on the subject, Sovereignty, was also anxious to draw 
a distinction between sovereignty and power and was, in so doing, very clear that any 
reduction of the state’s international freedom of action in no way placed sovereignty 
in jeopardy. It ‘is wrong to conclude that because the state has experienced a decline 
in its international freedom of action, sovereignty is no longer compatible with the 
state’s international position. To argue in this way is to associate the attribute of 
sovereignty with the possession by the state of freedom to act as it chooses instead of 
with the absence over and above the state of a superior authority’.41
Laughland made a similar point, referring to two favourite examples regularly quoted 
by those convinced of the practical irrelevance of sovereignty - France’s loss of face 
in 1983 when it was forced to abandon its reflationary economic policy under 
pressure from the international financial markets and Britain’s subservience, before 
the introduction of the Euro, to the Bundesbank, confirming that it had no ‘monetary
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sovereignty’.42 The notion that these examples point to the death or irrelevance of 
sovereignty, Laughland claimed, is based upon a failure to distinguish between the 
polity and the government, i.e. the foundation of law, within which people may seek 
to pursue their objectives, and the actual power of the executive, which will almost 
certainly be a function of the power of the economy sustained within that polity.43 
‘Sovereignty ...is a matter of authority, not power. The confusion between these two 
concepts lies at the very heart of the claim that nation-states, being weak, are no 
longer “sovereign”’.44
Robert Jackson is also clear about the importance of the distinction between economic 
power and sovereignty, claiming that notions of economic sovereignty are unhelpful 
because they confuse issues of power with issues of sovereignty. In the current age 
loss of economic autonomy is widely experienced but this, he argues, is not the same 
as loss of sovereignty. Considering the case of Canada in relationship to its powerful 
neighbour, the United States, he maintains, ‘while Canada has the right to its own 
currency, it has limited power or capacity to determine the value of that currency. 
Canada is a sovereign state but it does not possess very much economic autonomy’.45 
Sorensen, meanwhile, concurs: ‘The fact small or weak states were always less 
powerful actors does not make Denmark or Ghana less sovereign; irrespective of their 
substantial weakness these countries do have sovereignty in the form of constitutional 
independence’.46
The neorealist Kenneth Waltz also makes the same point. ‘To say that states are 
sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others’ 
influence, that they are able to get what they want’. States may be and probably are
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‘hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to avoid, and able 
to do hardly anything just as they would like to’. But they can still remain sovereign. 
Sovereignty, Waltz claims, is about a state being free, i.e. constitutionally free, to 
decide what choices it will make in the context of these constraints.47 In light of the 
actual distinction between sovereignty and power - according to the above view - it is 
clear why sovereignty deployed in deference to this understanding should appear to be 
little more than ‘gibberish’ to those who presume that it is a word pertaining to state
48power.
In closing this section it is interesting to note, given the English School focus of this 
research, that, whilst clearly not all scholars subscribing to the distinction between 
sovereignty and power express it within the framework of the English School, the 
notion that sovereignty is defined as ‘constitutional independence’, and is as such 
clearly distinguished from power, is particularly associated with this School. This 
relationship is clearly expressed by Hidemi Suganami in the following. ‘[Hjaving 
been brought up in the English School tradition, especially under the influence of 
Manning and James in this particular respect, I was of the view that there was one 
most basic, internationally relevant, sense of the word “sovereignty”. When the word 
is used in this specific sense, it is interchangeable with “constitutional 
independence’” .49
2) ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY
Having considered relative power, and made it plain that this does not define 
sovereignty; it is now possible to make contrasting observations about the 
ontologically absolute nature of sovereignty as constitutional independence. Alan
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James defines the absoluteness of sovereignty in the following terms: ‘constitutional 
independence is either possessed or not. The relevant entity is sovereign (and 
therefore 100% sovereign) or lacks sovereignty -  lacks it totally’.50 Georg Sorensen, 
meanwhile, echoes the constitutionally absolute status of sovereignty by drawing an 
analogy with other legal categories, marriage and citizenship. A person is either 
married or not, there is no legal status of 75% married. A person is either a citizen or 
not, there is no legal status of 75% a citizen. ‘[A] state either does have sovereignty in 
the sense of constitutional independence or it does not have it. There is no half way 
house, no legal in between’.51 Hans Morgenthau also unpacks this theme in terms of 
the logical demands of sovereignty with similar ontological implication. ‘We have 
heard it said time and again that we must “surrender part of our sovereignty” to an 
international organization for the sake of world peace, that we must “share” our 
sovereignty with such an organization, that the latter would have a certain “limited 
sovereignty” while we would keep the substance of it, or vice versa, that there are 
“quasi-sovereign” and “half sovereign” states’. Morgenthau contends that divided 
sovereignty, whilst enormously attractive, is conceptual nonsense. ‘If sovereignty 
means supreme authority, it stands to reason that two or more entities - persons, 
groups of persons, or agencies - cannot be sovereign within the same time and 
space’.52
In conclusion, then, sovereignty, disclosed through realism’s ‘constitutional 
independence’, is ontologically absolute. Not residing upon the inherently relative 
concept of power, which many suppose, sovereignty is manifest in constitutional 
independence which is either present or absent. In relating it to the spectrum whose 
parameters were defined in chapter 2, therefore, this legal perspective correlates to the
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ontological closure of the sovereign state pole within the realist tradition. Having 
defined the ontologically absolute (closed) character of the realist tradition from the 
perspective of constitutional independence, the chapter will now pursue the 
ontological closure of the realist tradition through the grid provided by realist 
conceptions of space, ‘spatialisations’.
iv. REALISM & ‘SPATIALISATION’: ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE
As noted earlier, Alan James - like the pioneers of the English School - has not been 
very theoretically self-conscious about the role of concepts of space, ‘spatialisations’, 
in the definition of sovereignty. It can be shown, however, that these do play an 
important role in developing the ontologically closed character of sovereignty. 
Specifically, one can see the spatial implications of modernity on the configuration of 
state sovereignty, and its consequential closed ontology, on two levels: first, through 
the grid of general modem social epistemological assumptions and then through a 
rather more clinical deployment of the modem ‘spatialisation’ which is implicated in 
the quest for social scientific explanatory capacity. The chapter will begin by 
examining this ontological closure in terms of realism generally before moving to 
consider the social scientific basis for ontological closure, focusing particularly on 
neorealism.
a) GENERAL CLOSURE
John Gerard Ruggie’s analysis of the shift from medievalism to early modernity 
clearly demonstrates the general impact of the modem social episteme on politics and 
the state from the perspective of IR.53 During the medieval era there was a great 
division between Nature and Grace with the focus being very much on Grace which,
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although mediated through various sacramental channels, had the general effect of 
preventing the physical world from coming into focus, giving rise to a multi- 
perspectival apprehension of reality. The Renaissance and Reformation assertion, 
contrary to medievalism, that matter was both knowable and good, posited a new 
epistemic confidence, replacing the subjectivism of the previous era with the belief 
that one could objectively know the world.54 This social epistemic revolution gave 
rise to the single point perspective which had significant implications on politics. 
‘Within the definite boundary of the new territorial state’, Mumford observes, ‘unified 
areas of administration were established ...In politics as well as in painting after the 
invention of the easel picture, the new life was held together in a rigid frame... the 
new territorial state... could be seen or at least visualised: it was a visible whole, and 
each country that was politically unified became, so to say, a self-contained picture. 
This visualisation of power became possible only when territorial continuity became 
an attribute of the sovereign state’.55 The use of this lens had the effect of cutting the 
world into discrete politico-territorial blocks. Approached in this manner, there is an 
important sense in which territory became the foundation for the state, upholding 
government, population and society. This has resulted in international relations being 
reduced in complexity to the point where it is entirely logical to invoke the image of 
clashing tectonic plates or the realist billiard ball metaphor.56 In this context, ‘state 
territories have been reified as set or fixed units of sovereign space. This has served to 
dehistoricize and decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration. 
Classical realism and idealism have both relied heavily upon this assumption. But it can
c * j
be regarded as the rock bottom geographical assumption that underwrites the others’.
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Thus the general impact of the new epistemology clearly had the effect of configuring a 
new ontology characterized by closure which provides further helpful perspective on the 
interpretation of territorial closure considered earlier in the chapter. In so doing it 
demonstrates, once again, the fact that sovereignty is characterized by ontological 
closure and thus by the sovereign state pole of the realist tradition of the sovereignty 
spectrum set out in chapter 2.
b) A  PRIORI CLOSURE
Instead of being impacted by philosophical and scientific developments simply by 
virtue of being part of modem culture and its new single-perspectivity, some forms of 
realism have deliberately sought to apply natural science methodological assumptions 
to the study of IR, calling into being ontological reification for the purpose of 
licensing a more advanced explanatory capability. The chapter will consider a 
seventeenth century and then a contemporary application of this endeavour.
i. THE HOBBESIAN PERSPECTIVE
Thomas Hobbes was committed to a new science based on Euclidean geometry and 
the notion that all phenomena could be explained as matter in motion. Specifically, 
this catered for the possibility of developing the autonomy of politics from religion.58 
This mechanical presupposition, with its explanatory capability, facilitated his 
confident, positivist epistemology, securing the absolute division between the subject 
and object such that the subject could not change the object by reference to its 
knowing of the object since the object was reified and fixed, ontologically closed. In 
arguing that the state should be understood by reference to such an epistemology, this 
form of realism attributes an essential ontology to its subject, the sovereign state a
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priori.59 Camilleri and Falk, as noted earlier, are in no doubt about Hobbes’ legacy 
and its positivistic, scientific basis. ‘The Hobbesian view of the state, which still 
colours the modem understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial 
consciousness implicit in Euclidean geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian 
physics’.60
ii. NEOREALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND ONTOLOGICAL CLOSURE61
Neorealism has had the effect of renewing realist ontology. In order to understand this 
renewal one must understand that it has been totally tied up with the aspiration to 
develop a rigorous social scientific approach. This chapter, therefore, approaches 
ontological renewal, and its implications for sovereignty, from the perspective of the 
development of this influential positivist, scientific frame of reference. This requires 
first some consideration of the underlining principles and assumptions of neorealism, 
paving the way more importantly for a definition of ‘structure’.
Waltz was critical of reductionist approaches and thus he rejected the rooted 
particularity of first and second image theories. This form of IR was, he maintained, 
of limited value primarily providing a ‘descriptive’ as opposed to an ‘explanatory’ 
service. Waltz’s neorealism thus embraced the systemic approach where it focused 
on the third image level of analysis. His aim in turning to the systems approach was 
to tease the subject matter out of the realms of process/subjectivity, wherein some 
misguided theorists suggest social practices can inform the character of international 
life, and raise analysis to a greater level of objectivity and success through identifying 
the international ‘structure’.
Drawing on examples of structure in other parts of social science, Waltz argued that 
the structure of international relations should be characterised by a profound 
instability bom of international anarchy. By shifting the motivation from human evil, 
emanating from particular individuals or groups rooted in specific state contexts, to 
the structural instability of states, neorealism became the study of abstract, ahistorical 
international structure. Indeed, whilst the states are constitutive of the structure, it is 
the stmcture rather than the specificities of individual states that provide the basis 
upon which neorealism is able to provide explanatory capability. ‘Waltz’s argument is 
at base a determinist theory in which stmcture dictates policy. This takes the classical 
realist idea of the importance of international stmcture in foreign policy to a point 
beyond classical or neoclassical realism, which always makes provision for the 
politics and ethics of statecraft’.63
THE RESULTING SOVEREIGNTY
This Waltzian stmcture results in a very particular closed view of sovereignty whose 
separation from process renders it, like the international stmcture that the states 
define, ahistorical and timeless. Set in the context of the stmcture, (that which 
facilitates the ceteris paribus condition, opening the door to science) the sovereign 
state assumes a remarkably absolute and uniform ontology. This uniform timelessness 
is seen in the fact that there is no differentiation of function between states and no 
facility for countenancing the possibility of structural change resulting from changes 
within the sovereign states:
First, differentiation of function: in the neorealist frame all sovereign states do 
everything. They cannot work together to share the burdens of different areas of
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responsibility or to extract the benefits of a division of labour. ‘[Ajnarchy’, Waltz 
maintains, ‘entails relations of coordination among a system’s units, and that implies 
their sameness’.64 The uniform, timeless state, moreover, expresses its sovereignty 
when discharging its unshared responsibilities. ‘To say that a state is sovereign means 
that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems’.65 
Critically for the purposes of this investigation, in the Waltzian view, the ontological 
closure and homogeneity of the state is a function of its autonomy and sovereignty. 
‘To call states “like units” is to say that each state is like all other states in being an 
autonomous political unit. It is another way of saying that states are sovereign’.66 
This approach, Agnew and Corbridge contends, ‘leads Waltz to take the territorial 
character of the state to an extreme in his claim that international relations should be 
studied only at a systemic level. This is because it is the anarchy beyond state borders
f\ 7that international relations as a field takes as its subject’.
Second, the possibility of structural change: the ontological closure of neorealist 
sovereignty is expressed in the timeless permanence of the state and the consequential 
sense, expressed by Wind, that ‘the territorial state lives on forever’.68 Walker similarly 
expresses his concern. ‘The apparently abstract claim to state sovereignty, much of the 
recent critical literature has suggested, must be understood as a complex political 
practice -  a practice that has been persistently reified by claims about political reality 
that simply affirm the eternal presence of the state in human affairs and, therefore, the 
inevitable absence of any need to treat questions about political identity with any 
seriousness at all’.69 In similar vein, Agnew and Corbridge claim that the ontological 
closure of the sovereign state is profoundly implicated in Waltz’s attempt to escape the 
specificities of history. ‘To retain a parsimonious structural model of international
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relations Waltz sacrifices historical validity. “The state system” thus has an existence
• • 7 fioutside of the historical contexts in which it has evolved’.
In conclusion, although in some senses neorealism shifts its focus away from the 
sovereign state to ‘international structure’, the role of the sovereign state as ‘structure 
builder’ is essential and more importantly is executed through a renewal of the 
sovereign state’s closed ontology. Indeed, to the extent that closure is central to the 
positivist scientific method which neorealism deploys (providing an absolute division 
between the subject and the object, which ensures that the knower does not change the 
known or vice versa, see chapter 2), its ontological closure ultimately is an a priori’ 
given. Thus closure in neorealism should not be seen as a pragmatic index of the 
state’s response to the realist group imperative (although that imperative remains and 
is responded to within neorealism), as seen in many classical forms of realism, but as 
a social scientific imperative flowing from its epistemology and allied explanatory 
aspiration.71
CONCLUSION
In drawing Part 1 and its characterization of realist sovereignty to a close, it is the 
contention of this chapter that modem territoriality, the realist group imperative for 
civility, the legal implications of constitutional separateness and the operative 
spatialisations within realism and neorealism, all demonstrate the basis for an 
ontologically closed conception of sovereignty at the sovereign state pole. First, 
drained of numinous and viewed in narrowly material terms as a territorial entity, the 
boundaried sovereign state is ontologically closed, i.e. discreet and self-contained. 
Second, the group imperative can only create civility through the creation of
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government that shuts out anarchy into the realm of the outside, the international 
arena. Third, shut off from other legal foundations, the sovereign state depends on 
constitutional independence. Finally, configured through the single-perspectival lens 
associated with modernity and its consequential ontological closure, the sovereign 
state ‘spatialisation’ at the very least suggests ontological closure. More importantly, 
however, where the closure of the modem ontology has been depended upon in the 
deployment of the scientific method, e.g. neorealism, this perceived closure has 
become not the mere consequence of being impacted by the prevailing social episteme 
but the consequence of an explicit theoretical assumption embraced a priori. In 
conclusion, sovereignty appears to have a clear basis for being conceived as an 
ontologically closed category.
PART 2: SOVEREIGNTY & CHANGE: CONSTRUCTED & GIVEN
At the heart of the absolute, closed definition of sovereignty that has emerged in this 
chapter is the sense of sovereignty pertaining not to contingent processes but rather to 
an ontologically closed juridical-territorial unit. This does not mean that there is no 
capacity to engage with changes that impact sovereignty as a whole at specific 
moments of time, like the Solomon Islands gaining their independence in October 
1978 or the reunification of Germany in October 1990. It does mean, however, that, 
whilst there is recognition of the reality of gradual change, there is a failure to engage 
with it.
I
iI
I  One can see a good example of the conceptual problems presented by gradual change 
when considering Alan James’ account of European integration. In James’ world there 
seems only to be room for sovereign nation-states or sovereign supranational states.
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There is no conceptual space for the ‘in between’. James claims that the EU is no 
where near becoming a sovereign state but the only other model he appears to have is 
one that addresses international bodies from an essentially intergovernmental 
perspective. Prior to sovereign federal statehood; organizations ‘do not have 
independent lives of their own; they do not have independent sources of finance; they 
do not have independent armed forces. All they have comes from or is loaned to them 
by states. Consequentially, organizations are unable to devour, as it were, their 
creators, and therefore present no threat at all to states’ constitutional independence’. 
Essentially it therefore seems that, even when one deals with integration projects 
between states with growing supranational components, these are deemed to be a 
function of the nation-state sovereignty, as in any conventional intergovernmental 
arrangement, until some day presumably their extent is such that they become a single 
new sovereign state.72
Mindful of the above, the point should be made that, if one subscribes to an absolute 
conception of sovereignty (i.e. when an actor is either 100% sovereign or not 
sovereign at all), it is hardly surprising that it is not really possible to contemplate a 
gradual transfer of sovereignty bit by bit and that one should be forced into 
accepting a framework that basically infers that one must move at a specific moment 
in time from a place where the member states are wholly sovereign (and the EU is 
not) to a place where the EU is wholly sovereign (and the members states are not).74 
The absolute approach to sovereignty may have worked when considering the advent 
of new sovereign states, released at specific moments from imperial rule but it is not 
applicable to regional integration, nor does it help when considering any other
nc
conceivable process of the gradual transfer of sovereignty over time.
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In light of the above, it is now necessary to criticise some of the implications of the 
sovereign state pole (Part 1), developing a defence of sovereignty that resides further 
out in the spectrum in the broader realist tradition (and which -  as will become 
apparent later in the thesis -  also has great claims to the rationalist tradition). Set 
apart from the place of absolute ontological closure, this makes for a realist account of 
sovereignty that can embrace a measure of openness and change. In a world in which 
sovereignty endures and yet has to come to terms with a constantly changing 
environment, developing a model of it that can deal with change constitutes a key 
theoretical challenge especially for the English School.76 In the first instance the 
School is deeply committed to being historically rooted and to avoiding the pitfalls of 
scientific over-enthusiasm with all its reifications. In the second instance, the three 
traditions framework has been devised specifically in order to cater for a changing 
environment. Of all theoretical frameworks, therefore, contemporary accounts of the 
English School should be particularly well positioned to employ a conception of 
sovereignty that can deal with twenty-first century change.
STRUCTURE
This chapter will explore the difficulties associated with the closed English School 
approach to sovereignty in three sections. Section 1 will examine how the centrality of 
the division between internal and external sovereignty (constitutional independence) 
to the English School definition of sovereignty has been used to generate an 
artificially closed model of sovereignty. Section 2 will identify a number of bases of 
openness manifest in internal sovereignty, which are actually implicit in the definition 
of sovereignty given in Part 1, but obscured from view as a result of its giving priority
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to external sovereignty. Finally, Section 3 will then consider how best to renew the 
English School realist approach to sovereignty in order to make it capable of engaging 
with current changes.
SECTION 1: CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: REVISITED
By involving territory, people and government in his definition of sovereignty, and 
yet distinguishing them from the central characteristic of constitutional independence, 
James engages with a long standing distinction in English School thought between 
‘internal’ and ‘external sovereignty’ according to which the former refers to 
supremacy with respect to internal government (embracing the positive presences of 
government, territory and people) whilst the latter pertains to constitutional 
independence, freedom from supranational legal constraint.77 In the history of English 
School thought there has been a tendency to invoke both internal and external 
sovereignty, observing that they are connected, but to then deal almost exclusively 
with external sovereignty to the extent that one loses sight of its relationship to
• • 70internal sovereignty. The ontologically closed character of sovereignty is the result 
of focusing on external sovereignty abstracted from its internal dimension.79 This 
generates some real logical problems. The chapter will first consider these in general 
terms (I) before focusing on the central challenge of change (II):
I. SOVEREIGNTY BY INFERENCE
Addressing the central difficulty with divided sovereignty, quite apart from the 
problem of change, the point must be made that the assertion that constitutional 
independence (external sovereignty) can effectively provide the definition of 
sovereignty in the context of IR suggests that what is liberated will constitute a
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naturally cohering unit (internally and externally). There is in this failure to address in
any way the nature of that unit, an essential Newtonian assumption that it is a natural
80self-sustaining, self-cohering, unchanging actor that will endure. Far from 
constituting an appropriate historically rooted approach, this definition is profoundly 
ahistorical. James was right to assert that territorial peopled units with forms of 
government do not by themselves provide a definition of sovereignty, but neither does 
constitutional independence, by itself, provide such a definition. In truth both 
constitutional independence and the positive presence of territory, people and 
government (internal sovereignty) are key ingredients of sovereignty. In response to 
James specifically, therefore, the point must be made that, whilst you cannot have 
sovereignty on the basis of a territory + people + government (internal sovereignty) 
alone, neither can you have sovereignty on the basis of constitutional independence 
(external sovereignty) alone. Both the positive and negative elements of sovereignty 
are important and require attention in any rigorous and historically informed 
definition of sovereignty
II. OBSCURING INSIDE-OUT CHANGE
Another perspective on the artificial nature of the closure attaching itself to 
sovereignty resulting from the division between internal and external sovereignty can 
be seen by narrowly considering its inability to engage with change. Specifically, the 
division effectively separates external from internal sovereignty and in doing so cuts it 
off from what -  certainly in the current environment of economic transformation -  is 
an important low politics/economics process arena of change. Set apart from such 
sources of change, which if allowed to inform external sovereignty might well result
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in variable levels of constitutional independence, sovereignty is a crucially absolute 
condition.81
CONCLUSION
The ironic consequence of subscribing to the negative definition of sovereignty is the 
fact that one ends up with an ontologically closed account of sovereignty that is more 
appropriate for neorealism than historically rooted approaches such as the English
Q 'J  •
School. In the context of regional integration and globalization, which have 
involved huge changes for sovereignty emanating from the world of low politics 
processes, the decision to deal with sovereignty as ‘external sovereignty’ abstracted 
from ‘internal sovereignty’ has been a major problem for the English School. There is 
a desperate need for it to embrace a holistic ‘negative and positive’ model of 
sovereignty that can be subjected to changes emanating from the inside-out as well as 
the outside-in. This must provide a capacity to deal with the positive presences of the 
social contracted territorial people or quasi-state governments, initiating both 
domestically and internationally, if they are to properly inform any definition of
83sovereignty.
SECTION 2: BASES FOR OPENNESS
Having considered the way in which external sovereignty can be used to infer 
ontological closure, it is now important to reflect on some of the bases of openness 
that inform sovereignty and which would be able to impact external sovereignty if a 
properly holistic conception of sovereignty is embraced. The chapter will focus 
primarily on its reconsideration of the realist group imperative which goes right to the 
heart of the definition of internal sovereignty.
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I. THE REALIST GROUP IMPERATIVE REVISITED
The chapter will reconsider the two expressions of the realist group imperative, the 
social contracted polity and the quasi-state ruled by force. In so doing it will 
demonstrate that, although developing effective internal sovereignty is about shutting 
out anarchy (see Part 1), it is not about shutting out openness per se. Furthermore, it 
will also demonstrate that, whilst - in deference to Part 1 - sovereignty should not be 
defined simply by reference to power; neither should it be defined by relying centrally 
on constitutional independence apart from power processes. Both provide crucial 
elements of the definition of sovereignty.
i. SOCIAL CONTRACTED POLITY
The constitutionally independent unit will probably cohere in the form of a social 
contracted polity. If so, power and process can be seen both in terms of its 
constitution (a) and in terms of the need to take action (b).
a. CONSTITUTION
From the perspective of the social contracted polity, the characterisations of 
sovereignty via the realist group imperative failed to properly engage with the 
ontological implications of its construction. It is the suggestion of this thesis that this 
was in part a consequence of using the notion of a social contract whilst denying the 
historicity of a contract signing process which has resulted in a tendency for people to 
invoke it as a closed, ahistorical given. (The utility of the theory did not pertain to the 
historicity of a contract-signing ceremony but to the provision of an account of 
political obligation. Whilst there was no specific event at which a contract was
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endorsed, there was/is some sort of ‘contract effect’ manifest through the purchase of 
effective political obligation, which rendered the employment of the theory 
appropriate). This must be combated in two ways. First, from the perspective of the 
broad sweep of history, there is a need to be explicit about the fact that, whilst the 
socio-politico-legal-cultural configuration that actually sustains the ‘contract effect’ 
may not be the result of the signing of a contract on a particular day, it is the result of 
many events that have manifested themselves across the socio-political history of the 
polity in question. Second, from the perspective of current practice, it is important to 
note that in recent years modem democracies have, through the provision of elections, 
come close to something like a regular contract signing ceremony which has helped to 
authenticate the political community. Facilitated in the UK by the 1867 and 1884 
Reform Acts and finally sealed by the 1918 and 1929 Reform Acts, this quest to 
increase the franchise provided a levelling process whereby all citizens of the UK 
could, every four or five years, vote in a General Election and call into being a new 
government in their name, the name of the people. Indeed, such is the obvious 
connection between the advent of voting and the expression/renewal of the social 
contract that it gave rise to the term the ‘sovereignty of the people’.84 In the context of 
social contract theory one would state that this ‘people’ has provided sovereignty with 
the cultural glue that has fostered a framework wherein individuals can shape the use 
of their surrendered natural rights/sovereignty to influence their polity and thus 
participate in their state sovereignty in an ongoing meaningful way which sustains a 
ongoing measure of openness.85
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b. AN ACTOR THAT ACTS
The relationship between sovereignty and process is also made plain through 
examination of the fact that it is not a naturally cohering, timeless unit. It needs to be 
able to act in order to seek to guarantee its own sustenance. At its most basic level 
sovereignty is about the creation of an actor that ‘acts’. From a social contract 
‘emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of the 
body politic ... Explicitly or implicitly the sovereign is endowed with a distinctive, 
identifiable will and a capacity for rational decision-making’. Thus the sovereign 
territorial people is not a political form that can be conceptualized apart from action. The 
actor forms judgements and acts. Again, this is not to say that sovereignty is not 
dependent on constitutional independence, in the context of the realist group imperative 
and modem social epistemic assumptions, nor is it to suggest that sovereignty is 
actually about being able to guarantee getting one’s own way. The point is simply that 
the prospect of a sovereign polity that is so constrained that it has no power to take 
action or initiate in any way is as nonsensical as the idea of a sovereign state without 
constitutional independence. Power and process must thus clearly feature in any credible 
conceptualization of sovereignty.
ii. A POLITY RULED BY FORCE
Whilst many sovereign polities constitute cohering social contracted, territorial units 
of some sort but nonetheless depend on power processes in order to initiate their 
purposes, the power dependence of other polities is heightened by the fact that power 
needs to be deployed constantly in order to maintain coherence because of the 
absence of any meaningful social contract effect. A constitutionally liberated unit that 
is an ex-colony may not have constituted a coherent political unit and may have only
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been sustained in the context of imperial grip. On becoming constitutionally 
independent, therefore, it might only be held together by the force of a dictator. To the 
extent that this polity depends very significantly on power for its sustenance, it would 
be even more inappropriate to claim that its sovereignty has nothing to do with power 
than to make this assertion with respect to sovereignty relating to a social contracted 
territorial polity. Thus, whilst ‘constitutional independence’ is an accurate definition
* * 8 7so far as it goes, sovereignty’s relationship with power requires more attention. 
Whilst this form of sovereignty sustains closure in the sense of constitutional 
independence, territory and modem ‘spatialisations’, the lack of a social contracted 
territorial people makes a polity rather less solid and consequently very much more 
vulnerable and existentially very much more dependent on power.
INTERNATIONAL INITIATION?
Finally, in considering the realist group imperative associated with internal 
sovereignty, the point should be made that this provides the basis for one of the 
clearest demonstrations of the problem with divided sovereignty. Specifically, the 
divide between negative, external sovereignty, defined as constitutional 
independence, and positive, internal sovereignty, defined as social contracted 
territorial people or a quasi-state ruled by force, is such that the positive agency 
sustaining the actor that acts, is identified with internal sovereignty. In reality 
however, the social contracted people or quasi-state ruled by force, uphold their 
respective executives that make decisions and initiate with respect to the low politics 
competencies pertaining to internal sovereignty and with respect to the high politics 
competencies pertaining to external sovereignty. The high politics foreign and 
defence policy competencies cannot be accounted for merely by negative
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constitutional independence apart from the positive polity any more than the presence 
of certain policy competencies without constitutional independence can necessarily be 
interpreted as confirming the presence of sovereignty.
II. TERRITORIALITY
Turning briefly to the notion that territoriality is necessarily an ontologically closed 
category, the point must be made that, whilst territory is indeed fixed, territoriality, 
namely the cultural understanding of territory, depends very much on the operative 
ideational lens through which territory is apprehended. The fact that different lenses, 
e.g. the medieval and modem, result in different configurations clearly demonstrates 
that sovereign territoriality must be seen as a partially socially constructed category. 
Given that territoriality is not entirely given, and thus completely closed, there is a 
sense in which it must be able to accommodate ontological openness to at least some 
degree. Any rigorous model of sovereignty must take account of the constructed 
nature of sovereign territoriality and the attendant measure of openness.
III. ‘SPATIALISATION’
Finally, the implication of modem ‘spatialisation’ in the quest for greater explanatory 
potential also mns into difficulty as a result of failing to account for a measure of 
openness. Specifically, Marlene Wind highlights the complete ontological closure of 
neorealism by noting that the interests of the actors are treated as givens, fixed and 
beyond question. They have no capacity for change. ‘States, like rational individuals 
in classical economics, are assumed to have ‘given’ utility preferences as states
0 0
regardless of other attributes they may possess, or variability they may show’. Over 
time, however, states and their interests do change as a consequence of changing
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• O Qexpenences and relationships. Any credible realist model of state sovereignty must 
embrace a measure of ontological openness in order to cater conceptually for changes 
in priorities and preferences.
RENEWED ENGLISH SCHOOL REALIST CONCEPTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY
Having considered the need for a holistic understanding of sovereignty both from the 
perspective of consideration of the difficulties associated with the divide between 
internal and external sovereignty (Section 1) and through examination of the bases of 
openness (Section 2), it is now possible to consider how best to renew the realist 
concept of sovereignty. In moving to make this assessment, it is in no sense the 
purpose of this reconsideration of the key components of sovereignty, as defined by 
Part 1, to suggest that they actually posit a false definition. Each remains important. 
The point of Part 2 has simply been to make the case that an historically rooted 
defence of sovereignty should recognize that whilst constitutional independence, the 
realist group imperative, territoriality and spatialisation inject a significant sense of 
ontological closure into the notion of sovereignty, there are problems with the 
contention that sovereignty is an essentially closed category. There has thus been a 
need to revisit each of these characteristics not to argue that they are not important, or 
even that they do not contribute to the sense of ontological closure that is definitive of 
sovereignty but simply to highlight the difficulties of seeking to suggest that they 
inject into sovereignty an ontology that can be characterized by reference to complete 
closure. The fruit of this approach is a conservative definition of sovereignty that is 
entirely consistent with realism, although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
not the complete ontological closure of the sovereign state pole.
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In demonstrating the need for any compelling realist account of sovereignty to be able 
to engage with change this thesis does not simply present a criticism of English 
School expressions of sovereignty but of all accounts of sovereignty - especially 
neorealism - whose ontology is such that they must be located at the sovereign state 
pole. Given the special English School focus of this research, however, the main 
purpose must be to unpack the implications of this critique on English School thought. 
Specifically, the commitment to approach international relations in an historically 
rooted manner should predispose the English School to see sovereignty as a whole in 
which openness can be mediated from both its internal and external dimensions rather 
than being ignored by a closed conception of sovereignty that is actually external 
sovereignty abstracted from internal sovereignty.90 It is perfectly proper to talk of 
sovereignty in terms of its implications for external relationships and it is perfectly 
proper to talk of sovereignty in relationship to domestic state authority. If one talks of 
them at length apart from each other, however, this suggests that these two 
conversations are not necessarily connected in the sense of being part of the same 
whole, two sides of the same ‘sovereignty coin’. Although it is quite impossible to 
conceive of constitutionally independent, external sovereignty without internal 
sovereignty, some English School thinkers have allowed their attention to focus on 
external sovereignty to such an extent that it has both given the impression that a) one 
can think of it apart from internal sovereignty and that b) it has an absolute 
ontological standing which, ironically, parallels that of neorealism. It is only when 
one approaches the sovereign state holistically - engaging with the fact that change 
can impact either internal or external sovereignty and thereby sovereignty as a whole - 
that one can see processes/changes and thus account for the actual model of
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sovereignty manifest in the states system. As such the dominant English School 
approach to sovereignty within the realist tradition should not identify with the 
sovereign state pole but the wider part of the realist tradition which is not entirely 
closed. This is particularly important if one is to usefully deploy sovereignty in the 
context of the profound changes of the early twenty-first century like European 
integration and globalization.91
Given the above, it is interesting to note that James -  who as noted at the beginning of 
this chapter -  has written extensively about sovereignty from within the English 
school tradition and in so-doing has been one of the foremost exponents of the 
internal -  external sovereignty divide and the allied emphasis on external sovereignty, 
has recently reassessed his position. Ironically, however, this would seem to be more 
the result of a concern to maintain an ontologically absolute vision of sovereignty 
rather than one that can better accommodate change!
‘It [sovereignty] may, and does, have different implications in different contexts, 
leading some to speak of internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. But that is 
dangerous terminology, for it can all too easily be taken to mean that sovereignty can, 
as it were, be split down the middle, enabling one of its halves to exist without the 
other’.92
CONCLUSION
Having provided a definition of sovereignty on the basis of ontological closure in Part 
1 of this chapter, and having qualified this in Part 2 through the demonstration of the 
presence of contingent processes in these apparently closed ontologies, resulting at
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least partially from the fact that sovereignty is no longer abstracted from its internal 
dimension, it is now possible to reflect in greater detail on the implications of the 
resulting model of sovereignty. Clearly, to the extent that sovereignty is actually 
constructed, it cannot be treated as ontologically entirely closed, Newtonian res 
extensa, given a priori. This does not mean, however, that a polity cannot have firm 
boundaries. Ontologically one is not confronted with the entirely open, ephemeral, 
inessential, depthless space associated with post-positivist epistemology, on the one 
hand, or the entirely closed, solid, essential, Newtonian space of positivist 
epistemology, on the other. In confronting this fact one must appreciate that the 
qualification of Part 2 is only partial for, whilst there are elements of construction in 
sovereignty, territory, the product of the realist group imperative, release from an 
imperial polity and modem social epistemic configuration, all make for a solid 
ontology. In this context the construction in question gives rise to solid boundaried 
entities that draw on givens, such as the physical givenness of the state’s extension, its 
territory. This approach enables one to see the importance of sovereignty but in a 
context where one can be theoretically self-conscious of the fact that it is not 
ontologically closed a priori. It might change.
Another perspective on the ontology of the sovereign state can be obtained by noting that 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to conceptualize a frozen but rather a living entity. As a 
dynamic unit in a dynamic world, it is essential to factor process into the sovereign 
state as it responds to, and engages with, challenges over time. This basis of process 
is central to both inter-dependent internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, i.e. 
in the social contracted territorial people, the recognized sovereign state and in the 
capacity of the sovereign state to take actions to assert itself. These processes are
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actually concerned with maintaining the integrity of the ontology and are articulated 
in its interest.
In conclusion given that, whilst territorial givenness and the realist group imperative 
might appear to be indicative of absolute closure, sovereign states embrace contingent 
processes and change and, given that the integrity of the sovereign state ontology 
depends on the states’ capacity as an actor to engage in processes and act, it is the 
contention of this thesis first, that a measure of change/construction is consistent with a 
solid ontology and second, that understanding the openness upon which this depends is 
central to the provision of an effective account of sovereignty. This conceptual approach 
confronts one with the fact that between the clinical modem spatialisation of a clinically 
positivist epistemology (entirely closed, solid, essential, Newtonian and given a priori) 
and post-modem spatialisations of pos-positivist epistemology (entirely open ephemeral, 
inessential, depthless and hyperspatial) is another spatialisation which is perhaps more 
the common sense understanding of the classical realist (and indeed, as the thesis will 
demonstrate, rationalist) space subscribed to by the English School tradition which, 
denying the temptation of either boldly building a science or of seeking to release IR 
categories from metanarratives, presents an ontology that is neither wholly closed nor 
wholly open. It is from this spatialisation that this thesis seeks to develop its model of
93sovereignty.
Having both defined the closure of the sovereign state pole (Part 1) and subjected it to 
criticism (Part 2), developing a qualified realism, it is now important to consider the 
utility of this model of sovereignty in the context of the pressures of change. The next 
chapter will apply the defence of sovereignty supported by this chapter in the context
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of the profound changes of the current era, including the rapidly increasing number of 
sovereign states and the process of European integration. It will contend that, in the 
context of contemporary pressures, sovereignty is demonstrating a significant capacity 
to endure and adapt.
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individuals is simply raised to the nth degree in national life’. Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral
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Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, p. 107. Hans Morgenthau meanwhile, contended that ‘the drive 
to dominate was common to all men’. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 30. ‘Whatever their 
other disagreements’, Jack Donnelly observes, ‘realists are unanimous in holding that human nature 
contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions; that these passions define the central problem of 
politics; and that statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature’. Jack 
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, p. 10. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt agree, ‘The 
structural realism lineage begins with Thucydides’ representation of power politics as a law of human 
behaviour. The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human 
nature. The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be merely a reflection of the 
characteristics of the people that comprise the state’. Dunne and Schmidt, ‘Realism’, The Globalization 
o f World Politics, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001, p. 147.
20 This domestic perspective, the quest for domestic peace, is particularly strong in Hobbes’ account of 
international anarchy, see the characterization given by Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to 
International Relations, pp. 74-76.
21 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 143. The basis and foundational nature of the group 
is seen in the assertion that in realism the group is seen as being logically prior to the individual, see 
Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, p. 103.
22 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 84.
23 ‘The question of Realism’s resilience touches upon one of its central claims, namely, that it is the 
embodiment of laws of international politics which remain true across time (history) and space 
(geopolitics)’. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, p. 145.
24 Ibid., p. 150.
25 R. B. J. Walker, ‘Security, sovereignty, and the challenge of world politics’, Alternatives 15, pp. 11-
12 .
26 Daniel Philpott, ‘Westphalia, Authority and International Society’, p. 147; Alan James, ‘Sovereignty: 
Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ p. 3 and Alan James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign statehood in 
Contemporary International Society’, p. 38.
27 Alan James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ p. 9.
28 Ibid., p. 11. James makes the same important point more recently: ‘Sovereignty in its most 
fundamental sense, amounts to constitutional independence’. Sovereignty ‘consists of being 
constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however, loosely within a wider constitutional scheme’. 
Alan James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 39.
29 The most recent example of a state demonstrating the same principle as the Solomon Islands was 
seen at midnight on May 20th 2002 when East Timor became constitutionally independent from 
Indonesia. Subsequently obtaining a seat at the United Nations, East Timor is the world’s 192nd 
sovereign state. The next most likely nation to gain sovereign independence, according to James 
Pettifer, will again result from the break-up of a former supranational state rather than decolonisation. 
The candidate in question is Kosovo which is seeking independence from the former republic of 
Yugoslavia. James Pettifer, ‘Kosovo: Nation in Waiting’, The World Today, Volume 61, Number 2, 
February 2005, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 18-20.
30 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A 
Knopf, 1948, p. 290.
31 H. W. R. Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’, Cambridge Law Journal, 1955, p. 189.
32 John Laughland, The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins o f the European Idea, London, 
Warner Books, 1998, p. 169.
33 Sorensen, ‘Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, p. 171.
34 A difficulty which none of the above scholars engage with is the fact that it is possible for a state to 
obtain membership of the United Nations, and thus be welcomed into the community of sovereign 
states as a sovereign state, whilst not being entirely constitutionally independent. UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1541 defines 3 forms of self-government set out in Principle IV. These include 
‘Free Association’, a status chosen by ex colonies who wish to maintain some constitutional ties with 
their former imperial master. At present only three states have chosen ‘Free Association’ the Marshall 
Islands, the Federal States of Micronesia and Palau. Their jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defence, 
telecommunications, immigration, environmental protection and currency is shared with the United 
States and thus they cannot be judged to be fully constitutionally independent. This is something o f an 
anomaly. The case can be made, however, that, to the extent that the freely associating states could 
embrace complete independence but rather use their freedom to freely associate, there is fundamentally 
an effective independence that has serviced their decisions which in relation to some issues they choose 
to make with the United States.
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35 James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ p. 10.
36 Please note that in 2000 Tuvula reassessed its position and actually did join the United Nations, see 
www.un.org.
37 James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ p. 10.
38 This does not mean that the polity in question will not restrain itself legally through the imposition of 
constitutional checks and balances on particular organs of the state. It does mean, however, that there 
can be no external legal check from a higher polity. A contrasting view that does associate sovereignty 
with power and which emerges from beyond the English School can be seen in Roy E. Jones, ‘The 
English school of international relations: a case for closure’, Review o f International Studies, 1981, 7, 
pp. 5-6.
39 •James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish’, p. 10.
40 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 293. This was amplified from the perspective of an equal 
legal sovereign, capacity to act: Sovereignty, Morgenthau maintained, ‘...signifies that with reference 
to the legislative function all nations are equal, regardless of their size, population, and power. In any 
international conference, the vote of Panama counts as much as the vote of the United States, and the 
votes of both are required to make the new rules of international law binding on both: the rule of 
unanimity’. Ibid., p. 291.
41 The quotation continues; ‘To do this is to confuse the situation to which states may often have 
aspired, but have never in fact enjoyed, with the opposite condition from which the concept of 
sovereignty in its international version historically obtained its relevance and from which it continues 
to drive it - that condition in which a collection of states, all insisting on their independence, were 
brought to recognize that they do not exist in isolation but are forced to live with other states’. F. H. 
Hinsley, Sovereignty, New York, Basic Books Inc, 1966, p. 226.
42Laughland, Tainted Source, p. 177.
43 Ibid., p. 177-181.
44 Ibid, p. 171.
45 Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics’, p. 10.
46 Sorensen, ‘Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, p. 173.
47 K N. Waltz, Theory o f International Relations, New York, Random House, 1979, p. 96. Others 
making the same point include Ian Clark who points out that sovereignty ‘makes no assumption about the 
capacity of the “sovereign” to act in an independent or autonomous fashion’. Ian Clark, Globalization and 
International Relations Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 74. Axford, meanwhile, also 
stresses the power/law distinction. ‘It is important to note that the concept of sovereignty does not carry 
with it the clear expectation that sovereign actors have the capacities to carry out these functions of rule, 
but affirms that they are recognized as having the right so to do without undue let or hindrances from other 
state actors’. Axford, The Global System, p. 136-7.
48 Camilleri and Falk provide an example of the view that James et al are anxious to dismiss. ‘To the 
extent that the international system normally comprises a few powerful and many weaker states, there 
inevitably arises a hierarchy of relations that does not easily correspond to the theoretical equality of all 
sovereign states’. Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, p. 33. Furthermore, they also state, ‘If  all 
states are deemed equal by virtue of their sovereignty, how is this theoretical equality - itself the legal 
expression of an abstract spatial relationship - consistent with or related to the actual geopolitical 
inequalities associated with colonialism,...’ Ibid, p. 240.
This is a great example of the functional approach that James et al are anxious to dismiss. In the first 
instance one must point out that colonies are not independent and therefore not sovereign. The notion, 
therefore that the difference between a powerful and sovereign state needs in some sense to be 
reconciled with a colony is false. They really are quite different. In the second instance 
constitutionally independent weak states and constitutionally independent powerful states are equally 
constitutionally independent and thus equally sovereign.
49 Hidemi Suganami, ‘Sovereign, intervention and the English School’, Paper for Pan European IR 
Conference, Kent, September 2001, p. 2. Furthermore, in the thinking of Suganami, this identity was 
distinctive. ‘[Ojnce you begin to see ‘sovereignty’ in the English School way, it is very difficult not to 
see it in that way. Similarly, those who do not see ‘sovereignty’ in the English School way seem to find 
it almost impossible to see it in that way. According to them, it seems, ‘sovereignty’ is inseparably 
associated with ‘the sovereign’ in the despotic sense’. Ibid, p. 3. He then goes on to make the ‘power 
contrast’ by comparing this English School approach with that of others who think that ‘“sovereignty” 
is inseparably associated with “the sovereign” in the despotic sense’. Ibid.
50 Alan James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 41.
51 Sorensen, ‘Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, p. 171.
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52 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 303-308.
53 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations’, 
International Organisation, 1993.
54 Oppenheimer, ‘On Science and Culture’, Encounter, October 1962 and Gunton, The One The Three 
and the Many, p.75. There were, moreover, forces at work within Catholicism itself that were moving 
away from a low view of matter. Many scholars would trace these developments back to Thomas 
Aquinas, whose contentions that, whilst man was fallen his intellect was not, opened the door to a 
humanism that gave matter a greater merit. This was manifest particularly clearly in art where it gave 
rise to a new realism and interest in nature. On a general level it provided a greater measure of 
objectivism, encouraging a rather more confident social episteme Francis Schaeffer, Escape from  
Reason, I VP, 1968, chapter 1.
55 Lewis Mumford, The Condition o f Man, London, Martin Seeker and Warburg Ltd, 1944, p. 169.
56 At this point one can clearly see once again the point of intersection between the concept of closure 
considered in association with the mechanical Newtonian metaphor, and the social epistemic category. 
Both provide means by which one can understand the essential, boundaried, closed, finished nature of 
the territorial modem nation-state.
57 Agnew & Corbridge, Mastering Space, pp. 83-84.
58 Iain Hampsher-Monk, A History o f  Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from  
Hobbes to Marx, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 8-12. Whilst all forms of realism subscribe to what is 
essentially a single-perspectival, territorial, ontology, it should be understood that they do not all, by 
any means, share Hobbes’ aspiration to treat the study of international relations as a science.
59 In order to assess the ontological implications of this scientific aspiration on sovereignty the chapter 
must reconsider the understanding of space and time developed in chapter 2. Both Aquinas and Newton 
provide absolute conceptions of space, whose ontological closure is testified by the fact that they result 
in the assimilation of time by space. (John Polkinghome, Science and Providence, p. 77. Gunton, The 
One the Three and the Many, p. 86.) Whilst the pre-modem and modem spatialisations are united in 
their common assimilation o f time by space, however, their implications are different. Although the 
pre-modem spatialisation posited an absolute conception of space, it was located in a sacramental view 
of the world. Consequentially, all space was joined together by a common numinous, which meant that 
there was no sphere for ‘different’ and ‘alienated’ chunks of space to clash. Newtonianism, 
meanwhile, which informed modem realism, posited an entirely different world, with an absolute 
materialist conception of space, bereft of the unifying reality of a sacramental presence. In this frame, 
different chunks of unmediated res extensa were indeed free to clash, hence the poignancy in 
international relations of the billiard ball metaphor. It is this absolute, alienated, clashing materialist 
ontology that informs the ontology of state sovereignty within the realist frame of reference. Thus, 
regardless of whether modem sovereign state spatialisations are viewed from the perspective of simply 
secular space (no common sacramental numinous) or the imperative to develop an environment that 
can service scientific explanation, the end result is the same; the positing of an ontologically absolute 
model of sovereignty.
It is important to understand that, whilst Hobbes might have required an a priori absolute conception of 
space because of his scientific aspirations, unlike neorealism (see below), this was not generally true of 
realism. Developed in the context of modem norms and assumptions, realism traded on modem 
spatialisations but frequently did so without any scientific aspiration and thus without the imperative 
for pure a priori modem spatialisations that could service scientific laws. A good example of this 
position is seen in classical realism which occupies space within the realist tradition apart from the 
sovereign state pole. (Realism itself embraces something of a spectrum between those who are 
ontologically closed in the absolute sense of being impervious to all forms of change - the sovereign 
state pole - and those that can embrace some forms of change -  see the broader realist tradition - whilst 
not sacrificing their spatial orientation (and thus givenness) to inter-subjective construction. The 
capacity for some ontologies within the realist tradition to embrace change at the same time that those 
with purer expressions of ontological closure remain fixed (i.e. those of neorealism) is explored more 
in chapter 4.
60 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, p. 238.
61 The consideration of neorealism is important partly to demonstrate that in the new approach to the 
three traditions spectrum posited by Linklater and Little (Richard Little, ‘The English School’s 
Contribution to the Study o f International Relations’, presented to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 
December 1999, University o f Manchester p. 18. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/) there is 
scope to embrace more scientific manifestations of positivism than those normally associated with the 
English School. An association with neorealism, however, has been present since Bull, who, although
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famously criticizing the scientific aspirations of American behaviouralism associated with works such 
as Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics? (Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in 
International Politics, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1957), did not have the same problems with 
Waltz, considering his Theory o f International Politics to be an important book. Andrew Hurrell, 
‘Society and Anarchy in the 1990s’, BA Robertson ed. International Society and the Development of 
International Relations Theory, London, Pinter, 1998, p.20. Since then there has been an increasing 
interest in the relationship between the English School and neorealism see for example Barry Buzan, 
‘From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the 
English School’, International Organization 47 (3), pp. 327-52.
62 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p 80, 82, pp. 97-99.
63 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, p. 87.
64 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p. 93.
65 Ibid., p. 96. Interestingly far from being determinist, this suggestion seems to introduce normative 
concerns to Waltz’s apparently scientific, third image theory.
66 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 95. This assertion that the sovereign state must do 
everything resonates very clearly with the allied notion considered in the previous section that 
sovereignty is absolute and cannot be split.
67 Agnew & Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 81.
68 Marlene Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions’, p. 19.
69 R. B. J. Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 446.
The ontological closure manifest in the timelessness of the neorealist sovereign state is thrown into 
sharp relief by contrasting it with Wight’s realist text, Power Politics, p. 23.
70 Ibid., p. 82.
71 At this point some might respond by stating that neorealism has perhaps not surprisingly been the 
subject of great criticism and it has no future and is thus not worthy of detailed analysis. To respond 
to this concern it is important to be clear that whilst neorealism has of course no shortage of critics, 
these have not managed to jettison neorealism, with its support for sovereignty, from a key and 
enduring role in international relations theory.
1] Global Flows: Some have critiqued neorealism’s state centrism pointing out that states are not the 
only actors in the international arena and that, in the context of transnational flows, their ontological 
integrity is in doubt. Crucially, however, Waltz does not question the increasing significance of non­
state actors and global flows. ‘The importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational 
activities’, he observes, ‘are obvious’. (Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 94.)
Whilst not doubting the reality of these flows and actors, however, Waltz is clear that they do not call 
into question his approach to structure. Indeed, given the fact that critics who refer to the growing 
roles of global flows and non-state actors are at least partially concerned with economics, Waltz 
contends that their criticisms are especially misplaced. First, the firm is penetrated by mergers and 
takeovers and does not control its environment and yet this does not make the social scientific 
methodology unsustainable in the field of the economics and its study of the role of the firm; why then 
should it undermine analysis of IR and its exploration of the role of the state? Second, the firm is 
constantly regulated and checked by non-firm actors and yet again this does not place the social 
scientific methodology in jeopardy in economics and its study of the firm, again prompting the 
question why then should it undermine analysis of IR and its examination of the role of the state? To be 
sure, some states may be vulnerable and short lived but this is certainly not the case for all states. The 
standing of the healthy states in the international system is such that it is they that still define the 
international system.
‘States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their drama or carry on their 
humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long 
periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting 
informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them. When the 
crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate. Indeed, one may be struck by the 
ability of weak states to impede the operation of strong international corporations and by the attention 
the latter pay to the wishes of the former’. (Ibid., p. 95.) The special status of the state, Waltz 
continues, is also upheld by the fact that those who study transnational phenomena, ‘have developed no 
distinct theory’. Furthermore, this is, in his judgement, ‘quite proper, for a theory that denies the central 
role of states will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivalling or surpassing the 
great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign o f doing that’. (Ibid.)
2] The End of the Cold War: Neorealism was conceived in the context of the Cold War, making a great 
deal of the challenge of providing explanation for international developments in the context of a bipolar
126
world. It is all very well to treat states as closed units with endogenously disclosed fixed national 
interests, in the context of paradigmatic/dispensational stability, but when the world is turned upside 
down, there must surely be a need to cater for a transformation that can only be accounted for if one 
concedes a measure of openness and thus sacrifices a purist Newtonian ontology.
Wind considers this inability to deal with structural change in neorealism more broadly in the context 
of the new rationalist consensus between neorealism and neoliberalism and the associated triumph of 
regime theory. ‘However, because most modem regime theory explains the set up and persistence of 
institutions on the basis of rational choice theory, they a priori exclude themselves from detecting the 
evolution of institutions produced through norm based state practices. ...the theories will also be 
unequipped to conceive of structural transformation in the international system: the territorial state will 
live for ever’. (Marlene Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions’, p. 18.)
Whilst critics of neorealism have certainly made much of this line of argument in a post-1989 world, 
however, neorealism itself endures.
Central to the reassertion of the neorealist ontology was the publication of John Mearsheimer’s ‘Back 
to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, in which he reasserted the basic neorealist 
ontology as a timeless ontology which is a function of the basic imperative for the creation of a 
polity/sovereign state. (John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold 
War’ in S. Lynn Jones ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press, 
pp. 141-92.) Reflecting on the timelessness of his position Jackson and Sorensen observe that 
Mearsheimer believes that ‘neorealism has continued relevance for explaining international relations’. 
It ‘can be employed to predict the course of international history beyond the Cold War’. (Robert 
Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, p. 89.)
Although Mearsheimer has concerns about social scientific prediction (p. 9), he clearly follows Waltz 
in asserting that ‘the keys of war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in 
the nature of the individual states’, (p. 12) The whole thrust of his argument is based very much on a 
third image, systemic analysis in the Waltzian tradition, with all of its implications for the ontology of 
sovereignty. Thus, whilst neorealism is the subject of much criticism, the neorealist ontology and the 
neorealist model of sovereignty remain alive and well in international relations theory.
In neorealism’s support, it is interesting to note that during the height of the Cold War some scholars 
feared that its danger was precisely that it was doing away with the effective multiplicity of many 
sovereign states dialoguing within a global states system. In other words, the Cold War was not 
significant for supporting sovereign states but for effectively negating their presence. (See Herbert 
Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, London, The Epworth Press, 1962.)
72 Alan James, ‘Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 46.
73 The problem with the 100% definition of sovereignty on the basis o f constitutional independence is 
that constitutional independence is increasingly no more absolute than power. This is obvious in 
relationship to the EU but also the Andean Community and CARICOM for instance. Daniel Philpott 
makes the point about partial sovereignty in the following terms: ‘Absoluteness is a measure of the 
scope of affairs over which a sovereign body governs within a particular territory. Is it supreme over 
all matters or merely some? .. .The government of France is supreme in defence policy but not in trade, 
which it governs jointly with other European Union members as prescribed by EU law’. Revolutions in 
Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2001, p. 19. Indeed one does not just have to look at regional integration to see sovereign states that do 
not have exclusive, constitutionally separate jurisdiction over all competencies. Those sovereign states 
that have a Compact of Free Association with their former colonial master, the United States: the 
Marshal Islands, Palau and the Federal States of Micronesia, are constitutionally tied to varying 
degrees to the US both with respect to their internal and external sovereignty. Critically, however, 
whilst these constitutional ties exist, neither state has surrendered either all of its internal or all of its 
external sovereignty. The three states remain sovereign by upholding partial internal and partial 
external sovereignty. Similarly a number of former British colonies remain constitutionally tied to 
Britain which provides their highest court of appeal through the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council: Jamaica, Trinadad and Tobago, Mauritius, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, St Lucia, Grenada, St 
Vincents and the Grendines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Kribati. All of 
these polities, however, are nonetheless sovereign.
74 The stark inability to deal with change is striking because it is a criticism that is usually directed at 
neorealists with their particular strand of positivism and associated ontological closure. On its inability 
to deal with change see e.g. Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the study of International 
Relations’, p. 12.
75 Given the comments made earlier about the divide between internal and external sovereignty
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shadowing a divide between high and low politics, it is interesting to note the passage of a colony to 
independent statehood, not only happens at a specific moment of time, it is also a thoroughly high 
political event at which government representatives raise and lower flags amidst much pomp and 
circumstance. It is, therefore, quite unlike the process of European integration which happens in a 
rather more gradual, functional and piecemeal manner across many years.
In light of the difficulties with the internal-external sovereignty divide, it is interesting to reflect on 
some observations made by Ian Clark when reviewing Alan James’ Sovereign Statehood. Clark 
observes, ‘Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of 
which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and 
independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should 
not decently enquire’. Ian Clark, ‘Making sense of sovereignty’, Review o f International Studies, 1988, 
p. 303. Later Clark returns to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the 
relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, not divorced from 
power. In the course of invoking the distinction between internal and external sovereignty ‘James 
reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal standing as contrasted with the notion of 
sovereignty as physical capability: ‘sovereignty is a matter of law and not o f stature’ (p. 40). This does 
not mean that physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 
‘sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities’, (p. 41), although, at the end of the 
day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities’ (p. 41). This is a less than lucid section of 
otherwise careful and workmanlike study’. Ibid., p. 305.
76 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, p. 267.
77 Martin Wight, International Theory, pp. 2-3; Martin Wight, Systems o f  States, pp. 129-130; Hedley 
Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 8-9; and Hidemi Suganami, ‘Sovereignty, intervention and the 
English School’, presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 
2001, University of Kent at Canterbury, pp. 2-3. http:/7www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/enulishschool/
78 The following sets out a list of examples of the internal external divide and reflections by others on 
its centrality to the English School:
Historians of political thought ‘have traced the development of internal sovereignty, of a supreme law­
making authority in each community...‘We are more concerned with the development of external 
sovereignty, the claim to be politically and juridically independent of any superior’. 129-30 
Martin Wight, Systems o f States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977. Also see: Martin Wight, 
International Theory, pp. 2-3.
‘On the one hand, states assert, in relation to [their] territory and population, what may be called 
internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and 
population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant 
not supremacy but independence of outside authorities’. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
o f Order in World Politics, London, Macmillan, 1977.Pp. 8-9
‘States necessarily are janus-faced: they simultaneously look inward at their subjects and outward at 
other states. Although each facet can of course be distinguished analytically and theorised separately, 
neither is ontologically independent o f  the other'.
Robert Jackson, Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life, Millennium, 19, 1990, p. 261. 
‘Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which 
sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence 
without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently 
enquire’.
Ian Clark, ‘Making sense of sovereignty’, Review o f International Studies, 1988, p. 303.
‘But having been brought up in the English school tradition, especially under the influence of Manning 
and James in this particular respect, I was of the view that there was one most basic, internationally 
relevant, sense of the word “sovereignty”. When the word is used in this specific sense, it is 
interchangeable with “constitutional independence”; sovereign states are thus constitutionally 
independent political communities’. Ibid., p. 2.
Hence their talk of sovereignty in its internationally relevant senses as opposed to domestically relevant 
senses; or external sovereignty as opposed to internal sovereignty. Of the internationally relevant 
senses, the most basic is said to be the sovereign state’s institutional standing as an entity which is 
constitutionally independent. Ibid., p 2-3.
Suganami, Hidemi, ‘Sovereignty, intervention and the English School’, presented to 4th Pan-European 
International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury.
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/
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79 For more information about the division between internal and external sovereignty in the English 
School and its impact on the School’s capability to conceptualize change please see Appendix 1.
80 The legal thesis that sees sovereignty as an enabling precondition rather than a power ‘seems to 
imply an “essentialist” concept of sovereignty, immune to historical change: the attributes of 
sovereignty exist in perpetuity and produce a single form of state’. Ian Clark, Globalization and 
International Relations Theory, p. 71.
81 One of the best examples of fractured sovereignty is manifest in the work of Stephen D. Krasner, 
which, whilst not traditionally located in the English School, has in recent years become increasingly 
closely associated with it (See especially Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1999 chapter 2.) Krasner claims that there are four views of sovereignty: 
‘Interdependence sovereignty’, ‘Domestic sovereignty’, ‘Vattelian sovereignty’ and ‘International legal 
sovereignty’ see: Ibid., pp. 9-25 and Stephen D Krasner, ‘Rethinking the sovereign state model’, 
Empires Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics, eds. Michael Cox, Tim 
Dunne and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 17- 42.
Interdependence sovereignty pertains to the ability of the state to control movement of money and ideas 
across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the authority structures in states that sustain 
behaviour regulation. This depends on a) acceptance of authority and b) the level of control the state 
can actually exercise. Effective states have strong domestic sovereignty, whilst failed states have none. 
Vattelian sovereignty, meanwhile, refers to the right of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
polity. Finally, international legal sovereignty pertains to the equality of all sovereign states regardless 
of their size and power, on the basis of their recognition and consequent membership of the 
international community. Crucially these different perspectives are potentially independent. ‘The rules 
institutions and practices that are associated with these four meanings of sovereignty are neither 
logically nor empirically linked in some organic whole'. Ibid., p. 21.
Whilst it is important to break aspects of sovereignty down into bit sized chunks, whose fate one can 
readily follow, Krasner’s approach has the effect of abstracting features away from the sovereign state. 
These features do not exist apart from state sovereignty. To really understand sovereignty, one must 
understand the phenomenon with respect to which the above provides different perspectives. We are 
not confronted by four autonomous characteristics. They are all related to the same reality. Thus 
contrary to Krasner, it is indeed the contention of this thesis that the four sovereignties that he describes 
are ‘linked to some organic whole’ and that failure to recognize this will lead to distorted understanding 
of sovereignty and thus the international arena, e.g. the ‘constitutional independence’ definition 
produces an artificially closed models of sovereignty that cannot deal with change.
82 The irony of this, given the rooted and historical identity of the English School is clearly 
demonstrated in the following: ‘Unlike neorealism, which largely confines itself to the international 
system pillar, takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over units, 
English School theory is much more inside-out, than outside-in. International society is constructed by 
the units, and particularly by the dominant units, in the system, and consequently reflects their 
domestic character (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 95) Buzan, From International to World Society: English 
School Theory and Social Structure o f Globalisation, p. 95.
83 Furthermore, it is important to appreciate that there is a sense in which even if one does consider 
external sovereignty alone, properly apprehended this involves a measure of construction. The 
constructed nature of sovereignty is also seen very clearly from the ‘outside in’ by reference to the 
doctrine of ‘recognition’. Recognition does not merely have the negative effect of pledging non­
intervention; it also has the positive effect of constructing a particular aspect of state sovereignty. In his 
work The Nature o f  International Society, C. A. W. Manning expressed the relationship between 
recognition and the acquisition of sovereignty by developing an analogy between the international 
community and the idea of a club for Kings. States are like Kings who, prior to their recognition, are 
seeking membership of the international community, their club. C. A. W. Manning, The Nature o f  
International Society* London, G Bell and Sons Ltd, 1962, pp. 101-3. Robert Jackson makes an 
identical point. ‘Having sovereignty amounts to membership of an exclusive club’, ‘Sovereignty in 
World Politics’ p. 27. On the importance of ‘recognition’ generally see Wight, System o f States, p. 23. 
On gaining that membership, they obtain sovereignty. When seen in this light one obtains appreciation 
of the fact that, in an important sense, sovereignty is in part a constructed social status, an international 
personality (C. A. W. Manning, The Nature o f  International Society^ pp. 101-3 and Wight, System o f  
States, p. 23). State sovereignty is thus, Clarke observes, ‘partially created by an international system of 
social recognition, of which they [sovereign states] are an integral part’. Clark, Globalization and 
International Relations Theory, p. 73. Thus recognition is not just negatively the guarantee of
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constitutional independence, it is also positively the impartation of sovereignty and identity through the 
social process of constructing international personality.
84 James Mayall, ‘Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination’,
85 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991, p. 15. & 44; Anthony D. Smith, 
Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. p. 36, 113 & 154 and 
Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘The Liberal State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe’, The History o f  
European Ideas, 1989, vol. 10, No 6, pp. 689-703. This can also be seen perhaps more fundamentally 
in the use of voting in the form of plebiscites to determine the boundaries of polities. See: Wight, 
System o f States, pp. 165-8.
Turning back from engaging narrowly with change in order to address the importance of the positive 
content of sovereignty generally, the above provides the opportunity for one to see the basis for the 
association between the felt presence of a social contracted territorial people and the sovereign nation­
state. (Please note that the importance of significant minorities and their implication for the notion of 
the social contracted territorial people will be considered later in the post-sovereignty pole (chapter 6) 
of this thesis). Specifically, Ulf Hedetoft recognizes the centrality of identity to sovereignty in the 
following: ‘in the popular mind, sovereignty is an unquestioned axiom, belonging equally to the world 
of politics and to the world of culture and identity. In fact sovereignty is the central building block in 
the wall of national identity. It links people and the state within a well defined authority space, where 
people’s consent to be ruled is conditioned by the fact that they feel the rule and the rulers to be their 
own, and hence refuse to recognize any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the 
state and as their property’. (Ulf Hedetoft, ‘The State of Sovereignty in Europe’, National Cultures and 
European Integration: Exploratory Essays on Cultural Diversity and Common Policies, ed. Staffan 
Zetterholm, Oxford, Berg, 1994. p. 17).
86 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, p. 238.
87 It is perhaps important at this point to make the qualifying remark that no one expects any sovereign 
state to survive without power in the form of police and military. The point here, however, is to 
highlight a qualitatively more basic power dependence that is a function of marked ontological flux and 
uncertainty. This state of affairs is often seen in what Robert Jackson has described as Quasi States, 
see Jackson, Quasi States, International Relations and the Third World, pp. 148-151.
88 Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions’, p. 29. See further exploration of the givenness of preferences in 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Ideas and foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework’, Ideas 
and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, New York, Cornell University Press, 
1993, p. 4.
89 Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions’, p. 29 and Ole Waever, ‘Four Meanings of International Society: a 
Transatlantic Dialogue’, International Society and the Development o f International Relations, ed. 
B.A. Roberson, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 93.
90 C. A. W. Manning, The Nature o f International Society, p. 102; Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 8 
and Alan James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground rule or Gibberish’.
91 The reasons for the English School division between internal and external sovereignty and the 
rationale for developing a holistic approach are defined in more detail by Appendix 1.
92 Alan James, ‘Sovereign, Statehood in Contemporary International Society’ p. 42.
93 The chapter will return to this particular realist model of sovereignty in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REALIST TRADITION,
THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE,
AND CONCEPTUALIZING CHANGE
Having provided a definition of sovereignty as a result of critical engagement with the 
realist tradition, it is the purpose of this chapter to ask how this tradition can be used 
to effectively come to terms with the implications of systemic change (globalization 
and regional [European] integration) which have prompted talk of the ‘end of 
sovereignty’.1 The chapter is divided into two parts each of which identifies a way in 
which realism can be used to rise to this transformational challenge. Part 1 will briefly 
examine the endurance of sovereignty manifest in its increasing popularity as the 
number of sovereign states increases sharply, noting the ongoing utility of the entire 
realist tradition as (as defined by Parts 1 and 2 of chapter 3) a means of coming to 
terms with this development. Part 2 will then argue at greater length that the 
endurance of sovereignty can also be seen in its flexibility and readiness to change, as 
manifest in the process of European integration. In examining this development the 
chapter will argue that, unlike the entirely closed model of sovereignty, defined by the 
sovereign state pole of the realist tradition (Part 1 of chapter 3), the wider realist 
tradition (Part 2 of chapter 3) does have the capacity to engage with the conceptual 
challenges presented by European integration. Thus, in examining the contemporary 
utility of sovereignty through the realist tradition - including the lens of the sovereign
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state pole and the lens of the broader realist tradition - the chapter will, in line with the 
contentions of chapter 3, particularly stress the significance of the latter.
PART 1: THE MULTIPLICATION & SOLIDIFICATION OF
SOVEREIGNTIES
Independence! As a people, as a territory, as a nation! One body, one mind one 
wish! ’
Xanana Gusmao,
President of East Timor, May 20th 2002
The day East Timor became (at the time of writing) the world’s newest (192nd) 
sovereign state.
In turning to examine sovereignty in the general context of globalization, in terms that
are consistent with English School realism, one is immediately struck by the fact that,
far from vanishing, the developments of the last fifty years have witnessed a huge
• 2  •increase in the number of sovereign states, from 75 in 1945 to 190 in 1999 and 192 in 
2002. Sovereignty is, as Robert Jackson notes, something that everybody wants. Far 
from bringing about the end of sovereignty, Clark argues, ‘[t]hose very twentieth 
century international organizations designed to herald a reformed international order 
themselves became agents for the universalisation of sovereignty, being unrelentingly 
committed to its observance and to its imposition as the essential test for 
membership’.3
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In the context of this multiplication of sovereignties, moreover, sovereignty has also 
become a more stable and certain feature of international relations in the sense that it 
has been rendered more ontologically absolute on account of a particular approach to 
territory.4 After the Second World War boundaries became set in stone in a way that 
had not really been the case previously. ‘Existing borders became sacrosanct and 
lawful border change correspondingly difficult. The right to territorial conquest was 
extinguished in the twentieth century’.5
The broad basis of acceptance for this absolutisation of sovereignty can be seen 
clearly across a raft of international agreements that have been developed over the 
past forty plus years. The 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting 
Independence to Colonial Territories and Countries, for instance, stated ‘any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of a the Charter of the 
United Nations’. Three years later the new Organization for African Unity made a 
point of reiterating the same principle.6 The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 also stated 
that ‘frontiers can [only] be changed, in accordance with international law, by 
peaceful means and by agreement’. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
reiterated the same provision, which was a key reference point in the Dayton 
Agreement signed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. This is not to say that 
boundaries have not changed. Germany has been re-integrated and Czechoslovakia 
has split, but in neither case has this been enforced against the will of the people.7
‘We are living’, Jackson observes, ‘at a time when existing state territorial jurisdictions 
are vested with exceptional value. The principle involved is that of uti possidetis juris,
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according to which existing ...(fixed/closed)... boundaries are the pre-emptive basis for 
determining territorial jurisdictions in the absence of mutual agreement to do 
otherwise’.8 In light of this he later states: ‘In international politics during the twentieth 
century the juridical-territorial clearly and decisively trumped the socio-national’.9 
These are developments with which the entire realist tradition can readily engage.
The coexistence of the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization, on the one 
hand, and the multiplication of ontologically closed sovereign states, on the other, is 
at first glance curious. If the impact of change introduced through globalization 
appears to call into being sovereignty, then surely the ontological closure of 
sovereignty must be impacted with the ontological openness of globalization which 
must in some senses undermine it? In coming to terms with this question, however, 
one must call to mind, first, the central distinction made in chapter 3 between internal 
(positive) and external (negative) sovereignty and, second, the fact that the means by 
which one measures the multiplication of sovereignty in the context of decolonisation, 
constitutional independence, is negative and thus only relates to one aspect of 
sovereignty. Surveyed from the perspective of the negative definition of sovereignty, 
globalization does not appear to be related to the demise of sovereignty but rather to 
its flourishing. Sovereign polities, however, do not just exist from the ‘outside-in’ but 
also from the ‘inside-out’, and consequently it is only possible to assess the true 
impact of systemic change on them by examining them both positively, from the 
perspective of internal sovereignty, as well as negatively, from the perspective of 
external sovereignty. The next section examines sovereignty in the context of 
European integration from both its positive and negative perspectives. (Chapters 5 and 
6 will then examine this challenge from the wider perspective of globalization).
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PART 2: THE EXTENSION OF SOVEREIGNTY
In moving to consider a realist approach to sovereignty in the context of regional 
integration, this chapter now engages with an example of sovereignty and systemic 
change that requires a rather more nuanced approach. However, before picking up 
concerns about the problems of having a narrowly negative account of sovereignty, it 
is important to make two introductory comments about the English School and 
European integration.
First, as Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman observe, ‘The English School of
international relations has rarely been used to analyse European integration’,10 citing
the publication of Hedley Bull’s ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’
in 1982 as a basic cause.11 This research would endorse this observation, pointing to
other ‘reasons for’ and ‘expressions o f  this failure to engage. Specifically, Wight’s
• * 1 2‘Why Is There No International Theory’ comments about regional integration and 
James’ (see the previous chapter) failure to successfully engage with the gradual 
nature of the process of integration, positing the evolutionary relocation of 
sovereignty.13
Second, on those more recent occasions when English School scholars have turned 
their attention to European integration in order to seriously engage with the 
transformational process of integration, their approach has either tended to ignore 
integration as an example of sovereignty transformation or to treat it as an example of 
transformation from the perspective of what, on the epistemologically plural three 
traditions spectrum, is classed as revolutionism.14 This chapter seeks to address this
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shortfall by considering sovereignty holistically (positively and negatively) in the 
context of European integration from what on the epistemologically plural three 
traditions spectrum is classed as realism. In so doing the chapter draws on the 
primarily historical work of Murray Forsyth15 (who was actually much influenced by 
the English School16) which, whilst not applied in great detail to the European Union, 
provides a rich resource from which to reflect on the process of European 
integration.17
THE CASE FOR THE EXTENSION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Having made the two introductory points above, the chapter can embark on its 
consideration of the extension of sovereignty, addressing Part l ’s concerns about 
adopting a narrowly negative approach to sovereignty. Specifically, the point must be 
made that, whilst looking at sovereignty in the context of systemic changes from the 
narrowly negative perspective can cause one to conclude that systemic changes do not 
threaten the integrity of sovereignty, one is arguably given a distorted and unhelpful 
picture. If power flows mean that the ability of sovereignty to sustain an effective 
constitutional framework that can call things to account is jeopardised by the 
development of an economic centre of gravity beyond the nation-state, this must 
surely dent the legal reach of the sovereign state even though it is ongoing? European 
integration, however, provides grounds for suggesting that sovereignty may be 
surviving, and not merely on the basis of a simplistic invocation of the 
imperviousness of its legal character to changes in power flows. Specifically the case 
can be made that sovereignty is also enduring because polities are deliberately 
reconstituting it in deference to changes in the centre of economic gravity. Indeed, 
when one reflects on this development in the context of the broader sweep of history,
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considering functionalist conceptions of the development of national sovereignty, it is
possible to imagine that sovereignty will not be dented in the long run because it will
simply expand to obtain a supranational reach in deference to transnational economic 
1 8developments. In order to fully appreciate this logic, however, one must locate 
sovereignty in the context of a brief overview of its historical evolution up to, and 
including, the process of European integration and the formation of a supranational 
sovereignty. The chapter includes this overview not for the purpose of making a 
contribution to understanding the development of the modem state but in order to 
show how the current European project might be seen as the expression of the 
reconstitution of the polity in deference to latest developments in its changing 
economic parameters.
TOWARDS MODERN SOVEREIGNTY
The development of the modem sovereign state must be traced from the demise of the 
feudal polity. From a functional economic perspective, specifically, this medieval 
system of government began to lose its grip on the people in the face of an embryonic 
capitalism as aspiring entrepreneurs diversified and generated profits which gave 
them an important measure of independence from their feudal overlords.19 As 
economic exchange, moreover, became less based on the land and an urban merchant 
class emerged, the old, agrarian medieval system became increasingly insecure. The 
needs of this environment, seen in the wider context of the erosion, and then demise, 
of the Respublica Christiana, began to propel the decentralised feudal state towards 
the early modem, centralised absolutist state. Specifically, this developed as a result 
of feudal lords endowing the monarch with greater powers in the hope that he would 
grant them greater support in their now vulnerable relationship with their villagers.
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It was in this context of absolutism that the concept of sovereignty first made an
21impression through the writings of by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.
A] MERCANTILISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The absolutist state formation was allied to ‘mercantilism’, whose innovative quest 
for the maximisation of economic growth was, of course, from today’s perspective, 
curiously enmeshed in military objectives.22 Of specific interest to this chapter as it 
prepares to consider current developments in European integration, the crucial 
contribution of mercantilism to the advent of the modem state and its sovereign self- 
understanding came through its development of what Freidrich List described as 
‘economic nationality’.23 During the feudal age the decentralisation of political power 
was reflected through the presence of many internal tariff barriers. Trade from one 
part of a nation to another thus paralleled the modem experience of trade between 
nations. Far from having a single market between different nation-states, as one now 
sees in the European Union, there was not even a single market within nations. When 
mercantilism was adopted in the context of the moves to increase the monarch’s 
power, however, the single market project became a top priority.24 Requiring that 
local economic regulation was replaced by national economic regulation, this 
development first eroded competing sub-state bases of authority and second, by dint 
of this process, contributed to calling into being the significant central state apparatus 
of the modem, absolutist state.
B] MODERN LIBERAL CAPITALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Mercantilism was followed by the liberal capitalist approach to wealth creation which 
triumphed during the 19th century. Liberal capitalism differed significantly from the
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mercantilist era because it suggested that the most effective form of wealth generation 
depended not on state control but on the free market.25 As capitalism developed 
rapidly in the context of this new laissez faire philosophy, the reality of the global 
market place became increasingly significant, expanding beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the state (which of course in some senses it always had for so long as 
nations traded). This did not take place, however, in a way that undermined 
sovereignty. In the first instance sovereign states remained important sources of 
government and regulation. In the second, at that time the extension of the market 
became a means of expanding the prestige of national sovereignty as sovereign states 
gained extensive empires across the globe. It was in this context, moreover, that 
sovereignty shifted from the person of the monarch to the state. Indeed as an era in 
which increasing numbers of states embraced constitutional democracy, this was a 
time when states saw fit to create modem ‘nations’ in whose name - ‘the sovereignty 
of the people’ - sovereignty could be sustained. It was thus a time when, far from 
disappearing, sovereignty was gaining a newly important role in the operation of 
modem politics.
C] GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY
In moving to consider late twentieth/early twenty-first century economic 
globalization, it is important to be mindful of the preceding laissez faire era and not to 
fall into the trap of thinking that the global market is new. What is new is the demise 
of the territorial colonial option, the consequent explosion in statehood since 1945 and 
the technologically increased intensity and extensity of flows. In this context, rather 
than seeking to extend one’s territorial reach by taking control of another part of the 
world, the response of some European states has been to freely create a new and
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territorially extended form of polity between themselves in which List’s concept of
• 27economic nationality finds near continental expression.
Having considered sovereignty developments from the perspective of economic 
imperatives, it is important to conclude this brief section by examining these 
developments from the perspective of the relevant political imperative. Specifically, 
one must recall the basic ground rule for the centrality of the sovereign state to the 
realist frame of reference, namely the need for the formation of islands of civility 
through the realist group imperative. ‘Realism identifies the group as the fundamental
9 o
unit of political analysis. Once it was the city state, now it is the sovereign state’, 
and, in light of the above, we might add that soon it will be the sovereign 
supranational state. Thus, whilst the principle of the group endures and is indeed even 
treated as law like, the actual boundaries of the group change in response to the 
basic socio-economic imperatives of the age.
In light of enduring realist principles and the changing economic centre of gravity, it 
would seem possible that any contemporary curtailment of the sovereign state’s 
capacity to subject economic and other processes to its accountability is just a 
function of a transitory stage that parallels the creation of the national single market 
and modem sovereign nation-state. Approaching this contention sympathetically, one 
could argue that the above perspective is less than clear today simply because we are 
in the midst of the revolution, in the midst of the transition from the nation-state to the 
supranational state. Once the change is over, however, it will be plain that the 
essential parameters of sovereignty remain the same. We will just be confronted by a 
sovereignty writ large.
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SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Working on the basis that a major extension of sovereignty is in progress, the current 
environment does not threaten sovereignty per se but rather its current boundaries. 
Central to the defence of sovereignty from a realist perspective, therefore, must be the 
development of the conceptualization of sovereignty in the process of extension. How 
should one respond rigorously to the challenge of defining sovereignty in the context 
of that transition?
THE THREE TRADITIONS AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM
When one considers sovereignty in terms of rationalism or revolutionism from the 
perspective of the Linklater -  Little spectrum - which as chapter 2 explained is the 
basic interpretation of the three traditions embraced by this spectrum - it is possible to 
detect sovereignty transformation because these two traditions express movement 
away from the ontological closure of realist sovereignty. If, however, one wishes to 
consider change that does not do away with the ontological closure of sovereignty but 
rather the relocation of its boundaries, whilst it is possible to locate the place of 
transformation on the Linklater -  Little spectrum, it is difficult to see the actual 
process of that transformation. (Similarly if one wishes to engage with ‘change by 
extension’ rather than ‘erosion’, as one may, in the case of rationalism - for reasons 
that will become apparent - see chapter 7, it is again difficult to see the actual process 
of transformation from the perspective of the Linklater -  Little interpretation). Having 
located its investigation of European integration within the realist tradition on the 
basic Linklater -  Little model of the three traditions, therefore, this chapter now turns 
to the alternative, complementary Wightian interpretation of the three traditions that
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can accommodate changes from the status quo on the basis of boundary changes (see 
Figure 1 chapter 2). Specifically the Wightian spectrum will be unpacked through 
reference to Forsyth’s confederal spectrum. In approaching the confederal spectrum 
this chapter must consider two tools for conceptualizing sovereignty in transition, the 
intra/inter-relational tool and the political existence tool. The chapter will then move 
on to apply this framework to the European Union, making the case that sovereignty 
is not just surviving in the context of transnational flows, because of an existential 
imperviousness to power flows, resulting from its juridical-territorial character, but is 
actually re-constituting and reasserting itself in the midst of those flows.
1) SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION: INTER & INTRA-RELATIONSHIPS
The legal term for relations between two sovereign states is ‘federative’, which means 
that they proceed between two equals from the primary act of recognition. They are 
called inter-relationships. The equality manifest in such relations means that they can 
have no legal element of compulsion and are based instead upon voluntary co-
• 31operation. The legal term for relations within sovereign states, meanwhile, is 
‘legislative’, which means that they are hierarchical, pertaining between a superior 
and an inferior. In order to understand these fully one must recall the social contract32 
myth wherein self-determining/obligating sovereign individuals in the ‘State of 
Nature’ agreed to cede their sovereignty to a ruler in return for his upholding a 
framework of law within which they could then enjoy civil freedoms, buttressed by 
civil rights, in the place of their erstwhile anarchical freedom, buttressed by natural 
rights. Instead of being entirely sovereign, free agents, the people were now subject 
to a sovereignty and thus hierarchical relationships. These are called intra- 
relationships. Thus it is clear that wherever there is an inter-relationship, one is
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dealing with relating sovereignties, whilst wherever there is an intra-relationship, one 
is dealing with a single/part of a single sovereignty. The identification of inter and 
intra-relations can thus be used as a means for assessing the sovereignty structure of 
any political configuration.
Having developed a clear conception of intra and inter-relationships, recognising their 
importance in the appraisal of the true locus of sovereignty, it is now possible to 
subject confederation to rigorous examination in order to establish what exactly is 
being constituted by it. The chapter will rise to this challenge by deploying the ‘inter’ 
and ‘intra’ tools self-consciously in the context of the confederal spectrum.
- CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSITION: INTRA-TER-RELATIONAL TOOLS 
AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM
Represented diagrammatically by Figure 2, the spectrum traces the development of 
integration between the two poles. Located on the left hand side is the 
intergovernmental pole, whilst the federal pole is on the right. At the 
intergovernmental pole are six cubes joined together. Each cube represents a 
sovereign state. They are joined because they are part of a six member 
intergovernmental organisation. The legal status of the relationships within each of 
these states is one hundred per cent intra, whilst the relationships between those states
- exercised in, among other things, the business of the intergovernmental organisation
- are one hundred percent inter. At the federal state pole, meanwhile, all of the 
relations pertaining between the six states are intra. Between these two poles exists 
the confederal spectrum which encompasses the whole gambit of conceptual space 
demanded by the process of integration.
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FIGURE 2
THE CONFEDERAL 
SPECTRUM
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REALISM RATIONALISM REVOLUTIONISM
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The six states at the intergovernmental pole will move into the spectrum when, and 
only when, they integrate a policy competence. Legally this involves their 
transforming, through a treaty, some of the previously monopolising inter­
relationships between themselves into intra-relationships. This results in the 
constitution of a new embryonic supranational sovereignty which forms the legal 
foundation for the newly integrated policy competence. Thus, prior to integration 
(Wightian realism) the six states have six sovereignties between them. After 
embarking upon integration, however, they have seven (Wightian rationalism).
In the event that these states should choose to continue to integrate themselves, thus 
setting more and more policy competencies upon the supranational foundation 
(Wightian revolutionism),34 they will move across the spectrum, enlarging the 
jurisdiction of the supranational sovereignty through the continued transformation of 
more and more inter-relationships into intra-relationships. Since the policies 
integrated are not new but are in fact taken from the jurisdiction of the member 
nation-states, integration necessarily involves the erosion of national jurisdiction over 
policy competencies until, at the right hand side of the spectrum, the confederation 
reaches the point which Forsyth calls ‘the brink’. At this juncture there is so little 
policy sustained by the nation-state sovereignties that the nation-states become 
unsustainable in their own respective rights, and all remaining inter-relationships are 
transformed into intra-relationships, thereby moving the enterprise off the spectrum 
and into the domain of the federal state pole. Thus, what began as an 
intergovernmental organisation involving six states - and therefore six sovereignties -
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at the intergovernmental pole, became seven sovereignties, as the six states embarked 
upon integration, and then finally just one sovereignty once integration was complete.
DEFINITION IN TRANSITION
The spectrum is called the confederal spectrum because it is via the concept of 
confederalism that one can conceptualize the flux of transition when neither the 
nation-state nor the supranation is fully sovereign in the conventional sense (i.e. 
commanding full sovereign jurisdiction over all competencies within their respective 
territorial remits). Confederalism is found in the simultaneous coexistence of 
intergovemmentalism and supranationalism in any proportion within the relationships 
between states. As soon as this co-existence is removed from the political form in 
question, with the victory of either supranationalism or intergovemmentalism, that 
body ceases to be a confederation and becomes either a sovereign federal state or 
simply a collection of sovereign nation-states. Thus, when apprehended within the 
confederal spectrum, one can see that the implications of integration involve 
contradictory tendencies but that these contradictions are not the sort that make 
sovereignty irrelevant. Armed with the confederal spectrum and a clear understanding 
of the place of inter and intra-relationships, one can obtain an orderly 
conceptualization of the transitory political formations on the spectrum, tracing the 
shifting centre of sovereign gravity - which was overlooked by the narrowly closed 
conceptualizations of sovereignty considered in detail by Part 1 of chapter 3 and 
subsequently briefly addressed by Part 1 of this chapter - as the union moves from one 
pole to the other.36
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At this point it is important to note that in confronting sovereignty in transition, via 
the confederal spectrum, one can identify a further basis for qualifying the wisdom of 
the absolute model of sovereignty (see Chapter 3 Part 1) developed by Part 2 of 
chapter 3. Sovereignty clearly is not like marriage in the sense that, although one 
cannot be 75% married, a member state certainly could have sovereign jurisdiction 
over 75% of policy competencies, whilst the EU could have jurisdiction over the 
remaining 25%. In light of this confederal option it is clear that although sovereignty 
should indeed be defined from its external perspective in terms of constitutional 
independence, this independence does not have to be absolute.
THE CONFEDERAL AND THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUMS
As noted earlier, the fact of the transformation in a potentially epistemologically 
constant context can be registered by the epistemologically plural account of the three 
traditions but not the process of that transformation. This requires utilisation of the 
vertical three traditions spectrum (Figure 1, chapter 2). Having considered integration 
from the perspective of the confederal spectrum, therefore, it is important to relate it 
to the conventional three traditions spectrum, hence Figure 2. On the one hand the 
intergovernmental pole correlates to the realist tradition and separate sovereign states, 
whilst the federal state pole, on the other, correlates to revolutionism and the 
transformation of inter-state relationships into what is effectively a new domestic 
arena. The middle of the spectrum, meanwhile, correlates to the endurance of member 
state sovereignty in the context of a developing supranational constraint and thus 
embraces key characteristics of rationalism. In this sense as this chapter applies 
integration both to the horizontal and the vertical spectrums of Figure 1, one can 
superimpose the confederal spectrum perspective on the vertical axis.
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2) SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION: POLITICAL EXISTENCE
Having considered sovereignty in transition from the perspective of the inter and intra 
tools, the chapter now approaches this challenge utilising the ‘political existence’ tool, 
exploring its deployment within confederation by Carl Schmitt.38 Again working on 
the basis that confederation is defined by the coexistence of intergovemmentalism and 
supranationalism in the same political form, Schmitt identified a number of cmcial 
characteristics of the ‘Bund’ (confederation) that differentiated it from a 
straightforward intergovernmental arrangement. First, he claimed that it was 
critically more than an alliance and as such was not designed to service a particular 
functional end such as a postal union. Second, as a logical extension of this 
characteristic, and as a clear indication of its difference from all ‘means end’ 
enterprises - that definitionally will only be sustained for so long as it is functionally 
prudent - the Bund is permanent and thus an end in itself. Finally, and again very 
much in the same vein, the Bund is based upon the common objective of upholding 
the self-preservation of all its member states. In order to embrace this commitment 
there must be a sense of the states in question being joined at a very fundamental 
level. All three characteristics thus give the development of the Bund deep existential 
implications, with ramifications for the realm of identity, rather than mere functional 
expediency.40
To press home the reality of the clear qualitative difference between the Bund and a 
standard intergovernmental organisation, Schmitt claimed that the treaties 
underpinning them must similarly be qualitatively differentiated from those that give 
rise to ordinary IGOs. Whilst standard inter-state treaties underpinned the latter,
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Bunds, he maintained, were the product of ‘inter-state-status treaties’ or 
‘constitutional treaties’ which had the effect of articulating the constitutive act of a 
new nation, a supranation. (This time, instead of being ratified by self-determining 
and self-obligating individuals, the constitutive act/social contract was the product of 
agreement between self-determining and self-obligating states.) As such they granted 
Bunds what an inter-state treaty conventionally does not confer upon an IGO, a 
‘political existence’ and ‘political will’ of their own.41
Schmitt’s work helps to add a greater depth to our appreciation of the consequence of 
newly created supranational intra-relationships. Whilst the legal ‘inter-intra’ tools 
bring essentially denotative, ordering delineations to bear upon an apparently 
confused situation, ‘political existence’ helps to unpack something of the solid 
existential reality (the actor with a political will) which lies within these dividing 
lines. What Schmitt's work helps to demonstrate is that when you integrate you create 
something far more profound than a new functional efficiency in a particular area of 
policy. You actually create a new sovereign political entity (agency) with its own 
being, identity, interests and will.
- CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSITION: THE EXISTENTIAL CONFLICT 
AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM
In the context of a confederation (a Bund), Schmitt maintained, that the reality of the 
‘politically existing’ supranation, bom through the first inter-state status treaty (which 
in terms of Figure 2 takes one away from the intergovernmental pole and into the 
spectrum), and then substantially empowered by subsequent similar treaties, exists in 
tension with the political existence of the members states as the centre of sovereign
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gravity and power shifts from one existence to the other. Although integration will not 
terminate the political existence of the member states so long as it does not take the 
confederation in question over Forsyth’s brink (see Figure 2), it will nonetheless 
always weaken the political existence of the nation-state. This weakening is critical in 
that it impinges on the central contradiction that, Schmitt claimed, is constitutive of 
the Bund, namely the state’s right to secede from the Bund, which is supposedly 
permanent.42 Specifically, pulling out of a confederation becomes progressively more 
unlikely as confederated states move across the spectrum because this involves the 
reconstitution of more and more of their interests within the supranation. This has the 
effect of causing proposals for secession to appear increasingly like proposals for 
departure from a diminishing aspect of their identity in favour of another developing 
aspect. The chapter will now consider various conceptual markers that help to define 
the movement of a union across the confederal spectrum and the implications of that 
movement on the relative standing of the diminishing nation-state sovereignty and 
emerging supranational sovereignty.
POLITICAL EXISTENCE: PRACTICAL/TECHNICAL, LEASED/SOLD
Given the changes experienced by political existence as one moves across the 
integrative spectrum and their implications for secession, it is necessary to 
differentiate between two different forms of political existence, one practical, the 
other technical. A state enjoying practical political existence continues both to 
maintain its own identity and will, together with the practical ability to secede from 
the Union if it so desires. This is because it upholds a sufficient number of policy 
competencies to maintain its own integrity.43 A state whose political existence is 
merely technical, meanwhile, continues to enjoy its own identity and will but in
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practical terms would find it very difficult to leave. This is because, unlike the state 
with practical political existence, this state no longer has a sufficiently extensive 
sovereign base, in terms of its jurisdictions, and therefore powers, through which to 
reassert itself.44
Another helpful contribution to the quest for a rigorous conceptualization of 
sovereignty in the context of regional integration is made by Schluter and Lee. 
Concerned that talk of pooling sovereignty has not provided a particularly rigorous 
account of what is constituted by integration, since it suggests countries merely seek 
to derive some functional benefit from holding their sovereignties in common for a 
period rather than actually building a supranation, Schluter and Lee put forward the 
concept of leasing and selling sovereignty. They argue that states can establish a 
supranational sovereignty and lease to it a number of policy competencies. These 
states can, however, only lease so long as they themselves continue to uphold a 
sufficient number of competencies in order to guarantee their own functional 
integrity. If they delegate such a volume of policy competencies to the supranation 
that they effectively dissolve themselves, then all the leaseholds they have granted 
will effectively become pure freeholds.45 To integrate Schluter and Lee’s work 
together with practical and technical political existence, one could argue that once the 
level of integration moves a state out of practical political existence into the realms of 
technical political existence, the basis for all delegated policy competencies will cease 
to be leasehold and become instead freehold. Once past the brink, moreover, the 
political existences of the erstwhile member states would be replaced by the single 
political existence of the supranation. Thus, as already demonstrated, instead of there
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being a number of competing politically existing ends (sovereignties), henceforth 
there would only be one politically existing end (sovereignty).
As in the case of the inter-intra tool, political existence also demonstrates the fact that, 
when in the process of reconfiguring, contrary to the contentions of those submitting 
an absolutely closed model of sovereignty (see Part 1 of chapter 3 and Part 1 of this 
chapter) sovereignty clearly is not like marriage. This perspective demonstrates once 
again that a member state certainly could have, for example, sovereign jurisdiction 
over 75% of policy competencies, whilst the EU could have jurisdiction over the 
remaining 25%.46 In so doing it again makes the point that, whilst sovereignty should 
indeed be defined from its external perspective in terms of constitutional 
independence, this independence does not have to be absolute.
THE SPECTRUM: HIGH AND LOW POLITICS
Having considered the fortunes of sovereignty in the context of the spectrum from the 
perspective of both the inter and intra-relational and political existence tools in general 
terms, it is now possible to set down some markers regarding the implications of 
different kinds of sovereignty loss. The chapter will consider this challenge from the 
perspective of the conceptual distinction between competencies upheld by internal and 
external sovereignty which will both further clarify the implications of movement along 
the spectrum and also provide another opportunity for underlining the inter-dependent 
nature of the relationship between internal and external sovereignty.
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i) EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
On the one hand if a state is joined to a new polity from the ‘outside-in’ so that it 
loses all external sovereignty, it ceases to be sovereign even if it maintains some 
controls over domestic government. To gain a clear appreciation of why in this 
context partial internal sovereignty alone does not amount to sovereignty, one must 
consider the autonomy of states within a sovereign federal state. Whilst the 
constituent states might have a measure of autonomy, they are not politically existing 
sovereign ends in their own right. They uphold competencies not because of their 
own right but because of that of the supranation, of which they are ultimately a part. 
It has chosen to divide a portion of its internal sovereignty competence and distribute 
it between the erstwhile member states in response to either an administrative need 
and/or a desire to give some recognition to the identities that previously undergirded 
the states. This arrangement only amounts to the delegation of some policy areas from 
the politically existing sovereignty. It does not itself give rise to a new politically 
existing sovereignty. Thus any internal sovereignty complex subject to another 
external sovereignty will ultimately be dependent on that other sovereignty and 
consequently ultimately upheld in its name.
On the other hand, however, if a state loses some of its external sovereignty to an 
emergent supranational sovereignty, whilst critically maintaining some controls over 
defence and foreign policy, this supranationalism does not terminate its political 
existence in the sense that its ultimate guarantee/guardianship of political existence, i.e. 
defence, remains in place. This does not mean that a state’s defence may not be tied up 
very closely with that of other polities but rather that the state cannot be compelled to 
deploy its defence as a consequence of being tied to a supranational sovereignty. It can
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engage the ultimate guarantee of its political existence with other states but it cannot 
allow them, or any supranational body, to make any kind of decisions regarding the 
actual deployment of that guarantee. Thus within the confederal spectrum one would 
conclude that the complete loss of foreign policy and defence competencies takes one 
over the brink, whilst loss of some internal sovereignty and some external sovereignty 
(especially that at the lower end of the high politics spectrum, e.g. trade policy) is 
consistent with sovereignty loss within the spectrum prior to the brink.
ii) INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
Having suggested that partial internal sovereignty, set within a sovereign state, does 
not constitute sovereignty by itself, it is tempting to conclude that the key to 
maintaining sovereignty in the context of a confederal spectrum relates to external 
sovereignty. As the previous chapter and Appendix 1 observed, however, it is not 
possible to conceive of a conventional sovereign state that has external sovereignty 
but no internal sovereignty. This point is clearly demonstrated by considering those 
polities that come closest to being entirely internally sovereign and yet not externally 
so, e.g. crown dependencies. Despite general internal autonomy, the ultimate sense of 
dependence on British defence, and thus ultimate dependence on British political 
existence, results in domestic intervention as witnessed in the Isle of Mann in the 
early 1990s when the British Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, stepped in to prevent 
the execution of a man found guilty of murder. In reality states that genuinely govern 
themselves in every respect internally, without any sense of dependence on a higher 
polity, actually always have responsibility for external relations thrust upon them as 
the result of their existence as a totally independent polity. They cannot exist on such 
a basis without calling into being the potential for external relationships by dint of the
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fact that their polity does not cover the globe. However, this does not mean that they 
must engage with international relationships, as seen in the early experience of 
Tuvulan independence, or that they will necessary receive recognition from other 
states, as in the case of Taiwan.
Having defined the centrality of internal sovereignty to the maintenance of the 
sovereignty of polities involved in confederal projects, it is important to note that it is 
not absolute. As in the case of external sovereignty, it is possible to lose some 
competencies sustained by internal sovereignty, whilst maintaining sovereign political 
existence. Indeed, as the chapter will demonstrate this has been the basis for the 
greater part of European integration to date.
In conclusion member state sovereignty can endure on the basis of only partial 
constitutional independence so long as that state maintains both some internal and 
some external sovereignty, although there is greater scope for sovereignty to endure in 
the context of constitutional dependence with respect to internal than external 
sovereignty. One must be conscious, therefore, that states can continue to be 
sovereign even whilst they actually cede sovereign jurisdiction over some policy 
areas. Quantitatively, this makes them partially sovereign. Qualitatively, however, 
they remain absolutely sovereign in the sense that, whilst brought into political 
accommodation with an emerging supranational sovereignty, they nonetheless 
constitute politically existing sovereign ends whose ontologies testify to teleologies 
that are mutually exclusive to that of the sovereign supranation. Having provided the 
theoretical framework for conceptualizing the transfer of sovereignty, the chapter will 
now apply it directly to the example of the European Union.
155
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM
There can be no doubt that the Union continues to maintain a significant measure of 
intergovemmentalism within the Council of Ministers and European summit system. 
Having said this, however, even when legislative decisions are made 
intergovemmentally, their standing is quite unlike inter-relational international law. In 
coming to terms with EU legislative decisions one must have special regard for two 
considerations. First, they rest within what the European Court of Justice has described 
as a ‘new legal order’ which is neither subordinate to member state law nor a part of 
international law.47 As such they are ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice not member states. Second, some of the decisions made on 
the basis of an enduring unanimity result not just in supranational legislation, to be 
deployed subject to the ultimate interpretation of the ECJ, but in supranational bodies 
that take decisions affecting all member states on a supranational basis. Perhaps the most 
pertinent examples of this come with the European Single Currency and the 
determination of interest rates supranationally by the European Central Bank.
Furthermore, despite an enduring intergovemmentalism, sovereign decision-making 
has been checked by the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting. In endorsing 
QMV, each member state agreed that whereas previously, under unanimity, they could 
reject a measure that was not in their national interest, henceforth, if in an opposing 
minority, undesired legislation could legally be thrust upon them in much the same 
way that legislation desired by a majority within a state can be forced upon an 
unwilling minority sub-state unit. Thus, whenever a majority vote is taken, the states 
galvanise around themselves the reality of a supranational sovereignty. European
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federalists rejoiced at the introduction of QMV which, as Wistrich and Pinder 
demonstrate, brought to an end twenty years of European constitutional paralysis. To 
this extent, many of them regarded this step as more significant than the creation of 
the Single Market which it was introduced to facilitate.49
Since the Single European Act, wherein the principle of unanimity was conceded, all 
subsequent intergovernmental conferences, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice have 
witnessed successive increases in the scope of Qualified Majority Voting.50 If the 
proposed European constitution is ratified by the requisite member state referenda, 
moreover, this will extend QMV to even more fields. Furthermore, of particular 
concern to larger states, a number of treaties (and the proposed constitution) have also 
introduced changes in the weighting arrangements with the effect that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for single large states to block measures without the development 
of significant coalitions of support.
Quite apart from creating a European Central Bank which, as noted above, 
supranationally determines interest rates, Monetary Union of course, in and off itself, 
constitutes a hugely significant development in the history of the Union, which will 
perhaps do more than anything else to call into being a new sovereign polity. This is not 
least because monetary union creates enormous pressures for even deeper integration. 
To be sure, the ‘stability pact’ currently goes some way towards mitigating the need for a 
formal deeper economic integration in the short term.51 It is, however, difficult to see 
how in the longer run formal fiscal harmonization can be avoided.
Leaving aside the likelihood of more integration, however, it is important to note that as
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long ago as 1998 Anthony Giddens claimed that over 75% of UK economic legislation
• SIand 50% of UK domestic legislation was in any event made by the European Umon. 
There would thus already seem to be a significant supranational European sovereignty. 
Indeed, if it is possible for more of a member state’s economic legislation to be defined 
by the EU than by its home legislature and for as much as its domestic legislation to be 
defined by the EU as the national parliament, it is surely imperative to recognize that the 
EU is, in some senses at least, sovereign.
THE EU AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
Having seen in the above figures the extent to which integration has advanced, the point 
must be made that it has been guided by what we will describe as the Jean Monnet 
strategy. This was/is, in very simple terms, the deliberate attempt to encourage the 
integration of low political policy competences first (sustained by internal sovereignty), 
leaving the ‘high political’, image bearing competencies (sustained by external 
sovereignty) until last, in the hope that the extensive and ‘relatively’ inoffensive 
development of Tow politics’ integration would/will accustom the peoples of the 
European project to the importance of supranational government and bring recognition 
of the interdependent nature of their futures, preparing their hearts and minds for 
integration in the ‘high political’ and emotive realms of currency, defence and foreign 
policy in the future.54
Whilst the bulk of European integration has focused on low politics competencies, the 
Union has taken tentative steps towards the development of external sovereignty in a 
number of fields. Initially, although these steps pertained to external sovereignty, they 
were at the lower end of the high political spectrum. For instance, (and this has actually
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long been the case) the EU enters trade negotiations either with the WTO (and 
previously the GATT) or bilaterally with another economy, rather than the member 
states pursuing separate trade negotiations. This demonstrates ‘the degree to which the 
EU has become a single actor in the international trade regime’.55 The Union also 
determines (again this has long been the case) the Common External Tariff which those 
approaching the Union from outside must confront.56 Since monetary union, moreover,
C H
this has also been true with respect to the interest rates of EMU states.
Turning to the conventional high politics terrain of foreign policy, the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although it is based on 
an intergovernmental pillar, where it is not subject to the European Court of Justice or 
the European Parliament, detailed decisions regarding the implementation of foreign 
and security policy (the basic direction of which would have first been made on the
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basis of unanimity) can be made on the basis of a qualified majority vote. The 
CFSP, moreover, now finds greater presence on the world stage through Amsterdam’s 
provision for the position of an EU ‘High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy’, effectively an EU foreign minister.59 The proposed European constitution, 
meanwhile, suggests renaming this post calling it the ‘Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs’ which strategically crosses a psychological frontier in its deployment of the 
word ‘minister’.60 In this context there was a radical new departure in the Middle East 
with the sponsorship of the roadmap coming from the ‘Quartet’ consisting of the 
United States, Russia, the United Nations and, rather than either of the two European 
permanent members of the Security Council, Britain or France, ‘Europe’. Having said 
all of this, however, one cannot overlook the fact that the CFSP completely failed to 
provide any sense of common policy in the context of the 2003 Gulf War.61
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In terms of defence, meanwhile, the growing insignificance of the Western European 
Union, the break-up of Yugoslavia on its doorstep and the reluctance to rely on 
America through NATO, resulted in a 1999 decision to establish a Common European 
Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), involving a rapid reaction force of 100,000 
people from all members states (bar Denmark62).63 Now, to be sure, the EU is a very 
long way indeed from having an army that can be deployed on the basis of a 
supranational sovereign decision (i.e. QMV). The contributions of different states 
cannot be deployed within that force without the agreement of their sending 
governments, but the fact that there could be a military force, an army, upheld in the 
name of Europe -  a body that clearly has deeper existential ambitions than the 
intergovernmental ‘means-end’ treaty organisations that address specific defence 
issues -  adds weight to the sense of an emerging polity.64
In conclusion, whilst an external sovereignty is clearly emerging in the sense that the 
EU is increasingly asserting its own international personality in different areas, its 
development is far more limited than internal sovereignty integration where decisions 
are potentially widely processed by QMV and set within the body of EU law. Perhaps, 
in deference to Monnet’s gradualist approach to integration, the EU has first moved 
tentatively into the area of international affairs by placing issues within its brief that 
associate it with matters international but initially on an intergovernmental 
foundation. When people become used to the fact that the EU apparently has a foreign 
and defence policy brief, it will be easier to incrementally draw this ‘high politics’ 
policy area into to the ambit of supranational decision-making. Whilst the current 
limitations on defence and foreign policy integration demonstrate that the EU has not
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yet reached the place of the brink, the fact that it is now moving into the realm of 
foreign policy and defence demonstrates that ‘low politics’ integration is quite 
advanced and that the Union has moved a considerable way across the spectrum.
EU SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM
So then, how exactly should one conceive of the emerging supranational European 
sovereignty that co-exists with that of the member states and which is primarily 
internal? By transforming some of the inter-relationships between themselves into 
intra-relationships, the integrating states have created a new politically existing 
sovereign end. In doing so primarily with respect to low policy competencies that 
pertain to internal sovereignty, however, the resulting new sovereign end has been 
impoverished and stunted in the sense that it has not enjoyed the image-bearing, high 
politics competencies related to external sovereignty but a sovereign end nonetheless 
it remains. It may pertain mainly to low politics but unlike the measure of domestic 
autonomy of the states within a federal state (see above), this emergent supranational 
sovereignty exists outside of any other ultimate sovereignty that guarantees political 
existence. It thus offers a form of constitutional dependence that is quite unlike that 
offered by the imperial frame through which conventional checks to sovereignty are 
understood. Instead of an external sovereignty providing covering from beyond the 
polity in question, one is confronted with an emergent supranational sovereignty 
which does not relate to any already existing historic state but rather to an emergent 
supranation freely created by the effected polities and yet not reducible to them in the 
sense of conventional intergovemmentalism (i.e. not reducible to the sum of its 
national parts).
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Coining to terms with the nature of the supranational sovereignty which challenges that 
of member states - curiously primarily from the inside-out rather than, in classic imperial 
fashion, from the outside-in - requires one to think rather differently about sovereignty 
and the manner in which it can be challenged and developed. The fact that sovereignty 
can develop from the ‘inside-out’, as well as the ‘outside-in’, is perhaps best 
communicated through an analogy. Suppose sovereignty (both internal and external), is 
represented by a clay urn. Within this image internal sovereignty, and the policies that it 
upholds, are represented by the clay on the inside of the urn, whilst external sovereignty 
and the policies that it upholds, are represented by the outside of the urn. According to 
this picture European integration - which, thanks to the genius of Monnet, focused on 
low politics first - has given rise to the creation of a supranational sovereign urn in which 
priority has been given to the inside surfaces before the outer surfaces. The result of this 
is that, whilst lacking its finished outside surfaces, and, therefore, constituting a rather 
fragile and unattractive piece of work, the EU is nevertheless effectively an urn in its 
own right from which one can take a drink. To the extent that the EU enjoys its own 
internal sovereignty, therefore, its own developing urn and not the multiple inside 
surfaces of the nation-state urns projected onto it, the EU’s internal sovereignty is clearly 
an autonomous sovereignty in its own right. To be sure, now that it is moving into the 
realm of external sovereignty, some progress is being made in developing the outside 
surfaces of the urn, although there is a long way to go. The point to grasp here is the fact 
that, although in recent times it is unconventional to create a politically existing polity 
from the inside-out, with domestic policy first, this is no more functionally impossible 
than it is to have a working urn, i.e. an urn that can hold water from which one can take a 
drink, even whilst it lacks its finished outer surfaces.65
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INVISIBLE SUPRANATIONALISM?
The fact that even polities that play a very significant role in the domain of high 
politics like Britain and France (having permanent board membership of the G8, the 
IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council) do so having lost aspects of their 
sovereignty as a result of their EU membership, means that one has to be very careful 
about drawing too many conclusions from the presence of external sovereignty. One 
must subject all manifestations of sovereignty to careful interrogation. If it is apparent 
that the intra-relations underpinning the internal sovereignty of the nation-state are 
wholly part of the political existence of the nation-state, then one can rest assured that 
the sovereign image of that nation (deriving from the monopoly of inter-relationships 
between it and the rest of the international community in respect of its high political 
competencies) is in fact entirely accurate. If, however, the intra-relationships 
underpinning low policy competencies are part of a supranational political existence 
rather than that of the nation-state, then one can conclude that the image of a 
sovereign nation-state, deriving from the continued existence of inter-relationships 
between that state and its neighbours, in terms of the high politics competencies, does 
not actually tell the whole story.66
According to the above perspective, there is undoubtedly a rapidly emerging 
supranational EU sovereignty. This sovereignty, however, has not by any means 
extinguished intergovemmentalism from the Union. Indeed, given that 
intergovemmentalism remains particularly developed in the context of high politics 
competencies - the main sovereignty image-bearing competencies - the appearance of 
national sovereignty remains largely intact. Thus, whilst a significant portion of the 
previously monopolising inter-relationships between member states have been
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transformed into intra-relationships, creating a politically existing, supranational 
sovereignty and placing the EU very definitely within the confederal spectrum, they 
have not by any means been wholly transformed, taking the EU into full federal
67statehood. This, however, remains the aspiration or fear of many observers.
ENGLISH SCHOOL SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
When the openness of the English School approach is made explicit by not adhering 
to an abstracted and consequently reified conception of sovereignty (i.e. external 
sovereignty effectively apart from internal sovereignty) it is possible to recognize 
fundamental transformation. By conceptualizing the process of change from the 
several sovereign states to the single sovereign supranational state, and the place of 
the in between, this thesis - drawing particularly on the work of Murray Forsyth - 
demonstrates how the English School realist tradition can account for sovereignty in 
the context of profound change. This chapter engages initially with this challenge 
from the perspective of the Linklater - Little interpretation of the three traditions 
which underpins the whole of this research. In order to unpack the process of change 
in detail, however, it makes use of the services of the complementary Wightian 
spectrum which this chapter has associated with the confederal spectrum, according to 
which the boundaries of the sovereign state can be modified. Contrary to James et al, 
it is as well to be able to engage with the process of transformation across time and 
not just the resulting ontology at the end of that transformation. This is of special 
importance in the current context, given that it is very possible that, whilst European 
integration has moved beyond the confines of a simple intergovemmentalism, it may 
well not result in the formation of a United States of Europe. In the framework of 
English School thinkers like James and neorealists such as Waltz, this would be a
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recipe for permanently viewing the EU as an essentially conventional 
intergovernmental project.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, therefore, it is the contention of the realist, pro-sovereignty perspective 
presented in this chapter that globalization does not bring about the end of 
sovereignty. In the first instance, the numbers of sovereign states has increased 
dramatically and the territorial fixity of their boundaries has become more certain. In 
the second instance, moreover, there is also evidence to suggest that sovereignty is 
actually adjusting to the pressures of systemic change. Through the exploitation of the 
confederal spectrum, underpinned by the ‘intra-inter-relational’ and ‘politically 
existing’ tools, it is possible to deploy the co-ordinates of sovereignty in the context 
of European integration. This is significant in that, whilst ‘the accountability’ reach of 
the state is constrained by the expansion of economic life beyond the borders of the 
state, the development of a European supranational sovereignty suggests that rather 
than being eroded by change, sovereignty itself may actually be being extended in 
order to secure/provide for its endurance. On both bases the chapter agrees with James 
- although for different reasons:
‘...The idea that this type of arrangement [sovereignty] is somehow becoming 
insignificant seems, to this observer, totally unreal’.68
As noted above, however, the important qualification that must be made is that, whilst 
there is clear evidence that sovereignty is extending in the current environment in 
deference to the reconstitution of the realist group imperative, it is by no means clear
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that Europe is on a road that will inevitably lead to the creation of a full blown 
supranational sovereignty of the kind one would associate with a sovereign nation­
state writ large, a United States of Europe. It is always possible that the emergent 
supranational sovereignty might find some form of long-term coexistence with nation­
state sovereignty. This would require a permanent confederal frame of reference 
wherein two sovereignties, each qualitatively absolute but quantitatively relative, 
sustain different jurisdictions with respect to the same piece of territory. This would 
not require the rejection of sovereignty but rather its relocation in a long-term 
confederal, transformational setting. Whether or not this will be necessary will, 
however, depend upon history which has not yet taken place.
Having considered territorial sovereignty in the context of systemic change from the 
vantage point of the realist tradition, and therein the sovereignty pole, the thesis will 
now turn to narrowly consider sovereignty in the context of globalization from the 
perspective of the revolutionist tradition and therein the post-sovereignty pole. This 
will confront the peculiarly extra-territorial nature of globalization in detail and 
consider the case that the impact of the global flows involved is such that it actually 
presents a form of systemic change that is not compatible with territorial sovereignty.
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Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987, London, Routledge, 1989; 
John Pinder, European Community, 1991; Ernest Wistrich, The United States o f  Europe, 1994; 
Laughland, Tainted Source, 1997; Norman Lamont, Sovereign Britain, 1995; John Redwood, The 
Death o f Britain, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.
68 James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 47.
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CHAPTER 5
REVOLUTIONISM &
THE POST SOVEREIGNTY POLE: 
GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY
Having considered sovereignty from the perspective of the realist tradition, both in terms of 
definition (chapter 3) and its capacity to respond to European integration, giving rise to 
‘change by extension’ (chapter 4), it is now the purpose of chapter 5 to examine the rather 
more dramatic systemic change challenge of wider globalization. Approached through 
consideration of Wight’s two agencies of revolutionism, see below, this will suggest that 
unlike European integration, globalization is giving rise to a new revolutionist ontology 
which is actually placing sovereignty in jeopardy. Chapter 6 will then go on to consider how, 
further authenticated by the responses of governments, globalization requires a 
reconceptualization of sovereignty that can accommodate ‘change by erosion’, laying the 
foundation for the definition of revolutionist post-sovereignty.
In reading these chapters it is important to remember that they define a tradition (a tool) 
which, along with the other traditions, and in deference to the methodology of the English 
School, prepares the way for developing a distinctive perspective on the role of state 
sovereignty in the context of systemic change. Armed not merely with an institutional but
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also an ontological perspective, the thesis will be better able to engage revolutionism with 
realism as subsequent (rationalist) chapters seek to develop a refined model sovereignty.
STRUCTURE
This chapter will begin with an introductory examination of the revolutionist tradition, 
exploring something of its ambiguity, before defining the manner in which this thesis seeks to 
deploy it. The thesis will then investigate the revolutionist ontology by considering 
globalization through the two agents of revolutionism defined by Wight, the ‘spirit of 
commerce’ and the ‘spirit of enlightenment’. Part 1 will investigate the development of 
revolutionist ontology through the ‘spirit of commerce’ as it considers economic 
globalization before Part 2 examines the progress of revolutionism through the ‘spirit of 
enlightenment’, focusing on the growth of global moral solidarity. The chapter will 
demonstrate how these developments have the impact of undermining the ontological closure 
upon which sovereignty depends to at least some degree. This will prepare the way for the 
second chapter in this two chapter exploration of revolutionism, chapter 6, which will provide 
a clear definition of the post-sovereignty position that this thesis’ deployment of the Linklater 
Little spectrum associates with this English School tradition.
INTRODUCING REVOLUTIONISM
The key feature of revolutionism in Wight’s thought resides on a commitment to dispense 
with the division of humanity between closed states. Specifically revolutionists reject the 
notion that the international arena is a manifestation of the Hobbesian or indeed Lockean 
state of nature, resulting from the creation of multiple sovereign polities in the absence of any 
overarching global government. The division of the world, be it within a Hobbbesian (realist)
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or Lockean (rationalist) frame, is illegitimate and should be swept away by the processes of 
history and make way for the expression of global humanity.1
The shape of revolutionism is actually the subject of some dispute. Porter contends that
alternative manifestations of it define three distinct models, a Roman form of imperialism, a
• •  2 •Kantian world federation and a cosmopolitan world society position. Buzan, meanwhile, has 
more recently made a similar observation, suggesting that this ambiguity is a function of the 
relative lack of attention afforded revolutionism vis-a-vis the other traditions and something 
that needs correction. Whilst this research agrees that revolutionism requires more attention, 
however, especially in the context of globalization, unlike Buzan it subscribes to the 
Linklater -  Little perspective which defines the three traditions as an ontological and an 
epistemological spectrum, which does not see each tradition as a homogenous block but 
rather as a portion of the flowing (three traditions) whole. In this context it is entirely 
appropriate to believe that the spectrum extends from a Kantian world federation on the one 
side (see the neo-Kantian category in Figure 1), sustaining an enduring state form and thus 
some ontological closure, albeit qualified by a very significant measure of commonality, 
through to a cosmopolitan arrangement which dispenses entirely with the ontological closure 
of the state on the far side of revolutionism (see the neo-Dantean, post-sovereignty pole 
category in Figure 1). Given the need to define revolutionism primarily in terms of its polar 
expression of complete openness, the post-sovereignty pole, it is especially important to now 
reflect on the bases for the ontology associated with the cosmopolitan form of governance.
In order to grasp the ontological openness posited by revolutionism’s deconstruction of the 
sovereign state it is helpful to consider the interrelationships between people in different parts
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of the world in the context of clear inter-state division (realism) and in the context of greater 
global unity (revolutionism). If one subscribes to the realist contention that ‘power is anterior 
to society, law, justice and morality’ it follows that the society in which Mr A resides, upheld 
by state Z, must be closed off from the society in which Mr B resides, upheld by state Y. 
Interactions between the two in the international arena, therefore, can only be made indirectly 
through the two states wherein they reside since it is only the states that bear international 
personality. If, on the other hand, subscribing to revolutionism, one locates humanity ‘in the 
open’, people are able to engage with each other on the basis of their common humanity 
which posits an ontological openness that unbundles conventional nation-state sovereignty. 
In this new order, the bearers of personality, international or otherwise, are people. This 
openness, ontologically diametrically opposed to the sovereign state, and championing the 
centrality of humanity in its place, is seen again and again in Wight’s characterisations of 
revolutionism:
‘States are not persons, they have no wills but the wills of the individuals who manage their 
affairs, and behind the legal facade of the fictitious Society of Nations is the true international 
society composed of men’.3
Revolutionists ‘have emphasized the ideal unity of international society as the standard for 
condemning the empirical divisions within the society and believing them to be transitory. 
They implicitly repudiate the validity of the state system’.4
Revolutionists ‘believe that the society of states is the unreal thing -  a complex of legal 
fictions and obsolescent diplomatic forms which conceals, obstructs and oppresses the real
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society of individual men and women, the civitas maxima. On this view, international society 
is none other than the community of mankind. If the community of mankind is not yet 
manifested, yet it is latent, half glimpsed and groping for its necessary fulfilment’.5
Bull’s characterisation of revolutionism, meanwhile, clearly echoes that of Wight. ‘For 
Kantians’, Bull observed, ‘it was only at a superficial and transient level that international 
politics was about relations among human beings of which states were composed. The 
ultimate reality was the community of mankind, which existed potentially, even if it did not 
exist actually, and was destined to sweep the system of states into limbo’.6
TWO AGENCIES FOR REVOLUTIONISM
In his definition of the revolutionist tradition Wight, drawing on Kant, identifies two agencies 
that led the way to revolutionism, ‘the spirit of commerce’ and ‘the spirit of enlightenment’. 
The commercial spirit, applied to contemporary society, pertains to the global economic 
flows that characterise this age. As Wight states, writing in 1960: ‘We should probably 
translate it as the growing material interdependence of mankind, due to the economic 
unification of the world and industrialization’.7 The spirit of enlightenment, meanwhile, 
Wight translates ‘as the growing moral interdependence of mankind due to education,
cultural exchange and intellectual standardization. It is manifested in the formation of a world
• » • •  spublic opinion, which some see as the animating principle of the United Nations’. This
chapter will offer reflection on the rise of revolutionism in the context of globalization from
the perspective of these two agents manifest in the explosion of global economic flows, and
the not unrelated increase in moral solidarity manifest through a growing willingness to
countenance intervention in sovereign states. These two elements of revolutionism give rise
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to two distinct - although none the less interconnected - developments, one of which, 
economic globalization, is more advanced than the other.
1] ECONOMIC AGENCY
In examining global flows the point must first be made that the rationalist tradition of the 
English school three traditions spectrum stresses the importance of economic flows between 
polities.9 What then is the justification for seeking to come to terms with economic 
globalization through revolutionism? In the first instance extensive economic 
interdependence was viewed by Wight as indicative of revolutionism. ‘It is worth noting’, 
Wight claimed, ‘that the doctrine of laissez faire, which was the guiding philosophy of 
Britain during her Victorian predominance, was as authentically Revolutionist a doctrine as 
Jacobinism for revolutionary France. Its supreme theoretical exponent was Cobden’.10 Later 
in another reflection on laissez-faire ideas Wight observes that: ‘This laissez faire doctrine 
has many of the marks of Revolutionism. It proclaims the international solidarity of economic 
interest, repudiates the doctrine of the balance of power, and uses non-interventionism as a 
mode of intervention’.11 In the second instance, as the chapter will demonstrate, the nature of 
economic interdependence has, since the mid-late twentieth century, (by some measures) 
expanded significantly beyond that experienced even during the nineteenth century such that 
rationalism is no longer the most obvious tradition to express economic interdependence. 
This necessarily translates into the selection of revolutionism when one appreciates that the 
intensity of this interdependence is actually inaugurating a ‘time space compression’ which 
threatens the very ontology of the state system - the chief target of revolutionism - with a new
1 9global connexity.
179
In demonstrating the extent and the increase of the ‘new temporality’, this chapter’s 
examination of economic processes reveals the special relevance of the revolutionist tradition 
to the current environment. First, it helps to address the criticism that the English School 
fails to engage with economics. As Richard Little observes: ‘Despite acknowledging the 
importance of economics, there has been a reluctance by the English school to embrace this 
sector wholeheartedly’.13 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, maintain: ‘The principal 
weakness of the English school is its relative disregard of economic and technological factors 
and the various types of international cooperation that these factors either induce or 
necessitate’.14 This is important not least because it provides the opportunity for developing 
understanding of revolutionism which is undoubtedly the tradition that has been afforded the 
least attention over the years and in relationship to which most concerns have been expressed. 
In considering revolutionism in the context of current economic developments the chapter 
will reveal that there is a sense in which revolutionism is now more important than ever,15 
further justifying the renewed interest in the English School.16
2] MORAL AGENCY
These physical flows, in and of themselves, do not generate a new moral solidarity but they 
do create pressures that can call into being a greater measure of solidarity. An explosion of 
global flows in the interest of capitalism forges a new level of connectedness between 
peoples, generating a need for regulation. This new level of connectedness, and associated 
need for regulation negotiation, inevitably results in the development of common norms that 
help the cause of global solidarity -  a kind of moral globalization. The new level of 
connectedness also makes it difficult to keep the violation of those norms secret. If human
180
rights abuses are taking place they can quickly find their way into the public domain and 
consequently pressure is placed upon governments to act.
This chapter will seek to demonstrate how the fortunes of the above agencies - especially the 
economic - provide examples of the new temporality identified in chapter 2, giving 
expression to globalization’s spatio-temporal revolution. In doing so, the chapter will reflect 
directly on their implication for state sovereignty.
PART 1: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
In turning to examine economic globalization in the light of revolutionism, it is important to 
be clear that it is not the purpose of this thesis to seek to make any contribution to current 
understanding of economic globalization per se, but rather to consider the conceptualization 
of sovereignty in that context from within the English School frame of reference. Section 1 
will thus examine different features of economic globalization namely trade, portfolio finance 
and foreign direct investment, not to reveal something new about these ingredients of 
globalization but instead to show how, in contributing to the new openness, they constitute an 
important contemporary example of revolutionist ontology which is corrosive of the closed 
sovereign state. Section 2 will then examine the specifically ontological implications of these 
economic processes in more detail through consideration of finance and the network.17 In 
building up an appreciation of revolutionism through consideration of the ingredients of 
economic globalization, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this approach to 
use the three traditions as a lifeless, ‘moribund classificatory device’ whose only rationale is
1 Rthe gathering of empirical examples of the revolutionist tradition. In the first instance, this 
detailed investigation of revolutionism demonstrates the ontological implications of
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economic globalization, providing a framework within which to sensitively consider the 
conceptualization of international relations and the place of the sovereign state therein. In the 
second instance, it demonstrates/explains revolutionism’s place within the three traditions 
spectrum in preparation for developing a detailed holistic appreciation of the entire spectrum 
through which the thesis will later consider the fate of sovereignty in the context of systemic 
change.
SECTION 1: THREE ECONOMIC FLOWS
1) TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION
In this section the chapter will first consider the possibility of revolutionist ontology resulting 
from the globalization of trade in general statistical terms before seeking further illumination 
through specific examination of: i) tariff reduction, ii) the changing definition of tariff 
barriers and iii) regulation.
Since the Second World War, the globe has witnessed a massive increase in trade. To be sure 
the relative rate of increase has slowed since the 1970s but the growth of trade has none the 
less continued, contributing to the increasingly interconnected nature of states. There are 
some discrepancies in accounts of the development of trade in the post war period. Held, 
McGrew, Globatt and Perraton claim that trade grew 5.8% per annum 1950-73,19 whilst
• 9HKitson and Michie put the figure at 7.2% and Hirst and Thompson contend that trade grew 
by 9% per annum during the said period.21 Between 1973-96 Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and 
Perraton claim that trade grew 4.1% per annum, whilst world output grew at 3.3% per
99annum. Kitson and Michie, meanwhile, with slightly different dates, 1973-1990, claim that
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trade grew by 3.9% per annum and world output by 2.8% per annum.23 Despite these 
marginally different figures and dates, however, if one takes a long term view of the 
expansion of trade across the course of history, it is clear that, world trade has grown more 
rapidly in the post-war period than in any earlier era. Whilst the rate of increase has slowed 
since 1970, the significance of trade has continued to grow such that, ‘where the key OECD 
economies are concerned, the figures ...indicate that trade, as a proportion of GDP (measured 
in constant prices), has been higher since the early 1970s than in any previous era’.24 Thus 
construed world trade has ‘played a key role in promoting growth and cementing the bonds of
• 7 ^interdependence between the leading Western economies’.
i. FALLING TARIFF BARRIERS
A key factor in the increase in trade, facilitating a greater connexity, has been the reduction of 
tariffs secured by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1948 and then from 1993 
the World Trade Organisation. During its life the GATT presided over seven rounds of tariff 
reduction negotiations. Negotiations brought tariffs down so that by 1979, when the Tokyo 
Round came to an end, they were lower than they had been during the Gold Standard era. 
Since then the Uruguay Round has taken them still lower and now of course the WTO is
7 7pressing ahead with its Doha Round.
Success has depended on not just involving the big players but in also persuading developing 
countries to reject protectionism 28 In the first 1947 GATT negotiations just 23 states took 
part, in the 1967-70 Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations over 80 countries participated 
whereas the last Uruguay Round 1986-93 embraced most countries in the world. In 1999 the 
WTO had 135 members with a further 30, including the likes of China and Russia, seeking
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membership. Free trade has thus become the orthodoxy of the late twentieth/early twenty- 
first century.29 This has generated a new level of interdependence and connexity between 
states whose putative sovereignty would suggest, contrarily, at least a very significant 
measure of ontological closure.
ii. NEW TARIFF BARRIERS
In order to fully appreciate the growing trade interdependence - facilitated in part by the work 
of the WTO in reducing tariffs - and its implications on putative state sovereignty, predicated 
upon ontological closure, it is vital to understand recent redefinitions of tariff barriers. 
Traditionally tariff barriers were legal provisions placing a levy on goods and services 
entering a country. Today the definition also includes so-called ‘link issues’ which constitute 
anything that distorts the reality of a level playing field for foreign goods or services; e.g. 
state policies regarding government procurement, investment, competition policy, 
environmental policy or labour policy which have the effect of creating barriers to trade by 
giving competitive advantages to nationals.30 As a consequence of the recognition of this 
reality there have been ‘pressures for a much deeper harmonisation of domestic laws and 
regulatory structures governing business’, precipitating the need for a distinction between 
‘shallow integration’, pertaining to conventional tariff reduction and ‘deep integration’,
*3 1
pertaining to the removal of other distortions of the level playing field.
The movement from a negative/shallow to a positive/deep free trade agenda, through the 
instrumentality of ‘link issues’, constitutes a very significant qualitative development with 
very much greater implications for levels of interconnection. ‘This unheralded theme... (deep 
integration) ...is continued by the ‘link issues’ which to be effective require harmonisation of
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national policies’. In enlarging conceptions of trade barriers from issues such as tariffs, to 
other obstacles whose governance can impinge upon broader conceptions of the ‘political 
good’, there is a greater sense in which the quest to increase trade can be seen to be calling 
upon a measure of moral consensus that is ordinarily sought within a sovereign polity. 
Crucially, this has the potential to take one out of the arena of technical ‘regularian law’ and 
into the arena of political ‘moral/emotive’ law.32 The ontological closure upon which 
sovereignty is predicated is thus once again called into question by growing transnational 
linkages.
iii. STATE SOVEREIGNTY, INTERDEPENDENCE & REGULATION
In the context of increasing mutual vulnerability, resulting from growing trade 
interdependence, there is a need for new supranational governance which further undermines 
the ontological closure of the sovereign state without calling into being a new ontological 
closure in the form of a supranational, federal sovereign state. The WTO does not just exist to 
encourage states to reduce tariffs. Crucially, the WTO is ‘a much more powerful institution 
[than the GATT] in so far as its dispute panels have the authority to make binding 
judgements’ in the event of trade disputes.33 Between 1995 and 2003 282 cases were 
registered leading to 68 adopted rulings and 64 cases where an out of court settlement was 
used compared with just 229 cases and 98 rulings in 42 years of GATT history (1948-89).34 
The development of the world’s free trade body from a basically intergovernmental structure 
into something very much more supranational is suggestive of a shifting economic centre of 
gravity bom of the globalization of trade. ‘[T]he global regulation of trade, by bodies such as 
the WTO, implies a significant re-negotiation of the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty’.35
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REVOLUTIONISM AND TRADE
In seeking to translate the ontological implications of recent trade developments into the three 
traditions spectrum, there is no doubt that they should be located, at least in part, within the 
revolutionist tradition. There are two bases for making this contention, both of which relate 
to the implications of the peculiar intensity of contemporary trading practices in championing 
and sustaining ontological openness. First, contemporary levels of trade introduce an 
ontological revolution by locating the sovereign state’s economic centre of gravity in a 
context that has to embrace the central importance of trade and thus, at the very heart of its 
ontology, a basic openness. This was not required by the earlier and more limited trade,
7 Awhose importance was such that it could only be deemed to constitute an ‘enclave’ within 
the broader national economy. Second, this interdependence calls into being global 
governance which, imposing decisions on members, undermines the ontological closure of 
the so-called sovereign state.
2) GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL FINANCE
Unlike the creation of the national economy during the mercantilist era, globalization is not 
primarily about a territorial reconfiguration on a larger scale, a quantitative extension of the 
market. It is rather concerned with a qualitative development of the market which can be seen 
with great clarity through the lens of an appreciation of the way in which global finance 
undermines the autonomy of the political through the development of a hyperspatial, extra­
territorial financial dimension which is not obviously accountable to the territorial sovereign 
state. Since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a massive increase in the significance of
37 •global finance which has played a key role in defining contemporary globalization and its 
implications for state sovereignty. This chapter will now examine recent developments in
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global finance from the perspective of: 1) the advent of the Euro-dollar market and 2) the 
termination of the Dollar-Gold Standard exchange rate system and the related demise of 
capital controls, considering their implications for sovereignty
1. MONEY AND VALUE AND THE EURO-DOLLAR
The development which has perhaps done more than anything to graphically generate an 
extra-territorial global financial realm has been the advent, and subsequent development, of 
the Euro-dollar market. The Euro-dollar market provides a mechanism whereby one can hold 
dollars beyond the control of the United States monetary regime or indeed any monetary 
regime. It thus provides a source of finance which, unaccountable to any state, is completely 
unregulated. As such its fortunes consequently depend entirely upon the market. Creating 
many of the tensions which have contributed to the policy of financial deregulation since
381970, the Euro-dollar market has had a definitive influence over the global economy.
Having begun life, according to one account, almost by accident in 1949 and developed 
quietly during the 1950s, the Euro-dollar market first became public knowledge in the early 
1960s.39 In the context of government acquiescence the Euro-dollar developed rapidly, 
creating an increasingly significant ethereal, extra-territorial dimension in which money was 
firstly growing at an incredible rate and secondly being moved around the globe in vast 
quantities.40 As such it was having an increasingly significant impact on national economies, 
despite the fact that it was divorced from any kind of direct relationship to ‘the real economy’ 
and thus became, in an important sense, an autonomous, ‘economy apart’ which was beyond 
government regulation. The quintessentially extra-territorial, autonomous, global nature of 
the Euro-dollar market is clearly demonstrated in the following quotation from one of its
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greatest champions, Walter Wriston. ‘National borders are no longer defensible against the 
invasion of knowledge, ideas or financial data, ...The Euro-currency markets are a perfect 
example. No one designed them, no one authorised them, and no one controlled them 
...today they are refugees, if you will, from national attempts to allocate credit and capital 
for reasons which have little or nothing to do with finance and economics’. (Emphasis 
added).41
Rapid expansion, of about twenty-five percent every year, continued during the 1970s42 such 
that the price of the Euro-dollar fell and consequentially there was a desire to hold extra­
territorial money in other rather stronger currencies. During the 1970s the Euro-dollar market 
was thus complemented by the Euro-sterling, the Euro-mark and Euro-yen market.43 The 
attraction of moving out of dollars, whilst maintaining extra-territoriality, was such that 
demand for the newly favoured Euro-mark pushed its interest rate higher than that in 
Germany. There was thus a tremendous incentive for the serious investor to evade controls 
and deposit in this new extra-territorial banking world.44
Thus, since the advent of the first extra-territorial currency, growth has been witnessed on 
two fronts: first, there has been a multiplication of the numbers of extra-territorial currencies 
and, second, these currencies have expanded very significantly in size. In 1973 there were 
just $50 billion Euro-dollars; by 1987 there were some $2 trillion. Euro-dollars were 
approaching the size of the monetary aggregates of the United States economy and yet they 
apparently had no economy of their own.45 As long ago as 1979 the value of Euro-dollar 
transactions were six times those of world trade. By 1986 their value had risen to twenty five 
times that of world trade.46
THE NEW AUTONOMY
The advent of the Euro-dollar, and other unpatriated currency markets has presented a 
significant challenge to national sovereignty, providing a form of liquidity that impacts the 
direction of both national economies and the global economy but over which sovereign 
governments have no control. Before reflecting in detail on the impact of this new extra­
territorial domain on state sovereignty, however, it is important to first consider the demise of 
fixed exchange rates and capital controls which were partially the result of growing extra­
territorial money flows and also a great cause for their further extension.
2. THE END OF FIXED EXCHANGE RATES & CAPITAL CONTROLS
The post war Bretton Woods System (BWS) placed great emphasis on the importance of 
exchange rate stability which was secured through a fixed exchange rate system underpinned 
by capital controls. British BWS architect Keynes, with the support of his America 
colleague, Dexter White, ‘consistently and emphatically maintained that national monetary 
autonomy [secured by the fixed exchange rate system in the context of capital controls] was 
essential to the successful management of a macroeconomic policy geared to full 
employment’.47 The development of significant unregulated capital flows resulting from the 
advent of the Euro-dollar market, however, placed the integrity of capital controls in 
unofficial jeopardy from the 1960s onwards. This threat to the integrity of capital controls, 
moreover, also came to have a measure of official sanction from 1961 with the founding of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its founding 
Convention, OECD members - including all the major capitalist economies of the world and 
thus those that had negotiated Bretton Woods (the USA, Britain, France etc) - agreed to seek 
to ‘reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services and current payments
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and maintain and extend the liberalisation o f  capital movements'1.48 (Italics added). 
Specifically, the OECD Code o f Liberalisation o f Capital Movements (ratified in December 
1961) states that: ‘In adhering to the Code, OECD Members have undertaken to remove 
restrictions on specified lists of capital movements between residents of different countries. 
OECD Members have thereby waived their right under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to 
maintain capital controls (while the Code does not alter OECD Members’ obligations as 
members of the IMF). The OECD is to date the only multi-lateral instrument promoting 
comprehensive capital movements liberalisation as its primary purpose’.49
Although in 1964 the OECD decided not to embrace further liberalization for fear of placing 
Bretton Woods under too much pressure, in 1971 the dollar-gold standard came to an end and 
the System began to unravel. To be sure, whilst increasing capital flows did place the 
integrity of the fixed exchange rate system in jeopardy - as Keynes and Dexter White warned 
-U S trade deficits with Europe and Japan, the costs of Vietnam and Johnson’s Great Society 
project arguably had more to do with Nixon’s decision to terminate convertibility.50 Indeed, 
even with growing extra-territorial currency flows in the absence of the fixed exchange rate 
system - and thus bereft of a key rationale for capital controls - they initially remained in 
place, although not for long. America led the way, abandoning its capital controls in 1974, 
followed by Britain in 1979, Germany in 1981 and France after the dramatic failure of its 
reflationary policies in the early 1980s.51 All OECD countries have now jettisoned capital 
controls and increasingly other countries are following suit. During the 1980s only 40% of 
countries had floating exchange rates and had thus removed effective capital controls. By 
1999 60% of countries had floating exchange rates and had thus removed their controls. 
Today it is only the transitional and developing economies that maintain capital controls,
although, anxious to draw in foreign direct investment, many of these nations are accepting 
the need for their abolition.
Having presided over the key change in aspiration in 1961, the OECD has done much - over 
and above the abolition of many capital controls - to actually encourage the realisation of free 
capital movements.53 Age Bakker contends that the liberalisation of capital flows constitutes 
‘one of the OECD’s most important successes’.54
THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY:
The removal of capital controls significantly undermines the autonomy of the state by making 
it much more difficult for a government to control its money supply. ‘Capital mobility, 
deregulation and financial innovation have transformed the capacity of governments to 
determine the domestic money supply and inflation levels’.55 The implications of this on the 
state are best demonstrated through the Mundell-Fleming theorem56 which maintains that a 
polity cannot abandon its capital controls at the same time as setting its interest and exchange 
rates. If a nation sets the interest rate and exchange rate but at the same time abandons capital 
controls then the free movement of money into and out of the country will immediately 
disturb its chosen rates. On abandoning its capital controls, therefore, the theorem claims that 
a state must either choose its exchange rate, and allow the interest rate to move according to 
the magnitude of money going in and out of the country, or it must choose its interest rate, 
and allow the exchange rate to move once again according to the movement of money in and 
out of the country.
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During the 1970s many states thought that they could effectively continue to have an 
autonomous economic policy, choosing their interest rate, whilst living with the 
consequences of a rather more fluid exchange rate. In the event, however, Held et al contend 
that exchange rates moved so rapidly that the aspiration for on-going economic independence 
had to be sacrificed to the global marketplace and its determination of the interest rate.57
If it is not practically possible to determine interest rates as a result of allowing exchange 
rates to fluctuate randomly, however, can the Mundell Flemming theorem be exploited the 
other way around? Can a state let go of interest rates and set the exchange rate? In practice, 
Held et al contend, this too has proved to be difficult. The shift in the centre of gravity to the 
bond and currency markets on the global level has meant that both interest and exchange 
rates are actually being largely determined by the world marketplace.58 Thus the ‘real’ 
economies of the world are presided over by a global financial market which operates in 
deference to blunt, stock exchange mediated, market forces. This means that the only way in 
which a country can hope to receive investment is by conforming to the prime imperative of 
the world’s stock markets, low inflation, whatever it takes.
THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
The chapter will now consider a number of the practical consequences of the removal of 
capital controls for the sovereign state:
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i. THE END OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
‘Capital controls’, Sassen observes, ‘provided some defense against speculative attacks and 
some policy autonomy within a fixed exchange rate system’.59 Today, however, the controls 
have been removed from most states and at the same time the massive growth of global 
financial aggregates over the last thirty years has completely dwarfed the significance of 
central bank reserves. The sum of all such reserves globally is a mere $1.5 trillion.60 In a 
world without capital controls, where the average daily foreign exchange turnover is itself 
$1.5 trillion, one can see what pitiful leverage sovereign states have at their disposal. 
Standing against the movement of the financial economy, a state could easily spend its 
reserves in just a couple of days.61
There are many examples of the impact of the massive expansion of currency flows on the 
sovereign state’s capacity to intervene in the markets in the context of the demise of 
exchange controls. Kenichi Ohmae documents the attempts of the Bank of Japan to prop up 
the dollar by spending $16 billion between March 1986 and January 1987. Its efforts were to 
no avail and today, of course, any such initiative would arise from the weaker starting point 
of a very much more extensive extra-territorial financial realm. ‘The FX market’, Ohmae 
contends, ‘has become an empire of its own, or the Third Empire, which seems completely 
independent of the Group of Five [now the G8] or, for that matter, any government’. Later 
he continues; ‘The world’s money supply has gone beyond the control of any single 
government ...Even if the BOJ tightens the money supply, a Japanese banker can borrow an 
impact loan instantaneously from abroad’.
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Turning to the 1990s Ohmae observes: ‘as the workings of genuinely global capital markets 
dwarf their ability to control exchange rates or protect their currency, nation-states have 
become inescapably vulnerable to the discipline imposed by economic choices made 
elsewhere by people and institutions over which they have no practical control’. This was 
demonstrated clearly in the Maastricht related speculation against the franc, the pound and 
the kronor.64
ii. THE END OF EFFECTIVE STERILIZATION OF INTERVENTION
Furthermore, even when government does seek to intervene, the termination of capital 
controls means that it loses the opportunity to ‘sterilize’ its intervention. In the past if a 
government intervened on the foreign exchange markets in order to support its currency it 
would then offset this action by intervening in its domestic money market in a process which 
came to be known as ‘sterilization’. This is best explained through an example. Suppose a 
currency is too strong and so its government intervenes on the foreign exchange markets to 
sell and thus reduce demand for that currency. If ‘un-sterilized’ such an action would increase 
domestic money supply, generating unwanted inflationary pressure. Having intervened to sell 
the currency on the foreign exchange markets, therefore, government would then sterilize the 
domestic impact of this intervention by releasing new bonds to mop up the excess money. 
Once the division between the domestic and foreign exchange markets has been removed, 
however, then the release of new bonds would put up the interest rate which -  in a global 
market place -  would have the effect of drawing in more money which would put up the 
exchange rate, exaggerating the original problem that selling the currency was supposed to 
solve.65
194
iii. THE DEATH OF REFLATIONARY POLICY
The death of effective intervention and sterilization carry with them the demise of the option 
of Keynesian demand management. This fact obtained seminal expression in the case of the 
French Socialist government in the early ’80s which pursued classic reflationary policy in the 
interest of generating growth. The government sought to stimulate economic growth by 
lowering the interest rate. Without the effective capital controls of the dollar-gold standard 
era, however, money left the country in search of more favourable interest rates. This 
naturally pulled down the exchange rate and rendered imports more expensive which in turn 
pushed up inflation. The government was thus forced to put interest rates up once again in 
order to slacken demand. Thus, in an open economy, unprotected by effective capital 
controls, reflation will not necessarily produce economic growth.66 ‘With rapid and increased 
capital mobility governments may find it difficult to sustain an expansionary macroeconomic 
policy. Financial globalization increases the incentives for governments to pursue national 
macroeconomic strategies which seek low and stable rates of inflation, through fiscal 
discipline and a tight monetary policy’.67 One is constantly aware of ‘the increasing 
constraints on national level governance that prevent ambitious macroeconomic policies that 
diverge significantly from the norms acceptable to international financial markets’.68
iv. GOVERNMENT DEBT AND GLOBALIZATION
The global financial markets also threaten the autonomy of sovereign states by undermining 
their standing and integrity in the arena of debt. Under Bretton Woods, the absence of the 
major global financial opportunities, subsequently bom of deregulation, placed constraints on 
credit options. In 1973 total net public sector debt, as a share of the GDP of OECD nations, 
was just 15%. During the ’80s, however, financial liberalisation opened the door to many
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new forms of credit which governments began to exploit, borrowing where previously they 
would have been obliged to either raise taxes or reduce expenditure. Total net public sector 
debt, as a share of GDP in all OECD nations, rose to 40% by 1995. One of the greatest 
enthusiasts for global credit was the United States which went from being the world’s biggest 
creditor nation to being its biggest debtor nation in less than a decade! Apparently sovereign 
nations are thus left answerable to international finance. ‘Governments with large debts are in 
fact partly in the hands of investors -  whether foreign or national -  who can switch their 
investments to other currencies. Governments and their central banks have thus been losing 
control over long-term interest rates, no minor matter if you consider that 60% or more of 
private sector debt in the United States, Japan, Germany, and France is linked to them’.69
THE WAY AHEAD?
Looking to the future the suggestion is that, despite their current magnitude, cross-border 
flows are destined to grow even more, with all that this means for the sovereign state. In 
1994 the McKinsey Global Institute suggested that the world was mid-way through a 50 year 
process that would culminate in full integration. In this context financial markets, they claim, 
will get even bigger in relationship to the real economy. Locating their forward projection in 
preceding developments, they observed that, between 1980 and 1992, the total stock of 
financial assets traded in the global capital market increased from $5 trillion to $35 trillion 
which was twice the GDP of OECD countries, the 23 richest states in the world. Increasing 
integration, Sassen observes, can only mean ‘[m]uch more integration and power may lie
H(\ahead for capital markets’.
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THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND AUTONOMOUS FINANCE
Thus the Eurodollar generated extra-territorial currency flows which placed pressure on 
capital controls and the state’s control of the money supply. This in turn contributed, along 
with other factors including the trade deficit and the cost of the Vietnam war, to the demise of 
the dollar gold standard which furthered the movement against capital controls, paving the 
way for their abolition and the further development of global financial aggregates. In these 
developments we see the basis for a new power source autonomous from the sovereign state.
Supranational finance, in league with the IMF, has now effectively become the new co­
ordinating power of every capitalist economy. It has in a very real sense laid down the 
universal ground rules to which every serious capitalist nation must adhere regardless of the 
political persuasion of its government. This, as Strange observes, has had the implication of 
effectively dictating the thrust of economic policy to states, significantly diminishing their 
freedom and in some senses eroding the difference between left and right.71 In this sense it is 
true that liberal democratic capitalism has indeed brought about Fukuyama’s ‘End of
• 72  •History’. Thus, whilst the French Left lives on in name, the reflationary projects that it 
inspired during the early 1980s have had to die. Indeed the Left across the whole of the 
western world, that is serious about election, has been forced to change out of all recognition 
from the modem era. It has had to be united with the Right in submission to the new 
universal jurisdiction of finance. As Harvey observed: ‘There had of course always been a 
delicate balance between financial and state powers under capitalism, but the breakdown of 
Fordist-Keynesianism evidently meant a shift towards the empowerment of finance capital 
vis a vis the nation-state’.73
197
The advent of unpatriated currency movements such as the Euro-dollar, whose lack of 
regulation has facilitated their massive growth, has thus effectively taken power from the 
politicians and in this sense disenfranchised the electorates of the world.74 ‘The formation of a 
global capital market represents a concentration of power capable of influencing national 
government economic policy and, by extension, other policies as well. These markets now 
exercise the accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote governments’ 
economic policies down or in: they can force governments to take certain measures and not 
others. While the power of these markets is quite different from that of the political electorate, 
they have emerged as a sort of global, cross-border economic electorate where the right to 
vote is predicated on the possibility of registering capital’.75
CAPITAL LIBERALISATION, EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
The challenge posed by the globalization of capital is that it creates power flows that cannot 
be married in any sense to sovereign territorial state government whether considered 
individually or collectively. If the global market consisted of the collective territories of the 
sovereign states it would be possible to govern them on the basis of those states. In reality, 
however, the creation of the global market does not simply mean the creation of a new 
market expression that has its being within the collective extent of the several territories. This 
new market expression actually generates an extensive extra-territorial reality which cannot 
be understood merely as the sum of its territorial state parts and governed effectively through 
the co-ordination of those state parts. Ontologically it calls into being a new end which is 
qualitatively different from that of the sovereign states and is arguably, therefore, beyond 
their direct ‘onto(logical)-constitutional reach’ and thus cannot properly be collectively called 
to account by them.
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GLOBAL FINANCE AND REVOLUTIONISM
In conclusion the revolution in portfolio finance has had significant implications for the 
sovereign state, undermining the ontological closure upon which it is predicated. The 
translation of this into ‘revolutionism’ on the three traditions spectrum has two bases. First, 
the revolution of global finance constitutes an ontological revolution that undermines the 
ontological closure of the sovereign state by generating a new global connexity through the 
advent of a new and influential extra-territorial domain. Second, and very strikingly given the 
history of other candidates for revolutionism, this manifestation of revolutionism does not 
just resolidify around a new boundary of closure, once the object of its critique has been 
deconstructed. In the language developed by chapter 2, its temporal orientation endows it 
with an enduring ontological openness.
3) FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)
Having considered the impact of the deregulation of portfolio finance, the chapter will now 
turn to address the implications of the deregulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI 
constitutes an investment in foreign assets which results in the investors taking control of 
those assets as opposed to foreign portfolio investment wherein an investor places money 
abroad but does not assume day to day governmental control of the project in which he/she
7 f\has invested. Thus FDI erodes the ontological closure of the sovereign state on a wider 
basis than portfolio finance in the sense that it not only involves economic flows but 
economic flows that involve the actual day to day control of the actual process of production. 
Animated through the vehicle of the multinational company, FDI ‘slices up the value chain’
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and co-ordinates the production of goods and services through networks of factories, under 
their international umbrella, between nations.
Some restrictions on FDI remain in place, aggravated by the failure of efforts to secure the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.77 Despite this situation, however, it is 
important to recognize that since 1945: a) some countries have always promoted a liberal 
approach towards FDI, namely Britain, Germany and the USA, and b) the OECD has played 
an important role in encouraging other economies to adopt a similar position. In the same 
way that the post-war period saw a very rapid increase in trade and portfolio finance, 
therefore, so too has it seen a significant increase in FDI. For most of the post-war period 
stocks and flows of FDI have grown faster than world income and on some occasions faster
70than trade, especially during the 1960s and the years immediately following 1985. By 
1998, Held et al observe that the multi-national net had extended such that there were 53,000 
multinational companies and 450,000 foreign subsidiaries, with global sales amounting to 
$9.5 trillion.80
Of particular relevance to this liberalisation has been the complete sea change in the attitudes 
of developing countries. During the 1970s there was huge suspicion of foreign ownership 
especially after the Allende government in Chile, which had nationalised the assets of
American firms, was removed by a coup in which the said multinationals apparently played a
81 •key role. As a reflection of this perception that the multinational’s agenda was an 
exploitative form of neo-colonialism, there were some 336 national expropriations during that 
decade. In the 1980s, however, there were just 15 national expropriations and the approach of
87many developing countries began to change as they actually sought to encourage FDI.
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‘[Liberalisation’, Held, et al note, ‘has been incremental but still substantial, with over a
♦ 83hundred countries making their FDI regime more open in the period 1991-5’. The 
increasing engagement of developing countries with FDI, moreover, has meant that the 
OECD states’ share of the agreements has been dropping as a proportion of the total number 
of agreements. In 1989 83% of such treaties were negotiated by OECD states. By the late 
1990s their share had fallen to 62%.84 Today most Latin American countries have adopted a 
liberal approach to FDI, as have most East Asian countries.85 Even China has moved from a 
posture of complete control to a more open regime. Whilst the African continent continues to 
sustain a great deal of diversity in its nations’ approaches to FDI, many restrictions were none 
the less lifted during the 1990s.86
A MORE ADVANCED CONNEXITY?
Before moving to examine the direct sovereignty implications of FDI, it is important to 
recognize that FDI not only constitutes a more advanced form of interdependence than 
portfolio finance in the sense that it brings with it greater control over the assets in question 
and inaugurates the transnationalisation of production. Less obviously it also contributes 
significantly to the development of world trade.
Today the significance of transnational production is such that it ‘outweighs exports as the 
dominant mode of servicing foreign markets’,87 thus providing the basis for the majority of 
world exporting. The trade perspective on FDI can be seen on three bases. First, and most 
obviously, FDI enables companies to directly service foreign markets by establishing bases 
overseas. Second, and less obviously, FDI also supports a process called ‘intra-firm’ trade 
which involves trading between units within a multi-national network in different parts of the
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globe.88 Finally, FDI increasingly enables companies to indirectly service foreign markets 
through the sales of foreign affiliates within transnational production networks. During the 
1970s and 1980s sales of affiliates were comparable to world exports. By the late 1990s, 
however, sales of affiliates were 30% higher than world exports. From the perspective of 
GDP percentage, the sales from foreign affiliates constituted 10-15% of world GDP during 
the ’70s. Today sales from foreign affiliates constitute 25% of world GDP.89 When one 
employs a sufficiently broad conceptualization of FDI - accommodating the three bases for 
trade cited above - one sees that it takes very significant steps in the constitution of an 
economic globality on which future economic growth depends.
Thus FDI creates a greater sense of economic interdependence than portfolio finance on three 
bases. It introduces the day to day control of assets, the transnationalisation of production and 
also a significant extension of trade. This provides a yet further basis for the contention that 
FDI presents a greater threat than portfolio finance to the basic ontological closure upon 
which the sovereign state depends.
A LESS ADVANCED CONNEXITY?
However, whilst FDI might seem like a more advanced expression of globalization in some 
respects, there is an important sense in which it is less threatening to the autonomy of the 
sovereign state than deregulated currency flows and portfolio investment. Whilst the latter 
can be moved around the world effortlessly in milliseconds, FDI investments are much less 
moble. Once a multinational has invested in a country and built factories these cannot be 
moved to another part of the globe by striking some keys on a computer terminal!
202
Having made this qualification, however, it is important not to overstate the point by 
concentrating on a dated vision of FDI. In the context of networked multinationals, which are 
not based on ownership, FDI is considerably more footloose than was once the case. Thomas 
Friedman notes that: ‘While it is true that the Fords, Ciscos, Nikes and Toyotas ...don’t move 
their capital around as fast as ...[the money markets] ...they are shifting it from country to 
country faster than many people realise’. A lot of MNC investment today ‘is not in building 
factories anymore. It is developing alliances with locally owned factories, which serve as 
affiliates, sub-contractors and partners of the multinational firms, and these production 
relationships can be and are moved around from country to country, producer to producer, 
with increasing velocity in search of the best tax deals and most efficient and low cost labour 
forces’.90 To the extent that FDI can be moved with greater speed than was once the case, 
MNC’s now have greater leverage over the state than was the case when all investment 
resulted in outright ownership of physical plants which could not be moved without 
significant reallocation costs. Thus, whilst FDI might not be constitutive of an economic 
autonomy in the tradition of portfolio finance, the former has certainly had the effect of 
further increasing the autonomy of global economic realities vis-a-vis the sovereign state.
FDI, MNCs AND SOVEREIGNTY
FDI can undermine the decisional expression of the sovereign state on a number of bases that 
the chapter will now briefly examine:
I. MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY
In the first instance the size of multinationals is such that they can undermine a state’s macro- 
economic policy simply by moving in a contrary direction to that of the government. If a state
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wishes to reduce unemployment by boosting domestic demand, for example, the benefit of 
taking this step may be undone by MNCs choosing to redirect profits to another nation. 
Similarly an MNC can create havoc with attempts to control the money supply by either 
borrowing from other nations where money is cheaper when a host government raises interest 
rates or by using the opportunities of low interest rates in the host country to finance its 
projects overseas.91 Furthermore, whilst in a global capital market exchange rates can be 
manipulated by many different money movements, one should not forget the significance of 
currency movements initiated by MNCs. As Held et al note, ‘although speculators may 
initiate an attack on a currency, it is when MNCs (and institutional investors) shift out of that 
currency, even as a precautionary measure, that pressure on the exchange rate can become 
irreversible’.92
II. TAXATION POLICY: MANIPULATION
MNCs can also undermine the sovereign state by manipulating its taxation policy. This is 
done through pressuring host governments to offer preferential tax regimes in order to attract 
their investment. Over the last twenty-five years, as the transnationalisation of production has 
grown significantly in importance, corporate tax rates in developed countries have fallen and 
moved more into line with one another. In the context of pressures from and MNCs and the 
desire to draw in FDI, Held at al contend that countries and regions today increasingly find 
themselves trying to out bid each other with tax incentives.93 More blatant manipulation is 
witnessed through the practice that Susan Strange describes as ‘tax farming’. ‘MNCs can be 
said to be tax farmers because of the freedom that they are often given, unlike other 
companies and the rest of the population, to determine how much tax they pay’. As examples
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Strange cites the oil companies whose tax liability the US government adjusted to 
compensate for royalties paid to the Middle East. In the end they paid no tax at all.94
III. TAXATION POLICY: TRANSFER PRICING
The position of the sovereign state with respect to taxation policy is also undermined by the 
practice of ‘Transfer Pricing’ which involves the under or over-charging of internal 
transactions within MNC networks in order to diminish profits in high tax countries and 
boost them in low tax countries. It is illegal but the extensiveness of intra-firm trade provides 
great opportunity for this practice. As governments increasingly share information in order to 
obtain a clear understanding of the accounts of multinationals, however, it is becoming more 
difficult for firms to exploit their global leverage. Rousslang estimated that transfer pricing 
makes MNCs an annual tax saving of somewhere in the region of $8billion.95
IV. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
One of the areas in which FDI has exerted its greatest influence over government decision­
making, Strange maintains, pertains to industrial policy. In the past countries like France 
based their industrial policy on the idea of promoting key national champions. In an age, 
however, where the big firms are, of necessity, ‘multi’ national, and can move from one 
country to another, it is more difficult to think in terms of national champions. Increasingly, 
therefore, industrial policy has looked to the creation of networked projects between nations 
like, for example, the Europe-wide Airbus project, which means that any sponsoring state 
must share its influence with the other sponsoring states and the powerful multinational itself, 
significantly eroding its leverage.96
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State sovereignty has thus clearly been subject to significant erosion thanks to the rapid 
development of FDI since 1945 and especially since 1970. Commenting on globalization, 
Susan Strange contends, that there can be no doubt that developments ‘add up to a substantial 
shift of power from territorial states to world markets, and indirectly therefore to the major 
operators in those markets, the transnational corporations’.97
CONCLUSION
In some ways FDI presents economic life with a greater measure of autonomy from sovereign 
state control than free trade or free portfolio finance. It achieves this by generating a stronger 
sense of a global economic centre of gravity, not only by sustaining the affect of a global 
marketplace (its hidden export function) and the reality of global flows of finance, but also 
through the transnationalisation of production itself. Whilst FDI may not have quite the 
quality of autonomy attached to portfolio finance, with its ability to leave instantly, the 
movement away from making big investments (e.g. building factories) in foreign countries, 
towards developing instead relational networks of indigenous smaller companies, to which 
the MNC ‘contracts out’ specific tasks, is greatly speeding up the potential flow of FDI and 
thus further undermining the autonomy of government.
FDI LIBERALISATION AND REVOLUTIONISM
In seeking to translate the ontological implications of recent FDI developments into the three 
traditions spectrum, there is no doubt that its ontological impact should be located within the 
revolutionist tradition. There are two bases for making this contention, both of which relate to 
the implications of the peculiar intensity and extensity of FDI flows, championing and 
sustaining ontological openness. First, contemporary FDI has introduced a level of
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interdependence across a broad basis (encompassing basic investment flows, asset control, 
the transnationalisation of production and trade) such that participating sovereign polities are 
rendered increasingly open in a way that questions the ontological closure upon which their 
putative sovereignty is predicated. Second, this interdependence does not seek to refer to 
ontological openness merely for the purposes of deconstructing that which went before 
merely to replace it with a new form of closure. FDI flows remain in an inherently dynamic 
state of flux. They do not solidify around a new point of closure. FDI undermines the 
significance of state sovereignty because, although it creates a domain that is beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state, the presence of this extra-territorial domain is able to 
impact the territorial domain of the sovereign state.
SECTION 2: THE QUEST FOR THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ONTOLOGY
In the previous section this chapter examined the increasing importance of economic flows, 
both between and beyond states, and the manner in which these have contributed to the 
erosion of the decisional freedom of the supposedly sovereign state. These flows impact the 
ontological closure upon which putative sovereignty depends on two bases: first through 
radically increasing the levels of interdependence and second, and more profoundly, through 
the development of extra-territorial power sources that are beyond the ontological reach of 
the territorial sovereign state. If one is to fully understand the implications of globalization on 
state sovereignty, it is now imperative to investigate the ontological character of this extra­
territoriality in greater detail. The chapter will do so by examining the dependence of 
globalization on an accentuated temporality, first through the lens of finance and then through 
the lens of the network.
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I. FINANCE AND THE NEW TEMPORALITY
The world of finance is inherently predicated on employing the services of time. It seeks to 
obtain opportunity for change ‘today’ by reaching into the ‘future’. In terms of the spatio- 
temporal parameters developed in chapter 2, one would say that finance is temporally rather 
than spatially oriented and is constructive of an openness that releases one from the
• • 98constraints of ‘the given’, to create and then access new opportunities.
A helpful perspective on the temporality/openness of the financial economy can be obtained 
by reference to its identity with what Hardt and Negri describe as ‘the plane of immanence’ 
which they define by reference to philosophical developments. The radical philosophical 
openness bom of the Enlightenment, they observe, threatened to erupt with hugely 
deconstructive implication during the eighteenth century, but was contained by the re­
imposition of closure via man-made transcendence and hierarchy. At this time the re­
imposition of transcendence was appealing not just because it protected certain vested 
interests but also because the economic and technological realities of the day affirmed the 
imposition of boundaries and thus spatially oriented frameworks of transcendence. In the 
twenty-first century, however, the re-eruption of philosophical immanence, culminating in 
post-modernism, is being greeted by a very much more amenable economic and 
technological framework. Sustained by information technology, global capital ‘operates on 
the plane of immanence, through relays and networks of relationships of domination, without 
reliance on a transcendent centre of power’. As such capital is ‘deterritorialising and 
immanent’, a logical economic bedfellow of ideational immanence in a way that modem 
national political economy never could be."  To the degree that all the devices informed by 
the plane of immanence endeavour to obtain a spatial liberation by reference to time, their
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ontology has a temporal root and thus, as demonstrated in chapter 2, a clearly hyperspatial 
character.
Some people, Castells notes, express the growing importance of the ethereal financial 
economy by contrasting it with the rather more obvious physical economy as the ‘real 
economy’. The relative significance of finance today, he contends, however, is such that they 
would do better to attribute ‘reality’ to finance since it increasingly determines the parameters 
that inform broader economic policy.100 Here one sees very clearly the 
transcendence/contradiction of the closed/given (space) by the open (time) that is definitive 
of the hyperspatial, the assimilation of space into time. Specifically, to the extent that the size 
of the financial economy in the context of global deregulation transcends value, there is a 
clear sense of space (the given, value) being assimilated into time (openness, the possibility 
of change). In this sense economic globalization has articulated a space-time revolution that 
has called into being the new rootless, extra-territorial domain of hyperspace.
II.THE NETWORK AND THE NEW TEMPORALITY
The sense in which economic globalization is temporally oriented is not only demonstrated 
by narrowly considering the ontological implications of finance. It is also seen in its 
identification with the networked form of organisation which impacts all aspects of economic 
globalization and has found particularly developed contemporary expression thanks to the 
services of information technology.101
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In order to understand the notion of the network, it is helpful to contrast it with the dominant 
notion that preceded it. If the post-modern age of globalization has given rise to, and is being 
inspired by, the network, the modem age gave rise to, and was inspired by, the machine.
The notion of the machine is based on the idea that certain ends can be secured by impacting 
many different discrete parts, cogs, intelligently arranged, with controlled forces. 
Ontologically these cogs are closed and indeed this is absolutely central to the functioning of 
the machine given that the operation of cogs depends on the fact that they interact on the 
basis of antithesis which transfers energy and movement in the interest of realising the 
objective for which the machine was created.102 The conception of space which informs the 
machine is premised on an ontological closure which makes it consistent with sovereignty. 
Indeed some writers have explicitly linked sovereignty to the machine.103
The notion of the network on the other hand involves large numbers of actors that, joined by 
multiple connections, mediate flows of money, ideas, services etc, securing the command of 
information that is central to success in a knowledge based economy. Actors embracing the 
‘networked form’ find that the ontological closure - that which secured the centred, 
boundaried identity of the cog and the machine - is exchanged for an ontological openness 
that increasingly refashions them as hubs for flows of information, ideas and money. Indeed, 
in order to really come to terms with the network it is necessary - as this and future chapters 
will demonstrate repeatedly - to focus on the relationships between actors rather than the 
actors themselves. As Mulgan reflected ‘[i]t may still look as if it... [the world today] ...is 
made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality 
is one of multiple connections, many of them inexplicable, many invisible’.104 This
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transformation can be described in postmodern language as a form of deconstruction that 
decentres the subject.105 As such it testifies to an acute temporal orientation mediated by the 
flows (see chapter 2) that dominate the actors, demonstrating again contemporary 
capitalism’s dependence on time. The network’s commitment to ontological openness, 
sustaining flows that deconstruct centred actors, means that it is consistent with post­
sovereignty.
Armed with this perspective, one can see that globalization’s dependence on the networked 
form provides a further example of contemporary capitalism’s dependence on the temporal 
orientation. As in the case of the previous section, the significance of this temporal 
orientation from the perspective of sovereignty is that it contributes to the generation an 
extra-territorial ontology beyond the direct reach of the territorial sovereign state.
SOVEREIGNTY, HYPERSPACE AND REVOLUTIONISM
The advent of an influential hyperspatial component in contemporary culture seen from the 
perspective of both a) finance and b) the network requires that sovereignty engages with a 
form of change that results in its erosion and arguably in its deconstruction. In the past any 
kind of power that threatened the autonomy of a state generally had a spatial orientation as 
did the state. In this sense it existed in the dimension where the modem state enjoyed its 
jurisdiction. This is not to say that a power threat to a state necessarily arose from within that 
state but simply that it arose from either within itself (i.e. a domestic, national civil society 
source), from within another state (a foreign, national civil society source) or directly from 
another state. Whilst a state threatened by forces from within another state, or indeed by 
another state, may not be able to seek solutions by referring to a municipal legal foundation,
given that the threat does not come from beyond the reach of the state per se there is a basis 
for its continued integrity. In light of the mutual desire of polities to uphold their common 
form, in the case of threats emanating from within another state, the government of that state 
(State B) may be willing to help the threatened state (State A) by addressing the source of the 
threat within its (State B’s) own territory. In the event that the threat actually comes from the 
other state itself, in the form of war, then even this would not offend the pertinence of 
sovereignty in the sense that the most dramatic conceivable outcome would merely be the 
redistribution of territory in terms of the enduring principle of sovereignty. The deployment 
of extra-territorial power beyond the ontological-constitutional reach of any state introduces 
an entirely different threat to the integrity of territorial sovereignty.
Specifically the development of extra-territorial power presents a problem for the realist 
assertion of a distinction between sovereignty and power. Champions of the realist tradition, 
as seen in chapter 3, are very clear that the accountability of power to the sovereign state does 
not make the state omnipotent. Often the state will find itself unable to do as it wishes 
because it cannot change the international environment but this does not erode its sovereignty 
because its sovereignty is not a matter of power. States, Morgenthau observed, ‘may be 
unable, because of prevailing actual conditions, to enact and enforce the kinds of laws which 
they would wish and which more powerful nations are able to enact and enforce. But the 
authority ...to enact and enforce laws they please is not thereby abrogated. The actual 
inequality of nations and their dependence upon each other have no relevance for the legal 
status called sovereignty’.106 (Also see Hinsley, James, Sorensen et a l}01) In the context of a 
global economy with hyperspatial expression, however, the central conceptual problem with 
this position is that restraints in the international system are no longer emanating either from
the influence of another sovereign territorial state or developments that are wholly 
accountable to them. Extra-territorial forces generate international restraint but are not subject 
to sovereignty. Given that sovereign states have never been able to do whatever they want, it 
would be easy to say that such restraint is nothing new but in adopting this position one 
would be turning one’s back on the conceptual distinction between territorial and hyperspatial 
extra-territorial restraint, the rapid expansion of the latter and its considerable implications 
for sovereignty. In a world where bases for power have been established which are not fully 
accountable to the sovereign state, there is a very real sense in which such powers stand in 
competition with those of the state.108
In making the distinction between the sovereign state’s relationship to territorial power which 
can be made accountable to it as a territorial category, on the one hand, and hyperspatial, 
extra-territorial flows on the other that are beyond its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach, 
one must have regard for the fact that: ‘they are more “real” in time than space, their power is 
evidenced through the exchange of signs not goods, and their effects are transparent and 
pervasive rather than material and discrete’. Of huge significance for the manner in which 
one conceptualizes politics and sovereignty, moreover, ‘they [the flows] are “chronopolitical” 
in the sense that they elevate chronology over geography, pace over space’.109 The 
elusiveness of these chronopolitical powers to modem conceptualization, however, does not 
make them any less real. As Castells notes, although there is no global capitalist class, ‘there 
is an integrated, global capital network, whose movements and variable logic ultimately 
determine economies and influence societies. Thus, above a diversity of human-flesh 
capitalists and capitalist groups there is a faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial 
flows operated by electronic networks’.110 The network’s complete lack of spatial rootedness
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is seen in its dependence on ‘the non-human capitalist logic of an electronically operated, 
random processing of information’.111 Such chronopolitical power cannot be made properly 
accountable to modem political categories like sovereignty because it is exercised on a 
hyperspatial, extra-territorial and thus extra-sovereign domain. Crucially this means that 
Laughland’s comments, for example, regarding the irrelevance of the French experience, at 
the hands of financiers in the early eighties, to fears about the integrity of French sovereignty 
are misconceived.112 They are based upon premises regarding the relationship between 
sovereignty and power which the hyperspatial has swept away.
Given the importance of global economic flows, their networked form, deconstructing the 
centred ontology upon which sovereign depends, it is the contention of this thesis that 
globalization provides a powerful and developing expression of contemporary, transnational, 
revolutionist ontology which Wight did not detect, partially because of his disinterest in 
economics, and partially because he did not live to see the development of globalization post 
1972. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that these developments make his 
revolutionist tradition, with its transcendence of the sovereign state, extremely relevant to
113attempts to come to terms with international relations in the twenty-first century.
PART 2: REVOLUTIONISM, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY & INTERVENTION
Having examined revolutionism through the first form of agency identified by Wight, ‘the 
spirit of commerce’, it is now important to consider the second form of agency, ‘the spirit of 
enlightenment’. Given that a key indication of the purchase of revolutionism’s concept of 
‘global humanity’ on international politics is manifest in a willingness to embrace 
intervention in the interest of justice, Part 2 will examine recent developments, demonstrating
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what is effectively a ‘globalization of morality’. This chapter devotes less space to Part 2 for 
the simple reason that, unlike economics, normative issues of intervention are already the 
subject of detailed English School analysis, as the footnotes testify.
QUALIFIED SOVEREIGNTY?
Whilst Article 2 (7) of the United Nations convention enshrines the principle of state 
sovereignty and the allied doctrine of non-intervention, it has of course always been possible 
to overrule and intervene in the affairs of a state. There are in international law two major 
bases upon which one may waive the norm of non-intervention. First, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter gives states the right to attack other states in self-defence. Given that this can be 
appealed to pre-emptively on the basis of a feared threat to security, it has the capacity to be 
widely invoked, as it was in 2001 to justify the US - British attacks on Afghanistan.114 
Second, if the Security Council judges that a state is threatening the peace and security of the 
world then it can pass a Chapter 7 resolution legitimising military intervention in that state to 
address the perceived threat to peace and security. Both these bases for waiving non­
intervention have the effect of violating sovereignty by reference to military means.115 
Beyond these explicit justifications for intervention which relate to self-defence/peace and 
security, one must also be mindful of the UN’s commitments to human rights, which sit 
somewhat uneasily alongside its simultaneous commitments to state sovereignty. For instance 
the Preamble states that the organization seeks to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights’, whilst Article 1(3) asserts the obligation to ‘achieve international co-operation ...in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”,116 
and Article 55 undertakes for the human rights and rights to self-determination of peoples of 
the world. To be sure the UN Charter’s reference to human rights are not linked directly to
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any explicit commitment to intervention, but there is arguably an inferred need to have a 
capability to take action, which might have to include intervention, if its commitments are to 
amount to something more than empty words.
The coexistence of the doctrine of non-intervention, on the one hand, and the right to 
intervene/the responsibility for monitoring human rights, on the other, would seem at first 
glance to be contradictory. Paul Taylor, however, points out that careful reading of Article 2 
(7) actually introduces a qualification which helps to make the UN’s commitments to non­
intervention and human rights rather more compatible. ‘Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter’.117 (Italics added) Introduction of the word ‘essentially’ suggests 
that there are non-essential issues with respect to which the door for intervention is open.
POST WAR: FROZEN QUALIFICATIONS
Whilst the above qualifications have - since the advent of the UN - denied non-intervention 
an absolute status in principle, post-war practice suggested otherwise. In this context any 
intervention was viewed disapprovingly as a simple violation of Article 2 (7) and ‘defined in
i  i  o
terms of a coercive breach of the walls of the castle of sovereignty’. In order to appreciate 
the reason for this rejection of intervention per se, and thus the effective absolutising of 
sovereignty, it is important to reflect in some detail on the impact of the Cold War and on the 
approach to decolonisation that developed after the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
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1. THE COLD WAR
There were two ways in which the Cold War eroded qualifications on state sovereignty:
First, the poignant ultimacy of the Cold War and fear of an impending nuclear meltdown 
meant that every other difficulty was thrown very much into its shadow, and in some cases, 
as far as public attention was concerned, effectively rendered invisible. Whilst anyone with 
an ounce of moral fibre would wish to intervene in another state to address injustices in the 
interests of a commitment to ‘global humanity’, the realist contention was always that, if one 
was really concerned about minimizing suffering, one would resist the temptation to 
intervene. This was not because of any moral callousness but rather the result of recognition 
that there was in world politics an ‘order versus justice’ trade off in relationship to which 
interventions, however well-meaning, always had the implication of upsetting international 
order and releasing consequentials which would probably cause even greater suffering in the 
long run. This Cold War realist logic gained perhaps its most famous expression through the 
argument of Jean Kirtpatrick who contended that western nations should ignore the human 
rights abuses of South American regimes during the 1970s in order to keep them on side in 
the Cold War.119 The cost of the loss of their support in this ultimate contest would eclipse 
any benefit resulting from interventions in the name of human rights, no matter how virtuous 
they might make the intervening state feel.
In this climate there were not surprisingly only three major cases of humanitarian 
intervention; the intervention of India in East Pakistan in 1971, of Tanzania in Uganda in 
1978 and of Vietnam in Cambodia also in 1978. In all cases, despite the horror of human 
rights abuses in Uganda and Cambodia, the interventions were not well received by the
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international community and were actually justified by the intervening states on the basis of 
self-defence and appeal to Article 51 of the UN Charter, thus making no reference to human 
rights abuses.120
Second, the Cold War also frustrated the qualification of sovereignty by making the Chapter 
7 intervention capability a latent constitutional potentiality in the Charter because Security 
Council decision-making was jeopardised by the presence of an East - West divide. With the 
exception of Korea in 1950, which gained UN sanction only because the Soviets were absent, 
there were no Chapter 7 collective security interventions between 1945 and 1989. Indeed, the 
Korean intervention, bypassing the Military Staff Committee and implemented through the 
USA, was actually a long way from anything that could honestly be described as collective 
security.
2. DECOLONIZATION
The post war world approached decolonisation with a very particular philosophy. A colony’s 
qualification for sovereign statehood derived entirely from the fact that it was a colony and 
thus must be released, at all costs, and as soon as possible, from its imperial shackles. This 
led, as Robert Jackson demonstrates at length, to a negative view of sovereignty. A polity 
was eligible for sovereignty not because of any positive substantive capacities but because it 
was a colony - constitutionally subordinated to an imperial power - which should be cut free 
and made a sovereign state. To the extent that there were no substantive governance criteria, 
such as human rights provisions, (or even capability tests -  does the government in question 
actually rule the whole territory that it claims) that must be met in order to obtain and 
maintain independence, there certainly was no basis for the international community (led for
218
the most part by former imperial powers) to intervene with internal checks after 
independence.
REASSERTING QUALIFICATIONS
The purchase of the above restraints on intervention, however, has now been greatly eroded, 
firstly, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and, secondly, as a result of pressures for 
a new approach towards decolonisation and the celebration of ‘good governance’. The 
chapter will explore each of these developments in turn:
I. THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The events of 1989 which (given that they cannot be understood apart from a) the economic 
failure of the Soviet Bloc outside of the global market place and b) the fact that its demise, 
sweeping away the bipolar structure, opened the door for a new globality) should be 
conceptualized as part of the process of globalization, released world politics from its 
previous all-consuming obsession, avoiding a third world war. This new environment has 
facilitated a very different approach to security which has very different implications for 
intervention and state sovereignty. Specifically, the Kirkpatrick logic against intervention, 
residing on the foundation of the ‘order versus justice trade o ff - which was so compelling in 
the context of fears of nuclear meltdown - has been significantly eroded. The implications of 
the demise of the bipolar structure on the trade-off have been greatly assisted by first, the 
redefinition of what constitutes a threat to peace and security in the post Cold War world and 
second, a better informed domestic electorate:
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i. BROADER BASIS OF INSECURITY
Against the backdrop of the demise of the Cold War bipolar straight jacket, the complexity of 
other problems - previously obscured by it - have come into focus. Appreciation of this 
complexity has brought with it a far greater willingness to recognize that the bases for global 
insecurity do not just reside directly in the threatened deployment of military hardware. They 
can also lie in socio-economic disorder which, left to fester, can lead to problems that will 
ultimately result the deployment of that hardware. In this context the need for order is no 
longer opposed to the need for justice. The two are intimately related such that the erosion of 
the latter will precipitate the erosion of the former and vice versa. In this environment a far 
broader cross section of UN agencies have found themselves drawn into the realm of peace 
and security. The wider UN system, Paul Taylor observes - together with allied NGOs - has
become ‘more involved in work which was seen as related to the maintenance of international
122 * order’. The promotion of security remains the major focus of the UN but there is now
recognition that security is not only maintained by focusing on military developments. It also
• * 19Tinvolves other tasks like humanitarian intervention and surveillance.
ii. PUBLIC OPINION
In the context of a greater awareness of a diversity of problems in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, the logic of the order versus justice trade off for politicians has also been threatened by 
increasing domestic concern and awareness of human rights abuses. The advent of the global 
media ensures that voters get to hear and see unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in great 
detail. ‘Television represents images of humanity in peril that are beamed into living rooms 
across the globe, and it is this which ...pressurized Western governments into raising new
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humanitarian claims to justify the use of force’.124 Specifically, the greater awareness of 
humanitarian crisis because of the global media has challenged the notion that the cost of 
intervening for ‘world order’ is greater than the benefits it secures for ‘world justice’. In the 
case of the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq in 1991 and of the Somalis with the 
breakdown of their government in 1992, the major reason for action, Wheeler and Bellamy 
observe, ‘was the media and domestic public opinion that pressurized policy-makers into 
taking humanitarian actions’.125 Talking about the CNN factor, they claim that recent
experiences suggest ‘that even if there are no vital national interests at stake, liberal states
126will launch humanitarian rescue missions if sufficient public pressure is mobilized’. James 
Mayall, meanwhile, argues that action was only taken to protect the Kurds ‘because the 
attention devoted by the Western media to the plight of the Kurds along the Turkish border 
threatened the political dividends that Western governments had secured from their conduct 
of the war itse lf.127 In the context of the global media, states have come to understand that 
ignoring human rights abuses can actually threaten international order. Thus, although 
‘[gjlobalization has generated many of the ills of contemporary life, ...it has also created that 
growing sense of “cosmopolitan awareness” which is beginning to make a reality of Kant’s
• * •  1 9 8 #vision of a right’s violation in one place being felt everywhere’. During the 1990s 
statesmen came to understand that ‘violations of individual’s rights were a major cause of 
disturbances in relations between states: a lack of internal justice risked international 
disorder. In consequence there was increasing challenge to the traditional injunction on the 
behaviour of diplomats that they should ignore the internal affairs of the states with which 
they dealt in order to preserve international stability’.129 The global consciousness emerging 
from the impact of the media, moreover, is greatly assisted by the work of global 
humanitarian agencies that both draw on and feed the broader media awareness of suffering.
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The fact that western electorates are increasingly aware of the plight of suffering peoples in 
other countries because of what they see from the media and learn from aid agencies makes 
non-intervention in the context of great suffering increasingly unsustainable.
II. QUALIFICATION OF THE SIMPLE DECOLONISATION IMPERATIVE
In the same way that the removal of Cold War pressures in the context of the global media 
and better education have crippled the order versus justice trade-off, so too have they 
challenged the traditional, ‘negative’ approach to decolonization, similarly provoking 
demand for the imposition of substantive testing of ‘would be polities’. This is not as a 
function of any reluctance to release colonies from their imperial shackles, but rather to 
ensure that aspirant states have the capacity to protect and champion the rights of individual 
citizens. Charles Beitz, Michael Walser and Terry Nardin argue for substantive tests: ‘states 
were conditional entities in that their right to exist should be dependent on a criterion of 
performance with regard to the interests of their citizens’.130 In this context, recent years have 
seen increasing reference to “good governance” and the notion that all governments - whether 
recently decolonized or not - should pursue openness and transparency and thereby be willing 
to subject themselves to international verification.131
THE NEW HUMANITARIANISM: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE
In the context of the end of the Cold War, and therein the erosion of the order versus justice 
trade off, and the simple decolonization imperative, the ‘new humanitarianism’ has become 
very important and consequentially the UN General Assembly has developed some clear 
position statements regarding humanitarian assistance, A/43/131 and A/46/182. These 
statements go out of their way to bow the knee to the principle of state sovereignty, as seen in
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Article 2 (7). ‘The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. The following sentence, 
however, carries within it the basis for an important qualification. ‘In this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in 
principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country’.132 Deployment of ‘should’ and 
‘in principle’ suggest very clearly that, whilst sovereignty should be respected in principle, 
this may not always be possible. This would seem to describe NATO intervention, against 
the wishes of the sovereign FYR in Kosovo during 1999 and 2000. In this context politicians 
are now more ready to pursue justice, and thus intervention and the violation of sovereignty, 
as a matter of ‘national interest’. Strategically justice and the national interest were the 
reasons given for US intervention in Bosnia in 1996. By extension humanitarian intervention 
and peacekeeping are increasingly justified as being in the national interest.133
THE RISE OF INTERVENTIONISM AND REVOLUTIONISM
The advent of a new interventionism informed by the demise of the Cold War and the 
globalization of information would certainly seem to describe the reassertion of a ‘global 
humanity’ category in deference to the revolutionism of the three traditions spectrum. As 
Wheeler and Bellamy - writing in the English School tradition - observe, in creating a 
growing cosmopolitan awareness which is licensing a greater interventionism, globalization 
has laid the foundation for an expanding expression of the Kantian ethic.134 This new 
interventionism undermines the ontological closure upon which sovereignty is predicated, 
contradicting the closure of the sovereign state through the reality of the connections between 
the polities of the world through which the notion of an interdependent global humanity 
flows.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion both of Wight’s agencies of revolutionism, the ‘spirit of commerce’ and 
‘enlightenment’ are calling into being a new connexity within international relations, 
challenging the notion that the international arena is divided into sovereign states and 
arguably rendering revolutionism far more significant than it ever was when Wight was 
writing. No longer confined to the realms of utopian political thinkers, the revolutionist 
ontology is coming of age at a time when globalization is fostering a new level of 
interconnectedness across the globe, both in terms of economics and a greater awareness of 
‘global humanity’, generating a greater sense of ontological openness with significant 
implications for sovereignty. In the next stage of its definition of the revolutionist tradition - 
chapter 6 - this thesis will consider the impact of the spatio-temporal revolution together with 
its extensive ontological implications, on the task of actually reconceptualizing the place of 
the sovereign state in international relations theory.
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From an English School perspective specifically, there has been a marked shift in favour of intervention and 
solidarist assumptions. In the early years pluralism dominated. The concern of scholars like Hedley Bull was 
that if a general right of intervention were granted this would remove one of the key doctrines of international 
society, creating uncertainty which would translate into disorder and, in all probability, far greater suffering than 
that alleviated through intervention. The pluralist position thus bought directly into the order versus justice trade­
off. In more recent years, however, there has been a far greater willingness to countenance intervention 
undoubtedly partially in response to recognition of the demise of the order versus justice trade off. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that in later life, Bull seemed to be moving very much more in a solidarist direction, especially 
in his 1983 Hagey lectures. Since then the likes of RJ Vincent, Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne have sought to 
move the English School rather more unambiguously into the solidarist camp. Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian 
Conception o f International Society’, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International Politics, 
pp. 51 - 73; Nicholas J Wheeler, ‘Pluralists or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent 
on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 1992, Vol. 21 No 3; Tim Dunne, 
Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, chapter 7 and 8. 
134 Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian intervention and world politics’, pp. 488-489.
234
CHAPTER 6
THE REVOLUTIONIST TRADITION &
THE POST SOVEREIGNTY POLE:
DEFINING POST-SOVEREIGNTY
Having considered how Wight’s two agencies of revolutionism are generating systemic 
changes that involve the erosion rather than the extension of sovereignty, the primary 
focus now shifts from ‘the flows’ to conceptualization of the erosion of the sovereign 
state and the development of revolutionist structures of governance in the context of 
these flows. The thesis examines these developments in accordance with the Linklater -  
Little approach both ontologically (Part 1) and epistemologically (Part 2). This will 
provide a framework from within which the chapter will be able to translate the 
implications of the ontological revolution that is globalization into the actual 
conceptualization of sovereignty.
STRUCTURE
In considering the erosion of sovereignty and the development of revolutionist 
governance structures ontologically, Part 1 is divided into two sections. Section 1 will 
examine the erosion of state sovereignty from the vantage point of the social contracted 
territorial people. Section 2 will then provide further perspective on this process by 
examining the networked model of governance called into being in its stead. This will 
manifest the unbundling of sovereignty through an organizational shift away from
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government resting on the modem social contracted territorial people to governance 
resting on multiple foundations each defined by specialized, functional concerns 
according to the subject in view. The chapter will then reflect on the implications of 
sections 1 and 2 on the development of English School revolutionism premised on a 
holistic appreciation of sovereignty. Part 2 of this chapter will then further its 
conceptualization of unbundled/deconstructed/decentered sovereignty through an 
epistemological lens, trading on the relationship between strong post-positivism and 
ontological flux identified in chapter 2. Whilst mindful of the numerous strongly post­
positivist critiques of sovereignty, this chapter will consider the basic effect of this 
approach through the window of the ‘unbundling’ framework formulated by John 
Gerard Ruggie, whose historical approach to the future is of special relevance to this 
thesis because it resonates very much with that of the English School. It will be shown to 
be particularly useful for the purposes of engaging with the epistemological challenges 
of revolutionism as disclosed by the Linklater -  Little spectrum. Together Parts 1 and 2 
will facilitate a clear appreciation of the deconstruction of sovereignty through the rise of 
revolutionist structures of governance from both an ontological and an epistemological 
perspective. The net result will be a clear definition of post-sovereignty.
PART 1: FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO POST-SOVEREIGNTY
In embarking upon consideration of the demise of the social contracted territorial 
people and the development of networked governance, it is important to set out, once 
again, the central spatio-temporal coordinates that, as chapter 2 has demonstrated, 
underpin this research. The ontologically closed sovereign state is spatially oriented 
(time assimilated by space, configuring modem Newtonian concepts of space), whilst 
the flows that characterise globalization are temporally oriented (space assimilated by
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time, configuring postmodern hyperspace). The unbundling of sovereignty and 
development of a post sovereign category will depend upon the injection of a greater 
temporality/openness which, as this chapter will demonstrate, results in first the 
deconstruction of sovereignty and then the development of post-sovereign, networked 
governance.
SECTION 1: THE SOCIAL CONTRACTED, TERRITORIAL PEOPLE
The deconstructive impact of ontological openness on sovereignty as a consequence 
of global flows can be seen very clearly by examining the fate of sovereignty as the 
social contracted territorial people. As the chapter will now demonstrate, this process 
is widely recognized by people across radically different intellectual backgrounds.1
The demise of ‘sovereignty as social contract’, is clearly expressed in the work of the 
neo-Marxist hyperglobalizers Hardt and Negri.2 Specifically, the two scholars contend 
that the global flows of capital, associated with globalization, generate pressures 
whose effect is to unbundle the social contracted territorial people that underpins the 
transcendent authority of the sovereign state, calling into being instead (as we shall 
see later), an immanent, post-modern, networked, form of governance. ‘The concept 
of the People no longer functions as the organised subject of the system of command 
...This shift demystifies and destroys the circular modem idea of the legitimacy of 
power by which power constmcts from the multitude a single subject that could then 
in turn legitimate that same power’.3 With the demise of the social contracted, centred 
‘people’ in whose name sovereignty is sustained, the ‘transcendental fiction of politics 
can no longer stand up and has no argumentative utility because we all exist entirely 
within the realm of the social and political’.4
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As a consequence of the deconstruction of the centred political self, in which the 
public private duality ties the state and people together into an essential oneness, one 
sees the administrative machine beginning to engage with the diverse ‘peoples’ that 
are released as a consequence of the deconstruction of ‘the people’ of the nation-state. 
‘Precisely to the extent that administration is singularized and no longer functions as 
the actor for centralized political and deliberative organs, it becomes increasingly 
autonomous and engages more closely with various social groups: business and labor 
groups, ethnic and religious groups, legal and criminal groups, and so forth’.5 Whilst 
some of these identities may rest primarily within the state, many will be related to 
larger transnational movements. Thus globalization, in this view, does not just 
champion revolutionism by eroding the integrity of the sovereign state -  upon whose 
wellbeing realism and rationalism depend -  but also by facilitating the development 
of transnational global identities.6
Writing in the liberal hyperglobalist tradition, meanwhile, Guehenno’s work The End 
o f the Nation State also considers the demise of sovereignty as social contract in the 
context of global flows. Modem (as opposed to postmodern) ‘politics does not exist as 
a simple outcome of private interests, but presupposes a social contract that precedes 
it and is greater than all particular contracts. If this premise is abandoned ...politics 
...[is] ...reduced to the function of the market ...No economic law can replace the 
territorial and historical basis of the nation’.7 This, Guehenno contends, is exactly 
what has happened in the context of global economic flows.
238
Guehenno chooses to point to the one time presence (prior to the triumph of global 
economic flows over politics) and then subsequent absence of the foundational 
character of the social contract (in the context of the triumph of economic flows over 
politics) through the state’s changing attitude towards war. During the high noon of 
the modem sovereign state it was able to command mass conscription in the ‘total 
war’ scenarios witnessed in the two global conflicts of the twentieth century. ‘By 
making war the ultimate expression of the will of whole populations, and not only the 
sport of princes, the national age had invented the idea of total war: ...The collective 
will to live, with its corollary, the will to kill, was, moreover, a sentiment stronger 
than the sense of duty and honor of the soldiers of the ancien regime \ 8 The erosion of 
the purchase of the social contracted territorial people in the current environment, 
however, is now seen in the fact that states cannot command that kind of sacrifice. 
‘No nation today is capable of mobilizing such gigantic forces around an idea. The 
great bloodbaths of the twentieth century were made possible by the conflation of the 
absolute power of a nation-state and of a “religion” -  nationalist, National Socialist or 
Communist -  that gave it direction’.9
As a function of the dissolution of sovereignty as social contracted political 
community, Guehenno observes, ‘community’ has to find new bases for its 
expression. Echoing Hardt and Negri’s comments about the replacement of ‘the 
people’ with ‘various social groups: business and labor groups, ethnic and religious 
groups, legal and criminal groups’,10 Guehenno contends that today it is ‘necessary to 
rediscover that a human community is not only a political notion but a philosophical 
and religious one. Having lost the comfort of our geographical boundaries, we must 
in effect discover what creates and bonds between humans that constitute a
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community’.11 Once again, therefore, one can see the development of revolutionist 
ontology not only in the erosion of the sovereign state, realist/rationalist ontology, but 
also in the development of transnational groups that give expression to the notion of 
‘transnational community’.
Writing again in the liberal ‘hyperglobalist school’ Kenichi Ohmae, perhaps the 
leading thinker in this tradition, similarly entitles his major contribution to the debate 
The End o f the Nation-State. Ohmae highlights the way in which he believes global 
flows are undermining the autonomy of the political, and bringing about the 
deconstruction of the sovereign state, by reflecting on expectations about the 
provision of a ‘civil minimum’ of state welfare. In the context of an efficient global 
market, he contends, there can no longer be a civil minimum of welfare provision, 
coextensive with the state, and thus no longer a centred, territorial social contract of 
the kind associated with the modem sovereignty complex.12 ‘Historically, the ethos of 
equally shared contributions to the common good (even though the benefits may not 
be shared quite so equally) has been the foundation on which genuinely democratic 
societies, no less than the nations that grow up around them, rest. When that ethos 
wanes or goes into eclipse, so does the glue that holds those nations together’.13
The deconstruction of the old social contracted people can be seen in Ohmae’s 
contention that sovereign states must be deconstructed into smaller region states 
which, giving the globe a greater ‘edge’ to ‘centre’ ratio, provide more interfaces for 
connexity and exchange within the networked global economy.14 ‘In a borderless 
economy, the units that do make sense are what I call region-states -  geographical 
units such as northern Italy; Wales; Baden-Wurttemburg in Germany; San Diego,
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California, and Tijuana, Mexico; Hong Kong and southern China...’15 Real economic 
progress is only truly possible ‘when regions are genuinely open and responsive -  in 
ways nation-states will not and cannot be'.16 These region states would be first 
economic rather than political units with a global vision that is concerned with 
maximising their linkages within the network of the global economy. Thus once 
again, as in the case of Hardt, Negri and Guehenno, there is recognition that the 
deconstruction of the social contracted territorial people results in the development of 
new identities, although, in the case of Ohmae, these new identities remain resolutely
1 7territorial.
Transformationalists Camilleri and Falk, meanwhile, also unbundle the sovereign state
• * 18with full blown deconstructive implications for the centred social contract.
Specifically, they attribute this to global flows whose impact is the marketisation of 
politics wherein the state becomes absorbed with the economic project and the classic 
relationship between the public and private spheres is consequently placed under great 
pressure.19 In this context there is a widening gap between state sovereignty and popular 
sovereignty which is a function of the growing separation between the state and civil 
society. ‘The state may be omnipresent, its tentacles may reach into every nook and 
cranny of social life, yet its structures, processes and policies may be far removed from 
the citizen’s sense of identity, history and solidarity. A deep divide may separate the 
public and private spheres'. (Italics added)20 This divide has led to mass disaffection. 
‘The separation of state and society leads, then, to an essential schism within the 
individual between the public and the private self. The decline of meaningful political 
discourse, hence of the public sphere, may prompt the individual to retreat to a private 
world in search of meaning and reward’. (Italics added)21
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In the death of the social contracted territorial people and the retreat to the private
sphere, Camilleri and Falk recognize, (along with Hardt, Negri, Ohmae and
22Guehenno ), that implicit in the deconstruction of sovereignty is the development of 
new identities. In the private sphere, concerns that would once have found expression 
in the ‘public’ are manifest through ‘new social movements’ and their creation of new 
de facto publics through the effect of what is perhaps best described as a constructed 
‘corporate private’ realm. Producing new bases of identity around differing moral 
consensuses outside the territorially boundaried, modem political domain, new social 
movements effectively deconstmct the social contracted, sovereign polity. They 
replace the imposed common good that they inherit from previous political 
generations with ones of their own choice with the people of their own choice.23 
Writing in the same vein, Peterson observes, ‘[e]ven as supranational force alters state 
power, subnational conflicts expose the illusion of homogeneity promoted by 
nationalist narratives. In short, identities conventionally ‘grounded’ in state 
territoriality are losing ground to a politics of new, or even non-space’.24 R. J. B. 
Walker, meanwhile, with his acute awareness of the new flows, also contends that 
sovereignty seems increasingly unable ‘to contain the contemporary profusion of 
ethnic and cultural identities’. The dissolving of the centred community is seen 
directly in the unbundling of the sovereign nation-state and the bases for legitimacy 
that it supports. ‘[T]he established routine of democratic theory and nationalist 
aspiration must become increasingly tenuous once the guarantees of state sovereignty 
lose their credibility’.25
Bauman similarly points to the death of sovereignty - expressed through the demise of
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political community (social contracted territorial people) - as a result of the impact of 
global flows. Specifically, Bauman argues, these flows erode the state prerogatives 
which, he maintains, are central to the state’s capacity to maintain its communal 
identity. ‘The task of order making requires huge and continuous efforts of creaming 
off, shifting and condensing social power, which in turn call for considerable 
resources that only the state, in the form of a hierarchical bureaucratic apparatus, is 
able to muster, focus and deploy. Of necessity, the legislative and executive 
sovereignty of the modem state was perched on the ‘tripod’ of military, economic and 
cultural sovereignties’. The latter, he maintained, constituted ‘the ability to muster 
enough cultural resources to sustain the state’s identity and distinctiveness through 
the distinctive identity o f its subjects'?1 (Italics added.) Strategically, however, this 
capacity to maintain the centred political community, of the nation-state and thus the 
‘sovereignty of the people’ has now been broken. ‘[A]ll three legs of the 
‘sovereignty’ tripod have been broken beyond repair. The military, economic and 
cultural self-sufficiency, indeed self-sustainability, of the state - any state -ceased to 
be a viable prospect’.28
CONCLUSION
Thus, in the context of global flows, basic, positive, internal sovereignty, manifest in 
the social contracted territorial people, is - according to revolutionism - unbundled 
and eroded away. Specifically, the politico-legal foundation for administration is 
replaced by a new functional, technocratic logic and individuals are increasingly 
released to find their own identity with those of their choice rather than those of their 
nation.
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SECTION 2: THE EMERGENCE OF POST-SOVEREIGN GOVERNANCE
In Section 1 this chapter has considered the first step towards revolutionist ontology 
with the deconstruction of sovereignty via: a) the demise of the social contracted 
territorial people that underpinned modem government and b) the emergence of new 
potentially transnational identities. The chapter will now turn to the second step, 
namely consideration of the networked form of governance arising on the basis of this 
deconstmction. After briefly defining the context of increased cooperation in which 
the shift to governance has been located, the chapter will move to the central task of a 
providing a definition of networked governance itself.
- INCREASING COOPERATION FACILITATING THE NETWORK
At the heart of the shift towards networked governance is the fact that, under the 
pressure of global flows, the foreign-domestic dichotomy is breaking down as the 
inside of the state, the domestic arena, increasingly spills out into the foreign,
♦ 90international arena and new extra-territorial power bases arise. As a function of the 
erosion of the foreign-domestic dichotomy it is no longer possible for the state to 
control the issues that were once within its exclusive and direct reach. This has led to 
a massive increase in the number of global interfaces as states, and an emerging 
global civil society, have come together in order to address the new challenges 
presented by the global marketplace. In this context international gatherings are no 
longer purely for the purpose of discussing geo-politics and defence.30 ‘Along with 
substantial increases in flows of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), financial 
commodities, tourism, cultural links, hazardous waste and knowledge ...there has 
been a corresponding intensification of forms of international cooperation to manage, 
regulate, facilitate and sometimes prevent these burgeoning flows and connections’.
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The increase in cooperation resulting from the demise of the foreign-domestic 
dichotomy is best expressed statistically. In 1909 there were just 37 
Intergovernmental Organizations but by 1996 the number had risen to 260. The 
number of treaties between states has similarly risen. Between 1946 and 1975, for 
instance, the number of treaties in operation between states rose from 6351 to 14061, 
providing a similar picture of the dramatic increase in global interconnectedness. As 
noted above, moreover, these bases for governance cooperation do not simply exist 
between states. Critically they involve states alongside many of the burgeoning 
numbers of non-state actors within national and global civil society. In 1909 there 
were just 176 International Non-Governmental Organizations but by 1996 there were 
5472. Whilst it is important to be clear that by no means all of the organizations 
called into being in recent years in order to cater for the need for greater cooperation 
comprise examples of what the following pages will define as networked governance, 
one should be aware that an increasing number of bodies do come within this 
category.33
- UNPACKING GOVERNANCE
Having gained some perspective on the rapid expansion of increasing international 
interfaces, the chapter will now provide a brief introduction to the principles of 
networked governance in general terms before proceeding to examine specific models 
that have been developed by different scholars in greater detail, highlighting their 
points of similarity.
245
AN INTRODUCTION
The central challenge in seeking to conceptualize networked governance is the need to 
factor its spatio-temporal profile, informed by the global flows considered above that 
have undermined the subject-object, public-private, foreign-domestic 
dualities/dichotomies, into government. As Guehenno observed: ‘The logic of 
networks will completely upset ... [the essential modem perspective]... the frontier is 
no longer a beginning, but an ending, always precarious, by nature fluid - for fluidity 
becomes the condition of competition and of dynamism in the age of networks. No 
juridical space is ever definitely fixed’.34
One can begin to gain an appreciation of how best to approach the challenge of 
factoring in the network by contrasting it with preceding intergovemmentalism. Once 
inter-dependence passes a certain level it becomes practically very difficult to use the 
veto and thus the intergovernmental enterprise undergoes a qualitative transformation. 
In the intergovernmental context, although the movement of relational flows between 
sovereign states meant that they were not completely closed, the nature of the 
relationship was such that the actors between which relationship flowed were the 
centre of attention. In moving into networked governance the intensity of these flows 
is such that they are forcing the opening of the actors to the point of threatening their 
deconstruction in the sense that they increasingly eclipse the significance of the actors 
between which they move. When states are opened up in this way, their closure on the 
competencies that once existed unambiguously within their remit is removed.
In the context of this demise of functional closure, instead of being set rigidly on the 
foundation of the social contracted, territorial people, differing competencies draw on
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the emerging global technological elites in each field in order to find their own centres 
of gravity. The networked governance frame of reference provides a means for 
coming to terms with this specialisation and its impact for the political through a form 
of functional systems theory. This should be understood first in terms of the erosion 
of politics, which instead of being foundational becomes one sub-system among 
many, and then in terms of the triumph of functional/economic concerns.
‘According to systems theory’, Jachtenfuchs observes, ‘the political system is only 
one among several functional subsystems of society, and does not occupy any 
particular place in society. ...This theory radically breaks with the ideal type of the
" X ( \state as an internally and externally sovereign political unit’. This does not mean 
that politics ceases to influence economics but it does mean that political decisions 
‘are processed by the economic systems according to its own logic and with 
incalculable side-effects’.37 The capacity of the territorial state to inform all policy 
development through its closed horizon is therefore greatly eroded as competencies 
find their own functional foundations, with differing territorial reference points. In 
this context governance becomes a matter of co-ordination between the different 
technical authorities that preside over differing competencies.38 Having considered 
some basic contours of the impact of the network, the chapter will now examine 
different accounts of this phenomenon through the work of a number of different 
scholars, purposefully drawn from different backgrounds in order to demonstrate the 
broad foundation of support for the notion of network governance.
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MODELS OF GOVERNANCE
Operating in deference to functional rather than social contracted territorial logic, 
Guehenno describes the new framework as ‘Multi-Dimensional Governance’. In the 
multi-dimensional form the endness that accompanied the modem state, with its 
territorial, social contracted foundation, upholding an absolute internal jurisdiction, is 
replaced by a functional form of governance which runs through the nation-state, 
breaking up its sovereignty ‘into several functional structures’. The net result is a 
form of decentred governance consisting of different strands of erstwhile sovereignty 
devoted to different areas of policy. It produces a ‘simple operating procedure 
governing a functional base of sectors of human activity’.40 The movement of 
government from a common, boundaried legal-territorial foundation - whose 
commonality services a basis for debate and resolution, in terms which are not 
entirely functional - to a network of multiple functional foundations, will bring the 
end of modem politics and birth of a multi-dimensional political form.41 This results 
in conflicting, multiple boundaries with the effect that the modem combination of 
boundaries and closure is exchanged for the postmodern combination of open, 
overlapping boundaries and a growing openness. ‘The multidimensional world, in 
which no structure can monopolize all the dimensions of sovereignty, favours 
openness, in contradistinction to the closed system that is embryonic in all political 
logic. In this way, as the questions at issue acquire a universal dimension, whether it 
is a question of dmgs, or the environment, or of financial matters, it becomes 
increasingly absurd to want to resolve them within the same framework. Geographical 
expansion requires functional specialisation, and any attempt at political totalization, 
whether European or not, appears as an artificial relic of a bygone age’.42
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Camilleri and Falk, meanwhile, also observe that one can obtain a particularly clear 
appreciation of the multi-dimensional networked model of governance, with its rejection 
of the centred self, replete with its distinction between the inside and outside, through 
consideration of boundaries.43 Boundaries are necessary but cannot be seen as the 
catch-all abstraction of sovereignty with its frozen piece of homogenous, Newtonian 
territory and essentialist implication. In the first instance, they must differ in that they 
pertain not to a broad basis of political existence, but rather to a specific function. 
Given that different functions are better set at different levels, multiple and differently 
located boundaries must pertain over the same pieces of territory. In the second 
instance and more fundamentally, however, these boundaries do not merely service 
physical territory but an extra-territorial realm, providing perspective on a world that 
is inherently ontologically open not closed, a form that is multi rather than uni­
dimensional. ‘Expressed more succinctly’, Camilleri and Falk maintained, 
‘boundaries (hence the delineation of systems and subsystems) need not be drawn 
purely according to jurisdictional or even geographical criteria. A particular issue (e.g. 
pollution), area of policy (e.g. education), or set of relationships (e.g. international 
finance) can each in its own way provide a useful and coherent basis of demarcation. 
It follows that conceptual boundaries must as closely as possible reflect the changing 
issues and terrain of socio-economic organisation and political conflict’.44
Rosenau, meanwhile, similarly recognizes how the radical openness of the 
governance form is constitutive of what he described as the ‘disaggregation’ of 
authority from its erstwhile given, social contracted, territorial foundations. This 
rejection of the ‘common’ politico-legal foundation inevitably takes Rosenau, like 
Guehenno, Camilleri and Falk into the realm of multi-dimensionality. Global
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governance, he observes, involves ‘literally millions’ of control mechanisms. ‘[A]ny 
attempt to assess the dynamics of global governance will perforce have multiple 
dimensions' , (Italics added) and in this context, moreover, ‘any effort to trace a 
hierarchical structure of authority which loosely links disparate sources of governance 
to each other is bound to fail’.45 Herein one sees the radical openness that underpins 
Rosenau’s model of governance. It is, he maintained, in ‘a continuous process of 
evolution, a becoming that fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change 
and emergent properties consolidate and solidify. To analyse governance by freezing 
it in time is to ensure failure in comprehending its nature and vagaries’.46
Hardt and Negri’s account of governance presents a similar multi-dimensional model 
to that of Guehenno, Camilleri, Falk and Rosenau. In the modem world, as a function 
of the public/private duality, the political and administrative aspects of government 
were supposedly united, facilitating linear integration of conflicts and the 
rationalization of social life. With the deconstruction of ‘the people’ (see section 1) 
and thus the public private duality, the management of political ends are now being 
separated from the bureaucratic means.47 Released from its conventional relationship 
with politics, Hardt and Negri contend, government administration is free to pursue an 
increasingly ‘dynamic’ and ‘functional’ as opposed to ‘given’ and ‘territorial’ agenda. 
‘In the imperial regime, bureaucracies (and administrative means in general) are 
considered not according to the linear logics of their functionality to goals, but 
according to differential and multiple instmmental logics. The problem of 
administration is not a problem of unity but one of instmmental multifunctionality’. 
Governance ‘is created by conforming to the structural logics that are active in the 
constmction of Empire, such as the police and military logics.., the economic logics
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...and the ideological and communicative logics. The only way that administrative 
action gains its autonomy and legitimate authority in the imperial regime is by 
following along the differentiating lines of these logics’.48 The stress on functionality 
and differential logics in the context of unbundled modem polity again resonates 
directly with the multi-dimensional model of governance that has emerged clearly in 
this investigation.49 In the fragmentation witnessed in the above multi-functionality 
and the deconstruction of the centralized polity into different strands of the public, 
one can see, as in the case of Guehenno, Camilleri, Falk and Rosenau, the clear multi­
dimensional shape of networked governance.
APPRAISAL
One could go on considering other conceptualisations of governance which respond in 
similar fashion to the temporality of globalization. Sassen for example unpacks 
governance through what she describes as the ‘denationalising of national territory 
...in a highly specialized and functional manner that befits the tenor of our era’50 
which causes sovereignty to be ‘decentred’ into the functional strands of ‘a 
multiplicity of institutional arenas’.51 Although different accounts have their own 
particular ways of unpacking networked governance, essentially the reality with 
which one is confronted is the same. First, it involves the demise of the social 
contracted territorial people, the basis of internal sovereignty on which external 
sovereignty depends. Second, in its place emerges a form of organization set out in 
deference to a primarily functional rather than politico-territorial logic, which is 
achieved by dividing up the sovereignty of the state into functional strands, each with 
its own specialist competencies. In the process sovereignty is replaced by new post 
sovereign categories informed either by specialist/technical interests or by the moral
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agendas of a newly created community rather than the territorial social contracted 
public sphere. To the extent that inherent in governance networks is a) the 
deconstruction of the social contracted territorial state and b) the accommodation of 
global flows giving expression to global identities, the development of governance
* S9provides a clear example of the rise of revolutionist ontology.
GOVERNANCE AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL
Having considered the implications of governance from an ontological point of view 
(Sections 1 and 2), it is important that before moving to consider these same 
challenges from the perspective of epistemology (Part 2), the chapter pauses to reflect 
on the implications of the above specifically for the English School. The challenge 
presented by Sections 1 and 2 for the School pertains to the fact that, if one works on 
the basis of the classic division between internal and external sovereignty, growing 
interdependence has to be interpreted simply as increasing connections between 
enduring sovereign states whose integrity can only be jeopardised by constitutional 
subservience to another sovereign state. This inability to detect other forms of change 
is a major problem for the English School given that its commitment to history should 
make it nervous about creating reifications with ahistoric implications.
Given the plight of international relations in 1958 there was good reason for Wight 
positing a division between internal and external sovereignty in order to justify the 
study of international theory in its own right.54 Forty-seven years later, and with the 
benefit of globalization (facilitating the demise of the foreign-domestic dichotomy), 
however, there is a need to question - as this chapter has demonstrated - the boundary 
between the inside and the outside. The long-term status of international relations for
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the English School cannot rest upon the invocation of an absolute divide between 
internal and external sovereignty that reifies sovereignty with the effect that the only 
form of change impacting the sovereign state with which one can engage pertains 
either to the development or termination of constitutional subservience to another 
polity. The School must rather develop to embrace a model of sovereignty that takes 
on the lessons of chapter 3, Part 2, recognising that sovereignty is an ‘internal- 
external whole’ that can be impacted from both the inside-out and the outside-in. 
Specifically, this will provide a frame of reference through which (moving way 
beyond the aspirations of chapter 3, Part 2) one can engage with the break-up of 
sovereignty into strands pertaining to different functional areas of policy and then 
unpack the implications of this change for internal sovereignty on external 
sovereignty and sovereignty as a whole. Armed with this perspective those parts of 
English School theory that embrace sovereignty will be able to engage with 
governance theory which has the capacity to greatly enrich conceptions of 
revolutionist world society, accommodating not only the development of extra-intense 
relationships between sovereignties bom of commonalities, but also the possibility of 
the very unbundling of sovereignty itself and the development of the notion of post­
sovereignty that authenticates revolutionist ontology.
Having pointed out that there has been a distinct lack of interaction between the 
English School and governance theory (which must be corrected if it is to rise to the 
challenge of conceptualising the impact of revolutionist ontology on the sovereign 
state), it is important to note that, whilst not using the language of governance theory, 
some of the current generation of English School scholars have begun to apply this 
approach to the long neglected subject of European integration. Ole Wasver has, for
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example, employed the notion of empire in seeking to come to terms with the 
European Union, breaking away from the idea that the EU is simply an intense form 
of international society, i.e. a framework within which there are close associations 
between sovereign states. Indeed, Waever has rejected the sovereign state altogether.55 
This has the benefit of making his position - in the terms of this discussion, informed 
by the Linklater -  Little perspective - clearly revolutionist.
Whilst Waever provides a model of revolutionism that embraces the deconstruction of 
sovereignty, however, the impact of his account is the introduction of a radical 
discontinuity between sovereignty and empire. Unlike this chapter he does not 
provide a framework that lends itself to engaging with the gradual unbundling of 
sovereignty through the application of governance theory. The English School 
perspective can be greatly assisted by embracing both a holistic model of sovereignty 
and contemporary governance theory and therein the multi-dimensional frame. These 
will together facilitate an appreciation of the gradual deconstruction of the social 
contracted territorial people, and attendant development of networked governance 
over time, as different policy areas are transferred from a territorial-juridical 
foundation to a functional foundation that contributes towards the development of a 
multi-dimensional form of governance.56
PART 2: POST-SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH AN EPISTEMIC LENS
Having considered the development of contemporary revolutionism from an 
ontological perspective (via the demise of sovereignty as social contracted territorial 
people and the advent of networked governance) in Part 1, the chapter will now 
consider this same development from an epistemological point of view in Part 2. In
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rising to this challenge it is crucial that this second chapter considers the manner in 
which epistemology can both accommodate and authenticate the spatio-temporal 
changes that are definitive of globalization. It will first recapitulate the basic 
epistemological principles developed by chapter 2 and then apply these in terms that 
are sensitive to the English School through the work of John Gerard Ruggie, 
reflecting on the resulting socio-epistemological implications for the application of 
revolutionism within the Linklater -  Little approach to the three traditions spectrum.
RECAPTILUATION
Chapter 2 made two key observations about strong post-positivism and change. First, 
it demonstrated that strong post-positivism enables one to see the relationship 
between the temporal orientation - seen in open ontology - and the celebration of 
change. Specifically, strong post-positivism abandons the absolute distinction 
between subject and object, with its attendant reifications, clearing the ground for the 
object to be changed by the subject. Second, in providing an epistemological 
perspective on the relationship between the temporal orientation and the celebration 
of change, it demonstrates how post-positivism can be used to confirm, and seek to 
shape, change and to translate its implication into the conceptualisation of ontology. 
Thus, to engage with fundamental transformation in IR one needs to employ strongly 
post-positivist epistemological assumptions, applying them specifically to the 
conceptualization of the sovereign state. This will facilitate the definition of post­
sovereignty.
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POST-POSITIVISM AND UNBUNDLING TERRITORIIALITY
One of the post-positivist applications that is particularly useful for this chapter, as it 
considers the forms of epistemology that can service globalization and its implications 
for the sovereign state, is that provided by John Gerard Ruggie. Like other bids to 
introduce a post-positivist frame of reference to IR, Ruggie challenges the ontological 
closure of the sovereign state associated with realist positivism through the 
introduction of epistemologically mediated openness. This thesis selects his approach 
to provide a window on this process because, whilst it certainly does not present the 
strongest form of available post-positivism, it engages directly with one of the most 
obvious expressions of sovereign state closure, the fixity of its territorial extension 
defined by rigid boundaries. Specifically, Ruggie’s attempt to embrace a post­
positivist epistemology results in a project that he describes as the ‘unbundling of 
state territoriality’ which provides an extremely useful framework through which to 
come to terms with the basic deconstructive effect of other manifestations of strong 
post-positivism on territorial sovereignty.57
Ruggie’s approach is also very relevant because, engaging with the conceptual 
challenge of coming to terms with the state in the context of globalization through 
history, it resonates with that of the English School. Invoking the medieval 
comparison, he follows in the path of Bull who first coined the phrase neo­
medievalism in 1977.58 Furthermore, as a chapter that seeks to demonstrate the 
relevance of the English School three traditions approach, in the context of 
globalization, the fact that Wight recognized that medievalism was the first type of 
revolutionist states system, makes Ruggie’s attempt to draw on medievalism in his 
attempt to come to terms with the impact of globalization (contemporary
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revolutionism) on the state very pertinent to this research.59
BACKGROUND AND APPROACH
Ruggie’s point of departure is an appreciation that the international arena is currently 
being subjected to fundamental transformation which the IR discipline has been slow 
to come to terms with. In seeking to be sensitive to this transformation he is very 
critical of the dominance of positivism. ‘As for the dominant positivist posture in our 
field, it is reposed in a deep Newtonian slumber wherein method rules, epistemology 
is often confused with method, and the term “ontology” typically draws either blank 
stares or bemused smiles’.60 In order to develop an appropriate reconceptualization of 
the state, Ruggie contends that it is necessary to adopt a post-positivist approach. 
Whilst never embracing sceptical postmodernist epistemology, his epistemological 
sensitivity, clearly differentiates him from the presumptions of ontological closure 
that underpin positivist IR.61
Recognising the difficulty that IR is having in engaging with fundamental 
transformation, Ruggie looks back in history to identify the last example of such a 
transformation. This he locates in the shift from medievalism to modernism which he 
assesses epistemologically through the notion of ‘social epistemology’, which seeks 
to associate prevailing ideas, with epistemological implication, with the broader 
physical (i.e. socio-economic-politico-environmental) infrastructure.62 Having applied 
this approach successfully to the transition from medievalism to modernity, Ruggie 
then applies it to the contemporary shift from modernity to post-modernity.
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I: FROM MEDIEVALISM TO MODERNITY
In order to both see the social epistemic method before actually confronting the 
current transformation and gain an appreciation of how best to give expression to the 
post-modern social epistemology, it is important to take two preparatory steps. First, 
one must see the socio-epistemic method in the transformation from medievalism to 
modernism. Second, it is necessary to consider how the ontological closure posited by 
the social episteme generated difficulties and precisely how these difficulties were 
addressed.
1] IMAPCT OF THE MODERN SOCIAL EPISTEME
The key to the modem era was, in part, the Reformation and Renaissance’s 
affirmation, contrary to medievalism, that matter was both knowable and good. The 
weakness of the previously dominant Catholic epistemology, with its strong element 
of subjectivism, was thus replaced by a confident objectivism which had broad social 
epistemological implications.63 Specifically, whilst the former supported a decentred 
subject the latter configured a centred subject which Ruggie illustrated through 
consideration of different aspects of life in general - including speech and art - 
culminating with an examination of its impact on politics and the state:
The most important demarcating development almost certainly took place in the 
sphere of the arts with the rise of single-perspectivity. During the medieval era artists 
viewed their subjects from a number of different angles rather than the ‘single 
perspective’. Within this multi-perspectivity there was often a great variation in the 
scale of subjects considered within the same piece of work. This was not the product 
of a skilfully invoked distortion of reality in deference to some scientific principle, but
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was rather to convey the relative importance of the persons concerned.64 The architect 
Bruneschelli, however, broke away from the medieval norm, replacing it instead with 
the ‘single point perspective’.65
Put simply single-point perspective suggests that the ‘pictorial surface is regarded as a 
transparent vertical screen, placed between the artist and his subject, on which he 
traces the outlines [of the visual field] as they appear from a single fixed viewpoint’.66 
The important thing to appreciate is that ‘this was precision and perspective from a 
particular point of view, the point of view of a single subjectivity, from which all 
other subjectivities were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the vanishing 
point’.67
This artistic revolution had wide ranging socio-epistemological ramifications that 
made their presence felt in many quarters, including politics. Before the advent of the 
single perspective, as Agnew and Corbridge reflect, ‘Communities were united only 
by allegiance and personal obligation rather than by abstract conceptions of individual 
equality or citizenship in a geographical circumscribed territory. Space was organized
concentrically around many different centres depending upon current political
* * , 68 affiliations, rather than a singular centre with established territorial boundaries’
Once the single perspective was in place, though, the modem political form was bom.
‘Within the definite boundary of the new territorial state’, Mumford observes, ‘unified
areas of administration were established...In politics as well as in painting after the
invention of the easel picture, the new life was held together in a rigid frame... But the
new territorial state, on the contrary, could be seen or at least visualised: it was a
visible whole, and each country that was politically unified became, so to say, a self­
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contained picture. This visualisation of power became possible only when territorial 
continuity became an attribute of the sovereign state’.69
The epistemic confidence of the subsequent modem scientific revolution also did 
much to strengthen the purchase of the new confident social epistemology on politics 
and the state. ‘The Hobbesian view of the state’, Camilleri and Falk observe, ‘which 
still colours the modem understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial 
consciousness implicit in Euclidean geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian
70physics’. Approached through this grid, territorial space enjoyed foundational 
significance in the definition the sovereign state, rendering it entirely logical that 
international relations should be reduced in complexity such that the realist billiard 
ball metaphor is invoked.71
Ruggie argued that together cultural developments in the arts and the sciences, which 
in themselves had nothing to do with politics, but everything to do with the prevailing 
social epistemology, did much to configure the political reality of the ontologically 
closed modem sovereign state.
2] PROBLEMS WITH THE MODERN SOCIAL EPISTEME
Once configured, the modem sovereign state immediately confronted a whole series 
of difficulties that were the fruit of its commitment to rigid boundaries. How could 
such states deal with those parts of the planet that needed to be shared, such as 
waterways and the sea, and how were such states to define space wherein they could 
interact? The absence of any sense of relational joining with other states - previously 
sustained through the supranational Catholic Church and empire in the Respublica
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Christiana - created very real practical challenges which Ruggie refers to as the
79‘paradox of absolute individuation’.
This problem initially came to a head with the so-called embassy-chapel question. 
The English king, Edward VI, demanded that the new English prayer book should be 
used in his embassies. Charles V of France, however, was not prepared to 
countenance a Protestant service being conducted in his Catholic court. After much 
heated debate the dilemma was eventually settled through the advent of the doctrine 
of ‘extra-territoriality’. This idea asserted that an embassy notionally rested on the soil 
of the nation that it represented. Thus when the ambassador stepped from the street 
through the door of the British embassy, he was actually leaving France and entering 
Britain. Thus construed, Protestant services held within were mysteriously projected 
out of France back to Britain, relieving the French monarch of the thought that he was 
hosting heresy.
The use of the notion of extra-territoriality was, in Ruggie’s judgement, the first 
example of the modem state being forced to contend with the foolish consequences of 
its own epistemic arrogance; a fact confirmed by the ridiculous procedures it was 
forced to adopt as a consequence. This arrogance was a function of an 
epistemologically (positivist) disclosed model of territoriality premised on absolute 
ontological closure. The development of the extra-territorial status of embassies, in 
response to the challenges of this posture, constituted the first step by states towards 
the ‘unbundling of their territoriality’, (the generation of openness) in order to 
facilitate communication and relationship between themselves.73 It is - as the chapter 
will now demonstrate - in this old unbundling solution that one can appreciate
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something of the impact of the shift to the post-modern social episteme.
II: FROM MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY
In essence the old unbundling solution has simply been radicalized in the context of 
the shift from modernity to post-modernity. The projection of greater openness that 
facilitates far greater unbundling is disclosed through a social epistemological frame 
that, like its modem equivalent, is also informed by cultural developments, although 
with diametrically opposing implications.
In the same way that the ontologically closed, bundled nature of the modem state was 
disclosed by a particular social episteme, so too must the ontologically open, 
unbundled post-sovereign form be disclosed by a particular social episteme, albeit 
different. As in the case of the above, Ruggie seeks to generate an appropriate social 
episteme by drawing on contemporary culture. To the extent that the modem episteme 
posited the centred self, the post-modern posits the decentred self.74 Similarly, in art, 
whilst the modem social episteme posited the single point perspective, the 
postmodern has introduced pastiche, abrupt juxtapositions, simultaneity and 
superimposition, pointing back towards a multiperspectival frame.75 To the extent that 
the modem social episteme traded upon an absolute division between the subject and 
object in which the knowing of the former could not change the latter, thus securing a 
closed, centred ontology, the postmodern social episteme traded upon the negation of 
any such division with precisely the opposite consequences. Now the knower could 
change the known securing an open and decentred ontology.
As noted above, the application of this post-positivist social epistemology, with its
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decentering implication, is the radicalization of the earlier unbundling of closed, 
centred, modem sovereign state territoriality. In using the ‘unbundling of 
territoriality’ to explain the consequences of the application of the post-modem social 
episteme, Ruggie provides a very effective image for responding to sovereignty’s 
relational problem (as defined not just by Ruggie but Walker, Wind, Donnelly, 
A gnew, Corbridge, Paul et at) because, to the extent that bundled territoriality posits 
thie image of a closed, centred unit, it is suggestive of a lack of relationship and 
communication. One focuses on a priori boundaried units rather than on their 
relationships and on the impact of these relationships on those units. Alternatively 
expressed one concentrates on the ‘centre’, the actual unit/body itself rather than its 
‘edges’, the points of contact/joining with other units/bodies. The unbundling of that 
territorial unit, therefore, infers the advent of a new, open structure which, lacking the 
closed, centred standing of the previous order, will be inherently relational, joined and 
connected rather than boundaried and separated.
As growing economic flows, a developing sense of global humanity and expanding 
global governance make polities ever more interdependent, the imperative for this 
unbundling has become greater and greater. Today unbundling has proceeded to such 
an extent that there is a real sense in which a space between nations has emerged 
which has increasingly had less to do with providing a basis for relationship between 
states - of being a means to an end - and has instead become a space in its own right. 
This is, of course, entirely consistent with chapter 5’s consideration of the nature of 
networked, extra-territorial, economic hyperspace, and this chapter’s consideration of 
networked governance (Part 1), which demonstrate a shift in attention away from the
• • 77entities that are joined to the interface which services their connection.
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Crucially the unbundling of sovereign territoriality should not just be seen from the 
perspective of the generation of a new space between actors but as a new space that 
involves the transformation of actorhood. Inherent in the process of advanced 
unbundling is the deconstruction of the sovereign state, producing both the 
decentering of the state internally and the erosion of its boundaries with other states, 
and indeed other actors, externally. This, Ruggie contends, replaces the single-point 
sovereign state of modernity with the multiperspectival political form of 
postmodemity. ‘From the vantage of the present analysis, however, a very different 
attribute of the EC comes into view: it may constitute the first “multiperspectival 
polity” to emerge since the advent of the modem era. That is to say, it is increasingly 
difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics among community members, 
and to a considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from a 
starting point of twelve separate, single, fixed view points’. Indeed such is the 
interconnection that ‘the constitutive process whereby each of the twelve defines its 
own identity -  and identities are logically prior to preferences -  increasingly 
endogenize the existence of the other eleven’.78 Ruggie also sought to apply multi- 
perspectivity beyond the EU. ‘The concept of multiperspectival institutional forms 
offers a lens through which to view other possible instances of international 
transformation today. Consider the global system of transnationalized microeconomic 
links... [These] have ‘created a nonterritorial “region” in the world economy -  a 
decentred yet integrated space of flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside 
the spaces-of-places that we call national economies’.79
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ENGLISH SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE
Although there is a need to engage with the unbundling of sovereignty from an 
epistemological perspective, for the reasons given above the English School has, 
despite the very real potential of the three traditions spectrum in this regard, by and 
large, failed to rise to this challenge. This would seem to be a function of (as was the 
case with the ontological reflections of Part 1) the classical English School division 
between internal and external sovereignty.80 If external sovereignty is abstracted from 
internal sovereignty, cutting it off from an important domain of change, this limits the 
capacity of sovereignty to engage with change and the unbundling of sovereignty. In 
truth the relatively recent move to see the three traditions explicitly as an 
epistemological spectrum, proposed by the Linklater and Little approach, means that 
the door has been opened for the tension between strong post-positivism, on the one 
hand (which is related to the deconstruction of sovereignty), and the assertion of the 
ontological closure of sovereignty on the other (which is related to strong positivism) 
to be highlighted and worked through but the resulting challenge has not been 
properly engaged with to date. This chapter has sought to make good this failing by 
unpacking the epistemology of revolutionism’s strong post-positivism, as seen from 
this thesis’ modified Linklater -  Little spectrum, drawing it into valuable conversation 
with Ruggie’s historical socio-epistemic approach. The result is a three traditions 
spectrum that services a holistic conception of sovereignty that can properly engage 
with the transformational implications of major changes.
CONCLUSION
Parts 1 and 2 have demonstrated the unbundling of sovereignty both from an 
ontological and an epistemological perspective in order to conceptualize the challenge
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presented by contemporary revolutionism which they have sought to enlighten 
through reflection on networked governance theory and strong post-positivism. In 
drawing together the implications of both Part l ’s primarily ontological perspective 
on the development of post-sovereign revolutionism and Part 2’s epistemological 
perspective on the same process, the crucial intersecting point of resonance is clear. 
The deconstruction of sovereignty in the decentred structure of networked governance 
- which, jettisoning the foundational political (social contracted territorial people), 
celebrates instead the pre-eminence of functional considerations - is readily 
apprehended by post-positivist epistemology, championing the ‘unbundling of 
sovereignty’. Specifically, the destruction of the subject-object duality at the heart of 
post-positivism releases the new temporality, in whose name the single-perspectivity 
and attendant ontological closure of the sovereign state are exchanged for the new 
multi-perspectival post-sovereign political form. Thus both approaches engage with 
the new revolutionism, whose consequence is the deconstruction of state
O 1 t
sovereignty. Having considered sovereignty in the context of systemic change from 
the perspective of both the realist (chapters 3 and 4) and revolutionist traditions 
(chapters 5 and 6), chapters 7, 8 and 9 will now consider it from the perspective of the 
rationalist tradition.
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Globalization(s) Globalization, Theory and Practice, pp. 15-16.) Ashley, meanwhile, similarly 
questions the boundary between the ‘inside and outside’. His post-structuralist analysis ‘regards this 
boundary - and, with it, the modem constructs of domestic society and sovereign state, on the one hand, 
and international anarchy on the other - as problematical effects whose production in history is never 
finally completed, always dependent upon knowledgeable practices that potentially traverse all bounds’.29 
In the context of globalization the problematic status of the inside-out divide has become very much more 
pronounced, exposing its constructed status and therein the interests for which it was built. (Richard 
Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the Domestication of Global Life’, p. 101.) 
During the modem age, R. B. J. Walker observes, ‘inside and out’ and ‘here and there’ communicated 
the importance of the difference between the ‘self and other, identity and difference, community and 
anarchy that is constitutive of our modem understanding of political space’. At this time the boundaries 
which notions such as sovereignty serviced were indeed of great importance. One’s success was 
located in identifying the here that was home from the there that was not and pursuing one’s agendas 
with primary regard to the security and integrity of the former reference point rather than the latter. For 
it was in this category and in this category alone that one would live and move and have one’s being 
and thus in this category that one would realize success or failure. ‘Here we are safe to work out the 
characteristic puzzles of modernity, about freedoms and determinations, the subjectivities and 
objectivities of a realm in which we might aspire to realize our peace and potential, our autonomy, our 
enlightenment, our progress and our virtu(e).. There we must beware’. (Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and 
the Articulation of Political Space/Time’ p. 456.) See similar observation regarding ‘here and there’ in 
Bauman, Globalization, p. 13. Today, however, in the context of the erosion of boundaries and 
development of the networked connexity that is constitutive of governance, the old perspective is 
wholly inappropriate. When considering the European Union, MNCs, Space, Sea, planetary habitat, 
Walker contends, ‘it seems more and more difficult to believe that here is indeed here and there is still 
there’. Realist accounts, he notes, ‘still assume that inside and outside can be easily distinguished, but 
this is an assumption that is now very difficult to take for granted’. (Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the 
Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 456.) The new environment, Walker argued, clearly requires 
reconceptualisation and the development of a new ‘common sense’. ‘Despite the immediate appeal to a 
common sense that will insist that of course there is a here here and a there there, it is unlikely that any 
analysis of contemporary world politics (of the world economy, of nuclear strategy, of communications 
technologies, of cultural inclusion or social exclusions, of refugees or tourists, of investments, 
ecologies, markets or literatures) will now avoid some mention of how this once uncommon sense is 
not quite right. (Ibid., p. 459.) In rising to the challenge of globalization, therefore, it is imperative to 
recognize that that which seems conceptually absolute is far from absolute. ‘Its [sovereignty’s] fixing 
of unity and diversity, or inside and outside, or space and time is not natural or inevitable. It is a crucial 
part of the practices of all modem states, but they are not natural or inevitable either’. (Ibid., p. 460.) 
Moving beyond IR theory specifically it should be noted that the problem with the ‘domestic -  foreign’
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distinction is also recognized elsewhere. Duchacek for instance appreciates the significance of the 
erosion of the inside-outside, foreign/domestic distinction which having informed international 
relations theory for so long must now be relinquished. ‘Constitutional texts generally assume and 
proclaim that the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic concerns is clear and firm -  which 
it is not’. (Ivo D. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension o f Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations, 
Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 235-6.) Bauman is similarly clear about the demise of 
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but the most narrow, “territory and population policing” sense’. (Bauman, Globalization, p. 65.)
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Goldbatt and Perraton, Global Transformations, pp. 52-53.
31 Ibid., p. 53.
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Nation State, p. 56.)
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CHAPTER 7
THE RATIONALIST TRADITION & SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Having defined the two polar traditions, realism and revolutionism, and applied them to the 
conceptual challenge of defining sovereignty in the context of change, this chapter now turns 
to rationalism. In so doing, it will posit a modified sovereignty - whose conceptual 
parameters will be further developed by chapters 8 and 9 - that can readily engage with 
change.
INTRODUCING RATIONALISM
Perhaps the best way to approach rationalism is through Locke’s conception of the state of 
nature, which Wight contrasts with that of Hobbes. Whilst Hobbes believed that the state of 
nature was characterised by anarchy, which when applied to the international arena resulted 
in international anarchy and war, Locke argued that, although human sinfulness limited the 
civic aspirations of the state of nature, it did not prevent natural law encouraging a significant 
measure of civility.1 To be sure, this universal legal framework was bereft of an executive 
and a judiciary but it had purchase on the hearts and minds of humankind because it 
resonated with human reason. ‘Reason means the capacity to know this natural law and the 
obligations it imposes; this law (of justice) is “written in his heart’” .2 Thus, whilst, as in the 
Hobbesian system, there was still a need to obtain a greater measure of civility through the 
creation of sovereign states, the application of the Lockean state of nature to the relationships
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between states resulted in a significant measure of civility which eluded Hobbes’ 
international anarchy thesis. This of course makes sense when one considers the fact that 
rationalism represents the space between realism and revolutionism. ‘Between the belief that 
the society of states is non-existent or at best a polite fiction, and the belief that it is the 
chrysalis for the community of mankind, lies a more complex conception of international 
society’ .3
To the extent that a measure of anarchy endures in the Lockean state of nature, the rationalist 
framework endorses the need for sovereign states. To the extent, however, that it also posits a 
measure of sociability secured by reason and natural law, albeit dependent upon the judiciary of 
the heart, these states form together a society of states. As such rationalism provides an 
ontological framework that posits a model of state sovereignty that, on the one hand, embraces 
an important measure of ontological closure, shutting out the disorder manifest in the state of 
nature and yet, on the other hand, embraces a significant degree of ontological openness in the 
sense that it recognizes that the states are joined by a measure of sociability undergirded by the 
common norms of natural law.
In addressing rationalism after realism and revolutionism, as Wight himself often did, positing it 
as the tradition of the ‘in between’, this chapter will refer to both the polar traditions. As it does 
so, however, it is important to remember that it is not its purpose to declare that their utility 
derives merely in their services as guides towards a rationalist synthesis of realism and 
revolutionism. As chapter 1 made clear, the whole point of the three traditions spectrum, with its 
methodological, ontological and epistemological pluralism, is that each tradition has a role to 
play in its own right and not merely as a means to a synthetic end in the context of a dialectic.
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The attraction of the three traditions spectrum is precisely the fact that in servicing such 
ontological breadth it provides a framework wherein one can cater for IR in the context of the 
ontological revolution called into being by the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization. 
Having said this, however - and as also noted by chapter 1 - it is the contention of this thesis that 
of the three traditions, rationalism is the most useful for coming to terms with sovereignty and 
change. Although the spatio-temporal profile of the three traditions means that only part of 
realism embraces a capacity to deal with limited change, whilst only part of revolutionism has 
the capacity to deal with an enduring sovereignty of sorts, the entirety of rationalism is able to 
engage with enduring sovereignty in the context of change. Endowed with an openness which 
does not negate sovereignty, rationalism consequently provides the best framework to deal with 
sovereignty and change. Specifically - as this chapter will demonstrate - it can cater for the 
endurance of sovereignty in the context of the two kinds of systemic change considered by this 
thesis, regional integration, leading to the extension of sovereignty (change by extension) and 
globalization, leading to the erosion, but crucially not the annihilation, of sovereignty (change by 
erosion).
STRUCTURE
The need to engage with the endurance of sovereignty in the context of the two forms of 
change defines the structure of this chapter which is divided into two parts. In Part 1 the 
chapter will examine the endurance of sovereignty, from the perspective of the rationalist 
tradition, in the context of regional integration. In Part 2 the chapter will examine 
sovereignty, from the perspective of the rationalist tradition, in the context of wider 
globalization. For reasons that will become apparent, Part 2 will occupy significantly more 
space than Part 1.
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PART 1: 
RATIONALISM, REGIONAL INTEGRATION & ‘CHANGE BY 
EXTENSION’
In turning to develop an understanding of the endurance of sovereignty as it engages with 
regional integration, one is immediately reminded of the fact that such an account has already 
been presented by chapter 4’s consideration of sovereignty and change from the perspective 
of the realist tradition. As was noted in that chapter the model of ‘change by extension’ has 
claims to the rationalist tradition.
In order to explain the relevance of chapter 4’s account of ‘change by extension’ to the 
definition of rationalism it is necessary to reconsider the three traditions spectrum as a whole. 
As chapter 2 explained, in employing an approach to the three traditions that treats them as 
constitutive of an ontological spectrum, this thesis does not engage with three different 
ontologically homogenous blocks but rather a spectrum extending from the place of absolute 
ontological closure, at the sovereign state pole, through to the place of absolute ontological 
openness, at the post-sovereignty pole. As such this thesis contends that realism as a whole is 
not entirely ontologically closed, any more than revolutionism is entirely open, with the 
consequence that certain manifestations of sovereignty within the realist tradition (the most 
useful ones) are not completely reified and closed and can consequently engage with a 
measure of change.
The above approach to the spectrum has two implications. First, the presence of an account of 
sovereignty that is neither entirely closed nor entirely open is not exclusive to the rationalist 
tradition. Second, - and crucially for this stage of the investigation - given the fact that the
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opportunity to engage with ‘change by extension’ in the context of such a model of 
sovereignty (albeit exhibiting a greater measure of closure) has already been explored in 
chapter 4, there is no need to simply recapitulate our account of it at this stage. Furthermore, 
given that this form of change is by definition consistent with the endurance of sovereignty (it 
relocates rather than deconstructs), there is also no need to embark upon a demonstration of 
why this change does not mean the end of sovereignty. Having identified the importance of 
needless duplication, though, this chapter can develop understanding of ‘change by 
extension’ on two bases that help to demonstrate the special relevance of rationalism.
1. ABETTER FIT
In the first instance, it is important to recognize that because rationalism embraces a greater 
measure of openness than wider realism, whilst maintaining sovereignty, it is better able to 
engage with the dynamics of ‘change by extension’ than the wider realist tradition. Indeed, 
whilst ‘change by extension’ can apply to only part of the realist tradition, it can be applied to 
the whole of rationalism. The confederal spectrum should thus primarily be identified, as per 
Figure 1 in chapter 2, with rationalism.
2. THE FORTUNES OF ‘CHANGE BY EXTENSION’
In the second instance, one can gain a clear insight to the special relevance of rationalism 
when confronted with some of the limitations of the aspirations of the ‘change by extension’ 
model defined by chapter 4. Appreciation of these will point to the superior wisdom of 
rationalism vis-a-vis realism on three bases. The chapter will first consider the shortcomings 
of the vision of ‘change by extension’ posited in chapter 4 and then highlight rationalism’s 
bases for superiority.
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Critical examination of the progress of European integration reveals that, whilst from a 
jurisdictional point of view there can be no doubt that the European Union does uphold 
competencies on a supranational basis, and thus a form of extended sovereignty, it has failed 
to generate a supranational jurisdiction harnessed to a demos.4 Positive sovereignty is not just 
about legal jurisdictions but critically legal jurisdictions upheld by a social contracted 
territorial people. ‘One of the greatest achievements of the nineteenth century model of the 
European nation-state’, William Wallace observes, ‘was its ability to bring together identity 
and order, legitimacy and community, national economy and national welfare within a single 
framework. The weakest dimension of the emerging post-sovereign European order is that it 
loosens the ties which bind elites to masses within nation-states and the links between policy 
outcomes and political accountability, without providing any substantial sense of shared 
identity, of representation or of accountability at the European level’.5 Indeed, although the 
sovereign nation-state may have been subjected to new ‘loosening’ pressures, there is a clear 
sense in which the ‘social contracted territorial peoples’ of the member states remain strong, 
whilst the sense of a social contracted territorial European people remains very weak and 
even absent.
The failure of the EU to complement its supranational administration with a supranational 
identity, and the implications of this for sovereignty, have been demonstrated with great 
clarity by J. H. H. Weiler. A Union between Denmark and Germany, he observes, would be 
unacceptable to a Dane even if he were promised a vote and representation in the Bundestag, 
because democracy is not just about having a vote. ‘Their screams of grief will be shrill not 
simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship (that may be
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true for the German Greens too), but because the way nationality, in this way of thinking, 
enmeshes with democracy is that even majority mle is only legitimate within a Demos, when 
Danes mle Danes’.6 Democracy is dependent upon a shared ‘social contracted territorial 
people’.
The implications of this observation are twofold. First, there is no supranational ‘social 
contracted territorial people’. Second, as the following comment from Ulf Hedetoft further 
underlines, the ‘social contracted territorial peoples of the member states remain alive and 
well. ‘[I]n theory as well as in the popular mind, sovereignty is an unquestioned axiom, 
belonging equally to the world of politics and to the world of culture and identity. In fact, 
sovereignty is a central building block in the wall of national identity. It links people and 
state within a well defined authority space, where people’s consent to be ruled is conditioned 
by the fact that they feel the mle and the mlers to be their own, and hence refuse to recognize 
any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the state and as their own 
cultural property’. In short, referring back to Weiler’s example, there is a ‘social contracted 
territorial people’ in Germany and in Denmark, but there is no such thing encompassing 
Germany and Denmark or indeed the other EU states.7
The enduring significance of the social contracted territorial people at the level of the state 
has meant that, whilst there is a sense in which the European Union should be thought of as a 
federal tier that has taken competencies from national sovereignty, the European Union 
‘remains, for its member governments and for the overwhelming majority of their citizens, a 
secondary and subordinate framework for political activity’. (Italics added) As an expression 
of this citizens ‘still see the Community policy process refracted through the spectmm of
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their national governments, looking to those governments to promote and defend ‘their’ 
interests against those of other countries without more than a passive and undefined 
acceptance of any wider European interest’.8 Whilst 75% of economic legislation and 50%9 
of domestic legislation is determined by the Europe Union for its member states, the general 
public continues to engage with the state as if it continued to be by far and away the primary 
source of law.10 In the context of the European Union, it seems very doubtful that people are 
fully aware of just how many decisions are made by EU institutions, because of the rigidly 
‘national’ nature of their self-understanding.11 There is a real sense in which the Union needs 
the ongoing appearance of strong member states so that this can continue to provide the 
political legitimacy upon which the project can rest.12 ‘The central paradox’, Wallace 
observes, ‘of the European political system in the 1990s is that governance is becoming 
increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while representation, loyalty 
and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions o f the nation-state’
• t  ^
(Italics added). For the purposes of legitimacy, therefore, governments ‘sustain the illusion 
that [they] can themselves provide their voters with benefits - security, prosperity, regulation 
of economic and social inter-change - which can in practice be won only through common 
action with others’.14
Thus, whilst from a jurisdictional point of view there can be no doubt that the European 
Union does uphold competencies on a supranational basis and thus a form of extended 
sovereignty, to date it seems to have failed to have generated a key element of positive 
sovereignty, namely the supranational ‘social contracted territorial people’. It would thus 
seem that integration has given rise to a truncated form of supranational sovereignty 
alongside a dented nation-state sovereignty.15
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As noted earlier, the above account’s assessment of integration points to the wisdom of 
rationalism by pointing to the need for a significant openness across a number of different 
bases. First, to the extent that European integration actually does not deny the reality of 
change by extension, it upholds the need for a form of sovereignty that is open in the sense 
that i: can develop over time. Second, it also supports a model of sovereignty that is open in 
the sense that it is partial because it only relates to a portion of the policy competencies 
withii its territorial remit and - in a qualitatively different sense - because it has not been able 
to marry its partial jurisdiction to a demos and thus only sustains part of the conventional 
sovereignty configuration. Finally, it also sustains a model of sovereignty that is open in the 
sense that it services nation-state sovereignties that, whilst enduring, are significantly 
truncated, and thus partial, in the sense that their claim to certain policy competencies has 
been radically circumscribed and is in a process of on-going circumscription. Thus 
ratioralism can be applied to both the quasi-supranational sovereignty of the EU and to the 
enduring but truncated nation-state sovereignty of the member states.
PART 2: RATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
As in the case of regional integration and the related ‘change by extension’ there is no need to 
defim globalization and the attendant ‘change by erosion’, since this has already been done 
by ciapters 5 and 6. Given that these chapters posited revolutionist post-sovereignty, 
however, there is a need to explain why a form of sovereignty none the less endures and why 
this is best engaged with through rationalism.
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STRUCTURE
Part 2 will be divided into three sections. Section 1 will first consider sovereignty in the 
context of economic globalization - the first threat considered in chapter 5 - demonstrating 
both its endurance and the manner in which it has been changed. Section 2 will then similarly 
examine sovereignty in the context of increased state intervention - the second threat 
considered by chapter 5 - highlighting once again its endurance and the manner in which it 
has been changed. Having obtained a clear picture of an ongoing sovereignty, albeit subject 
to changes in the form of erosion in the context of growing extra-territorial flows and 
increasing state intervention, Section 3 will then ask what this means for the ‘unbundling of 
territoriality’, providing a theoretical critique of the previous chapter’s revolutionist 
definition of post-sovereignty. In short Part 2 will first demonstrate that a form of sovereignty 
endures and second that rationalism presents the best, although not the only, conceptual 
framework for coming to terms with it.
SECTION 1: SOVEREIGNTY ENDURES DESPITE ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION
After briefly examining the ongoing significance of qualified sovereignty from the 
perspective of its negative definition (as set out by chapter 3), this section will then focus on 
interrogating sovereignty from the perspective of its positive definition (as again set out by 
chapter 3). This investigation will involve consideration of the endurance of sovereignty from 
the perspective of legitimacy (Sub-Section 1) and initiation (Sub-Section 2), demonstrating 
that, whilst the development of an extra-territorial domain through globalization has eroded 
the ontological significance of the sovereign state, it has been unable to fully displace the 
sovereign state.
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1) NEGATIVE SOVEREIGNTY
As noted in chapter 4, the global economic flows associated with globalization have not 
placed negative sovereignty - constitutional independence - in jeopardy. The detailed 
examination of global flows and reflection on political responses in chapter 5 and 6 has not 
changed chapter 4’s key observations firstly that the number of sovereign states actually 
increased from 75 in 1945 to 190 in 199916 and to 192 by 2002 and, secondly, that the 
territoriality of the nation-state has become even more pronounced in the sense that its 
boundaries have become more absolute since 1945.17 With the exception of Antarctica, the
1Rsurface of the globe continues to be divided into territorial states claiming sovereignty. 
Viewed from this perspective sovereignty both endures and has no need to accommodate 
change whether by extension or by erosion. If one was just interested in negative sovereignty, 
therefore, one’s defence of sovereignty in the context of globalization need go no further. As 
chapter 3 argued, however, depending entirely upon a negative, external definition of 
sovereignty results in an abstraction that should not sit well in the English School tradition. In 
light of this fact the chapter will now turn to consider the bases for enduring sovereignty in 
terms of its positive, internal foundation.
2) POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty also endures positively, despite the reality of globalization, although this does result 
in its erosion. Demonstrating the reality of the endurance of sovereignty positively in the context 
of this form of systemic change, however, is very much more challenging than demonstrating 
the endurance of sovereignty negatively and will thus take considerably more space. The chapter
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will seek to rise to this challenge first from the perspective of legitimacy (Sub-Section 1) and 
then from the perspective of power (Sub-Section 2).
SUB-SECTION I: ENDURING POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY: LEGITIMACY
As the social contracted territorial people (see chapter 3), positive (internal) sovereignty 
continues to provide a crucial legitimacy function. The chapter will now examine the 
endurance of positive sovereignty on the basis of this legitimacy function as it is worked out 
in relationship to the demands of the European Union, global capital, and state decision­
making.
i. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
In addressing European integration as a local manifestation of globalization whose 
governmental implications chapter 6 unpacked in terms of a networked model of governance 
that is deconstructive of sovereignty, the point must be made (as per Part 1) that the social 
contracted territorial peoples of the member states endure and in so-doing provide a 
significant measure of legitimacy for the integration project. This suggests that member state 
sovereignty has no more been wholly ‘changed by erosion’ in the context of accounts of 
European integration that view it simply as a local manifestation of globalization, resulting in 
sovereignty’s complete deconstruction, than it has been wholly ‘changed by extension’ in 
accordance with those regional integration accounts that champion a supranational 
sovereignty, completely replacing nation-state sovereignty. This is not to infer, however, that 
the networked thesis has no merits any more than the endurance of a form of nation-state 
sovereignty had this implication for the extension thesis. It can be used to show the erosion 
but not the demise of sovereignty and in so-doing provides a valuable, alternative perspective
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on the absence of a supranational European demos, which is not required by extra-territorial, 
functional governance theory. To the degree that the impact of globalization on government, 
defined by chapter 6’s account of networked governance, is not even associated with the 
quest for a new social contracted territorial jurisdiction, the EU is arguably even more 
dependent on enduring member state positive sovereignty for legitimacy than when see from 
the perspective of regional integration.
ii. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND GLOBAL CAPITAL: REGULATION
For the reasons set out in chapter 5 the rise of global capital flows has in some senses resulted 
in the erosion of sovereignty. Crucially, however, although there is a sense in which these 
extra-territorial flows have been located beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach 
of the territorial state, this has not actually released them from state regulation. In the absence 
of any kind of global government, globalization needs the sovereign state to assume a critical 
legitimacy role sustaining a regulatory and accountability function which is not being 
provided by non-state actors. The chapter will now examine the endurance of positive 
sovereignty, manifest in its legitimacy role, through the scholarship of Panitch, Hirst and 
Thompson.
Panitch is very clear about the dependence of capital on an enduring sovereign state.19
Capital requires guarantees of property, contract, standard currency, weights measures, the
free flow of factors of production, and maintenance of a macro-economic framework across
the globe. Whilst recognising that, in the context of globalization, accountability is no longer
the exclusive preserve of individual sovereign states, he is equally clear that it is not a matter
of some cosmopolitan networked governance of many different actors wherein the privileged,
foundational role of the sovereign state is lost.20 Instead, drawing on Stephen Gill, he
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maintains, globalization depends upon inter-state-based ‘neo-constitutionalism’21 which 
‘appears to be taking the form ...o f formal interstate treaties designed to enforce legally upon 
future governments general adherence to the discipline of the capital market’. The resulting 
neo-constitutionalism is clearly seen in bodies, created and sustained by sovereign states, 
such as GATT and NAFTA which witness ‘states as the authors of a regime which defines 
and guarantees, through international treaties with constitutional effect, the global and
• 99domestic rights of capital’.
Hirst and Thompson, meanwhile, are equally clear about the need for ongoing state 
regulation to service capital in the context of globalization. The creation of international 
agencies and bodies for the purpose of regulation, they argue, means that states are embracing 
a new role in the ‘function of legitimating and supporting the authorities they have created by 
such grants of sovereignty. If sovereignty is of decisive significance now as a distinguishing 
feature of the nation-state, it is because the state has the role of being a source of legitimacy
9^in transferring power or sanctioning new powers both “above” it and “below” it’.
The reality of the increasing importance of the sovereign state’s legitimacy role, Hirst and 
Thompson contend, can be seen particularly clearly by considering the needs of the 
marginalized. In the context of the multiplication of agencies, the movement of competencies 
between them (which characterises global governance) increases the risks of the marginalised 
‘falling between the cracks’ and becoming net losers, generating unsustainable legitimacy 
problems for late capitalism. As a consequence ‘[t]he governing powers (international, 
national and regional) need to be “sutured” together into a relatively integrated system,’24 a 
task for which the sovereign nation-state - set upon the social contracted territorial people,
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facilitating an objective legal view that can take account of the common good of the whole - 
is uniquely positioned. ‘The nation-state is central to this process of “suturing”: the policies 
and practices of states in distributing power upwards to the international level and 
downwards to the subnational agencies are the ties that will hold the system of governance 
together’.25
Thus, in the opinion of Hirst and Thompson, the idea that the market can do without 
regulation from the sovereign states is ‘strange’. In reality companies have a strong interest 
in the continuity of sovereign states: ‘Internationally they seek a measure of security and 
stability in financial markets, a secure framework of free trade, and the protection of 
commercial rights. Nationally they seek to profit from the distinct advantages conferred by 
the cultural and institutional frameworks of the successful industrial states’.27
In conclusion, consideration of the regulation of extra-territorial global capital clearly 
demonstrates the endurance of positive, internal sovereignty, namely the social contracted 
territorial people, through the ongoing dependence of globalization on internal sovereignty 
for regulation rooted in a widely accepted sense of legitimacy. This does not mean that an 
erosion of sovereignty is not taking place. To the extent that the extensive and intensive 
connections between states in this neo-constitutionalism make the reality of the state’s veto 
increasingly implicit, neo-constitutional accountability moves towards a networked form of 
governance, as defined by chapter 6. To the extent, however, that the state does not actually 
participate, on a basis of equality with other non-state actors, in networked relationships that 
unbundle any sense of hierarchical government, this neo-constitutionalism maintains the 
privileged, politico-legal foundational status of the sovereign state to at least some extent.
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With the social contract based nature of government actually significantly preserved
(contrary to Ohmae et al - see chapter 6) ‘neo-constitutionalism’ arguably fosters a
28framework with greater parallels to intergovemmentalism than networked governance,
iii. SOVEREIGNTY AND DECISION-MAKING
The fact that, whilst eroding positive sovereignty for the reasons given in chapters 5 and 6, 
economic globalization has not actually resulted in the demise of positive sovereignty can also 
be seen from the perspective of legitimacy via the social contracted territorial people in 
relationship to general decision-making. The chapter will make this case by examining the 
claims of regularian law which are of particular importance to networked models of governance 
that seek to escape any notion of ‘the people’. By way of introduction, it is necessary to briefly 
define our terms:
MAJORITARIAN LEGITIMACY
Majoritarian legitimacy is given to government as a result of the direct sanction of the electorate 
expressed through the ballot box. An agenda has majoritarian legitimacy if it was in the 
manifesto of the winning political party that goes on to form the government. Symmetrically, it 
lacks legitimacy if it was in the manifesto of a losing party (unless of course it was also in that of 
the winning party). In the majoritarian context, as Majone observes, ‘[t]he main if not only 
source of legitimacy is accountability to voters or to their elected representatives’.29
NON-MAJORITARIAN LEGITIMACY
Non-majoritarian approaches to legitimacy, on the other hand, contend that legitimacy is 
essential ‘but deny that a higher level of politicisation of the regulatory process [as seen in the
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majoritarian system] is the correct answer’. Wherever possible, non-majoritarianism sets 
decision-making on a functional technocratic basis in order to protect the judicial, executive 
and administrative functions of government from representative assemblies and from fickle 
mass opinion.30 This involves the dispersal of decision-making out of government 
departments into specialist technocratic agencies where subsequent determinations are 
legitimated on the basis that they are undertaken by experts in accordance with predetermined 
procedures. This basic thrust, whose functional character clearly resonates with the 
deconstruction of the ideal typical modem, liberal-democratic political form, and with the 
advent of multi-dimensional governance (defined in chapter 6), is further buttressed by its 
location in the context of a system of mles which provide a facility for judicial review and the 
protection of minority rights.31
MAJORITARIANISM, NON-MAJORITARIANISM AND SOVEREIGNTY
The dominant form of legitimacy will depend upon the strength of positive sovereignty, as 
the ‘social contracted territorial people’. In the case of a strong sovereignty, supporting an 
appropriately large public square, legitimacy is sought through vigorous debate, followed by 
a division and a majoritarian decision made by the people’s representatives. Such an 
approach is possible because the strength of ‘the social contracted territorial people’ means 
that the differences of opinion will not place its integrity in jeopardy. It is, moreover, also 
necessary because the strength of the ‘social contracted territorial people’ develops the habit 
of majoritarian democracy which can cause the demos to feel extremely dissatisfied with 
non-majoritarian substitutes. This renders the political culture of such polities unhappy at the 
thought of hiving-off decision-making to experts.32 In the case of polities with a weaker sense 
of a social contracted territorial people - whose heterogeneous identity means that they
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cannot resolve controversial issues through ‘the will of the people’ because the category ‘the 
people’ is actually too fragmented33 - non-majoritarian forms of legitimacy are more 
attractive.34 The hiving off of policy competencies to functional agencies does not offend the 
democratic conscience of such societies and consequently projects such as European 
integration are not perceived as threatening. In the context of globalization, where, as a 
consequence of greater people movement, states are becoming more heterogeneous, the 
majoritarian approach to legitimacy is being increasingly displaced by non-majoritarian 
alternatives.
ENDURING MAJORITARIANISM -  ENDURING SOVEREIGNTY
To the extent that decisions are made on a majoritarian basis, positive sovereignty 
assumptions are drawn on through the instrumentality of ‘the social contracted territorial 
people’ and, to this measure, sovereignty is consequently ongoing. Furthermore, whilst non- 
majoritarian approaches do not directly invoke the people, a state would need all of its 
decisions to be taken on a non-majoritarian basis for it never to invoke the ‘social contracted, 
territorial people’. No examples come to mind! Indeed, in seeking to conceive of such a 
polity one runs into the problem that rules cannot always be determined by rules and so 
ultimately there is a need for politicians and thus elections. The reality of the minimal, social 
contracted territorial people, underpinning any putative regularian technocracy, must, at the 
very least, be expressed at elections when the direction of the common polity for the next x 
years is determined by ‘the people’ and for ‘the people’.
In making these qualifications, it is important to note that some scholars are prepared to be 
rather more forthright about the limitation of the potential expansion of non-majoritarianism.
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Given that ‘redistributive decisions’ result in certain sections of the population losing out, 
Majone contends, in deference to Wicksell, that they must be made on a majoritarian basis in 
the name of a general civic interest.35 Similarly, although specific decisions may not receive 
the sanction of the legislature, every executive depends on its majoritarian legitimacy when 
making decisions about the use of national (non-mercenary) forces that could result in the 
death of citizens. Whilst the years of mass conscription are over -  although national service is 
not in many countries -  armies, unprivatised, remain resolutely national and are deployed in 
the name of the nation or its figurehead.
Thus it is the contention of this thesis - whether considering decision-making in general or in 
relationship to the issues that are, according to Majone and Wicksell, particularly resistant to 
the regularian approach - that the reality of positive sovereignty as the ‘social contracted 
territorial people’ is present to some degree in state decision-making, even whilst states 
increasingly appeal to non-majoritarian legitimacy. Once again, therefore, the notion that 
globalization has brought about the end of sovereignty would appear to be without 
foundation.
A POLITY RULED BY FORCE?
Having considered the endurance of sovereignty positively in relationship to the European 
Union, capital regulation and decision-making, via the social contracted territorial people, the 
question arises, what about those states that cannot really claim to rest upon such a 
foundation? Specifically, what of those former colonies that never constituted cohering 
political units, were only kept together as colonies in the context of a tight imperial grip and 
which since decolonization have only been sustained through the deployment of power? In
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the first instance even if one concluded that these states were not sovereign, given that there 
are many other states underpinned by some sense of a social contracted people, the point 
must be made that this would not enable one to dispense with sovereignty. In the second 
instance, moreover, whilst polities lacking an effective social contracted territorial people do 
not enjoy this particular expression of sovereignty, they enjoy others in the sense that they 
have of course first negative sovereignty, constitutional independence, and positive 
sovereignty through their enduring capacity to initiate, of which more in Part 2.
RATIONALIST SOVEREIGNTY?
In light of the endurance of positive internal sovereignty in terms of legitimacy, albeit in the 
context of its erosion, there is a need to provide a conceptual framework that can engage with 
continuity and change. Rationalism rises to this challenge because of its particular spatio- 
temporal profile. On the one hand, it is neither wholly spatially oriented and closed, (the 
sovereign state pole), nor largely spatially oriented and largely closed (see the wider realist 
tradition). On the other hand, it is neither wholly temporally oriented and open (post­
sovereignty pole), nor largely temporally oriented and open (see the wider revolutionist 
tradition). It consequently embraces an ontological balance between the open and the closed. 
This capacity to uphold a greater measure of openness than any part of the realist tradition, 
whilst not provoking the deconstruction of sovereignty, as per revolutionism, results in an 
extremely useful model of sovereignty because it provides a better means of engaging with 
the simultaneous demands for change and continuity.
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SUB-SECTION II: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CAPACITY TO INITIATE
Having considered the presence, albeit qualified, of positive sovereignty in the form of the 
‘social contracted territorial people’ from the perspective of legitimacy in relationship to the 
European Union, global capital and general decision-making, it is now important to consider 
the endurance of positive sovereignty from the perspective of a continued capacity to initiate. 
The bulk of those who question the ongoing significance of sovereignty in the context of 
globalization do so on the basis of loss of decisional room for manoeuvre. Of course, if one 
responded to this observation from the narrowly negative perspective of James et al (see 
chapter 3, Part 2) one could simply brush these contentions to one side. This thesis, however, 
has argued that, whilst sovereignty is defined negatively in terms of constitutional 
independence, it must also be defined positively in terms of a ‘social contracted territorial 
people’, which carries within it the clear capacity to initiate (although crucially not absolute 
power, chapter 3, Part 3), if one is to avoid abstraction. As Camilleri and Falk observe, from a 
social contract ‘emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of 
the body politic’ which is ‘endowed with a distinctive, identifiable will and a capacity for 
rational decision-making’.37 Thus, on the basis that it is not possible to conceptualize 
sovereignty bereft of power any more than sovereignty bereft of constitutional independence, 
demonstration of an enduring decisional freedom - no matter how restrained it might be relative 
to that of the mid twentieth century - constitutes an important expression of the fact that 
sovereignty endures.
ONGOING SOVEREIGN STATE COMPETENCIES
In moving to consider the presence of positive sovereignty as an enduring capacity to initiate, 
it is important to be clear that sovereign states have always been constrained by their
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resources and environments. Their challenge has been to use the freedom of manoeuvre at 
their disposal, which will vary from issue to issue, to find the most effective way to promote 
their interests. Clearly if globalization generated a new environment that removed all freedom 
of manoeuvre so that the state could no longer initiate, the concept of sovereignty would run 
into difficulties in the same way that a particular sovereignty would if it was incorporated 
into another polity. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst globalization has 
introduced new constraints that have restricted room for manoeuvre, it has in no sense 
removed this room for manoeuvre and the continuance of a meaningful capacity to initiate. 
Furthermore, the restricting implications of globalization should also be balanced by 
recognition of the fact that there are some areas - as the chapter will demonstrate - in which 
globalization has increased the options and thus room for manoeuvre within which the 
enduring capacity to initiate resides.
Quite apart from anything else it is important to recognize that most polities today uphold 
more extensive state machines, and intervene more in the lives of their citizens, than ever 
before. In light of this, Giddens and Milward contend that it is rather strange that there has 
been so much prominent literature suggesting the end of the nation-state.39 To demonstrate 
the inappropriateness of such thought, Giddens provides a list of the key state functions 
which, in his judgement, eloquently demonstrate the continuing importance of the state.40 
Giddens concludes that ‘[t]he list is so formidable that to suppose that the state and 
government have become irrelevant makes no sense’. Whilst some of these tasks can be 
shared with other agencies, they can never become wholly independent of the state in the 
sense that they are run entirely in deference to market relationships and without regard to 
some anchoring reference to the politico-legal, social contracted territorial people, i.e.
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internal/positive sovereignty. ‘Markets cannot replace government in any of these areas, but 
neither can social movements or other kinds of non-governmental organization (NGO), no 
matter how significant they have become’.41
In turning now to consider this enduring capacity to initiate in some detail, it is important to 
be clear that it is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest that there are not aspects of the 
following examples that some would wish to interpret differently. The purpose is simply to 
point to evidence for some ongoing state decisional autonomy which in turn points to the 
endurance of positive, internal state sovereignty. The chapter will consider evidence of an 
enduring freedom to initiate with respect to two broad policy areas: fiscal and monetary 
policy.
I. STATE AUTONOMY AND FISCAL CONSERVATISM
It is often suggested that globalization has inaugurated a ‘race to the bottom’ in which levels 
of government expenditure have fallen thus restraining both the development of public debt, 
and thereby satisfying the markets, and the level of taxation, and thereby placating otherwise 
reluctant Foreign Direct Investment. In fact, as a proportion of GDP, average OECD 
government spending actually increased on average by 100% between 1960 and the mid 
1990s (part of the era of globalization). In other words, governments are now very much 
more involved in direct decision-making about economic resources than they were in I960.42 
Having highlighted this general fact, the chapter will now consider in greater detail three 
bases upon which globalization is commonly thought to have resulted in the erosion of state 
autonomy in the arena of spending, namely borrowing, taxation and welfare provision:
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i. GLOBALIZATION AND LIMITS ON TAXATION
As noted above, at the heart of the contentions that deregulation is prompting a reduction in 
taxation and thus spending is the observation that FDI - which, as chapter 5 demonstrated, is 
more mobile than one might imagine - forces states to offer competing tax reductions to draw 
in multi-nationals. If India can present a lower cost environment than Finland then India will 
get the investment. This logic sounds immensely compelling. In reality, however, as an 
increasing number of scholars, including Hirst, Thompson, Garrett and Weiss, are now 
demonstrating, it is not always that simple.43
In the first instance, a significant portion of the doubling of expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s (see above), resulted from increased taxation. To be 
sure, taxes of the kind that might chase mobile capital away, e.g. marginal rates of corporate 
income tax, have fallen in most OECD countries in recent years, but this is not the whole 
picture 44 As Garrett observes, effective rates of capital taxation moved up to an average of 
almost 40% in the early 1990s compared with just 30% during the 1970s. This, he maintains, ‘is 
a long way from the predictions of a free fall in capital taxation resulting from the exit threat of 
multinational firms and financial speculators’.45
In the second instance, one must recognize that multi-national companies - as Held, McGrew, 
Perraton, Goldbatt, Garrett, Hirst and Thompson have pointed out - have a number of 
priorities. As well as seeking to avoid unnecessarily heavy taxes, they: a) endeavour to access 
new technology and new skills that will almost certainly not be available in low cost 
environments, and b) bid to develop global networks that provide new markets and new
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(cost-effective) distribution opportunities.46 Again, low cost environments will not 
necessarily produce appropriate markets.
ii. GLOBALIZATION AND LIMITS ON BORROWING
High government spending is said to be inflationary with the consequence that the market 
will seek compensation through higher interest rates in order to maintain bond yields. It must 
thus be restrained. The idea that this market discipline should prevent growth in government 
expenditure, however, is simply not bom out by the facts which tell us that OECD public 
deficits rose by about seven points between 1960 and 1994.47 If anything, by providing a 
whole new extra-territorial domain of finance, deregulation has been significant for 
expanding the state’s capacity to borrow. Indeed part of the attraction of deregulation for 
states has been the opportunity to access these new funds. As examination of the work of 
Sassen in chapter 5 made clear, this has actually made it possible for some governments to 
access more funds than would have otherwise been possible.
Having identified the increased availability of funds as a result of globalization, however, it is 
important to be clear that there are limits to the new sources of funding and these can 
constrain the state’s freedom of movement. Specifically, one can only continue to borrow for 
so long as the markets are comfortable, a judgement that usually will depend in large measure 
upon the ratio of debt to GDP. However, whilst this has certainly constrained the freedom of 
some states, such as Brazil during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, Garrett 
observes that it has not presented a serious constraint for industrialized democracies.49
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The freedom of industrial democracies to go on obtaining loans, despite considerable levels 
of debt, can be seen with great clarity in the experience of highly indebted Belgium and Italy. 
Belgium had the greatest public debt between 1988 and 1998 of any OECD country, a deficit 
that stood at twice that of Germany and yet during that period it did not experience 
significantly greater interest rates. Italy, meanwhile, with its large public sector deficit, has 
never, in recent years, seen its interest rates rise more than 3-4% higher than those of 
Germany. ‘[I]f this’, Garrett concludes, ‘is the most brutal fiscal repression wrought by global 
finance among the industrial countries, the proclamations of many commentators would seem 
hyperbolic’.50 Whilst Garrett’s observation may not apply to countries like Brazil, the point 
can nevertheless be made that deregulation need not necessarily constrain a sovereign state 
by limiting its opportunities to borrow. Indeed, in the cases of many developed nations it has 
provided scope for initiatives that would have otherwise been absent and has in this sense 
provided the state with greater room for manoeuvre.
iii. THE DECLINE OF WELFARE?
In considering the supposed decline in the sovereign state’s capacity to initiate, it is important to 
examine the welfare state in its own right because it is held up as a prime casualty of 
globalization’s restraint on government spending.51 In light of the above reflections about 
borrowing and taxation, though, it will come as no surprise that the welfare state does not appear 
to be about to die, even if the manner of its organisation is being renegotiated.
In understanding the ongoing role of the welfare state, it is important to appreciate the
argument that economic globalization needs the welfare state. Those supporting this
contention point out that, as the renowned political economist Karl Polanyi demonstrated in
the middle of the last century, explosions of economic growth often consist of a ‘double
298
movement’.52 The first part of the double movement involves market liberalisation and the 
second a socially protective response to uphold the social environment, ensuring that growth 
is not jeopardized by social fragmentation and conflict. As Garrett observes ‘[ojpenness 
increases social dislocations and inequality and hence heightens political pressures for 
dampening these effects. If protectionism (and the disastrous spiral of economic decline, 
nationalism, and conflict with which it was associated in the 1930s) is to be averted, 
government must redistribute market allocations of wealth and risk’. Rieger and Leibfried 
similarly contend that, if significant sections of the population lose out and conclude that 
globalization is to blame, then they will demand a return to protectionism. Politicians 
presiding over such a policy change ‘run the risk that potential, putative, and real losers of 
such policies will turn against globalization, European integration, and other such processes, 
and demand more control over foreign economic policy -  in short, protectionism’.54 As 
Stephen Gill points out, therefore, it is clear that neo-liberalism is not an internally self- 
sufficient philosophy. Despite its assertions to the contrary, neo-liberalism actually requires a 
measure of interventionism, in the form of welfare, for its own maintenance. Thus welfare 
provision can help to sustain capitalism.55
In light of the above it is not surprising that when one subjects welfare regimes to analysis, 
the most impressive fact is that there continues to be a very significant level of service 
provision. ‘What is striking’, Pierson observes, ‘is how hard it is to find radical changes in 
advanced welfare states. Retrenchment has been pursued cautiously: whenever possible, 
governments have sought all-party consensus for significant reforms and have chosen to trim 
existing structures rather than experiment with new programs or pursue privatization’.56 
Having considered the fortunes of the welfare state in the context of globalization Rieger and
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Leifried observe, ‘the general notion of an inexorable globalization pressure to shrink welfare 
states is untenable. In fact, at least in Western Europe in general and in Germany in 
particular, economic globalization has not led to any radical dismantling of welfare states. On 
the contrary, ‘The stronger the pressure of globalization and the more open a country’s 
economy is, the more difficult it becomes to touch the status quo of the welfare state’.
CONCLUSION
Thus, in conclusion, many states, whilst not being able to ignore market disciplines, have 
maintained positive sovereignty by sustaining an ongoing capacity to initiate in the context of 
fiscal policy.58 To the extent that on some occasions this has been eroded, whilst on others it 
has been increased, there is a clear need for an enduring model of sovereignty that can engage 
with change.
II. MONETARY POLICY
Having dealt with the sovereign state’s enduring capacity to initiate with respect to fiscal policy, 
it is now important to turn to monetary policy. As chapter 5 demonstrated through the Mundell- 
Fleming theorem, the demise of capital controls means that a change in the domestic interest rate 
will result in a change in the exchange rate and vice versa. Henceforth the state can only change 
its base interest rate or its exchange rate, not both independently, although Held et al claim that 
even trying to select one rate can be difficult.59
Whilst this development certainly erodes the state’s capacity to initiate, however, it is not 
symptomatic of the demise of the sovereign state. The endurance of a significant decisional 
autonomy in the monetary sphere can be seen with greatest clarity by considering: a) its
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temporary loss as a result of the state/s in question joining exchange rate regimes and b) the 
decision of most states - jealous for their autonomy - not to join such regimes. Specifically, in 
joining an exchange rate regime, states effectively lose control over their interest rates and 
thus domestic monetary policy and, because of this, exchange rate regimes often remain 
aspirations precisely because states are unwilling to sacrifice their sovereignty. The 
disadvantage of the rules-based regime, Benjamin J Cohen observes, is that ‘it would require 
a greater surrender of policy autonomy than many governments now seem prepared to 
tolerate’.60 The decision about whether or not to form/join such a regime will depend, 
therefore, on ‘how much basic affinity governments feel in other areas as well -  in effect, on 
the extent to which they feel they share a common destiny across the full spectrum of 
economic and political issues’.61 Largely in light of this, he maintains, ‘the conditions 
necessary for a serious and sustained commitment to monetary cooperation are not easy to 
satisfy and, without major effort, appear unlikely to be attained any time soon’.
Garrett deploys a similar argument in his examination of fixed exchange rate systems. 
Contending that managing one’s own risk portfolio through hedging will be more attractive 
to many companies, he is at pains to stress the decisional costs involved in the sacrifice of 
exchange rate flexibility. Maintaining the freedom to bring about a smooth devaluation in a 
recession in order to increase competitiveness, he argues - an option open to states, according 
to the Mundell-Fleming theorem, in an integrated financial market - is a great asset for any
f tXgovernment and clearly demonstrates an enduring capacity to initiate. This obviously does 
not provide a sovereign state with the means of being sure that it can get its own way but it 
does ensure the maintenance of a measure of room for manoeuvre in which the capacity to 
initiate associated with positive sovereignty can be sustained to at least some extent and in a
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way that would be absent in the context of membership of an exchange rate system. ‘Talk of 
lost monetary autonomy’, Garrett claims, ‘only makes sense if one believed that the 
integration of financial markets forces governments to peg their exchange rates to external 
anchors of stability. On recent evidence, the credibility gains of doing so are far from 
overwhelming; indeed, noncredible pegs (that is, those not consistent with other political and 
economic conditions) have promoted the most debilitating cases of financial speculation and 
instability’.64
There can be no doubt, as chapter 5 demonstrated, that the dissolution of the boundary 
between the domestic and foreign markets through the abolition of capital controls has 
impacted states’ freedom of action. In reality, however, whilst freedom was greater in the 
years when the relationship between foreign and domestic markets was mediated through 
capital controls, real ‘choice’, and the freedom for the state to express that choice, at least 
through devaluation, endures, providing an ongoing foundation for positive sovereignty.65
CONCLUSION TO SUB-SECTION II: THE WISDOM OF RATIONALISM
In conclusion, this investigation of state economic competencies in the context of 
globalization suggests that the latter has not brought about the end of the ability of the 
sovereign nation-state to initiate. As consideration of the capacity of the government to tax, 
to borrow, to spend, and to exert some influence through the putative trade-off between 
interest rates and exchange rates, has demonstrated, it is clear that, whilst the state is in some 
senses more hemmed in than was the case in the past, it still has at its disposal significant 
freedom to initiate.66 This is important because, whilst defining sovereignty negatively in 
terms of constitutional independence, this thesis contends that there is also a need to
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recognize that positively it endures as an evolving social contracted territorial people, 
sustaining a capacity to initiate.67 Having recognised the endurance of sovereignty, however, 
it is important to note that to the extent that the measure of autonomy at the disposal of the 
state has in certain cases undeniably been eroded, there is again a need to develop a model of 
sovereignty whose ontology can accommodate this change. This once more points to the 
importance of the rationalist tradition which, on the one hand is neither wholly spatially 
oriented and closed, (the sovereign state pole), nor largely spatially oriented and largely 
closed (see the wider realist tradition) and on the other hand is neither wholly temporally 
oriented and open (post-sovereignty pole), nor largely temporally oriented and open (see the 
wider revolutionist tradition). This capacity to sustain a greater measure of openness than any 
part of the realist tradition, whilst avoiding association with revolutionism and ultimately the 
deconstruction of sovereignty, results in an extremely useful model of sovereignty when 
seeking to come to terms with the challenges confronting the sovereign state in the context of 
regional integration or wider globalization.
In closing, it is interesting to consider the relevance of rationalism via an historical 
comparison. Specifically natural law, which, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, is 
consistent with sovereignty even whilst it results in the introduction of an external 
transnational moral flow and thus affects a measure of openness, has some very real 
parallels with the transnational economic flows associated with globalization which can 
similarly affect the direction of the state without negating its sovereignty.
CONCLUSION TO SECTION 1
Thus in conclusion to Sections 1, one can see that positive sovereignty endures positively both
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through its provision of legitimacy and through an enduring capacity to take initiative. If a state 
loses the sense of social contracted territorial people that can provide legitimacy, or the freedom 
of manoeuvre within which the agency of that people can take action, then it would end up with 
just negative sovereignty. This constitutes the experience of a very small number of states such 
as Somalia. To the extent that these remain negatively sovereign, though, even they testify to the 
enduring importance of sovereignty. In doing so, however, they also demonstrate the difficulty 
with narrowly reductionist, negative definitions of sovereignty and the need for the English 
School to maintain a holistic model that engages with the interdependent positive and negative 
dimensions of sovereignty.
SECTION 2: SOVEREIGNTY ENDURES DESPITE INTERVENTION
Having considered the endurance of sovereignty in the context of economic globalization (the 
spirit of commerce), it is now necessary to turn to the other dimension of the threat to 
sovereignty documented by chapter 5, the increasing violation of the principle of non­
intervention (the spirit of enlightenment). This violation will be considered from both 
sovereignty’s external and internal perspectives. In so doing it will question the idea that: i) 
the UN’s provision of a framework wherein acts of self-defence and intervention in the 
interest of ‘peace and security’ can obtain legitimation, and ii) the increased use of these 
provisions, are placing sovereignty in jeopardy.
1) NEGATIVE SOVEREIGNTY
Viewed from the perspective of negative sovereignty, one’s focus on intervention relates 
primarily to the ‘high political’ military act of breaking through into a nation without
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invitation. In responding to the suggestion that this places sovereignty in jeopardy, one must 
bear two considerations in mind.
In the first instance, it is not credible to argue that the use of intervention to repel 
intervention, e.g. the international community’s response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
places sovereignty in jeopardy. Rather it should be seen as an attempt to uphold the 
constitutional independence, i.e. negative sovereignty of UN member Kuwait, in accordance 
with the Charter commitment to state sovereignty Article 2 (4). No Chapter VII intervention 
has placed the role of the sovereign state per se in jeopardy. The point should be made, 
however, that even if the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait had been accepted and constitutional 
independence consequentially been lost, it would not have removed the concept of 
sovereignty from international relations but rather reduced the number of the world’s 
sovereign states by one.
In the second instance, from the perspective of self-defence, even before the UN Charter 
enshrined Article 51, it would not have been credible to argue that the use of military force by 
one state against another in self-defence resulted in the termination of sovereignty. Article 51 
is provided to help states protect their constitutional independence, i.e. their sovereignty. If 
the integrity of the notion of sovereignty required absolute non-self-defence then it would be 
a utopian fantasy since states have always, and indeed must always, generally seek to defend 
themselves in order to sustain their constitutional independence. Self-defence may 
occasionally result in boundary changes and thus changes in the allocation of sovereignty, but 
these do not place sovereignty, and the fact that there is in international relations an important 
conceptual job of work for it to do, in jeopardy.69
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Considered in the round it should be stated that, as in the case of economic globalization, the 
increasing trend towards intervention has not resulted in the demise of constitutional 
independence. Indeed, the new willingness to intervene, resulting from the demise of the 
Cold War world, has been associated with the rapid increase in the number of sovereign 
states as the former USSR broke up.
2) POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY
Viewed from the perspective of positive sovereignty, meanwhile, one’s focus relates 
primarily to the internal governance of the polity in question. Intervention violates positive 
sovereignty when some aspect of the sitting government’s policy is changed by outside force. 
As chapter 5 demonstrated, in recent years increasing humanitarian concern has done much to 
animate interest in intervention to change aspects of internal policy; for example, intervening 
to terminate a policy of ethnic cleansing.
In examining the new interventionism, however, it is important to recognize that no Chapter 
VII interventions have ever been made purely on humanitarian grounds.70 The humanitarian 
dimension has always been grafted on to broader strategic justifications. Examination of 
intervention in northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1999), East 
Timor (1999) confronts one with the fact that the development of a right of intervention 
solely on a humanitarian basis is being resisted.71 This resistance has largely been the result 
of the fact that two permanent, veto-carrying members of the Security Council, Russia and 
China, have good reason not to want to see the bases for intervention extended. In each case, 
therefore, whilst (with the exception of Kosovo) they have not sought to prevent specific
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interventions, there has always been a clear policy to prevent specific interventions from 
establishing a general precedent for humanitarian intervention.
On the one hand, despite the fears of the Russians and Chinese, there can be no doubt that 
increasing concerns about human rights abuses are giving rise to a greater willingness to 
countenance intervention and this can in some senses be interpreted as giving rise to the 
erosion but certainly not demise of sovereignty. On the other hand, however, to the extent 
that humanitarian interventions are justified on the same basis as straight forward military 
interventions, they should not be judged to be any more threatening than those interventions. 
If there was a clearly accepted basis for intervention in international law in response to both 
a) threats to peace and security and b) threats to humanitarian standards, then the basis for 
intervention would clearly be wider than is actually the case. This would increase the 
purchase of solidarist, Kantian, revolutionist ontology on the international arena alongside 
that of the sovereign state, and require a greater qualification of sovereignty. The fact that this 
has not happened arguably makes sovereignty stronger than would be the case if those 
solidarist assumptions were embraced by states in the same way that they have been by 
humanitarian NGOs. Indeed the point should be made that even if there were two Chapter VII 
bases for intervention, this would not undermine the general significance of sovereignty 
because, as in the case of interventions viewed from their negative perspective, the 
international community can only intervene in deference to the UN Charter and thus, whilst 
an intervention might even result in a change of government, this cannot cause the 
annihilation of state sovereignty. Furthermore, one must also remember that, whilst there has 
been an increased sense of global solidarity and a growing willingness to countenance 
intervention, this is not without limitations. ‘ [WJhat emerges from a study of state practice in
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the 1990s’, Wheeler and Bellamy contend, ‘is that it is not states but an emergent global civil 
society that is the principal agent promoting humanitarian values in global politics. 
Globalization is bringing nearer Kant’s vision of moral interconnectedness, but as the 
Rwandan genocide so brutally demonstrates, this growth in “cosmopolitan moral awareness’ 
has not yet been translated into the solidarist project for forcible humanitarian intervention’.72
Thus, whilst the end of the Cold War and the new approach to decolonization has resulted in 
a far greater willingness to countenance intervention, it would be wrong to conclude that this 
new approach is indicative of the end, or likely end, of sovereignty.73 In this context there is 
again a need to be able to cater for an enduring but changing sovereignty. ‘The norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention remain the key foundations of order, but there is a growing 
sense -  especially among western states -  that these principles should be overturned by the 
collectivity of states in cases of exceptional human suffering’.74
CONCLUSION: THE WISDOM OF RATIONALISM
It is at this point that one can again see the great advantage of rationalism. The fact that the 
closure of the sovereign state is not absolute and that intervention is possible generates some 
problems for closed realist models of sovereignty, just as the enduring reality of the sovereign 
state, and the limited bases upon which intervention may be conducted, point to problems for 
the notion of post-sovereignty. The rationalist tradition, meanwhile, which champions the 
enduring reality of sovereignty but without claiming that it has ontological closure over all 
issues, presents an extremely useful tool for the purpose of seeking to come to terms with the 
state in the context of economic globalization and the growing interest in humanitarian 
intervention.
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In closing it is interesting to note that, as in the case of global economic flows, consideration 
of intervention from an historical perspective provides insight into the long term importance 
of rationalism. Although rationalism has always postulated a world divided into sovereign 
states, classically it has also appealed to natural law, in the name of which sovereign states 
could intervene in a fellow but wayward sovereign state. Indeed, the leading rationalist 
Grotius strengthened the basis for such intervention by arguing that the international arena 
comprised not just sovereign states but also people.75 This is very useful because, quite apart 
from anything else, it demonstrates that, across a broad stretch of history, sovereignty and 
intervention have always coexisted and been seen, by some people at least, as entirely 
compatible. It is also useful because it demonstrates, once again, that because the rationalist 
model of the sovereign state was subject to natural law it was never developed on the basis of 
ontological closure.
SECTION 3: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF UNBUNDLING 
TERRITORIALITY
Having examined sovereignty in the context of rising revolutionism (manifest in both
economic globalization and intervention) and demonstrated that sovereignty both endures and
has been subject to changes in the form of ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’, it
is now necessary to reconsider the implications of these findings for chapter 6’s claims about
the reconceptualization of sovereignty specifically via the ‘unbundling of territoriality’
(which this chapter deploys generically, and not just to the work of Ruggie, who coined the
phrase, to describe the weakening/deconstruction of sovereignty). There are two major points
of difficulty pertaining to the unbundling agenda. The first relates to the reductionist
conception of territoriality obtaining in the models of sovereignty cited by those seeking its
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deconstruction. The chapter will provide a critique of this reductionism from both an 
historical and a theoretical perspective. The second, meanwhile, (which is a development of 
the first point of difficulty) concerns the implications of ‘unbundling territoriality’ per se 
which the chapter will critique in theoretical terms. This section will demonstrate the 
ongoing, although qualified, importance of the concept of sovereignty to international 
relations and the special significance of the rationalist tradition for the purpose of engaging 
with it.
1) TERRITORIAL REDUCTIONISM
The strength of the post-sovereignty position resides in the fact that it is undoubtedly true that 
there are interconnections between states that are wholly incompatible with the idea of an 
ontologically closed (as per neorealism) model of sovereignty. The sovereign state must be 
reconceptualized (unbundled) so not to deny contemporary global flows if it is to clarify 
rather than obscure understanding of the international arena. If one unbundles sovereignty 
only in so far as it is necessary to cater for these relationships, however, sovereignty can 
actually endure. In truth, unlike the a priori ontological closure of the neorealist ontology 
required to license its methodological ambitions, historical sovereignty, as demonstrated 
below, actually engages with a significant measure of openness.76
OPEN SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORICALLY
A brief reconsideration of its past demonstrates that sovereignty has never been about 
complete ontological closure. For 158 years after the Peace of Westphalia, which is 
classically associated with the advent of sovereignty, there were in fact significant 
supranational hangovers from the medieval age. Empowering the Pope and emperor to
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intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, these hangovers meant that the new 
polities could not be deemed to be ontologically closed.77 One might think, however, that 
given the formal demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and the association of the 
nineteenth century with the apogee of the sovereign nation-state, that an era associated with 
the ontologically closed, sovereign state would then follow. In reality, however, even this 
period was one of very permeable boundaries. The chapter will consider this openness both in 
terms of economic flows and human/minority rights interventions.
i) ECONOMIC FLOWS
During the nineteenth century trade78, FDI79 and people80 moved about the world with a 
measure of liberty that exceeded that of much of the twentieth century. Hirst and Thompson 
contend that financial openness - measured in terms of the ratio of current account balance to 
GNP - demonstrates no increase in openness between 1875 and 1975. In fact there was a 
decline in capital movements for six leading countries: Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and the US.81 In this context of significant flows, and thus blatant permeability, 
Hirst and Thompson go on to argue that ‘the degree of constraint on national economies in
• 89the gold standard period seems to have been consistently greater than at any time since’. 
Economic enmeshment was further manifest, Krasner observes, through debt, in relationship 
to which ‘European leaders engaged in a variety of practices that violated the Grundnorm of 
sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs’. When states defaulted lenders set up 
collection agencies that directly took state revenues to foreign creditors. Such actions had an 
impact on the sovereign states of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Persia, the Ottoman Empire and 
Argentina.83
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ii) INTERVENTION
The nineteenth century also saw permeability via interventions bom out of concern for 
minority and human rights. In 1830 Britain, France and Russia signed a protocol 
guaranteeing Greek independence which insisted that all religions within the state be treated 
equally. Similarly the Berlin Congress of 1878 stated that religious toleration was a condition 
of the recognition of Balkan states. Moving into the twentieth century, the Treaty of 
Versailles made similar demands of central/east European states in relationship to both 
religion and ethnicity/language. These demands went into considerable detail covering the 
guaranteed provision of primary education in the language of the relevant minority. In 
Poland, moreover, a commitment was made not to hold elections on Saturdays so not to 
violate the Jewish Sabbath.84
Given the extensive bases for openness, it seems that in seeking to address an ontologically 
closed model of sovereignty, the unbundling agenda has been aiming at a straw man. To be 
sure some forms of realism, especially neorealism, have indulged this desire for 
methodological reasons, developing a model of sovereignty for critics to deconstmct but, 
historical sovereignty has never generally been about complete ontological closure.
OPEN SOVEREIGN TERRITORIALITY: THEORETICALLY
In the same way that closure is negated by empirical historical investigation, so too is it 
negated theoretically both internally (positively) and externally (negatively). Internal, 
positive sovereignty, manifested through the ‘social contracted territorial people’ and the 
government it upholds, is open in two senses, one distant, the other immediate. In the case of 
the former, internal sovereignty sustains a measure of openness by virtue of the manner of its
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constitution. Whilst it may not have been the result of a social contract signing ceremony, the 
reality of what chapter 3 describes as the ‘social contract effect’, underpinning polities with a 
sense of legitimacy, is the result of a process of social construction (trading on openness), 
drawing on a mixture of shared history, legend and law. The latter and more immediate sense 
of openness, meanwhile, sustains an ongoing basis for citizens, operating in the private realm, 
to influence their erstwhile, surrendered natural rights through engagement with national civil 
society and democratic processes. If this were not the case then the domain of openness 
(temporally oriented), the private realm, would have been fully collapsed into the domain of 
closure (spatially oriented), the law. To the extent that the spatial is the domain from whence 
closure and the absolute is derived, it is quite correct to conclude that its presence is central to 
the generation of sovereignty. However, it is not the only element of the sovereignty 
complex. To be positive, modem sovereignty - certainly in a democratic context - sovereignty 
depends on being connected to a private realm; a private realm that has given, and continues 
to give it, authority. Presenting what might thus be described as a living social contracted 
territorial people, the ontology of internal sovereignty is a far cry from closed, asocial
o  c
Newtonian res extensa.
Externally, meanwhile, closure is similarly negated by virtue of the fact that the most basic 
act of state engagement in international relations is that of ‘recognition’, where two states 
mutually assent to the sovereignty of the other. Consideration of this act shows that
•  • • 8Asovereignty is in part a socially constructed institution. Whilst it may not make for the same 
kind of order as that obtaining within the state, the reality of recognition demonstrates that the 
social constructions develop conventions which help to make the international arena, in the 
words of Hedley Bull (writing in the rationalist tradition), more an ‘anarchical society’ than
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an international anarchy per se*1 States do not collide, in the absence of social mediation, 
like billiard balls and thus the ontology of external sovereignty is a far cry from asocial 
Newtonian res extensa.
CONCLUSION
If one contends that modem sovereignty is unhelpful because it cannot deal with relationship, 
one refers to a very specific form of sovereignty informed by the a priori Newtonianism of 
neorealism. If one unbundles neorealist sovereignty merely to remove absolute closure in 
order to cater for a measure of relationship then one need only unbundle up to the point at 
which one generates a minimally open form of sovereignty consistent with the wider realist 
tradition. To be sure if there was a desire to maintain a greater measure of relationship one 
may unbundle until reaching the rationalist tradition which provides a still more open model 
of sovereignty. Thus construed one can unbundle to escape Newtonian closure and yet still 
have sovereignty in place. This does not support the idea that in the current context 
sovereignty is ‘ridiculous’.88
2) THE PERILS OF UNBUNDLING TERRITORIALITY PER SE
In light of the above the question arises, what if one pursued complete, rather than partial 
unbundling even though it is not relationally necessary? This, however, gives rise to serious 
theoretical difficulties. Radical constructivism involves a complete openness and thus the 
rejection of the spatial pole. Its ‘spatialisations’ are consequently rootless and hyperspatial.
89The notion that territoriality is rootless and radically open, however, is problematic. To 
suggest that territoriality can be devoid of an appreciation of roots is somewhat oxymoronic 
given that the soil of territory - that to which territoriality relates - is the medium of roots. In
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light of the fact that any notion of territoriality must have some sense of spatial loyalty if it is 
not to betray its own nature, the idea that one can develop concepts to apprehend territory, the 
ontological accomplice of the spatial orientation, without any reference to the spatial pole, 
would suggest that one ultimately ends up with some kind of anti- or post-territoriality. Put 
another way, the radical constructivism informing these approaches is such that any resulting 
configuration would be hyperspatial which would make it, by definition, extra-territorial, the 
antithesis of the territorial. The whole point about hyperspace is that it transcends territory. 
Territory cannot transcend territory without being negated. No amount of inter-subjective 
projecting can make the given, fixed material extensions of territory - which should inform 
territoriality - ultimately go away. Inter-subjectively constituted social constructions do of 
course inform and thereby humanise territory in territoriality, but they work on something 
that is in some senses given. Territoriality may not be a matter of reified, ‘Newtonian’ units 
delimited by tectonics plate, but neither is it a matter of the depthless hyperspatiality, spoken 
of by Jameson, which flows from the radical constructivism bom of the demise of the inside- 
outside, domestic-foreign dichotomy. In short, whilst it is difficult to argue that territory is 
entirely given, it is equally difficult to claim that it is entirely constructed.
The given dimension of territory is significant for modem politics and will continue to be for 
so long as it is informed by a ‘social contracted territorial people’. In the event that politics 
moved to a functional, multi-dimensional frame of reference wherein there was no territorial 
public just a mass of differing functions pursued by different groups of specialists, then, 
although spatially oriented territory would endure, it would cease to directly inform politics.90 
If such an arrangement were possible then the removal of territory from the heart of political 
life would bring with it the demise of sovereignty. Whilst there are aspects of an increasing
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multi-dimensionality in government, however, its hyperspatial consequences exist in tandem 
with, and not instead of, the modem political form which, although weakened, is ongoing.
THE THREE TRADITIONS AND AN IMPOSSIBLE GLOBALITY?
In conclusion to this critique of unbundling, the point must be made that clear comprehension 
is often frustrated by the fact that globalization is frequently discussed in terms that suggest 
that it is a phenomenon that displaces the old order. In truth the chief characteristic of 
globalization is its introduction of a new dislocated world that does not come fully into view 
within a single perspective. This is not because of an acute temporality per se, in the genre of 
the multi-perspectivity of a hyperspatial heterotopia, but because of an acute temporality 
which co-exists with the given spatiality that continues to inform much o f human experience, 
including politics. Extra-territorial flows inaugurate a new global economy that creates, in its 
transcendence of space, a hyperspatial realm that can have the fullness of its being in a 
moment without the alienation of distance which may provide the opportunity for difference. 
This new globality, however, cannot extinguish the ongoing reality of given territory, the 
social contracted territorial people and constitutional independence. The extra-territorial 
implications of globalization thus coexist with, rather than displace, territory and territorial 
government. In light of the above, sophisticated models of sovereignty must clearly engage 
with both the pressures of change, mediated via extra-territorial developments, and 
continuity, mediated through enduring territorial givens. The three traditions spectrum is 
uniquely positioned to address this challenge because it is defined in terms of an ontological 
pluralism. In this context the rationalist model of sovereignty in particular can provide a great 
service, recognising, on the one hand, the endurance of sovereignty but, on the other, the fact 
that this does not have ontological closure on all aspects of life.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE OPEN MODEL OF SOVEREIGNTY
It is the contention of this chapter that, of the three traditions, the rationalist definition of 
sovereignty - the entirety of which embraces a measure of ontological closure and openness - 
provides the most useful model of sovereignty in the context of a fast changing world. The 
measure of ontological openness which it embraces means that it does not pretend that 
sovereignty is reified and closed. In the first instance rationalism caters for regional 
integration, facilitating the extension of sovereignty - as defined by chapter 4 - but subject to 
the demos qualification. In the second instance rationalism caters for globalization, providing 
for the erosion but not the annihilation of the sovereign state. In catering for both continuity 
and change, rationalism supplies an appropriate expression of the partial unbundling of 
sovereignty without denying the endurance of sovereignty.
Having set out the utility of the rationalist tradition in the context of the challenge of 
developing an appropriate conceptualization of sovereignty in the context of systemic change, 
the next two chapters will seek to provide further perspective on rationalist sovereignty by 
drawing on the latent resources of the theological dimension of English School three 
traditions theory. The final chapter will then draw together the implications of this thesis for 
the conceptualization of sovereignty in the context of systemic changes manifest in European 
integration and globalization.
1 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Tradition, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 13 and Martin Wight, 
‘An anatomy of international thought’, Review o f International Studies, 1987, 13, p. 223. This same point is also 
appropriated by the English School through reflection on Hugo Grotius according to whom sovereign states: 
‘were not in a state of nature, but part of the great society of all mankind, magna communitas humani generic’.
Hedley Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002, p. 
72.
2 Wight, International Theory, p. 14.
3 ‘Western Values in International Relations’, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International 
Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 95.
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CHAPTER 8
TOWARDS ‘OPEN SOVEREIGNTY’:
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL &
THE RESURGENCE OF THEOLOGY IN IR: PART 1
Having established that some form of ‘open sovereignty’ provides the most 
appropriate conceptual framework for apprehending sovereignty in the context of 
systemic change, it is the purpose of the next two chapters to seek to develop a fuller 
understanding of this model of sovereignty. How should one conceptualise 
sovereignty so that it can embrace openness and accommodate the two categories of 
change identified by the previous chapter, ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by 
erosion’?
In light of the inter-disciplinary breadth that is definitive of the English School, 
embracing history, law, philosophy and theology, this thesis aims to provide a more 
detailed examination of open sovereignty, exploiting the sharp focus provided by one 
particular literature. It selects theology for the following reasons: First, the last twelve 
years have seen an explosion of interest in the relationship between religion/theology 
and IR, making the focus provided by this discipline extremely timely. Second, the 
fact that, whilst largely ignored by IR for many decades, the English School has 
maintained an interest in theology means that it is in a strong position to make a 
relevant contribution in this area, providing a further basis for the renewed interest in
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the English School itself.1 Third, part of the reason for the new interest in religion and 
theology has been the result of the so called ‘Revenche de Dieu’ which has been a key 
component of globalization from whence the most significant ‘conceptual change’ 
challenges emerge.2 (It is fitting to engage with something that is involved - in a 
general sense - with the change that is the source of the conceptual challenge). 
Finally, and of course most importantly, theology is selected because it has the 
capacity, as the next two chapters will demonstrate, to throw some necessary new 
light on to our subject.
Having referred to some of the benefits of adopting this ‘theology approach’, it is also 
important to note the limited nature of its objectives. First, it is the purpose of the next 
two chapters to fill out, rather than fundamentally change, conceptualisation of 
rationalism and, as we shall see, realism. Second, it is important to be clear that it is 
not the purpose of this thesis to make substantive theological points but to rather mine 
a literary genre which, in the context of the new move to ‘let culture’ and indeed
# o
‘religion back in’ has an important contribution to make.
OVERVIEW: CHAPTERS 8 AND 9
In turning to the English School’s theology component for the purpose of developing 
a clear understanding of sovereignty, this thesis is immediately confronted by the fact 
that the most celebrated association between theology and theories about the 
sovereign state relates to the work of Saint Augustine who is credited both with 
having inspired ‘Christian Realism’ (rather than Christian Rationalism) and with 
having had immense influence on the first generation of English School scholars, 
especially Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. Chapter 8 subjects this Augustinian
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legacy to close scrutiny for two major reasons. In the first instance, such is the 
centrality of Augustine to English School reflection on the sovereign state that it 
would be quite wrong for any consideration - especially one with a theological 
interest - to ignore the venerated North African Saint. In the second instance, although 
the Augustinian legacy is usually judged to leave a form of realism rather than 
rationalism, it is a realism that none the less embraces a limited capacity to engage 
with change, which causes this thesis to identify Augustine with that part of the realist 
tradition which is beyond the sovereign state pole. It thus presents an improvement on 
the narrowly closed models of sovereignty associated with that pole. Although the 
Augustinian legacy provides for some opemiess, however, chapter 8 will argue that it 
does not embrace a sufficient measure of openness in order to effectively sustain the 
model of open sovereignty required by chapter 7.
Whilst the prime theological inspiration for the English School approach to 
sovereignty is undoubtedly Augustine, there are actually lower profile theological 
sources informing models of sovereignty in rationalism, constituting what one might 
describe as ‘Christian Rationalism’. Chapter 9 will turn to these recognising the 
openness embraced by rationalist conceptions of sovereignty as a consequence of 
natural law but will then contend that there is potential for rationalism to embrace a 
greater appreciation of openness as a result of engaging more effectively with 
Reformation theology. Highlighting the failure of the English School to fully engage 
with Reformation theology and its legacy, this chapter will lay the foundation for the 
thesis to draw on a group of Welsh theologians who played a key role reflecting on 
state sovereignty in the context of what this thesis calls ‘Welsh proto-nationalism’.4 
(The term ‘Welsh proto-nationalism’ has been chosen for the purpose of referring
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specifically to a particular epoch of Welsh nationalist thought from the advent of 
modem Welsh nationalism in the mid to late nineteenth century through to about 
1970. This period is distinctive in that it upheld a frame of reference whose 
nationalism and was rooted in a comprehensive theological worldview). The chapter 
will unpack this Welsh proto-nationalist approach, demonstrating the basis for a 
model of sovereignty that can accommodate change in the context of enduring 
continuity and thus make an important contribution to the English School, enabling it 
to develop beyond Augustine, towards a fuller, open, rationalist model of sovereignty.
INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN REALISM
The chapter will first briefly set out the reality of the relationship between Augustine 
and Christian Realism/the English School as defined in the relevant IR literatures. It 
will then provide some introductory reflections on the character of Christian Realism 
before laying out the basic structure of the chapter.
- AUGUSTINE AND CHRISTIAN REALISM
The reality of the relationship between Augustine and Christian Realism/the English 
School is clearly documented. In his article ‘Augustine and Christian Realism’, 
Niebuhr observes, ‘Augustine was, by general consent, the first great realist in 
Western history’.5 Sean Molloy in his article, ‘Bridging Realism and Christianity in 
the International Thought of Martin Wight’, argues that Wight’s Christian Realism is 
directly related to his commitment to Augustine. ‘In order to account for this 
[Christian Realism] we have to make reference to the issue of Augustine’s influence 
on Wight’.6 Charles Jones in ‘Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English 
School’ defines the development of Christian Realism through the impact of
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nAugustine on Herbert Butterfield and indeed Arnold Toynbee. Roger Epp, 
meanwhile, demonstrates the centrality of Augustine to all three thinkers in his article, 
‘The “Augustinian Moment” in International Politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and 
the Reclaiming of a Tradition’.8 Finally, for our purposes, Michael Loriaux observes, 
‘Niebuhr, with Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight laid the foundations of a 
specifically Christian realism that had a markedly Augustinian tone to it, and which 
contributed mightily to the development of realist thought generally’.9
- INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS
The existence of a concept of ‘Christian Realism’ in IR seems at the same time both 
logical and illogical. It seems logical because it is from Christian thinkers that realism 
generally has gained its appreciation of original sin, which is what produces the realist 
group imperative for government. To the extent that the degree of ontological closure 
of state sovereignty is an index of the need to expel disorder through strong 
government, the association of Christianity with realism makes perfect sense. Having 
made this assertion, however, the existence of Christian Realism seems strange in the 
sense that, within the Christian frame of reference, any commitment to crude power 
politics, i.e. national interest expressed through power, must be checked by the reality 
of some kind of transnational morality with its foundation in God. The ontological 
closure of Augustine’s realism can surely never be a match for secular realism 
wherein the ontologically closed nature of state sovereignty is sealed by the fact that 
one is confronted by a survival of the fittest frame of reference, bereft of any kind of 
transcendent global morality. The fact that Christian Realism both caters for a 
measure of ontological closure - upon which sovereignty depends - and yet qualifies
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this with a commitment to transnational morality, is suggestive of a potentially helpful 
frame of reference whose balance differentiates it from secular realisms.10
- STRUCTURE
In seeking to unpack the above, it is essential, given the centrality of Augustine to 
Christian Realism, that Section 1 embarks upon an investigation of Augustinian 
ontology, first in general terms and then specifically in relationship to government. 
This will reveal that Augustine presents a largely closed frame of reference which 
accommodates a limited measure of openness. Section 2 will then seek to identify the 
implications of the Augustinian ontology in modem Christian Realist thought, 
demonstrating that it has been primarily used in order to engage with ontological 
closure rather than flux.
SECTION 1: CHRISTIAN REALISM & AUGUSTINIAN ONTOLOGY
In turning to Augustinian ontology it is important to be clear from the outset that 
Augustine was a complex thinker who wrote prodigiously over a long period of time 
and has since been the subject of radically different interpretations over the centuries. 
In light of this complexity the following examination of his account of earthly 
ontology (the City of Man/Nature), and of the impact of the spiritual realm (the City 
of God/Grace) on that ontology, obviously does not pretend to address its every 
nuance but is rather concerned to obtain an appreciation of its capability to engage 
with both ontological closure and flux.11
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A) AUGUSTINIAN ONTOLOGY IN GENERAL
In the Augustinian system the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world were 
expressed by his references to the two cities, the City of God and the City of Man. 
The relationship between the two cities is of great importance because it determines 
every Christian tradition’s understanding of what is possible here on earth and thus 
has significant ontological consequences. Christian theology posits a range of possible 
interpretations regarding the relationship between the two cities. In some theologies 
the kingdom of God is fully accessible here on earth. This optimistic view gained 
currency in liberal Protestant circles around the turn of the twentieth century, against 
which Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr were united in criticism.12 In other theologies 
the kingdom of God is said to be partially realized on earth but will not fully come
• 1 "Xuntil the second coming. Finally, there are those in the pessimistic Augustinian 
tradition that state that the kingdom of God will not come in any way until the second 
coming of Christ.14
If God manifests his kingdom either fully or partially on earth and invites humanity to 
participate in the establishment of this kingdom, then a series of ontological 
consequences follow. First, the fact that that God is working to establish his kingdom 
on earth, and invites humanity to engage with this project, dignifies ‘this-worldly’ 
change, making it a high priority. Second, it makes it plain that the material with 
which God and humanity work has an openness in the sense that it is ready to be 
remoulded by both parties. By contrast, where God is not thought to be interested in 
the building of his kingdom on earth with human help - instead locating this task in 
some extra-terrestrial context -  life on earth ultimately becomes an arid waiting game, 
waiting either for one’s own death or for the second coming. The earthly ontology,
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and human labour therein, consequently is not dignified by the presence of the 
emerging kingdom and the exhortation to become involved in the kingdom project. 
Instead the earthly ontology is largely closed and real virtue is found in meditation 
and focusing on ‘otherworldly’ spiritual matters.
As a subscriber to a futurist eschatology which locates the advent of the kingdom of 
God in the second coming, Augustine, whilst arguably resisting the attractions of 
Gnosticism, had a very otherworldly spirituality. To be sure, humankind lives upon 
the earth and engages with it, but its celebration and focus must be on the things 
above. Instead of championing Christian dominion over the earth, Augustine regards 
all earthly projects with suspicion, referring to them as ‘the rivers of Babylon’ which 
he contrasts with the Holy Jerusalem. ‘[T]he rivers of Babylon are all things which 
are here loved, and pass away. For example, one man loves to practise husbandry, to 
grow rich by it, to employ his mind on it, to get his pleasure from it’ but, in the 
ultimate scheme of things, Augustine claims, this project is worthless. He then goes 
on to consider other forms of enterprise, e.g. the military, the law, business/trade, 
damning their celebration as inappropriate conduct since they represent the fickle 
rivers of Babylon. ‘But there are other citizens of the holy Jerusalem, understanding 
their captivity, who mark how human wishes and the diverse lusts of men, hurry and 
drag them hither and thither, and drive them into the sea. They see this, and do not 
throw themselves into the rivers of Babylon and upon the rivers of Babylon weep, 
either for those who are being carried away by them, or for themselves whose deserts 
have placed them in Babylon’.15 There is thus no place for celebrating the City of 
Man and human endeavours therein.16
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One particularly helpful perspective on Augustinian otherworldliness, and its 
ontological implication, comes from consideration of his view of time. Colin Gunton 
identifies three key characteristics of Augustine’s conception of time. First there is the 
germ of an otherworldliness in his ‘appearing to deny reality to the present as the 
disappearing margin between past and future’. Although he agrees that time is 
created, he chooses to unpack it in terms of ethereal experience rather than through 
‘the experience of things’. This gives rise to the notion that “we cannot rightly say 
that time is, except by reason of its impending state of not being”. In this context 
change assumes a somewhat otherworldly standing which inevitably impacts 
Augustinian thinking regarding ‘this-worldly’ developments. Second, this
otherworldliness takes on a clearer form in Augustine’s contention that time is 
perhaps best understood as a projection of the mind. “I begin to wonder whether it is 
an extension of the mind itself’.17 Finally, and most importantly, this otherworldiness 
is seen in the way in which Augustine conceives of time in his theology of history. In 
this regard the key question, according to Gunton, is ‘how far does he conceive the 
order of time to be inherently and essentially the place of disorder rather than -  say -  
of a fallenness whose redemption is the hope of the Christian gospel?’18 This question 
is answered by turning to Augustine’s eschatology, which is defined by the fact that 
he believes that everything is completed in Christ. ‘There is no realized eschatology 
for Augustine, or rather there is an eschatology realized only in the incarnation and at 
the end of time: accordingly, there is no anticipated eschatology. After the incarnation 
and before the end, all history is equally fallen. His mature view, says Markus, is, 
therefore, of the essential homogeneity of history: ‘since the coming of Christ, until 
the end of the world, all history is homogenous . . . ,19 Thus one is confronted again
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with a sense of ontological closure that on this occasion denies history new openings 
and fresh departures.20
Interestingly, this otherworldy account of time has all the classic hallmarks of that set 
out by the consideration, in chapter 2, via Plato and Newton, of a closed model of 
time. The reader will recall that Plato’s description of time as ‘the moving image of
91eternity’ subscribed to a division between a world of appearance and reality, of the 
shadowlands, of the here and now and the ultimate world of the ‘forms’. In his 
perspective there is a sense in which time was only a shadow of the ultimate world of 
truth. To this extent, as chapter 2 observed, one should not seek progress in the world 
of time but rather in the higher world of ‘forms’. In this view real time is found in the 
universal. Similarly Newton argued that beneath the relative space and time of our 
experience was an absolute space and time. To obtain real time one must go to the 
underlying layer of absolute time.22 In both cases, however, chapter 2 observed that 
Plato and Newton’s absolutisation of time resulted in the abolition of its truly 
temporal nature. Writing specifically of the Newtonian view, it argued that time ‘does 
not belong to the inner being of things’. Furthermore, ‘for Newtonian science time is 
spatialised, in the sense that it is considered reversible’.23 Whenever time becomes 
absolute it loses its finiteness, and thus its temporal character, and dies. Time, chapter 
2 argued, is thus assimilated into space. Returning to consider Augustine through the 
above framework, the fact that the denial of time, realised through his absolute 
division between the two kingdoms (the immanent shadowlands and the transcendent 
forms), results in a dominant ontological closure, makes complete sense. Having 
examined general ontological closure, and resulting otherworldliness, it is now 
important to consider ontological closure specifically in terms of government.
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B) AUGUSTINIAN ONTOGY AND GOVERNMENT
As in the case of general ontology, Augustine’s approach to government is informed 
by his otherworldliness which separates government from the kingdom of God which 
has implications for changes/openness being mediated through government. First, it is 
the product of the love of self rather than God, which is actually commensurate with 
contempt for God. “[T]wo cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the 
love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to 
the contempt of self’.24 Second, in Augustine’s view, government is a punishment for 
sin. ‘Political domination entered human society as retribution for sin’. Whilst it can 
be inspired by common interests, Augustine is clear - in classic realist style - that the 
government of sinful people does not depend upon liberal aspirations for the common 
recognition of justice, but on force. Commonwealths, Augustine claimed, ‘could not 
maintain themselves without the imposition of power’.26 Loriaux observes that ‘for 
Augustine, humankind’s self-inflicted alienation from God introduced the supply of 
rule through coercion’.27 Recognition of sin provides an imperative for strong 
government and a developed sense of the ontological closure of state boundaries 
which shut out disorder and create a framework wherein government can enforce 
civility. To the extent that sin is central to non-Augustinian forms of realism, 
Augustinian realism’s stress on the importance of sin makes his consequentially low 
view of government much like that of other forms of classical realism. To the extent, 
however, that his two cities framework adds another dimension to this, Augustinian 
realism posits an especially pessimistic view of government. Having set out these 
introductory principles which hardly suggest that government can be an enlightened 
instrument for the purpose of inaugurating the kingdom of God, the chapter will first
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qualify them by reflecting on the role of civic virtue before then considering
28Augustine’s general approach to government in greater detail.
WHAT ABOUT CIVIC VIRTUE?
Having considered the general ontological closure associated with Augustine’s 
approach to government, it is important to remind oneself about the tension in 
Augustinian thinking between an understanding of the implications of sin and the 
realist group imperative, on the one hand, and the reality of transnational moral 
values, on the other. Crucially, these values can help to stimulate civic virtue. As 
Loriaux observes ‘Christianity is not only the way of salvation but the source of civic 
virtue. It becomes a wellspring of civic virtue for the elect, and a model of civic virtue 
to be inculcated in the reprobate’. Niebuhr, meanwhile, spoke of ‘Augustine’s formula
9Q *for leavening the city of this world with the love of the city of God ... ’ Wight also 
observes how ‘the virtues of the City of God flowed back into the organism of 
temporal society’ .30 If one entertains the notion of civic virtue, however, is it not the 
case that the provision of a Christian, charged with responsibility for ‘this-worldly’ 
government, might introduce something of the kingdom of God, with its redemptive 
function, and qualify the radical discontinuity between the two cities and thus the 
ontological closure of the Augustinian position? For the purposes of understanding 
why enlightened leadership cannot introduce the kingdom of God on earth and why 
one is consequently confronted with enduring ontological closure, it is important to 
pause to reflect on the manner in which ‘doing good’ manifested itself without 
undermining the division between the two cities.
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In examining Augustine’s approach to the promotion of civic virtue one must first 
confront the fact that this was not a priority. ‘[C]itizens of the heavenly city must care 
about God’s grace to embrace that higher love, caritas, that is quite simply what 
Christians do. It is the Christian’s duty to care about the quality of secular life. ...“It 
is love of truth that prompts the search for holy leisure, while it is the compulsion of 
love (necessitas caritas) that makes men undertake a righteous activity in affairs 
(negotium iustum suscipit)”\  However, ‘“If this burden is not placed upon us, we 
should use our freedom to discern and contemplate truth; but if it is placed upon us it 
must be accepted because of this compulsion of love’” .31
The fact that Christians should, other things being equal, focus on contemplation, 
unless ‘the burden is placed upon us’, makes it plain that, whilst it is sometimes 
necessary to promote righteous affairs on earth, it is better to contemplate the life to 
come. Thus there is a sense in which, although Augustine seeks to engage with 
something of the ‘this-worldliness’ of life on earth, conscious that he must if he is to 
follow the life of Jesus, he has the greatest of difficulty squeezing this approach into 
his quasi-Gnostic, neo-platonic mindset. This position regarding public life is 
eloquently expressed by Herbert Butterfield: ‘The Christian will realise that he can 
never be happy in it [public office] and will never long for it. He will rather pray that 
he will not have to drink this cup, but if he must accept the office, this is the spirit in 
which he will. And the same is true even with the office of the Emperor himself -  the 
Christian will accept it as a means of service’.32 At the end of the day, whilst civic 
virtue is good for the individual - although less worthy than contemplation - it cannot 
introduce the kingdom of God and thus cannot change the fact that government will 
be basically fallen until the impact of the radical discontinuity comes to an end with
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the second coming. Thus any sense of openness resulting from Augustine’s comments 
about civic virtue would seem to be limited.
The lack of concern for, and interest in, the kind of changes a Christian ruler might be 
able to invoke can be seen in the very individualist manner in which Augustine 
considers the potential of civic virtue.33 Instead of reflecting on the possibilities for 
bringing good to a nation through enlightened government, Augustine is far more 
interested in the inner spiritual life of the ruler than with the substance of his actions. 
Preoccupied with the inner spiritual dynamic, which located the moral significance of 
any action in the intention, Augustine could have a surprisingly detached approach to 
physical politics, leaving Christian rulers extra-ordinarily unrestrained. This can be 
seen with particular clarity in the case of warfare. ‘Fought with love in one’s heart’, 
war might be conducted with savage disregard of the rules of ju s in bello and was 
likely to prove “a grim and horrible necessity,” bringing unavoidable harm to non- 
combatants’.34 Thus there is, in an important sense, no real difference between the 
significance of the decision of the Christian leader and the Christian subject. Both 
depend on an internal process that is related to the City of God. The fact that the 
decisions of the Christian leader will have wider consequences is not of primary 
importance. This reflects the fact that, in Augustine’s thought, the prime goal is the 
development of the individual in question’s virtue, in this case a political leader, not 
with the possibility of building the kingdom.
Thus, whilst there is potential for the City of God to have an impact on the City of 
Man, which is suggestive of a measure of openness, this openness is limited. 
Specifically, the opportunity for change is indirect in the sense that it is not there for
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the purpose of dignifying earthly exploits. It is more of a question of the City of Man 
picking up some benefits resulting from Christians focusing on the City of God. To 
the extent that this indirect City of God input effectively injects a measure of 
openness, there is a basis for a qualified ontological closure.
As a function of his basic rejection of the notion of Christian government, Augustine
'X £was hesitant about making value distinctions between different states. Given that 
even with fellow Christians in the driving seat, there was no potential for bringing a 
significant ‘this-worldly’ change which could be valued in significant ‘this-worldly’ 
terms, the Augustinian perspective fostered the sense that there was little point in 
distinguishing between different kinds of government. Government was basically the 
mechanically necessary response to sin, resting in a closed system, wherein state 
history went round and round, repeating itself. Augustine ‘reasoned that all 
civilizations, past and present, pagan and Christian, were bound to suffer similar 
catastrophes, and argued that all history of the earthly or post lapsarian world (the 
civitas terrena) was a process of human suffering, part of a divine plan through which 
redemption from original sin might finally be achieved’.
CONCLUSION
Thus, in conclusion, one can clearly see the way in which the Augustinian system has 
imbued Christian Realism with a sense of the absolute divide between the two cities 
and how this has cut the world off from the domain of dignified openness, rendering it 
a largely closed system. To be sure, whilst they are two distinctive and separate 
orders, their commingling effectively provides a very limited openness through which 
the City of God - via media such as natural law - can have a leavening effect on the
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City of Man, but this is indirect in the sense that it is not there for the purpose of 
dignifying earthly exploits. It is more of a question of the City of Man picking up 
some benefits resulting from individual Christians focusing on the City of God. Thus 
Christian Realism, defined through Augustine, gives rise to a ‘largely’ rather than a 
‘wholly’ closed ontology. Strategically, therefore, it caters for a more open model of 
sovereignty than that of secular realisms.
SECTION 2: AUGUSTINE, NEIBUHR, WIGHT AND BUTTERFIELD
It is the contention of this chapter that, although Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr 
recognise openness manifest in the possibilities of civic virtue, their ‘Augustinian’ 
understanding of international relations has primarily been defined by the closure 
manifest in the Augustinian system. The chapter will seek to demonstrate this 
tendency first by identifying the reality of the distinctive Augustinian division 
between the two cities in modem Christian Realism. It will then examine the 
ontological closure emanating from that divide and its implications for the 
conceptualisation of the sovereign state and the international system.
I. THE NATURE GRACE DIVIDE IN MODERN REALISM:
MARTIN WIGHT
One of the most fundamental assumptions underpinning Wight’s realist and indeed
- j *7
rationalist thinking is his recognition of human sinfulness. He celebrated both 
Herbert Butterfield and Reinhold Niebuhr’s attempts to draw Christianity back ‘to the 
Old Testament or prophetic interpretation of history, with its belief in the sinfulness of
341
• 38  *human nature, in cataclysm and tragic conflict, in judgement and providence’. This 
clearly generated the need for a strong Leviathan.
Recognition of the serious reality of sin informs the division between the fallen 
kingdom of this world and the perfect kingdom of God and this obtains its clearest 
articulation in Wight’s thought during the late 1940s. Hedley Bull, Roger Epp and 
Sean Molloy highlight, in this regard, an address given in Switzerland in 1948 and a 
radio interview that same year.39 Specifically, Bull and Molloy argue that Wight’s 
commitments made for a very gloomy Augustinian theology.40 ‘In order to account 
for this [Christian Realism]’, Molloy observes, ‘we have to make reference to the 
issue of Augustine’s influence on Wight. Following Augustine, Wight differentiated 
between the City of God, which was perfect, and the City of Man, which was 
imperfect. Wight as a Christian believed in the eventual victory of the City of God, 
but this was after the end of history: Wight the political theorist recognised that the 
saeculum was of a very different order, and operating according to the rule of Man, 
not God, and thus had a very different logic underpinning the relationship, one that 
was best understood as conceiving Man as a sinful and corrupted being and a slave to 
his passions, chief among them greed and anger’.41 The implications of the division 
between the two cities, for the reasons given in the previous section, made for a clear 
sense of ontological closure.
One interesting perspective on Wight’s Augustinian theology is seen very powerfully 
in the division between his personal morality and his reflections regarding 
international relations. Although all mainstream Christian traditions believe in the 
notion of a fallen world, the fact that it is corrupted by human sin does not necessarily
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mean that these traditions posit an absolute divide between the personal and the 
public. Specifically, the violation of Christian humanitarian values often gives rise to 
actions seeking to ameliorate the consequences of their violation with the aim of 
improving life on earth. Wight, however, demonstrates little interest in writing 
manifestos for enlightened change.
This curious state of affairs has exercised some onlookers, most famously Michael 
Nicholson in his ‘The enigma of Martin Wight’. While recognising Wight’s Christian 
value system, Nicholson reflects on its separation from his work. ‘There is of course 
no reason at all why one should not describe the world and how the world behaves 
while deploring it. Indeed to pretend that the world is how one would like it to be in 
the face of the evidence that it is not, is the most basic of blunders for the social 
observer. However, there does seem to be a reason for urging that if the world 
behaves in ways which you believe to be manifestly wrong, that one should 
endeavour to do whatever one can to right it’.42 Later Nicholson makes the point, with 
some exasperation, that ‘pessimism does not absolve one from trying to avoid the 
Holocaust, however poor one thinks one’s chances are’.43 The apparent gulf between 
Wight’s personal, Christian morality, and his resignation to an international order 
animated by sin, is clearly suggestive of the fact that he has embraced an Augustinian 
perspective wherein civic virtue is primarily a personal and not a corporate 
phenomenon. There is no potential to improve matters in the public square through 
championing bold structural changes. The way to seek improvement is through using 
one’s personal life as a vehicle for caritas.44 Politically, therefore, Wight’s thought is 
very much informed by the Augustinian characteristic of thisworldly ontological 
closure.
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RHEINHOLD NIEBUHR
Reinhold Niebuhr’s work is underpinned throughout by a strong ‘Augustinian’ sense 
of human sinfulness which, he argued, becomes more problematic when examining 
national communities, thus rendering sinfulness a greater problem in the domain of 
international politics. ‘A perennial weakness of the moral life in individuals is simply 
raised to the nth degree in national life’.45 The impact of this falleness is exaggerated 
on a national level because, again in the Augustinian tradition, Niebuhr (like Wight) 
was reluctant to seek to translate Christian principle to the reformation of government.
Religion is, Niebuhr maintained, primarily for the moral invigoration of the 
individual, not the state. ‘Yet the full force of religious faith will never be available 
for the building of a just society, because its highest visions are those which proceed 
from the insights of a sensitive conscience. If they are realised at all, they will be 
realised in intimate religious communities, in which individual ideals achieve social 
realisation but do not conquer society’.46 There is something personal and 
individualistic about Christianity in Niebuhr’s view. ‘The devotion of Christianity to 
the cross is an unconscious glorification of the individual moral ideal. The cross is the 
symbol of love triumphant in its own integrity but not triumphant in the world and 
society’.47 Hence, the title of his most celebrated work, Moral Man, Immoral Society.
Niebuhr’s Augustinian views on salvation and fallenness meant that, whilst he did not 
reject the possibility of religion impacting politics, and whilst indeed he believed that 
there are contexts in which religious people’s morality should cause them to want to 
impact the political realm, it is not something to be generally sought after. Once
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again, therefore, one is confronted by a key thinker whose political imagination was 
informed by a dominant ontological closure as a consequence of his Augustinian 
worldview.
HERBERT BUTTERFIELD
Like Wight and Niebuhr, Butterfield, writing in an Augustinian tradition, is similarly 
convinced about the importance of human sin. Behind the need for limited war, 
Butterfield argues ‘is the comprehension of man’s universal sinfulness, and something 
of the sense that we are responsible for one another’s sins’.48 Butterfield links the 
reality of sin explicitly to government, highlighting the need for a strong state, in the 
following passage: ‘Let us be quite clear. The problem of evil is a very formidable 
thing -  terrible because there is so much of this evil that is potentially there, lying in 
wait for the opportunity, so to speak. History gives us glimpses sometimes of the 
appalling things that can happen if the whole order of things breaks down, and if, for 
example, it comes to appear that there is no government capable of bridling the 
criminals’ 49
Butterfield similarly does not believe that the church should corporately seek ‘this- 
worldly’ change. Instead, he celebrates the fact that the advent of a secular age 
provides the church with an opportunity to get back to the spiritual basics. The 
development of Christendom opened the door for the church to become closely 
associated with the mundane world, with government and culture, distracting it from 
its prime calling. ‘Christian thought has had to repeat the process of disentangling the 
essential of the spiritual life from the mundane institutions and intellectual systems -  
from the earthiness -  with which it has become intermixed’. The rejection of religion
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from the mundane has ensured that ‘the spiritual life emerges better for all the 
purifications it has suffered’.50 This does not mean, as noted earlier, that the 
individual Christian should not become involved in public life if such responsibility is 
thrust upon him, but he should not seek it.51 Thus one is again confronted with a 
thinker whose political thought was strongly influenced by a dominant ontological 
closure as a consequence of his Augustinian worldview.
II. CONFRONTING THE CLOSED SYSTEM
Having defined the radical discontinuity between Nature and Grace and the resultant 
ontological closure that militates against valuable and creative ‘this-worldly’ change 
(wherein government was called into being as an almost mechanical consequence of 
sin and in which history repeats itself), it is extremely interesting to note Wight, 
Butterfield and Toynbee’s52 willingness to see the international system in terms of a 
certain pattern of repetition. In his celebrated ‘Why there is no international theory’ 
Wight claims that if Sir Thomas More or Henry IV were to return to consider 
international relations they would be confronted with similar challenges. Granted, ‘the 
stage would have become much wider, the actors fewer, their weapons more 
alarming, but the play would be the same old melodrama’.53 Later in the same article, 
and sounding in some senses rather like Waltz, Wight contends that ‘[international 
relations is the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political 
action is most regularly necessitous’.54 Butterfield and Toynbee similarly identified 
this sense of recurrence that in some senses undermined the particularity and 
uniqueness of any specific event. ‘Both Toynbee and Butterfield took a very long 
view, freely employing historical analogy. Like many realists -  secular as much as 
religious -  they emphasized continuity, even synchronicity’.55 In embracing this view
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there is the clear Augustinian sense of history repeating itself, almost mechanically, 
trapped in the closed system of the ‘kingdom of this world’.
In considering the place of repetition, it is particularly important to examine the 
Wightian view of war. Wight’s approach to war has both of the crucial hallmarks of 
an Augustinian model of ontological closure. First, from the perspective of Nature, 
Wight believed that war was inevitable, although particular wars were avoidable. 
Writing to J. H. Oldham, however, he claimed that one war that was not avoidable - 
indeed he said it was ‘as certain as the return of Hailey’s Comet’ - was a Third World 
War. Second, from the perspective of Grace, he clearly believed that God was 
sovereign over history. In this sense, as Bull observed, he ‘appears to have felt that 
even to pray for peace can involve a kind of impiety’. In a broadcast in 1948 he 
stated; ‘Perhaps there is a sense today in which we will have to say that the 
preservation of civilization and the averting of war are not important, before we can 
recover our balance and find again the way in which they are important. For what 
matters is not whether there is going to be another war or not, but that it should be 
recognised, if it comes, as an act of God’s justice and if it is averted, as an act of 
God’s mercy’.56 Either way one must embrace what happens as a function of God’s 
sovereign determination through the closed system. ‘Free will’, Molloy observes, 
‘granted by God to man, but conditioned by man’s natural propensity to immorality as 
a consequence of original sin, acts as a paradoxical tool of God in the divinely ordered 
universe. Thus men are free to choose, but the results of their actions are in fact 
determined as a result of God’s judgement -  punitive or merciful’.57
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This tendency towards repetition identified in the Augustinian legacy is of particular 
interest because of its significant parallels with the rise of the scientific method in IR, 
against which the English School was in some very important senses supposed to
f O
have defined itself. This rather ironic relationship is identified by Molloy and 
Loriaux.59 One of the most interesting observations in this regard, however, comes 
from Roy E. Jones’ renowned 1981 article which makes no reference to Augustine 
whatever but perhaps unconsciously highlights his impact on Wight with great clarity. 
He notes that, like Waltz et al, English School thinkers seem to have an obsessive 
holism which causes them to have a ‘disregard for individual experience’.60 In this 
respect he notes with interest the passionate English School critique of the new 
science. This response, he claimed emotively, can ‘be equated with Calaban’s howl of 
horror and rage on being confronted with his own reflection’.61 In the case of Wight 
specifically, Jones claims that this holism has caused him to see ‘that all states at 
given levels of power are internationally much the same’.62 Indeed, he accuses Wight 
of a certain determinism wherein the sphere for free action that can bring change is 
fundamentally absent.63 ‘No passion singes Wight’s pages’. Having referred to his 
dependence on ‘the impersonal cogs of history’, Jones claims that familiarising 
oneself with Wight’s system leads one to conclude that ‘what happens to us sinners 
here below matters very little. To be alive is to be mildly depressed’.64
One of the most interesting points about this criticism of the English School’s lack of 
regard for first and second image issues is the fact that it obviously hangs on what 
Jones saw as a structuralism in the English School. Whilst it is indeed true that the 
English School defined itself against the new scientific method, one must remember 
that the behaviouralist revolution, whilst scientific, did not locate its analysis at the
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structural level.65 Indeed, the advent of scientific structuralism in IR did not become 
influential until after the death of Wight.66 This prompts the question of whether 
Wight would have found Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics quite as 
disagreeable as Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics?67 
Interestingly Bull, who led the English School charge against the scientists, thought it 
an important piece of work.68 The fact that Waltz did not find himself pounced upon 
by Bull might be construed as interesting evidence of the reality of an English School 
structuralism bom of an ontological closure secured through Augustinian 
assumptions.
OPEN SOVEREIGNTY, CLOSED SOVEREIGNTY
Having considered Augustinian ontology on its own terms and having reflected on 
this directly through the work of modem Christian Realists, it is now possible to 
consider the relevance of this ontology to the challenge of coming to terms with 
sovereignty in the context of globalization. Specifically, there can be no doubt that the 
Augustinian system has had an impact on modem Christian Realism bringing a sense 
of the divide between the two cities and that this has cut the world off from the 
domain of dignified openness, rendering it a largely closed system. To be sure 
commingling provides the opportunity for some leavening impact but this is indirect 
and does not result in the creation of a bridge between them that lifts them from the 
place of fundamental incommensurability. To the extent that this opens the door to a 
limited ‘effective openness’, Christian Realism defined through Augustine gives rise 
to a ‘largely’ rather than a ‘wholly’ closed ontology, and thus caters for a more open 
model of sovereignty than secular realism. Modem Christian Realists, however, have 
neither focused on the reality of this openness nor sought to exploit it. Turning
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critically to the theological component of English School thinking has been beneficial 
to the extent that it has identified an under exploited openness. To the extent, 
however, that this openness is limited, the Augustinian perspective, although 
important in the history of the English School, does not seem likely to be able to 
contribute to the development of a model of sovereignty that is sufficiently open to 
rise to the conceptual challenge of providing a framework within which to define a 
model of sovereignty that can engage with the change, defined by chapter 7.69
LOOKING BEYOND AUGUSTINE
In seeking to rise to the challenge of open sovereignty, it is the contention of this 
thesis that the English School Christian Realist tradition should exchange its 
Augustinian two cities framework, with its consequent futurist eschatology, and 
attendant ontological closure, for another perspective from mainstream Christian 
theology. Whilst Waltz sought to move realism forward through neorealism’s 
rejection of human evil, Christian Realism can renew itself, and its relevance, by 
embracing an ontology that rests upon a less futurist eschatology and which 
consequentially embraces a less pessimistic view of human fallenness.
Although Augustine does not secure his account of fallenness on the basis of the 
classic Gnostic division wherein spirit is good and matter is bad, he nonetheless 
arguably exaggerates the implications of human fallenness on account of embracing 
what can be argued to be a rather more subtle form of Gnoticism. The peculiarly 
pessimistic nature of Augustine’s position is best demonstrated by critiquing his 
approach to time through that of another Church Father, Irenaeus, who interestingly 
inspired a very much more optimistic approach to politics in the 17th century.70
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Although Irenaeus, as a mainstream Christian theologian, obviously believed in the 
fallenness of man, the impact of the fall on life on earth and the need for redemption, 
this did not cause him to relocate redemption to a realm that was discontinuous with 
life on earth. Thus, whereas within Augustinian thought, the City of God and City of 
Man were discontinuous, in the Irenean framework the two Cities, whilst distinct, 
were related. In this lack of fundamental discontinuity, the fallen world was dignified 
with the possibility of engaging with redemption. As Gunton observes in Irenaeus ‘no 
major contrast is drawn between the perfection of the timeless eternal and the 
imperfection of the temporal. That would be to concede too much to gnosticism. If the 
order of time is the order of imperfection, it is not due to its ontological inferiority but 
for two reasons: first its fallenness, its falling away from its due directedness, and 
second, and far more important for our purposes, its specific ontology, as created and 
so as depending upon God for being as it is and for being what it is. That is to say the 
being of the temporal order consists in its temporal nature. It is what it is only through 
the fact that it must be perfected in and through time, by the action of the creator of 
time. Like a piece of music, its peculiar perfection consists in the fact it takes times to 
be what it is. In that respect it is not ontologically inferior to that which is eternal, but
71merely different’.
This rejection of the fundamental discontinuity facilitates the injection of openness 
into the Irenean ontology on two bases, through God’s resulting relationship to the 
world and through humanity’s relationship to God in that world. In the case of the 
former, openness through the triune God’s relationship to the world is seen in the fact 
that God the Father was related to creation through the act of creation, God the Son
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was involved in creation through the incarnation and God the Spirit is involved in 
creation in an ongoing way. In this sense there is openness in the fact that God 
intervened and continues to intervene in creation and thus the world is not a closed 
system. In the case of the latter basis for openness, meanwhile, change is seen in 
humanity’s relationship to God in the world and the challenge to do ‘good works’, 
facilitating the development of a much bolder conception of civic virtue than anything 
seen in the work of Augustine. In introducing this point it is important to state that, as 
an expression of mainstream Christianity, the Irenean theological grid is pessimistic in 
the sense that it believes that the world is fallen, that sin is real and that man cannot, 
in his own strength, build anything approaching utopia. To this extent it buys into all 
of the realism of Augustine. This conceptual framework provides grounds for hope, 
however, in the sense that it believes that this is a ‘real world’ in which real changes 
can be made by humanity, in relationship with God, for the improvement of life on 
earth. Ireanian ontology is thus partly God given and partly the result of human 
construction.72
Thus Irenaeus provides for a significantly greater measure of openness than 
Augustine. In so doing it certainly presents a theological framework that would be 
more useful to the project of developing a cultural reference point/lens through which 
to apprehend an open model of sovereignty that can engage with change, as required 
by chapter 7.
CONCLUSION
This chapter’s consideration of the best-known direct theological reflection on 
sovereignty, Saint Augustine, demonstrates his great influence on the English School,
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finding expression in the development of Christian Realism. It also reveals, however, 
that the impact of his thought only provides for a limited, de facto ontological 
openness in the resulting conception of sovereignty. Given that the Augustinian 
position is in no way definitive of a generally accepted Christian ontology, however, 
this thesis contends that there is a need to consider the manner in which other 
Christian theological perspectives can inform conceptualisation of the sovereign 
state.73
In recognising other theological sources, the next chapter will turn to what is arguably 
a more logical, and yet currently under-developed, framework through which to 
apprehend the sovereign state in the context of change, namely the legacy of the 
Reformation theology that actually impacted the advent of the sovereign state. It will 
be argued that, in the context of the imperative to ‘let culture back in’, the renaissance 
of interest in theological reflection within IR, and the need to develop a clearer 
conceptualisation of sovereignty in the context of globalization, its approach presents 
the discipline with an important conceptual frame.
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CHAPTER 9
TOWARDS ‘OPEN SOVEREIGNTY’:
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL &
THE RESURGENCE OF THEOLOGY IN IR: PART 2
Having considered Christian Realism, this thesis now proceeds to examine the importance of 
what it calls ‘Christian Rationalism’. This chapter will unpack the ontology of the sovereign 
state, first from the perspective of natural law, a traditional English School theological 
referent (Part 1), and then via the Reformation theological legacy manifest specifically in 
‘Welsh proto-nationalism’1 (Part 2), which has not previously been applied to the School. In 
so doing it will provide a holistic definition of a model of sovereignty, in the rationalist 
tradition, that is sufficiently open in order to be able to rise to the challenges of systemic 
change set out by chapter 7.
The natural law perspective on rationalism, as noted in chapter 7, posits an open model of 
sovereignty on the basis that it constitutes an external, transnational moral influence that 
reaches into the government of the sovereign state. To the extent, however, that this openness 
is inferred from the outside by reference to the impact of natural law, rather than understood 
from direct consideration of the open nature of state sovereignty, natural law provides an 
essenlially negative account of open sovereignty. Examination of the Welsh theologians that 
inspired ‘Welsh proto-nationalism’, however, will provide a theological framework for
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developing a positive account of the development and sustenance of open sovereignty from 
the inside-out. Having considered the Welsh theology in question, the chapter will 
demonstrate how, by complementing the negative, natural law perspective on rationalist 
sovereignty with the positive, Welsh theological perspective, one can gain a framework that 
can be applied to obtain a holistic appreciation of rationalist sovereignty, well able to rise to 
the challenges of change. From an English School theory perspective specifically, this 
investigation will contend that a holistic rationalist appreciation of sovereignty, drawing on 
Welsh theology, presents a more useful framework for the School as it grapples with 
systemic change than does the historically dominant Christian Realism, with its debt to Saint 
Augustine. In making this case the chapter will thus demonstrate how the development of 
English School theological reflection in the context of the current resurgence of 
religion/religious ideas, can be used to increase the conceptual relevance of the School as a 
whole.
PART 1: OPENNSS FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: NATURAL LAW
Although chapter 7 has already reflected on negative rationalist models of sovereignty, it is 
important for this chapter, which specifically focuses on Christian Rationalism, to briefly 
reconsider its definition through theologically disclosed natural law.
In approaching natural law from the perspective of rationalism, it is first important to 
recognize that it is not peculiar to rationalism. As noted in the previous chapter, Augustine, 
who is classically associated with realism, recognized natural law. To understand the 
rationalist character of natural law, however, one must see it connected to a broader belief 
that, whilst the absence of a global government makes the realisation of a society comparable
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with that of the domestic arena impossible, the presence of natural law can help to create an 
important measure of society and therein the capacity for a measure of progress that will 
always elude the Augustinian frame of reference.
Wight’s chosen figurehead for the rationalist tradition, Grotius is considered to be the father 
of international law, a concept that, unlike later international lawyers, he based on natural 
law. In doing so Grotius was in good company. The late 15th and early 16th century was, in a 
real sense, the age of natural law. During this time Catholic neo-scholastics Francisco 
Victoria and Francisco Suarez championed the notion of natural law whilst, in his own 
Protestant camp, Grotius was joined by Alberico Gentili and Hugeut Lambert. ‘They all 
believed that politics and war were to be governed by moral precepts that are written on the 
heart and thus accessible to all reasoning beings: the natural law (Romans 2: 14-15). They 
believed in Christian truth, but held -  with some variation among them -  that a certain 
portion of it was accessible to humans by virtue of their rational capacity and that this natural 
law was to be the basis of relations, the jus inter gene, between people of different creeds’2
In light of the presence of this natural law, Grotius claimed that it was wholly proper for 
states to intervene in the affairs of a wayward polity on certain occasions in the event of its 
violation of natural law. For Grotius, Bull observes, ‘the right of a sovereign state to take up 
arms for a just cause applies to civil conflicts as well as international ones; kings, as well as 
being responsible for the safety and welfare of their subjects are burdened with the
• • ' Xguardianship of human rights everywhere’. This celebration of intervention in the name of 
natural law, however, in no sense changed the fact that Grotius was committed to state 
sovereignty. Indeed Grotius had a very clear commitment to sovereignty: ‘Of its
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[international law’s] major political philosophers, he is the strongest proponent of 
sovereignty: “That power is called sovereign, whose actions are not subject to the control of 
any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will. The term ‘any 
other sovereign will’ exempts the sovereign himself from this restriction, who may annul his 
own acts’” .4
The fact that sovereign polities endured, despite the reality of a transcending international 
law, lays the foundation for a model of sovereignty that is eroded rather than replaced. The 
reality of erosion rather than replacement is seen, first, in the fact that the transnational law 
does not call into being a formal international constitution that provides the basis for the 
determination of its direction, thereby effectively placing it in a new supranational sovereign 
polity. Erosion rather than replacement is also seen in the character of natural law and the fact 
that, far from being located in a polity and having access to a supranational judiciary, this 
law instead manifests itself in the realm of ‘hearts and minds’, drawing on a universal 
commonsense, endorsed by different religions. As a form of law that exists in an important 
sense apart from the state, natural law brings an openness by breaking into the sovereign 
state, introducing change through erosion rather than replacement.
Parallels to the present situation can be seen on two bases. First, today global power flows, 
like natural laws, break into states, influencing their conduct but without completely negating 
their sovereignty. Second, transnational moral norms, upheld principally by international law, 
license interventions in the affairs of states, demonstrating the fact that sovereignty is not 
absolute, whilst at the same time strategically not negating that sovereignty. Both the above 
perspectives on global power flows and international intervention imply a domain beyond the
362
sovereign state. Like extra-territorial, hyperspatial economic flows and international law, 
natural law is ontologically above and apart from the sovereign state and yet it can still 
impact the direction of the sovereign state. In this sense because the ontology of sovereignty, 
although important, is not self-sufficient (i.e. it cannot provide a grid on the totality of 
‘reality’), it is necessarily ontologically open.
In addressing the role of sovereignty in the context of the spatio-temporal revolution that is 
globalization - wherein closed ontologies have lost ground to the new openness evidenced 
through increasing global flows - this thesis argues that it makes sense to revive the model of 
rationalist sovereignty premised on the ontologically open implication of natural law.5 The 
fact that sovereignty is consistent with this extra-territorial form of quasi-spiritual law 
demonstrates with great clarity that the notion of open sovereignty, whilst less than attractive 
to the IR theory of recent years, because of certain positivist, methodological aspirations with 
ontological implications, has a good historic pedigree. There is a need to release sovereignty 
from the grip of a priori ontological closure that has been its lot in recent years in both the 
thinking of neorealists and the other realists who need closure to invoke their methodology 
and in the thinking of reflectivists who reject sovereignty precisely because they say it is 
defined by ontological closure.
PART 2: OPENNESS FROM THE INSIDE-OUT:
Although the above provides an account of a measure of openness, it is important to 
recognize that Christian theology is not limited to providing an explanation of the ontological 
openness of rationalist models of sovereignty negatively, from the outside, by natural law. It 
can also rise to this challenge by positively reflecting directly on the sovereign state itself.
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This chapter will now examine the lack of recognition afforded to Reformation thought in 
modem international relations theory’s conceptualization of the sovereign state, first from a 
general IR, and then from a specifically English School, perspective (Section 1). In so doing, 
it will demonstrate the potential of Reformation thought to contribute to positive 
conceptualizations of open sovereignty through special reference to theologically disclosed 
‘Welsh proto-nationalism’, (Section 2). When this direct, positive reflection on the sovereign 
state is brought alongside the indirect, negative perspective of natural law, this will give rise 
to a fuller account of open sovereignty that can readily accommodate change.
SECTION 1: THE REFORMATION
One of the curious things about Christian Realism, as noted in chapter 8, is its dependence on 
one theologian, Augustine. Had the modem states system emerged in a secular age and had 
nothing to do with theology then it would not have been strange for those English School 
thinkers interested in theology to look elsewhere and draw on an influential fifth century 
saint. The truth is, however, that the modem state system did not emerge in a secular age and 
neither did it emerge without theological reflection. There seems to be at least some sense 
then in which English School thinkers bought into the widespread contention that the advent 
of the states system itself was a secular development, necessitating their reference to theology 
from other historical epochs. The chapter will first consider this position from the general 
perspective of IR theory and then home in on its impact on the English School.
a) THE SECULAR STATES SYSTEM?
In challenging the historical basis for the identification of the sovereign state and advent of 
modem international relations with the denial of religion, the critique of IR theory provided
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by the work of scholars such as Fabio Petito, Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Daniel Philpott is of 
special interest.6 Petito and Hatzopoulos contend that international relations has always been 
based on the denial of religion. ‘[RJeligion was the object that needed to vanish for modem 
international politics to come into being. Religion has been, and largely remains, what the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) can speak about only as a threat to its own 
existence’.7 In light of this observation it is hardly surprising that theorists should not look to 
religion to obtain a better understanding of the sovereign state. In sympathy with this 
conviction there has been a tendency, Philpott observes, for international relations scholars to 
account for sovereignty narrowly in terms of material developments. The sovereign state 
triumphed in the modem era because it provided the best institutional frame within which to 
fight wars and produce wealth.8 Furthermore, when a more ideational approach is adopted 
modernity and its politics tends to be seen through the lens of 1789, as if sovereignty was a 
secular, Enlightenment phenomenon. Whilst not wishing to deny the important role played by 
material and Enlightenment imperatives in the advent of sovereignty, one must take care not 
to assess the development of sovereignty without due regard for the Reformation and the 
critical century in the run up to 1648, and the Treaty of Westphalia, in which theology played 
an important part.9 Crucially, Philpott observes, every state that embraced sovereignty during 
the 1648 era had a strong Reformation crisis, whilst every polity that showed no interest had 
no Reformation crisis.10
b) SECULAR & OTHERWORLDLY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE ENGLISH SCHOOL
Although the English School is distinct in modem IR for having sustained an interest in 
theology at a time when it was afforded scant attention from elsewhere, even its treatment of 
the Reformation legacy has been lacking. Specifically there have been two English School
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commitments that have animated its reluctance to engage with the advent of the states system 
positively in terms of its theological motivation.
In the first instance Wight seems to have viewed the significance of Reformation thought 
almost entirely in terms of revolutionism, i.e. the subversion of the modem states system. To 
be sure, there is no doubt that the different expressions of Protestantism would have liked the 
whole world to have been filled with like-minded Protestant states and to this extent there is a 
sense in which the central figures of the Reformation should be seen as embracing something 
of revolutionism. Critically, however, unlike the Catholic counter revolutionaries with whom 
Wight contrasts them, the main implication of the reformers’ agenda was to seal the break-up 
of the previous revolutionist structure, the Respublica Christiana, and to lay a foundation for 
the modem states system with a new realist or rationalist ontology. Given the centrality of 
their theologically charged discourse to the advent of the modem states system, the decision 
to locate the reformers primarily in the tradition defined in terms of transcending the modem 
states system, referring instead for theological insight regarding that system to a Saint, 
removed by one thousand years of history, seems very strange.11
In the second instance on the one occasion when Wight does see fit to discuss Luther in the 
context of his consideration of realism, he makes it very plain that he does not think much of 
his thought. Although, for reasons considered in chapter 8, Augustine can certainly be 
accused of peddling an otherworldly theology, Wight seems to be of the opinion that Luther 
pursued this project with even greater vigour such that it becomes problematic. Whereas 
Augustine provided the means for mediation between the City of God and the City of Man, 
Luther did not. ‘It was in the spirit of Lutheran thought to attribute totality of value to inward
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morality, and depreciate external morality, the moral issues involved in power, property, war
12or slavery, even though this morality was still stated in terms of natural law’.
The notion, however, that Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith gave rise to an 
otherworldly spirituality is highly contentious. Whilst Luther taught that good works could 
never earn a man or woman his/her salvation, he was very clear that good works were of 
great importance for the Christian.13 ‘Luther’, Cargill Thompson observes, ‘held that good 
works are necessary in this life because the Christian does not exist solely for himself or in a 
spiritual relationship with Christ. In this world, he exists among men: he is in continual 
contact with other men and he therefore has a duty to serve his neighbours to the best of his 
ability. ..It is because the Christian does not exist for himself alone that he is bound to devote 
himself to the service of others’.14
Wight’s critique of Luther then continues, specifically addressing his approach to the two 
kingdoms. ‘Luther echoes Augustine’s antimony between the city of God and the earthly city. 
But Augustine reconciled the antinomy through the fundamental unity of Christian ethics: 
through the Church the virtues of the city of God flowed back into the organism of temporal 
society. ...A prince may be a Christian, but must govern not as a Christian but as a prince. 
This was an attempt to spiritualise the church, leaving the dirty work of history to the state. It 
was in effect an abdication of all moral and organizing activity into the hands of the state’.15 
Lacking proper relationship to the earthly city, Luther represented ‘anti-intellectualist 
religious thought, or mysticism, and a predominance of sentiment and feeling over intellect’. 
He reveals ‘too a swollen consciousness of self, and religious egocentrism, leading to 
complete subjectivism. ...Luther subverted supernatural morality and the doctrine of grace’.16
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The notion that the two cities in Luther’s frame of reference have no means of reconciliation, 
forcing Christians into an otherworldly posture, seems to lack any appreciation that in 
Luther’s threefold deployment of the terms, two of its applications (the two realms and the 
two regiments) do not invoke any kind of division in the Augustinian sense. When applied to 
the two realms and the two regiments, Luther’s usual applications, the two domains exist side 
by side in a complementary relationship.17 It is only in the third and less frequent application, 
of the two cities formula, which does not impact the Christian’s attitude to politics, that the 
tension exists. This is the eschatological opposition between the kingdom of God and the
• 1Rkingdom of the devil in relationship to which reconciliation is not relevant.
Thus, although Luther used the two kingdoms dichotomy to argue strongly for a division 
between church leadership and political leadership, he in no sense argued for an otherworldly 
spirituality, encouraging Christians to vacate the social and political realm in order to go into 
spiritual retreat. ‘For Luther’, Cargill Thompson observes, ‘it is a basic principle of his 
theology that the Christian in this world is not concerned solely with his relationship to God 
nor should he turn his back on the world. God has created both the temporal and the spiritual 
order and Fie has placed man in both. Besides his spiritual calling to Christ man has a 
temporal calling in this world in which God has placed him in order that he may serve his 
fellow men’.19 The outworking of this calling can be seen in and through Luther’s own 
political exploits, like the publication of ‘The Ordinance for a Common Chest of the Town of
•  * * 9 0  •Leisnig’ which was concerned with welfare provision. Thus, far from being more 
otherworldy, there are actually very good grounds for arguing that Luther was more this- 
worldly in his concerns than Augustine.
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SECTION 2: EXPLOITING THE REFORMATION LEGACY THROUGH WELSH 
NATIONALISM
Having considered the curious decision to ignore the theology of the Reformation era in 
seeking to come to terms with the sovereign state, despite the fact that this was the 
theological framework in which the sovereign state was bom, the chapter will now examine 
what is arguably a more appropriate alternative. Mindful of the actual scope of Reformation 
thought (seen above in relationship to Luther but also applicable to other Reformation 
theologians, e.g. Calvin), it is the intention of this chapter to turn to reflect in detail on one 
expression of this Reformation legacy found in the work of the Welsh theologians whose 
work played such a key role in defining Welsh nationalism between approximately 1870 and 
1970. Specifically, this chapter will examine their spatio-temporal commitments, the 
consequent ontology of their aspirant polity and its implications for the conceptualization of 
state sovereignty. The resulting conceptualization of sovereignty will be shown to embrace a 
significant measure of openness and consequentially be especially useful in contexts that 
need to accommodate change, be it ‘change by extension’, as a result of e.g. European 
integration, or ‘change by erosion’, as a result of globalization.
The relevance of a theological referent does not depend on its association with nationalism. 
Augustine’s theology did not have to be nationalist to be significant. The fact that the Welsh 
theology in question is associated with a nationalism, however, provides two further bases for 
its relevance. First, it builds on the English School’s long commitment to the examination of 
international relations in the light of different cultures and indeed a commitment to homing in
91 • •on particular national cultures e.g. see its references to the Chinese school. Second, it is also
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important because it resonates with the ‘return of culture and identity in IR theory’ bom of 
post Cold War, post-positivist epistemological innovation.22 In this regard Daniel Deudney’s 
article ‘Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism’, which looks at conceptions 
of place and space within national traditions and their implication for IR theory is an 
important inspiration.23
In addressing religion in a national context, the question inevitably arises, why focus on 
Wales as opposed to any other nation? First, Wales is a small nation whose distinctive 
characteristics have been historically obscured by the wider British identity and as such it 
presents the kind of identity overshadowed by an ‘other’ metanarrative that the ‘letting 
culture back in’ manoeuvre is designed to address. (This had added significance in the sense 
that the author is from England - the perceived source of the British metanarrative - but 
conducted his research at a Welsh university). Second, it is a nation whose political self- 
understanding and aspiration was until very recently deeply enmeshed in religion. In 
selecting Wales it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue that what it demonstrates is 
unique. Such a claim could not be made unless investigations were executed regarding all the 
nations of the world which would require many theses! What this study can be clear about, 
however, having considered some other religious nationalisms, is that there are certainly 
other religious nationalisms - indeed other Christian nationalisms - of a wholly different 
character from Welsh proto-nationalism, suggesting that the Welsh perspective is at least 
interesting and possibly distinctive.24
Beginning its substantive investigation of the spatio-temporal commitments of Welsh proto­
nationalism with general definition (Sub-Section II, Part I), the chapter will move on to focus
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on two of the most important figures in the definition of the theology of Welsh nationalism 
during the twentieth century, J. R. Jones and R. Tudur Jones (Sub-Section II, Part II). Before 
embarking upon this project, however, there is a need for some preliminary definitions (Sub- 
Section I).
SUB-SECTION I: DEFINITIONS:
a. UNDERLYING RELATIONSHIPS
In coming to terms with the relevance of Welsh proto-nationalism for a theologically 
informed conceptualization of state sovereignty, one must first be clear about the basis for the 
extremely close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity and second the 
sovereignty aspirations of Welsh nationalism.25 Given the extensive material that could be 
drawn upon to develop and defend these relationships, and the desire not to lose sight of its 
main focus, this chapter will simply make brief reference to the relevant evidence and point 
to more detailed information in its appendices.
The very close relationship between Wales and Christianity can be seen in developments 
such as the fact that Welsh identity and the Welsh language emerged at the same time that 
Christianity was embraced by the people of Wales and more latterly in the key role played by 
the Church in sustaining the Welsh language especially through the translation of the Bible 
into Welsh. Developments such as these have made the relationship between Wales and 
Christianity peculiarly intense so much so that it has given rise to what has been described as 
the ‘Wales as Church’ paradigm.26 This has laid the foundation for theology to make a major 
contribution to the development of Welsh proto-nationalism. Prof. R. Tudur Jones begins his 
paper ‘Christian Nationalism’ (which is about Welsh nationalism) with a long list of clerics
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• • 27and Christian thinkers who have been central to the definition of Welsh national identity. 
Dorian Llywelyn makes a similar point in his important examination of the relationship 
between notions of Welsh territoriality and spirituality. ‘The theology of nationality and the 
theological justification of nationalism have been very minor concerns for most theologians 
...For Welsh theologians of this century, however, they have been central issues. That many 
of the writers in Welsh on nationalism in general have been clergymen and academics is not 
surprising’.28
Despite a reluctance to use the language of sovereignty, Welsh proto-nationalism did aspire 
for Wales to have its own governance and membership of the international community on a 
basis of equality with other constitutionally independent polities and thus sovereignty. This 
can be seen in assertions that Wales should obtain membership of first the League of Nations 
and a proposed European confederation and then latterly the United Nations. None of these 
positions is possible without sovereignty and thus it is clear that Welsh proto-nationalism did 
seek sovereignty.29
b. HERMENEUTICAL PARADIGMS
Having set out the above underlying relationships, it is now necessary to define three key 
hermeneutical paradigms, drawn from Dorian Llywelyn’s Sacred Place, Chosen People: 
Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality, which inform this section’s approach to its 
subject matter. This will lay the foundation for this chapter to then interrogate the territorial 
ontologies (defined by its spatio-temporal commitments) of Welsh proto-nationalism’s 
aspirant polity, and related conception of sovereignty, trading on the fact that, in the
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theological frame of reference, the relationship between time and space is reflected in the 
relationship between spirit and matter.
1) CHALCEDON
The first of these paradigms derives from the fundamental basis of the relationship between 
time and space in Christian theology, namely the nature of Christ. The key theological 
statement on this subject came from the Council of Chalcedon. It declared that Jesus is both 
fully God and fully man. He is one person with two natures;
‘perfect both in his divinity and in his humanity...We declare that the one selfsame Christ, 
only begotten Son and Lord, must be acknowledged in two natures, without commingling or 
change or division or separation; ...the distinction between the natures is in no way removed 
by the union, but rather the specific character of each nature is preserved and they are united 
in one person and one hypostasis; he is not split or divided into two persons, but that there is 
one selfsame, only begotten Son, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ’.31
The Chalcedonian hermeneutic describes the union of two realities without a mixing to 
produce a third reality in which both survive, neither being subsumed into the other and 
within which each finds its full realization.
2) INTERPENETRATION
Llywelyn then posits a philosophic expression of the spatio-temporal commitments of 
Chalcedon in the form of the celebrated Christian Welsh philosopher J. R. Jones’ 
hermeneutic, ‘interpenetration’. ‘Substances interpenetrate when one goes as it were into the
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other, without merging, but rather creating an interior relationship which does not come about 
when substances are merely joined together’. z
3) PERICHORESIS
Llywelyn’s last hermeneutical paradigm, meanwhile, is located in the perichoretic nature of 
the relationship between the different members of the Trinity. Perichoresis is ‘a term which 
suggests that union and differentiation within the Godhead is a dynamic process in which the 
ontological differences between persons or spheres are actually strengthened, rather than 
dissolved, by their uniting’.33
Thus all three paradigms are interrelated in the sense that they focus on upholding unity in 
diversity and are arguably a function of a Trinitarian grid which seeks to reconcile the open, 
diversity of the Godhead with the closed, unity of the Godhead. The Chalcedonian and 
interpenetration hermeneutics, however, also engage with unity and diversity specifically 
with respect to the coming together, but without commingling, of spirit and matter. The 
chapter will now turn to consider Welsh proto-nationalism through the lens provided by these 
hermeneutical paradigms in order to consider precisely how they endow it with the 
conceptual resources to develop a model of sovereignty that can cater for both the endurance 
of the sovereign state and the reality of global flows.
SUB-SECTION II: TIME AND SPACE IN WELSH TERRITORIALITY
In the first instance the chapter will consider the spatio-temporal commitments of Welsh 
proto-nationalism in general terms, suggesting a Chalcedonian frame of reference (Part I). It 
will then address this same question through two leading nationalist theologians whose
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thought makes the Chalcedonian nature of Welsh proto-nationalism, and its aspirant 
sovereign polity, even clearer (Part II).
PART I: SPATIO-TEMPORAL COMMITMENTS: GENERAL
A] SPATIALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY:
The spatial orientation and therein givenness of territoriality depends on two factors: first, the 
self-evident physical givenness and fixity of the land (territory) and second its relatedness to 
God, the absolute. Unlike medieval Catholic notions of territoriality, however, wherein 
relatedness to God was posited through a sacramental union with the physical substance of 
territory, God’s relatedness to territory in Welsh proto-nationalism, sustained in the broader 
notion of the territorial nation, was instead usually located in his ordaining the nation.34 
Emrys ap Iwan, ‘one of the founding fathers of modem Welsh political nationalism’, 
maintained that the nation constitutes an order of creation. In one sermon he exhorted his
36congregation ‘[r]emember also that you are a nation, through God’s ordinance’. J. E. 
Daniel, the third president of Plaid Cymru similarly contended that nations are ‘a social 
divinely ordained reality’.37 Writing more recently Dewi Watkin Powell expressed the same 
conviction. ‘If the nation of Israel was and is God’s creation, it follows that every nation is
• o o
his creation and that he has created it, as he created Israel for his own purpose’. In other 
accounts, meanwhile, as this chapter will demonstrate, provision is made for the nation to be
•  O Q
related to God, even whilst the notion that God ordained nations is actually rejected.
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B] TEMPORALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY:
The temporally oriented openness in Welsh proto-nationalism, meanwhile, is seen in the fact 
that neither the territorial fixity of the land, nor Wales’ relatedness to God, removes openness 
and an enduring role for human agency in the definition of the nation and its territoriality. 
The chapter will examine this openness through the lens of Welsh proto-nationalism’s 
approach to: i) territoriality, ii) language and finally through its iii) internationalism.
i) TERRITORIALITY
In order to come to terms with the partially constructed nature of Welsh territoriality it is first 
necessary to consider the distinction developed by Llywelyn between ‘place’ and ‘space’. 
Space is experienced by people whose culture lacks the temporality that sustains the openness 
that makes interpretation, and therein the development of a cultural, personable bond between 
a people, and their territory, possible. It upholds a kind of ‘existential vacuum, a location 
which is devoid of truly human society. In this way, “space” is also a kind of “anti-place” 
connoting a certain existential emptiness, non-being, anti-value or chaos’.40 Denied any sense 
of social construction, it is condemned to being a barren, homogenous desert. Place on the 
other hand has been appropriated by the people it sustains through a dynamic process of 
interpretation set in time. Charged with meaning, it is deeply personable and anything but 
cold and homogenous. ‘[P]lace and time are intimately and inseparably connected. I would 
like to suggest therefore, that what all comprehensive concepts of ‘place’ involve is time’ 41 
Thus the configuration of territory in the Welsh proto-nationalist tradition has two 
ingredients, time and space, not just space (or for that matter just time). This is a function of 
‘the connection and mutual co-implication between two expressions of the fundamental
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existential planes of space and time, along with another two theological considerations, 
namely the human (both individual and the social) and the divine’.42
Having understood the distinction between place and space, however, one must move on to 
consider the heightened capability of Welsh proto-nationalism to engage with openness and 
construction that results from the fact that when place arises as a theological issue in Welsh 
thought, ‘then’, as Llywelyn observes, ‘it is as a function of social issues’. Specifically, the 
non-conformist, Protestant background of the majority of Welsh theologians means that they 
reject the notion, popular before the Reformation, that the divine can be mediated through 
earthly channels. ‘Among such writers, if holy places in Wales are discussed at all, it is 
generally only as a derivative of the religious nature of national identity’. Indeed such is 
Protestant Welsh nationalism’s focus on dynamic social factors that its treatment of the land 
is often somewhat implicit. In recognition of this Llywelyn writes: ‘Despite their theological 
preferences, in the works of many of these thinkers concerning what it is to be fully human, 
an interest in place is evidenced by the particular emphasis they attribute to the historical and 
geographical context of social insertion. In the Welsh mind, as expressed through these 
writers, one’s place and one’s society play a significant part in who one is as an individual. 
Place -  understood as a social and geographical reality -  defines, shapes and guides each 
human being’.43
ii) LANGUAGE
Strategically one can see the explicit presumption of an ongoing openness in Welsh proto­
nationalism in the fact that it contains constant exhortations to uphold Wales by preserving 
the language, something that depends primarily on man. Emrys ap Iwan, balances the
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givenness of the nation, manifest through its divine ordination, with recognition that people 
have the capacity to either, with God, sustain the nation or, without God, destroy it. 
‘Remember that God who made men also ordained nations; to destroy a nation is only one 
grade less of a disaster than to destroy the whole of mankind, and to destroy the language of a 
nation one grade less of a disaster than to destroy the nation itself ...Remember also that you 
are a nation, by maintaining its language, and all other valuable things that may pertain to it. 
If you are not faithful to your country and your language and your nation, how can you 
expect to be faithful to God and humanity?44
iii) INTERNATIONALISM
The rejection of ontological closure, moreover, can be seen with great clarity in Welsh proto­
nationalism’s outer focused internationalism. Writing in philosophical-theological terms 
Waldo Williams (a Baptist who subsequently became a Quaker) claimed that the ‘nation and 
the community in which... [the Welshman] . . .seeks his roots is not an end in itself: it is man’s 
link with eternity’.45 In other words instead of the nation being a universal that can be held up 
as the source of Wales’ salvation, it is actually a ‘particular’, albeit one of great importance 46 
Providing a link to eternity, to the universal, it is self-consciously aware that there is a greater 
truth beyond, and this means that such a nationalism is in no way definitionally mutually 
exclusive to external universals that order relations between nations, such as international 
laws. Furthermore, the status of the nation as a ‘link to eternity’, i.e. the universal, which is 
by definition subordinate to that universal, suggests that, far from constituting potentially 
‘opposing universals’, other nations may perhaps also constitute different links to the 
universal and thus find reconciliation through relationship with the same universal.47
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The openness of Welsh proto-nationalism manifest in its internationalism is also testified to 
in more narrowly theological terms by the non-conformist theologian, and president of Plaid 
Cymru Prof. J. E. Daniel.48 In his sermon ‘The Blood of the Family’ Daniel contended that 
Acts 17. 26 (‘and he made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the 
earth, and determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation’) lays the 
foundation for a nationalism that is inherently internationalist. God made the nations, 
therefore, God made Wales, therefore, it is right that the people of Wales should celebrate 
their identity. God, however, also made all other nations and did so crucially from one blood.
‘He made every nation of one blood. That puts an end to any Christian attempt to set the 
nation in place of God .. .He made every nation from one blood. That puts an end to any idea 
of Herrenvolk or “lesser breeds without the law”. Here once and for all, is the unity of 
mankind’.49
CONCLUSION
Having considered the tension between elements of givenness and elements of construction in 
Welsh proto-nationalism, it is now possible to point to its Interpenetrative-Chalcedonian 
credentials. In doing so, however, it is helpful to first consider how both Newtonian 
spatialisations and postmodern hyperspatialisations (defined by chapter 2) violate 
Chalcedonian spatio-temporal co-ordinates. In the case of Newtonian spatialisations, time 
(spiritual), as chapter 2 observed, is assimilated into space (material). This results in both 
commingling and the transformation of the temporal.50 Symmetrically hyperspatialisations, 
again as chapter 2 observed, involve the assimilation of space (material) by time (spiritual) 
and thus the Chalcedonian hermeneutic underpinning Welsh territoriality is again violated. 
There is a commingling giving rise to the transformation of space. What then of Welsh proto-
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nationalism? Of great significance, the relationship between the material (spatially oriented, 
body) and the spiritual (temporally oriented, mind) in this theologically disclosed nationalism 
suggests an ontology that involves something other than either the material res extensa that 
attends positivist epistemology or the hyperspatial, extra-territoriality of post-positivism. In 
the first instance, the spiritual sustains an important interpretative relationship between space 
and its inhabitants which prevents it from merely being a ‘given’ in nature. Territory has a 
relationship to societies and individuals ‘all of whom have a temporal, intrahistorical 
aspect’.51 It is in part a social construction. In the second instance, however, this partial 
constructivism takes place in the context of a measure of givenness, deriving implicitly from 
the fixity of the land and through relatedness to God. Combining an ongoing commitment to 
the spatial orientation with a commitment to the temporal and a consequent openness which 
strategically is not just seen in the constructed nature of Welsh territoriality but more 
fundamentally in its capacity to provide an enduring openness over time (see, for example, 
the ongoing role of human agency in the use of the language), the Welsh proto-nationaist 
framework is certainly suggestive of the imprint of the Chalcedonian hermeneutic.52 It is, as 
such, of strategic relevance to any open, rationalist conception of sovereignty because it 
presents a lens with the capacity to accommodate change over time.
PART II: TEMPORALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY: J. R. & R. 
TUDURJONES
The chapter will now examine the conceptual resources provided by Welsh proto-nationalism 
in greater depth through focused analysis of the approaches provided by the Calvinistic 
Methodist, Prof. J. R. Jones and Congregationalist, Prof. R. Tudur Jones:
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TERRITORIALITY AND INTERPENETRATION: J. R. JONES
Whereas many Welsh writers start from the position of taking the givenness of territory as 
read, against which they stress its constructed component, J. R. Jones, impressed by the
53widespread appreciation of openness/construction, instead asserts territorial givenness. 
Human existence, J. R. Jones contended, is set in terms of both time and space. In the 
context of an open world, however, the tendency for the self to transcend itself means that 
‘humans constantly live in danger of finding themselves lost in a meaningless world, in a 
vacuum of identity’. That self then needs to ‘come home’.54 He/she needs, as seen through 
the Welsh tradition’s emphasis on roots, something of a spatial orientation.55 ‘The need for 
roots is to be understood above all else as a need for an earthly place, or a foothold ...The 
need for roots becomes a need for a neighbourhood, community and a country. It is 
impossible to overemphasize the territorial aspect’.56 Later he observed: ‘Humankind needs a 
“familiar place” in a vacuum and infinity of space . . . ’ 57 (Italics added). Thus, to the degree 
that self-transcending is the option of radical openness and its attendant rootlessness, ‘coming 
home’ can actually be construed as an attempt to keep the hyperspatial, the ‘infinity in space’, 
in check.
Deploying his ‘interpenetration hermeneutic’, however, Jones’ concern for the land does not 
result in it being made into an absolute. As demonstrated earlier, like the Chalcedonian 
hermeneutic, interpenetration involves time and space relating but without merging. 
‘Substances interpenetrate when one goes as it were into the other, without merging, but 
rather creating an interior relationship which does not come about when substances are 
merely joined together’.58 Thus temporality and the possibility of change is not negated by 
concern for physical territory because concern for space ultimately is not inversely related to
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concern for time. Specifically the temporality of J. R. Jones’ position is demonstrated through 
the insertion of the self-reflexive people whose identity is maintained, he argued, through the 
Welsh language. Failure of the people of Wales to use their freedom in order to sustain the 
language, and thus the specific interpenetration that is constitutive of Wales, would place its 
future in jeopardy. In Jones’ view the openness expressed through language and the closed, 
givenness expressed through the land combine in a crucial relationship that gains further 
solidity from its status as part of God’s creation. ‘Any threat to that marriage of land and 
language besmirches that distinctiveness and brings us nearer to the destruction of the Welsh 
national community, a unique piece of God’s creation’.59
J. R. Jones’ approach, therefore, strategically does not foster a view of the world whose 
narrow spatial orientation generates a panorama filled with absolute, homogenous 
spatialisations that (as defined in chapter 2), when applied to the sovereign state in the 
context of international relations, gives rise to the billiard ball metaphor. On the other hand, 
however, neither does his approach support a perspective whose narrow temporal orientation 
fosters a world filled with rootless, heterotopic, hyperspatialisations (as defined in chapter 2) 
whose radical inessentialism sustains a flux that upholds a depthless surface carrying the 
superficial image of a radical diversity. Jones’ interpenetrative grid is actually all about 
championing the Chalcedonian balance between spirit and matter, the open and the closed, 
diversity and unity, time and space. His interpenetrative hermeneutic facilitates an aspirant 
state territoriality that is partially constructed, and open to ongoing construction and change, 
and yet not entirely the fruit of man’s creativity. Neither wholly inessential nor wholly 
essential, Welsh proto-nationalism provides a conceptual tool that can cater for change, 
whilst remaining faithful to the enduring givenness of the subject matter.
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TERRITORIALITY AND INTERPENETRATION: R. TUDUR JONES
Perhaps one of the strongest statements in favour of a temporality but one that, in deference 
to the Chalcedonian hermeneutic, does not negate a simultaneous spatial orientation, is found 
in the work of R. Tudur Jones who pursues a greater sense of openness than that of J. E. 
Daniel and others by rejecting the notion that nations are one of the orders of creation.60 
‘[H]is non-sacramental theology does not allow for any mediated or derived holiness. 
Making no distinction between the divine and the sacred, worship and veneration, Jones 
asserts that to insert the nation into the order of creation is to run the risk of divinising it and 
of adopting the political manifestation of this divinisation in the form of imperialism’.61 Seen 
in the context of the cultural mandate, set in time, it is clear, Jones argued, that man has 
rightly engaged in his cultural responsibilities and, within the economy of God, these have 
given rise to nations. Boldly Jones proclaimed ‘God did not create nations. God created man 
and man formed nations. That is why it is misleading to talk of nations as one of the orders 
of creation’.62
This rejection of the notion that nations are orders of creation, however, does not actually 
negate the reality of a simultaneous spatial commitment and/or givenness. In the following 
passage R. Tudur Jones deployed a sophisticated conceptual framework underpinned by his 
interpenetrative, Chalcedonian hermeneutic that makes this balance clear. ‘God is the 
Creator. As Creator He has set his creation under the rule of law. That is that God has 
brought into being an orderly universe. God’s law is a dynamic one. The order which He has 
given to his creation is such as to allow for development and growth. He has not imprisoned 
his creation in a rigid, congealed framework where creativity is impossible. On the contrary,
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his law is the servant o f freedom. It is intended to allow for the unfolding and revealing of 
the riches implicit in creation from the beginning’ (Italics added).63 God did not want to cast 
essential nations in place by divine fiat. Instead, in partnership with man, through the 
instrumentality of the dominion mandate,64 R. Tudur Jones maintains that the nation is 
actually something of a joint effort. ‘In this sense, a Christian nation is both the work of man 
and the work of God’.65 It is partly given and partly constructed.
Jones underlines this point by referring back to Emrys ap Iwan. ‘After God had made men of 
one blood, he divided them into nations and scattered them over the face of the earth and 
appointed their times and determined the bounds of their habitation. But there is a tension in 
his [Emrys ap Iwan’s] thinking. Nations he considers, are God’s creations. And yet, they are 
the product of human activity too. Since God has made you into a nation, maintain your 
nationhood; since he took thousands of years to form an appropriate language for you, keep 
that language; because if you co-operate with God in his intentions towards you, you will the 
more easily find Him when you seek Him’.66
Thus, despite his interest in time and construction, R. Tudur Jones clearly has a commitment 
to the spatial pole. Having championed the temporal as a means of protecting against the 
danger of absolutising the nation he stated none the less; ‘It must be admitted that a great 
nation, with a history extending over many centuries has a solidity, an objectivity, a giveness 
which obscures the individual’s contribution to its life’.67 (Italics added) This ‘solidity’, 
‘objectivity’ and ‘givenness’, moreover, which contrasts starkly with the ephemerality of 
pure construction, is seen clearly in R. Tudur Jones’ argument in favour of national territorial 
government. ‘It is time for us to demand for the nation the chief medium which God has
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ordained for it to bear responsibilities, namely a government chosen by the people of Wales 
and answerable to them. Self-government for Wales is not a convenient policy. It is rather 
the next step in Wales’ growth towards maturity before the King of Kings’.68 Rather more 
starkly, and actually using the language of sovereignty he contends, ‘Welshmen must 
strengthen the bond of brotherhood between them that they may create a sovereign State of 
their own to which Welshmen can offer unembarrassed allegiance’.69 (Italics added)
THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF WELSH PROTO-NATIONALISM?
Before moving to its conclusion, it is important to reiterate that it is not the purpose of this 
thesis to suggest that the use of a Christian theological frame by Welsh proto-nationalism in 
its development of the ontology of the aspirant Welsh state is unique. As noted earlier, such a 
claim could only be made after examining every form of religiously inspired nationalism 
which would demand many theses. Whilst one cannot state that the ontology of Welsh proto­
nationalism is unique, however, one can be clear that its ontology is not commensurate with 
all other Christian nationalisms. Quite apart from the fact that Augustinian ontology contrasts 
sharply with that of Wales, reference to Russian Nationalism and the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Protestant 
German nationalist philosophy reveals a clear divergence between the open, Chalcedonian 
Welsh tradition and the profoundly closed, monistic nationalisms in the other countries, even 
whilst they all relate to the Christian faith. None of this means that one can argue that Welsh 
proto-nationalism is unique but - given its difference from at least some other Christian
• • 70nationalisms - there clearly are some grounds for asserting its distinctiveness.
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CONCLUSION: THE CHALCEDONIAN WELSH NATIONALIST FRAME AND IR
Welsh non-conformist theology, disclosed through Welsh proto-nationalism has an important 
contribution to make to the conceptualization of the sovereign polity, in the face of the 
pressures of systemic change. Specifically, Welsh proto-nationalism aspires to sovereign 
statehood but not a model of sovereign statehood that expresses pure ontological closure. It is 
the contention of this thesis that, set in the context of the global village, where one witnesses 
the increasing significance and dynamism of the temporal pole alongside the ongoing 
givenness of physical territory, the interpenetrative, Chalcedonian framework of the Welsh 
approach posits a particularly significant conceptual grid for the English School. Upholding 
an open model of sovereignty, Welsh proto-nationalism is in a good position to account for 
both ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’. Far from relu ctantly recognizing the 
actual implications of permeability, for instance, Welsh proto-nationalism is able to deal with 
the ontological challenges emanating from global flows between and beyond states because 
of the reservoir of openness sustained within its conception of aspirant sovereign statehood. 
Developed within a national and a theological perspective, moreover, the Welsh proto­
nationalist contribution fits well in the English School tradition. More importantly, however, 
it makes a contribution to the School by providing a positive ‘inside-out perspective’ on 
aspirant rationalist sovereignty to dovetail in with the negative ‘outside-in’ perspective 
provided by natural law. This perspective is of particular interest, given that it draws on the 
capacity of the Protestant Reformation theology to inform understanding of state sovereignty, 
which the English School has thus far overlooked in deference to its traditional preference for 
Saint Augustine.
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Having considered the way in which the resurgence of religion/religious ideas can be used by 
the English School to rise to the conceptual challenge of open, rationalist sovereignty in the 
context of systemic change, the thesis will now draw together the implications of this 
research as it moves to its conclusion.
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11 Interestingly, Wight gives the impression of being very frustrated with the reformers for their lack of direct, 
explicit consideration of the Reformation. This may explain why Wight chooses to consider them in the 
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wondering whether the term English was actually selected as a means of distancing Jones’ own nation from 
what he judged to be an ill-considered development?
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38 Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 60.
39 Ibid.,p. 62.
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42 Ibid. Daniel Deudney adopts a similar approach to space and place, ‘Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space 
in Nationalism’, p. 133.
43 Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, pp. 46-47.
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trans Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 165.
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answers. (Osmond, Creative Conflict, pp. 232-231.) Implicit in recognition of its status as a particular - as part 
of the whole picture rather than being the whole picture - is an appreciation of otherness and its need for 
relationship with other contingent particulars.
48 D. Densil Morgan, The Span o f the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales 1914-2000, Cardiff, 
University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 157 and Peter Beresford Ellis, The Celtic Revolution: A Study in Anti- 
Imperialism, Talybont, Y Lolfa, 1997, p. 85.
49 Making the Firm Foundations, p. 84. Trans Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, pp. 57-58.
Welsh theologian, R. Tudur Jones testifies to the internationalist character of Welsh nationalism through 
developing the term ‘polycentric nationalism’. This fosters the notion that ‘each nation has something valuable 
to contribute to the life and culture of the family of nations’. (R. Tudur Jones, ‘Christian Nationalism’, p. 74.) It 
is not afraid of the prospect of interdependent relationships with other nations. Writing in a similar vein, 
meanwhile, Welsh nonconformist Philosopher Prof. R. M. Jones contends that, far from demeaning other 
nations, the celebration of national identity by a polycentric, Aristotelian, lower case nationalism increases the 
wellbeing of other nations. ‘A healthy nationalism is synonymous with love, a fertile and active love of one’s 
country’s culture and civilisation, a love for just relations between the world’s nations, and a love for people of 
all nations without exception’. (RM Jones, ‘Gweddnewid Gwladgarwch’ in Y Cylchgrawn Efenglaidd Cyf 12, 
Rhif (tr.) R. M. Jones, ‘Language in God's Economy: A Welsh and International Perspective’, Themelios, Vol 
21 No 3, April 1996.
50 John Polkinghome, Science and Providence, London, SPCK, 1994, pp. 77-78.
51 Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 7.
52 The significance of this distinctive will become apparent as the chapter develops, especially when it later 
compares Welsh proto-nationalist thought with that of some key German nationalist thinkers.
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54 Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, P. 67. For more information on rootedness please see Appendix 4.
55 Osmond, Creative Conflict, p. 172, p. 247 and p. 250.
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Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 67.
57 J. R. Jones, Cristnogaeth a Chenedlaetholdeb, Christianity and Nationalism, p. 6, cited by Ibid., p. 67.
58 Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 6.
59 Ibid., p. 71.
60 Prof R. Tudur Jones (1921-1998) was professor of Church History at the Congregationalists Bala-Bangor 
seminary.
61 Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 62.
62 R. Tudur Jones, ‘Christian Nationalism’, p. 79.
63 Ibid., p. 76. Given the need to better appreciate the importance of reformation thought it is interesting to note 
the ontological parallel between Luther and R. Tudur Jones working later within his Protestant legacy. ‘For 
Luther, God’s activity as creator did not cease with the creation, it is a continuing process which is still going 
on. He is not a divine clock maker in the eighteenth century sense, who sets the universe in motion and then 
leaves it to operate according to its own predetermined laws. Far from it. He is continually active in His 
creation, upholding and sustaining the universe and replenishing His creation’. Cargill Thompson, The Political 
Thought o f Martin Luther, p. 49. In this eschewal of Newtonian mechanism, licensed through the enduring role 
played by God in creation, one sees the rejection of pure ontological closure.
64 R. Tudur Jones, ‘Christian Nationalism’, p. 79.
65 Ibid. p. 85.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 R. Tudur Jones, ‘Crist: Gobaith Cenedl’ [Christ: The Hope of the Nation] in Dewi Eurig Davies ed. Gwinllan 
a Roddwyd, Llandybie, Christopher Davies, 1972, p. 110, trans, Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen 
People, p. 63.
69 R. Tudur Jones, The Desire o f  Nations, p. 205.
70 Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis to claim that Welsh proto-nationalism is unique, it is worth noting in 
passing that a number of other forms of nationalism with Christian identity content, point to very different 
theologies that develop very different, monistic influences on the aspirant polity. The fact that there are other 
Christian theologically inspired nationalisms with radically different implications suggests that the Welsh 
approach is at least distinctive.
The close relationship between Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church has been subjected to 
close analysis by Andrew Evans. Contrary to the open, Perichoretic, Chalcedonian character of Welsh proto­
nationalism, the Russian Orthodox Church has informed a very closed model of nationalism that struggles with 
pluralism, internationalism and diversity. (Andrew Evans, ‘Forced Miracles: The Russian Orthodox Church and 
Postsoviet International Relations’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002, pp. 33-43. A similarly 
closed Christian nationalism is also clearly expressed in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: 
Sophia Senyk, ‘The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines’, 
Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30, No 4, 2002, pp. 317-332.)
Eighteenth and nineteenth century German Protestant scholars were similarly adept at using their theology to 
generate very monistic conceptions of the nation and its state. In, Deity and Domination: Images o f  God and the 
State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, David Nicholls argues - in much the same way as Llywelyn - 
that a thinker’s conception of God will impact his conception of the state. (Nicholls, Deity and Domination: 
Images o f God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 2 and Llywelyn, Sacred Place, 
Chosen People, p. 5.) His reflections on Fitche and Schleiermacher in this regard eloquently demonstrate the 
negation of the Chalcedonian hermeneutic with significant implication for their consequential conception of the 
state:
Fitchte presents a closed view of God, suggesting that God is monistic, autarkic and changeless. God is the 
Absolute ‘reposing within and upon itself, without change or alteration, firm and complete of itself ...without 
any foreign influence; for every thing foreign must vanish when we speak of the Absolute’. For Fichte the idea 
of God always involves self-sufficiency. The idea of independence -  Selbstandigkeit -  which played such a 
vital role in Fichte’s ethical theory as the necessary condition for free and moral action, becomes the goal of the 
state, though it is perfectly realised only in God’. (Ibid., p. 170.) Fitche’s view of God translates, Nicholls 
observes, directly into his view of the state. ‘In the political sphere Fichte’s ideal of a ‘closed commercial state’, 
set forth in 1800 in his tract of that title, and his subsequent espousal of German unity and the nationalist cause 
embody the autarkic principle, while his religious writings increasingly portray God as an absolute, unchanging 
and impassible being’. (Ibid., P. 162.) Fitche’s romantic nationalism, approached through what is effectively a
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Unitarian theological lens, thus has quite different consequences to that approached through the self-consciously 
Perichoretic, Trinitarian, Chalcedonian theological lens of the traditional Welsh genre considered above.
The German nationalist scholar, Schleiermacher, meanwhile, Nicholls observes, similarly posited a monistic, 
unchangeable, conception of God. God, Schleiermacher argued, is timeless and thus unable to engage in the 
world since this would suggest his dependence. ‘Implicit in the eternity or timelessness of God is the notion of 
his unchangeability. “No religious emotion shall be so interpreted, and no statement about God so understood, 
as to make it necessary to assume an alteration on God of any kind’. Furthermore, God must be conceived as 
independent -  not depending upon anything beyond himself. (Ibid., p. 176.)
At the heart of this independent and closed vision of God was of course a rejection once again of the Trinity 
with the possibility for interaction and change. ‘While discussing Trinitarian doctrine, Schleiermacher assumed 
that dependence involves imperfection and implies subordination. Thus he rejected any real distinctions in the 
godhead, maintaining that such distinctions would imply that “the Father is superior to the other two Persons’, 
owing to the dependence of the Son on the Father and the “twofold” dependence of the Spirit’. Once again, 
Nicholls argued, this helped to inform a very closed and monistic model of nationalism. ‘Every nation, my 
friends which has developed to a certain height is degraded by receiving into it a foreign element, even though 
that may be good in itself; for God has imparted to each its own nature, and has therefore marked out bounds 
and limits for the habitations of the different races of men on the face of the earth’. (Ibid., p. 174)
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION:
SOVEREIGNTY AND SYSTEMIC CHANGE:
AN ENGLISH SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE
It is widely claimed that sovereignty has been made radically less significant and even 
redundant as a consequence of recent systemic changes especially globalization.1 This 
thesis has responded in two ways. First, it has sought to demonstrate that sovereignty 
endures, despite systemic changes, and second, it has provided a means of 
conceptualizing sovereignty in the context of these changes by critically engaging 
with the English School three traditions spectrum. In so-doing it has argued that, 
appropriately applied, the three traditions spectrum has a greater contribution to make 
today than at the time of its initial development. It is the purpose of this concluding 
chapter to draw together the different components of the argument of this thesis, 
provide an overview of its main findings and to reflect on how this research may be 
taken forward in the future.
STRUCTURE
The chapter begins by defining the English School methodological framework of this 
thesis before moving to engage with the two central problems which this research has 
addressed. First, Part 1 engages with the question, ‘does sovereignty endure in the 
context of systemic change?’, and in so-doing necessarily provides a detailed
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definition of sovereignty, before Part 2 then moves on to the rather more challenging 
terrain of defining a framework for coming to terms with sovereignty in the context of 
systemic change. The chapter concludes with a summary overview of the main 
findings of this thesis and reflections about the direction of future research.
THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to come to terms with the challenge of examining the conceptual utility of 
sovereignty in the context of systemic change this thesis has pursued its analysis 
through a spectrum. This has a number of benefits.
First, and most obviously, a spectrum provides one with the possibility of being able 
to engage with change across a range of positions embracing state sovereignty both 
before and during regional integration/globalization. This approach has the benefit of 
not just providing an account of where sovereignty is now but of where it has been, of 
where it could go, and of how journeying across the spectrum impacts upon its 
integrity.
Second, the spectrum is also important because the fact that different states have 
different strengths and resources and respond differently to changes like regional 
integration and globalization means that these changes affect different states in 
different ways. Any conceptual frame, therefore, that rises effectively to 
globalization’s challenge must be able to accommodate the fact that at any one time 
the 192 polities of the world will be differently affected by it and thus best serviced by 
a flexible model of sovereignty. A spectrum approach rises to this challenge by
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facilitating a conceptualization of sovereignty which can vary ontologically, within 
certain parameters, from one place on the spectrum to another.
The third and final rationale for selecting a spectrum approach relates narrowly to the 
challenge of the ontological diversity generated by globalization. Globalization is 
defined as a ‘time-space compression’, the term developed to describe the manner in 
which growing interdependence has altered human experiences of the basic 
dimensions that are constitutive of reality, namely time and space. Specifically, 
globalization touches these basic dimensions, giving rise to an ontological revolution 
in which it is said that the closure (fixedness) of given space is transcended (as the 
thesis will demonstrate) by the openness (potentiality) of time. This generates a new 
ontology alongside, rather than in place o f  the previous ontology. Thus, there is a 
need to keep in view both the new and the old ontologies at the same time. Once 
again, therefore, one is confronted with the challenge of needing to cater for a breadth 
of conceptual space that can only be serviced by a spectrum.
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL
In rising to the challenge of providing an appropriate framework within which to 
conceptualize the fortunes of sovereignty in the context of systemic change, this thesis 
has adopted the ontologically plural English School ‘three traditions’ spectrum which 
can cater for change in the form of movement between the said traditions. Replete 
with this capability, it is the contention of this thesis that the English School approach 
is actually more relevant today, where it has to deal with the new ontological 
pluralism of coexisting territoriality and extra-territoriality, than it was at the time of 
its development in the 1950s. Thus far, however, this latent potentiality has been
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somewhat overlooked, a failing that this thesis makes good by developing 
understanding of the three traditions spectrum in terms of its definition and 
application.
- DEVELOPING THE DEFINITION OF THE THREE TRADITIONS
Noting Brian Porter’s challenge regarding the need for ongoing refinement of the 
three traditions,4 this thesis has sought to develop the three traditions spectrum both 
by equipping it to deal with different forms of change and also by unlocking its 
potential through the perspective of specific subject areas.
1. DIFFERENT FORMS OF CHANGE -  DIFFERENT SPECTRUMS
This research has engaged with two different kinds of change: globalization, resulting 
in the erosion of sovereignty and European integration, resulting in the territorial 
extension of sovereignty. Given that the most demanding and widespread systemic 
change in view is globalization, and that European integration can actually be 
interpreted as part of this wider process, this thesis has defined its basic approach to 
the three traditions in terms of the need to engage with this challenge, selecting the 
ontologically and epistemologically plural approach defined by Linklater and Little 
(Figure 1). In an attempt to provide a better framework for coming to terms with 
regional integration understood as ‘change by extension’, however, this thesis has also 
provided a complementary alternative perspective based on the conventional 
Wightian model (which is applied in chapter 4 - and is also relevant to chapter 7 - 
alongside and not instead o f  the basic Linklater -  Little perspective. Again see Figure 
1). Although it is possible to locate the place of European integration, leading to 
‘change by extension’, on the Linklater -  Little spectrum, it is not possible to unpack
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the process of that change between traditions because it does not involve any 
epistemological transformation. The Wightian model, however, can rise to this 
challenge. The chapter will now consider each spectrum in turn.
i) THE LINKLATER -  LITTLE MODEL
The thesis has developed the Linklater -  Little model in two ways. First, it has been 
more explicit about the capability of the three traditions to define a full 
epistemological spectrum which extends from a tight positivist pole through to a 
radical postmodern, post-positivist pole. In so-doing it has drawn on Manners’ 
critique of Linklater and Little, maintaining their association between revolutionism 
and critical theory, whilst also inserting a more radical postmodern expression of 
post-positivism at the far side of the tradition. Second, in an effort to stress the fact 
that the three traditions constitute a spectrum from ontological closure and positivism, 
on the one hand, through to a radical ontological openness and post-positivism, on the 
other, rather than three separate ontologically homogenous blocks, this research has 
employed sub-divisions within the three traditions. The resulting spectrum (moving 
from realism to revolutionism) begins with the ‘sovereign state pole’ at the extremity 
of the realist tradition, which is definitive of complete ontological closure, whilst the 
broader realist tradition is defined by a dominant ontological closure, albeit embracing 
a gradually increasing measure of ontological openness as one moves towards 
rationalism. This tradition is generally associated with positivism, extending from 
strong positivism at the ‘sovereign state pole’, through to a weaker positivism in 
wider realism. On entering the rationalist tradition one encounters the place where the 
spatial and temporal orientations find a balance, although exhibiting a bias towards 
closure at the realist end of the rationalist tradition and a bias towards openness at the
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revolutionist end of the rationalist tradition. This tradition is generally associated with 
mild post-positivism in the interpretivist/hermeneutic mould. Finally, on moving into 
the revolutionist tradition, one is faced first with a dominant ontological openness in 
whose presence the remaining spatial orientation declines until arrival at the place of 
complete ontological openness at its extremity, which this thesis defines as the post­
sovereignty pole. This tradition is related to strong post-positivism, extending from 
critical theory, associated with the wider realist tradition, through to radical 
postmodernism, associated with the post-sovereignty pole.
ii) THE WIGHTIAN MODEL
This thesis has developed the conventional Wightian approach in two ways. First, it 
has applied the spectrum to European integration (which Wight considered 
uninteresting) associating it with the confederal spectrum. Second, it has developed 
the spectrum by integrating it with the new Linklater -  Little spectrum, and gives this 
diagrammatic expression through Figure 1.
2. DEVELOPING SUBJECT PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRADITIONS
In examining the English School ‘three traditions’ spectrum and highlighting its 
relevance for engaging with systemic change, this thesis has also sought to develop 
understanding of its relevance by engaging with two important subject perspectives.
In the first instance, it has worked on the application of the spectrum to economic 
phenomena especially in chapters 4 to 7. This is important because, as many 
observers have noted, the English School’s preference for history, law, philosophy 
and theology has meant that it has only made passing references to what is arguably
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the central element of the systemic changes in view, economics. As Richard Little 
observes: ‘Despite acknowledging the importance of economics, there has been a 
reluctance by the English School to embrace this sector wholeheartedly’.5 Tony Evans 
and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, maintain: ‘The principal weakness of the English 
school is its relative disregard of economic and technological factors and the various 
types of international cooperation that these factors either induce or necessitate. If the 
characteristic feature of the Grotian conception of international society is continual 
international intercourse such as trade, as Wight held, then it is quite an omission for 
the English school to largely ignore the growth of trade and other economic relations 
in their account of the evolution in of international society’.6 More importantly in his 
call for the reconvening of the English School, Barry Buzan identified 
economic/globalization challenges as an important gap, requiring future research.7 In 
addressing economic globalization from the English School perspective, this thesis 
has demonstrated the increasing importance of the three traditions spectrum, 
especially revolutionism.8
In the second instance, this thesis has sought to develop three traditions understanding 
of ‘open sovereignty’ in the context of systemic change by drawing on the perspective 
of religion/theology (chapters 8 and 9). For many years the English School was 
unique in sustaining an interest in theology and religion, as the greater part of the 
modem IR discipline ignored this area. Recently, however, there has been a renewed 
interest in the role of religion and religious ideas in international relations.9 This 
development, in the context of the revival of interest in the English School, and the 
location of the so-called La Revanche de Dieu within globalization,10 render this an 
important area within which to develop the ‘three traditions’ schema - and especially,
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as chapter 9 argues, the rationalist tradition - demonstrating that it has an important 
contribution to make when it comes to understanding sovereignty in the context of 
contemporary systemic change.
In considering the challenge of change through the three traditions, developing their 
perspective through working on economics and theology, this thesis has highlighted 
the need for the renewal of English School methodology. Specifically, it has argued 
that there is a need to underline the interdependent nature of the relationship between 
internal and external sovereignty if the School is to remain faithful to its aspiration for 
historical sensitivity. This chapter will make reference to the need to respect the 
interdependent nature of the internal and external dimensions in defining enduring 
sovereignty in Part 1 and for the purpose of engaging with sovereignty and change in 
Part 2.
PART 1: ENDURING SOVEREIGNTY DEFINED
Having considered the English School methodological framework selected by this 
thesis and its development, it is now important to examine the definition and 
endurance of sovereignty in general terms that this thesis has developed. Specifically, 
as noted above, this thesis has argued that sovereignty must be viewed from two inter­
dependent perspectives, one negative, focusing on its external character, and the other 
positive, focusing on its internal character. (The failure of the English school to fully 
engage with the implications of the interdependent nature of the internal and external 
dimensions of sovereignty will be taken up in detail by Part 3). This has revealed the 
ongoing significance of sovereignty, rebutting the contentions of those who speak of 
its demise or relegation to practical insignificance.11
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I. NEGATIVE/EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY:
From the external perspective the English School (and indeed other theoretical 
approaches) defines sovereignty as constitutional independence.12 According to this 
approach a non-sovereign political unit (e.g. a colony or a sub-state nation) is 
constitutionally joined in a subservient relationship to a sovereign state. The polity 
generally has no freedom in the realm of foreign and defense policy, although it may 
have some autonomy in domestic policy. When the ties to the superior political form 
are broken, however, the state becomes constitutionally independent and gains 
sovereignty.13 On this basis the rich and powerful United States is no more 
constitutionally independent than is relatively impoverished and weak Sri Lanka. The 
fact that US GDP gives it greater global leverage and a greater capacity for 
maintaining decisional autonomy than Sri Lanka has no negative impact on Sri 
Lankan sovereignty whatsoever.14 Viewed from this negative perspective it is clear 
that sovereignty is ongoing. Indeed, in the context of the last fifty years with the 
demise of empire, sovereignty has triumphed with the number of constitutionally 
independent states rising from 75 (1945) to 190 (1999) and 192 (2002). On this basis 
talk about the end of sovereignty is patently inappropriate.15
II. POSITIVE/INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY:
This thesis has argued, however, that whilst any effective definition of sovereignty
must embrace constitutional independence, one runs into difficulties if one does not
have a proper regard for its positive components. The relationship between internal
and external sovereignty is recognized by the English School but in practice the thesis
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has shown that there is a tendency to focus on external sovereignty apart from internal 
sovereignty.16
i. POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND PRESENCE
In the first instance, sovereignty is not just about an absence, the absence of 
constitutional ties, but also a presence. If one makes constitutional independence the 
central definition of sovereignty, then one implicitly injects a closed Newtonian 
assumption that the granting of constitutional independence will release a ‘given’ unit 
to uphold sovereignty.17 The difficulty with this approach is that if a colony merely 
cohered under the influence of imperial power, then when made constitutionally 
independent it could break down into anarchy. In this sense there may not actually be 
anything in which to invest sovereignty. Conversely, if the colony becomes a stable 
sovereign state, then this is because the positive elements of sovereignty are present. 
There are two basic forms of positive sovereignty whose definition and endurance the 
chapter will now examine: a) the social contracted territorial people and b) the quasi­
state ruled by force.
- THE SOCIAL CONTRACTED TERRITORIAL PEOPLE
Typically, the positive presence of sovereignty is given expression through the social 
contracted territorial people. The social contract is a conceptual device -  of dubious 
historical validity -  developed to describe the formation of civil society. Whilst it 
might have been satisfying from the perspective of rights to be a self-determining 
sovereign individual, the implication of everyone brandishing such rights and refusing 
to submit to any authority, other than their own, was anarchy. Given that a measure 
of order was required for people to peaceably pursue their objectives, government was
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necessary and thus the self-determining, natural rights bearing, sovereign individuals 
surrendered their unlimited state of nature prerogatives to facilitate the formation of a 
polity sustaining the rule of law. Upheld in the name of the people, the resulting 
sovereignty provided the underpinning foundation for a framework of law, replacing 
the erstwhile state of nature with civil society.18 More recently, in the context of 
democratization, moreover, there has been an appreciation of the need for the 
contracting parties to have an enduring institutionalised influence over their collective 
sovereignty via the ballot box which has provided the means whereby they can 
continue to inform that sovereignty as individuals within their ‘people’ and has in-so- 
doing contributed to the development of the notion of the ‘sovereignty of the people’. 
Thus, whilst one can be clear that without constitutional independence polities cannot 
be sovereign, it is equally true that without a positive presence, securing coherence - 
which will often be manifest through the social contracted territorial people - they will 
also lack effective sovereignty. Critically, therefore, it is not appropriate to state that, 
as a concept in international relations, sovereignty can be defined simply by 
constitutional independence.
The continued existence of sovereignty as ‘social contracted territorial people’ has 
been demonstrated through the ongoing significance of its ‘peopled’ status - 
especially highlighted in the context of democracy and references to the ‘sovereignty 
of the people’ - which has been examined through the lens of legitimacy. Specifically, 
part of the reason why submitting to the laws of one’s own nation is judged to be 
acceptable, whilst submitting to the laws of another is not, is that the law in question 
is felt in some meaningful senses to be the law of one’s own people. It is sustained in 
the name of the social contracted people, the sovereignty of which one is a part. On
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this basis one can see the endurance of sovereignty as the social contracted territorial 
people as a function of its enduring legitimacy function.
Referring specifically to the EU, J. H. H. Weiler points out the endurance of nation­
state sovereignty as a social contracted territorial people, by considering the 
implication of its replacement. A Union between Denmark and Germany, he observes, 
would be unacceptable to a Dane even if he were promised a vote and representation 
in the Bundestag because democracy is not just about having a vote. ‘Their screams of 
grief will be shrill not simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to 
permanent minorityship (that may be true for the German Greens too), but because the 
way nationality, in this way of thinking enmeshes with democracy is that even 
majority rule is only legitimate within a Demos, when Danes rule Danes’.19 Alan 
James, meanwhile, also picks up on the endurance of sovereignty via its continuing 
legitimacy function. ‘The reason for this attachment to the idea of sovereignty is not 
hard to find. It seems that when people have come to feel affinities of the kind which 
are summed up in the word “national”, they also feel that the only proper form of 
government for them is one which is in the hands of their fellow nationals’. 
Referring back to Weiler’s example, therefore, the point that must be made is that 
there is a social contracted territorial people in Germany and a social contracted 
territorial people in Denmark but there is no such thing held in common between 
Germany and Denmark.
- QUASI-STATE AND ENFORCED ORDER
In considering positive sovereignty, the thesis has also engaged with quasi-states. 
Quasi-states are constitutionally independent and thus negatively sovereign but they
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lack the full positive content of ‘social contracted territorial sovereignty’ and thus 
depend, either on enforced coherence (through the machinery of the state i.e. police or 
military), or they don’t really exist as coherent polities even though they still enjoy
external sovereignty.21 Examples of such polities include Somalia, Chad and
22 •  •  •Angola. In maintaining external sovereignty even these polities testify to the
ongoing reality of sovereignty, although they eloquently demonstrate the problems 
associated with the general use of the English School’s narrowly negative definition 
of sovereignty.
ii. POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CAPACITY TO INITIATE
Beyond investigating the endurance of sovereignty positively in terms of coherence, 
this thesis has also considered it in terms of a capacity to initiate. The whole point 
about sovereign states is that they are not just about sustaining a passive legal 
framework but also involve an actor that acts. In the case of one of the positive 
presences for instance, the social contracted territorial people, it is said: from a social 
contract ‘emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of 
the body politic’. This sovereignty, moreover, is ‘endowed with a distinctive, 
identifiable will and a capacity for rational decision-making’. As R. Tudur Jones put 
it, ‘without a sovereign state of its own, a nation is bereft of the only body that can 
officially and formally act and speak in the name of the whole nation’.24 Thus, once 
again, whilst one can be clear that there can be no sovereignty without constitutional 
independence neither can there be sovereignty without the positive capacity to take 
action and thus express power.
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The endurance of sovereignty from the positive perspective has been demonstrated in the 
ongoing capacity to initiate sustained via extensive state machines intervening 
domestically and internationally.25 Furthermore, examination of the state’s economic
role - often said to be the main casualty of globalization - has revealed enduring room
* 26for manoeuvre in relation to which its judgement remains important in spending, 
taxation,27 borrowing,28 interest and exchange rate policies 29 This is not to say that 
the state’s freedom has not been significantly constrained, especially in some areas 
such as monetary policy following the demise of capital controls, but the sovereign 
state continues to be able to make meaningful political decisions. Indeed in some 
senses globalization and heightened borrowing opportunities provide greater room for
• * • 30initiation.
In confronting the fact that states initiate both domestically and internationally this thesis 
has provided a further demonstration of the importance of respecting the 
interdependence of internal and external sovereignty. Specifically, to the extent that the 
capacity to initiate usually depends on the agency of the social contracted territorial 
people, it can be tempting to connect it with internal sovereignty. In reality, however, 
external sovereignty does not just amount to constitutional independence. It also 
involves agency that presides over foreign and defence policy decisions. The capacity to 
make decisions and initiate, therefore, does not relate purely to internal policy 
competencies. The agent of the social contracted territorial people (or quasi-state) acts 
both domestically and internationally.
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CONCLUSION
In terms of the definition of sovereignty, whilst it certainly does depend on constitutional 
independence there needs to be something coherent that can be made independent. 
Independence does not give rise to a naturally cohering timeless given in nature. 
Coherence is secured either by a) an effective social contracted territorial people, or b) 
the power of quasi-states to enforce civic order. (In the absence of either of these positive 
presences a form of anarchy will prevail, although this does not necessarily infer the 
complete negation of sovereignty in the sense that it can endure negatively e.g. Somalia). 
Furthermore, as well as requiring something coherent that can be made sovereign as a 
result of constitutional independence, state sovereignty also requires a form of agency 
to take action domestically and internationally. Although this thesis would contend, 
therefore, that sovereignty is defined by constitutional independence and not in terms of 
absolute power,31 it does not adopt a purist legal position, asserting that sovereignty is 
not a matter of power. In this sense, whilst this thesis is very committed to the 
centrality of ‘constitutional independence’ to the definition of sovereignty, it contends 
that independence only provides part of the definition of sovereignty. In light of these 
points this thesis is critical of those, such as James, Sorensen and Waltz, who contend
• • 32that the internationally relevant sense of sovereignty can simply be defined negatively.
In terms of endurance, meanwhile, examination of sovereignty from both its 
interdependent negative and positive dimensions reveals that it is ongoing, although it 
(and in some senses its negative content) has certainly been subject to erosion. The 
thesis is consequently critical of those positing the end of the nation-state/the end of 
sovereignty thesis/practical insignificance of the sovereign nation-state without 
sufficient qualification e.g. Walker, Camilleri, Falk, Jim Falk, Hardt, Negri, 
Guehenno, Ohmae, Wriston, Horsman, Marshall, and Bauman.
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PART 2: SOVEREIGNTY & CHANGE
Having defined sovereignty and its the endurance in Part 1, it is now important to 
consider the conceptual challenge presented by an enduring but changing sovereignty 
in detail. As noted above, the conceptual apparatus of the English School is 
particularly interesting for anyone considering the place of sovereignty and systemic 
change in the sense that the three traditions spectrum provides the conceptual space 
within which to accommodate both sovereignty (most obviously in the realist and 
rationalist traditions but also to some degree in early revolutionism) and its 
transformation. Whilst these features make the three traditions extremely relevant, 
however, it has been the contention of this research that their capability to rise to this 
challenge has been undermined by the way in which the division between internal and 
external sovereignty, and subsequent focus on the latter, has been asserted by the 
English School. This division has the effect of invoking ontological closure which 
can be considered from a number of perspectives.
1. SOVEREIGNTY BY INFERENCE
First, the point must be made that the division between internal and external 
sovereignty, followed by the adoption of external sovereignty narrowly conceived, 
results (as noted earlier) in the definition of sovereignty as constitutional 
independence, suggesting that what is liberated constitutes a naturally cohering unit 
that can then be made sovereign. As Ian Clark observes, there is in this failure to 
address in any way the nature of that unit, an essential Newtonian assumption that it is 
a natural self-sustaining, self-cohering, closed, unchanging actor that will endure.34
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Far from constituting an appropriate historically rooted approach, this definition is 
profoundly ahistorical.
2. OBSCURING INSIDE-OUT CHANGE
Second, the division between internal and external sovereignty effectively separates 
external from internal sovereignty and in so-doing cuts it off from what -  certainly in 
the current environment of economic transformation -  is an important low 
politics/economics process arena of change. Furthermore, to the extent that external 
sovereignty depends foundationally on the social contracted territorial people of 
internal sovereignty which is treated as effectively closed because of the above 
division between internal and external sovereignty, this arguably does not just impart 
external sovereignty with ontological closure in the sense that a source of openness is 
denied. As a basis upon which external sovereignty rests, it also has the capacity to 
inform the character of that external sovereignty with closure.
3. ABSOLUTE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Finally, the fact that the abstracted external sovereignty - resulting from the division 
between internal and external sovereignty - is defined in terms of an absolute 
constitutional independence makes it wholly incapable of engaging with gradual 
change that might result in the slow development or erosion of constitutional 
independence. Alan James defines the absoluteness of sovereignty in the following 
terms: ‘constitutional independence is either possessed or not. The relevant entity is 
sovereign (and therefore 100% sovereign) or lacks sovereignty -  lacks it totally’. 
Georg Sorensen, meanwhile, echoes the constitutionally absolute status of sovereignty 
by drawing an analogy with other legal categories marriage and citizenship. A person
410
is either married or not, there is no legal status of 75% married. A person is either a 
citizen or not, there is no legal status of 75% a citizen. ‘[A] state either does have 
sovereignty in the sense of constitutional independence or it does not have it. There is
'Xfkno half way house, no legal in between’.
Thus the ironic consequence of subscribing to the negative definition of sovereignty is 
the fact that one ends up with an ontologically absolute account of sovereignty that is 
more appropriate for ontologically closed neorealism than historically rooted 
approaches such as the English School.37 The ontological implications of this 
tendency seriously undermine the School’s capacity to deal with the sovereign state 
and systemic change and thus the sovereign state in the context of European 
integration and globalization.
One can see a good example of the problems of engaging with change that result from 
the closed conception of sovereignty in Alan James’ account of European integration. 
In James’ view there is only room for sovereign nation-states or sovereign 
supranational states. There is no conceptual space for the ‘in between’. James claims 
that the EU is nowhere near becoming a sovereign state but the only other model he 
appears to have is one that addresses international bodies from an essentially 
intergovernmental perspective. Prior to sovereign federal statehood; organizations ‘do 
not have independent lives of their own; they do not have independent sources of 
finance; they do not have independent armed forces. All they have comes from or is 
loaned to them by states. Consequentially, organizations are unable to devour, as it 
were, their creators, and therefore present no threat at all to states’ constitutional 
independence’. Thus it would seem that even when one deals with integration projects
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between states with growing supranational components, these are deemed to be a 
function of the nation-state sovereignty, as in any conventional intergovernmental 
arrangement, until some day presumably their extent is such that they become a single 
new sovereign state.38 Thus, as suggested above, when one subscribes to an absolute 
conception of sovereignty (i.e. when an actor is either 100% sovereign or not 
sovereign at all), it is not really possible to contemplate a gradual transfer of 
sovereignty bit by bit.39 It is, therefore, hardly surprising that one should be forced 
into accepting a framework that basically infers that one must move at a specific 
moment in time from a place where the member states are wholly sovereign (and the 
EU is not) to a place where the EU is wholly sovereign (and the members states are 
not).40 This absolute approach to sovereignty may have worked when considering the 
advent of new sovereign states, released at specific moments from imperial rule, but it 
is not applicable to European integration, nor does it help when considering any other 
conceivable process of the gradual transfer of sovereignty over time.41
In the context of contemporary systemic changes emanating from the world of low 
politics/economic processes, the decision to deal with sovereignty as ‘external 
sovereignty’ abstracted from internal sovereignty has been a major problem for the 
English School. There is a clear need for it to embrace a holistic ‘negative and 
positive’ model of sovereignty that can be subjected to changes emanating from the 
inside-out as well as the outside-in. This must provide a capacity to deal with the 
positive presences of the social contracted territorial people or quasi-state 
governments which must be seen as capable of initiation if they are to properly inform 
any definition of sovereignty.42
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ENGAGING WITH TWO CHANGES
Having recognized the importance of developing a holistic account of sovereignty that 
can engage with change, this chapter will now consider the two forms of sovereignty 
transformation with which this thesis has engaged, ‘change by extension’ and ‘change 
by erosion’ through the approach to the three traditions spectrum defined in Part 1.
1) REGIONAL INTEGRATION & ‘CHANGE BY EXTENSION’
As noted above, one subject that requires English School engagement with change is 
European integration where the transformation in question is classified as ‘change by 
extension’. This concluding chapter will first define the relevant application of the 
three traditions and then consider the actual process of ‘change by extension’.
This thesis has engaged with European integration through both the models of the 
three traditions defined by Figure 1. From the perspective of the epistemological 
account of the spectrum (the horizontal axis, Figure 1) which is adopted as the basic 
approach of this research, ‘change by extension’ is examined in terms of the non­
sovereign state pole part of realism and rationalism. As noted in Part 1, however, 
given that this account of the spectrum can only locate epistemologically constant 
transformations rather than unpack them, this thesis has deployed the complementary 
Wightian perspective (in tandem with the confederal spectrum) in order to tease out 
the transformation from nation to supranation, from realism to revolutionism (the 
vertical axis, Figure 1).
According to the functionalist perspective, it was the liberation of factors of 
production from sub-units of what would become a national economy that resulted in
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the creation of the modem nation and the sovereign nation-state. Extrapolating 
forward within this framework, this research has considered the possibility that the 
current explosion of factors of production out of the national economy testifies to the 
need for a larger supranational territorial market and thus polity. On this basis it 
would seem that European integration, for instance, is about the development of the 
sovereign nation-state writ large and thus the extension rather than the negation of 
sovereignty.
This thesis demonstrates, however, that although a supranational jurisdiction is 
emerging on a functional basis, it is not giving rise to a supranational social 
contracted territorial people nor the demise of the member state social contracted 
territorial peoples. Presenting a form of ‘interest’ rather than ‘identity based’ 
jurisdiction, the emerging supranational base constitutes what might be described as a 
truncated sovereignty that exists, for legitimacy purposes, very much in subjection to 
the several social contracted territorial national sovereignties of the member states.43
In light of this, the confederal framework developed for studying the emergence of 
supranational jurisdiction in chapter 4 (and applicable to both wider realism and the 
whole of rationalism) is very relevant so long as one appreciates that, on the basis of 
current experience, the EU shows no signs of having the capacity to go over Forsyth’s 
brink and generate a United States of Europe, replete with a European demos. The 
sovereign member states thus continue to remain very important, coexisting with the 
growing supranational jurisdiction. By facilitating recognition of the development of a 
supranational jurisdiction that does not result in the demise of the member states, the 
approach developed by this thesis provides an important service. On the one hand it
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avoids the difficulties of theories based on abstracted Newtonian models of 
sovereignty (be they based on a narrow English School concern for constitutional 
independence or the Newtonianism of positivist IR, whether neorealist or neoliberal). 
These permanently view the EU as a conventional intergovernmental project, failing 
to see the gradual emergence of something new.44 On the other hand it avoids some of 
the pitfalls of strongly post-positivist critiques which, in their eagerness to detect 
radical breaks from the past, tend to lose sight of the continuity of the sovereign state 
either in spite of the change or as part of it.45
2) GLOBALIZATION & ‘CHANGE BY EROSION’
Having recognized the importance of seeing ‘change by extension’ in the context of 
European integration, it is now important to consider ‘change by erosion’ in the 
context of wider globalization. This thesis has associated this challenge primarily with 
the revolutionist tradition, as disclosed in the Linklater-Little spectrum (see the 
horizontal axis of Figure 1), considering it from the perspective of both economic and 
political developments. This chapter will now explore each in turn:
a. ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE DIMINISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY
Whilst globalization involves the quantitative extension of factors of production 
which can be interpreted as the next stage of the functionalist account of the nation­
state heading towards a supranational destination, it is arguably very much more 
about a qualitative transformation.46 Defined as a revolution in the nature of space and 
time, globalization has given rise to a new ontologically autonomous, extra-territorial 
domain wherein power flows operate that constrain the liberty of the state which are
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crucially located beyond its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach which is by 
definition territorial.47
To the extent that extra-territoriality is driven by power flows that contradict the will 
of the sovereign state, one might be tempted to say that it can’t change sovereignty 
because sovereignty has never been about power in the sense of guaranteeing states 
the capacity to do exactly what they want. In adopting this position, however, one 
would be turning one’s back on the conceptual distinction between territorial and 
extra-territorial restraint, the rapid expansion of the latter through globalization and its 
considerable implications for territorial sovereignty. In a world where power bases 
have been established which are not directly accountable to the sovereign state, there 
is a very real sense in which such powers stand in competition with those of the state, 
eroding it in a way that was not and is not true of territorial power.48 Crucially this 
means that Laughland’s comments, for example, regarding the irrelevance of the 
French experience, at the hands of financiers in the early eighties, to fears about the 
integrity of French sovereignty are misconceived.49 They are based upon ontological 
premises which the hyperspatial has swept away. Thus there is a need to account for 
changes that affect sovereignty by taking jurisdictions beyond sovereignty’s direct 
onto(logical)-constitutional reach and consequentially result in its curtailment.50
The ontological impact of globalization’s spatio-temporal revolution on sovereignty 
can be seen with particular clarity when one examines the attempts of some scholars 
to relocate sovereignty to the extra-territorial realm. Reflecting on the rising 
significance of hyperspatial, extra-territorial flows, Sassen contends that ‘rather than 
sovereignty eroding as a consequence of globalization and supranational
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organizations, it is being transformed. There is plenty of it around, but the sites for its 
concentration have changed over the last two decades -  and economic globalization 
has certainly been a key factor in all this’.51 Whilst this research does not support this 
approach because the centrality of territory to sovereignty effectively makes any 
extra-territorial category definitionally post-sovereign, this reference demonstrates 
very clearly the movement of power into the extra-territorial realm, and thus beyond 
the direct onto(logical)-constitutional/jurisdictional reach of territorial sovereignty.
b. POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE DIMINISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY
The thesis has considered two bases for the erosion of sovereignty through political 
developments relating both to a) the increasing numbers of interventions in the affairs 
of sovereign states and also b) networked interpretations of the reactions of polities to 
the governance challenges of globalization. This chapter will now review both in turn.
I. INTERVENTION
Consideration of the curtailment of sovereignty through intervention reveals the 
increasing willingness of states, to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states in 
the absence of the old Cold War restrictions. Not only is this giving rise to a greater 
number of interventions but also interventions on a wider basis that can be interpreted 
as taking steps towards the authentication of a global humanitarian ethic in violation 
of the division of the planet between separate sovereign states.52
II. NETWORKED GOVERNANCE
Examination of the state’s response to extra-territorial power flows through the 
development of networked governance also demonstrates the diminishment of
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sovereignty. Specifically, rather than checking the erosion of sovereignty, it is said 
that there is a sense in which, by embracing the networked organizational form, states 
themselves actually develop an extra-territorial political domain to govern extra­
territorial life which itself contributes to the erosion of sovereignty. To properly 
understand this development one must examine the networked form that is definitive 
of governance, first in general terms of its impact on participating actors and 
conceptions space and then narrowly in terms of government.
Actors embracing the ‘networked form’ find that ontological closure is exchanged for 
an ontological openness that increasingly refashions them as hubs for flows of 
information, ideas and money. Indeed, in order to really come to terms with the 
network, it is necessary to focus on the relationships between actors rather than on the 
actors themselves. As Mulgan reflected, ‘[i]t may still look as if it [the world today] is 
made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper
•  * 53reality is one of multiple connections, many of them inexplicable, many invisible’.
In seeking to come to terms with the impact of states embracing the network the 
central challenge is the need to factor the flows associated with the network - bringing 
the demise of the subject-object, public-private, foreign-domestic 
dualities/dichotomies, and its consequential hyperspatial co-ordinates - into 
government. ‘The logic of networks will completely upset ...[the essential modem 
perspective]... the frontier is no longer a beginning, but an ending, always precarious, 
by nature fluid - for fluidity becomes the condition of competition and of dynamism 
in the age of networks. No juridical space is ever definitely fixed’.54 On the one hand,
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as demonstrated below, the network erodes old sovereign spaces; on the other hand, it 
creates new spaces.
In terms of eroding old spaces, networked governance, operating in deference to 
functional rather than social contracted, territorial logic, has tended to exchange the 
all-purpose, fixed boundaries that enclosed ‘life’ during the modem era for a new 
multi-dimensional political form. Specifically, in the multi-dimensional form the 
endness that accompanied the modem state, with its social contracted, territorial 
foundation, upholding a potentially universal legal jurisdiction within its territorial 
boundaries, is replaced by a functional logic which runs through the nation-state, 
breaking up its sovereignty ‘into several functional structures’.55 The net result is a 
form of decentred governance consisting of different strands of what used to be called 
sovereignty devoted to different areas of policy.
In developing new spaces, networked governance is becoming part of extra­
territoriality such that there is a real sense in which a space between nations is 
emerging. This has increasingly less to do with providing a basis for relationship 
between states - of being a means to an end - and has instead become a space in its 
own right. ‘Consider the global system of transnationalized microeconomic links... 
[These] have ‘created a nonterrritorial “region” in the world economy - a decentred 
yet integrated space of flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the 
spaces-of-places that we call national economies’.56
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CATERING FOR CHANGE BY EROSION
In light of the above examples of ‘change by erosion’, it has been important for this 
thesis to consider how to introduce the requisite conceptual adjustment. In rising to 
this challenge it has used the epistemological lens provided by strongly post-positivist 
critiques of sovereignty, focusing particularly on the approach identified by John 
Gerard Ruggie, ‘the unbundling of territoriality’. The need to unbundle sovereignty is 
bom of the fact that sovereignty is ‘bundled’, i.e. ontologically closed, such that the 
sovereign state is not sensitive to relationships between itself and other actors - be 
they other sovereign states or non-state actors - and any resulting changes. The 
sovereign state must be reconceptualized (unbundled), in order to give expression to 
contemporary global flows and change, if it is to clarify rather than obscure
• ^7understanding of the dynamic international arena.
Whilst this thesis supports the use of the unbundling of sovereignty as a means of 
coming to terms with ‘change by erosion’, however, it has argued that, although there 
can be no questioning the reality of ‘change by erosion’, the evidence suggests that, it 
has not actually resulted in the deconstruction of sovereignty. In truth, as noted in Part 
1 (and chapter 7), sovereignty endures and thus the impact of ‘change by erosion’ has 
been crucially partial. Whilst sovereignty clearly has experienced some erosion as a 
consequence of global flows, intervention and the emergence of networked 
governance, it has not been deconstmcted. Indeed, even whilst there is a sense in 
which aspects of life have been relocated to an extra-territorial realm that is beyond 
the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach of the sovereign state, as chapter 7 
demonstrated, this has not prevented them still drawing on the ‘legitimate’ regulation 
of states rooted in the social contracted territorial people. This provides another
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opportunity to highlight problems with the traditional legal defence of sovereignty. In 
asserting that sovereignty, as a legal rather than a power category, is unaffected by 
globalization, it is the contention of this thesis that those scholars like James, Jackson, 
Sorensen, Hinsley and Laughland who stress a narrowly negative definition of 
sovereignty fail to recognise the very real way in which globalization does diminish it 
ontologically.58
Having considered the impact of both ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’, 
the chapter will now turn to the model of sovereignty which this thesis has sought to 
develop in order to engage with these two forms of change.
RATIONALISM: TOWARDS OPEN SOVEREIGNTY?
Both ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’ require a model of sovereignty 
that can engage with a measure of ontological openness which this thesis has defined 
as ‘open sovereignty’. In the case of ‘change by extension’ the notion of open 
sovereignty is useful because it engages with the reality of an enduring sovereignty 
which, not reified in the sense of being unpliable and fixed, can be extended albeit (to 
date) in truncated form. In the case of ‘change by erosion’, meanwhile, the notion of 
open sovereignty is useful because the unbundling of sovereignty required to come to 
terms with global flows and intervention gives rise to the development of a form of 
sovereignty that, whilst eroded, and thus changed, none the less endures. Indeed, to 
the extent that completely ontologically closed (bundled) sovereignty is pure 
abstraction, open sovereignty can also be used to refer to pre-globalization 
sovereignty, although the point must be made that in the context of current pressures, 
there is clearly a need for any relevant model of sovereignty to accommodate a greater
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measure o f  openness. To the extent that this m odel o f  sovereignty i:s neither 
completely closed, in the neorealist (sovereign state pole) tradition, nor completely 
open, in the revolutionist (post-sovereigpty pole) tradition, open sovereignty finds its 
natural hom e in tlhe rationalist tradition. O pen sovereignty is o f  strategic importance 
because, on the one hand its enduring spatial orientation provides a w ay o f  
recognising the ongoing reality o f  territorial sovereignty (continuity), w hilst its 
temporal orientation provides a means for engaging with extension, permeability, 
global flows and intervention (change).
Given the above foundation for rationalism ’s revived significance,, this thesis has 
endeavoured to contribute to the developm ent o f  the conceptualization and application 
of rationalism  in a w ay that is sensitive to the current environment. In doing so, 
mindfuil o f  both the multi-disciplinary nature o f  the English School, and the need to 
maintain a  narrow focus, this thesis has sought to m ake its contribution to the 
conceptualization o f  rationalism  through concentrating on one o f  the relevant 
disciplines, theology. This provides a  very appropriate lens because o f a) its 
increasing importance in the context o f  globalizatio n, b) the fact that it resonates with 
the current desire to ‘let culture back in ’ and c) because it is also the subject o f  
renewed interest as a  function o f the current revival o f  the English School.59
Examination o f rationalism  dem onstrates the role o f  theology at its genesis through 
natural law  assum ptions.60' This posits an ontologically open m odel o f  sovereignty in 
the sense that this external, transnational moral imperative, affects the direction o f  the 
sovereign state from the outsidle-in but strategically without negating; its sovereignty.. 
In seeking to develop understanding o f  rationalism  in order to make it a  fuller
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concept, however, this thesis has sought to complement this outside-in, theologically 
disclosed perspective on rationalism with one that is inside-out. This strategy has two 
benefits, one pertaining narrowly to the definition of open sovereignty, the other 
relating to the wider development of English School thought:
i. DEVELOPING THE DEFINITION OF OPEN SOVEREIGNTY
Examination of the Augustinian legacy revealed the foundation for a very limited 
form of openness.61 This thesis has demonstrated, however, that the English School 
can develop its theologically disclosed understanding of open sovereignty by reaching 
out beyond Butterfield and Wight’s engagement with Saint Augustine. Drawing on 
Welsh proto-nationalism, this research has demonstrated a theological source that can 
provide the requisite openness to describe an ‘inside-out’ account of open 
sovereignty. This chapter will first look at openness from a Welsh proto-nationalist 
perspective in general terms and then specifically from the outside-in and then the 
inside-out perspective.
On the one hand, its temporal orientation renders it ontologically open in a way that 
will always elude Augustinian (not to mention especially Newtonian) models of 
sovereignty. As a consequence it is able to engage with, and be sensitive to, both 
relationship between international actors and change. On the other hand this new 
temporal orientation and attendant openness does not terminate an enduring spatial 
orientation which provides it with the capacity to appreciate, and account for ongoing 
sovereign territorial government. Strategically, it is the spatial orientation of the 
spatio-temporal balance of open sovereignty that ensures that it is ‘open sovereignty’ 
rather than just openness (post-sovereignty). Unlike those accounts that seek a radical
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unbundling/deconstruction of territorial sovereignty, open, rationalist sovereignty 
maintains a clear, partially bundled territorial ontology. It does not become 
hyperspatial and extra-territorial, thereby negating its character as sovereignty 
manifested in the form of a social contracted territorial people enjoying the 
recognition of fellow sovereign polities.
Approached from the outside-in, the temporality of open sovereignty posits a state 
that is not ontologically cut off from the international realm through an obscurantist 
absolute foreign/domestic dichotomy.62 It avoids the suggestion that the international 
arena is a matter of states that - constituting hard, unrelational billiard balls crashing 
into each other -  generate an asocial ‘no man’s land’ which, entirely ‘silent’ on the 
subject of positive relationships, can only understand ‘war’.64 It can accommodate 
relational interaction, facilitating the development of social institutions that mean that, 
rather than merely being a realm of anarchy, the international arena can sustain a 
mixture of anarchy and hierarchy, openness and closure.65 Not claiming to have 
closure on all issues, open sovereignty can cater for the possibility of extra-territorial 
flows that are not within its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach.
Approached from the inside-out, meanwhile, open sovereignty, unlike neorealist 
sovereignty, avoids blocking endogenous changes of interest.66 As a partially open 
category, the polity bearing open sovereignty is not endowed with entirely fixed 
interests deployed a priori. Thus the rationalist sovereign state (unlike the neorealist 
sovereign state) is not condemned to being a timeless category that ‘effaces our 
understanding of the historically constituted character of political life, and of the
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specific articulation of spatio-temporal relations we have come to treat as the a priori 
condition of all political existence’.
ii. THE BROADER THE ENGLISH SCHOOL BENEFIT
The cultural lens provided by the Welsh proto-nationalist literature is also useful 
because it contributes to the development of English School theological reflection by 
highlighting an alternative interpretation of the Reformation (conventionally 
associated with revolutionism) which actually lays the foundation for the contention 
that the Reformation is central to the definition of the sovereign state and is thus of 
primary importance to the realist and rationalist traditions. This has provided an 
opportunity to place the School’s approach to the sovereign state (and thus realism 
and rationalism) in a theological context that is wider than that of Augustine and, in 
the context of systemic change, more useful.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has not criticised the English School’s difficulties with change to argue 
that it is theoretically bankrupt. It has rather affirmed the three traditions spectrum as 
a framework for coming to terms with continuity and change, serviced by its classical 
and historically cautious approach. In doing so, however, it has highlighted the 
importance of not abstracting external from internal sovereignty and allied low 
political processes, including economic change. There is a need to renew the three 
traditions approach so that it can cater for the full breadth of potential contemporary 
change through the reaffirmation of the relationship between internal and external
/ o
sovereignty. Given the English School’s rooted, practical approach, it argues that 
this development of a more holistic approach to sovereignty (not abstracting external
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from internal sovereignty) provides a model that is more in line with undergirding 
English School philosophy, removing the basis for Jones’ mistaken believe that he 
was confronting an ontology associated with a scientific project.69 Developing this 
renewed approach to sovereignty means that rather than simply catering for changes 
effecting sovereignty as an ‘external whole’, like decolonisation or secession, it can 
engage with current transformations that bring both gradual ‘change by extension’, 
(associated primarily with the vertical Wightian spectrum and gradual ‘change by 
erosion’, (associated with the horizontal epistemological spectrum). In rising to this 
challenge, the thesis has championed an open rationalist model of sovereignty in the 
context of a renewed interpretation of the wider three tradition spectrum drawing on 
the Linklater Little approach, the challenges of globalization and the conceptual 
resources of theology.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The following provides an overview of the six main contentions of this thesis:
First, the partial nature of globalization has inaugurated a dislocated world, embracing 
both modem territoriality, which this thesis associates primarily with realism, and 
post-modem extra-territoriality, which this thesis associates with revolutionism. This 
requires the development of an ontological spectrum in which the ontological 
pluralism of the English School three traditions spectrum comes into its own. Indeed, 
in light of the ontological challenges of globalization, it is the contention of this thesis 
that the three traditions spectmm is more relevant today than at the time of its 
development.
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Second, the tendency to separate positive/internal sovereignty from negative/external 
sovereignty, if pressed too far, can lead to an abstracted, ahistorical view of 
sovereignty that cannot cater for change. The fact that this tendency has been 
especially true of the English School, which is characterised by a concern for history, 
is particularly ironic. It must guard against treating sovereignty as essentially 
‘constitutional independence’ and develop instead a holistic appreciation that is 
sensitive to the interdependent nature of the positive and negative dimensions of 
sovereignty. Failure to rise to this challenge results in an ontology that is just as 
problematic as that of Hobbesian or neorealism. This has resulted in this thesis parting 
company with neorealists like Waltz and Mearsheimer and, more importantly those 
writing more in the English School tradition, like James and Sorensen.70
Third, in applying a holistic, change sensitive, definition of sovereignty in the context 
of globalization, there are two kinds of change with which one must engage:
In the first instance there is a need to account for ‘change by extension’. In the context 
of European integration the movement of competencies from one sovereign 
jurisdiction to another results in the erosion of some sovereignties and the formation 
of a new supranational sovereignty, albeit bereft of a demos and consequentially 
adopting a narrowly interest rather than a broader interest/culture/history based 
identity. These changes result in partial sovereignties (relating to some rather than all 
competencies), offending the notion that sovereignty is a necessarily absolute 
condition, as argued by those positing ontologically closed models of sovereignty 
namely realists, neorealists and those English School thinkers subscribing to an
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abstracted negative definition of sovereignty e.g. Morgenthau, Waltz, Hinsley, James, 
Sorensen, etc.
In the second instance there is a need to account for ‘change by erosion’. The spatio- 
temporal revolution that is definitive of globalization results in the removal of some 
aspects of economic and political life beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional, 
reach of the sovereign state.71 Sovereignty may be a constitutional, legal category 
whose reality has never been negated by environmental constraints but globalization 
has transformed the world by complementing power flows that are directly within its 
onto(logical)-constitutional reach with those that are not. The massive increase in 
constraining power flows beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach of the 
territorial state is such that it results in a new kind of erosion of state sovereignty.
Fourth, whilst this unbundling is an appropriate means of introducing ontological 
change to sovereignty to account for changes beyond sovereignty, it is not appropriate 
to unbundle sovereignty per se. One should only unbundle to the extent that there is a 
need to develop a non-Newtonian ontology that is partially open. There is no case for 
unbundling sovereignty per se because investigation of it both negatively and 
positively demonstrates that sovereignty endures. The thesis is consequently critical 
of those positing the end of the nation-state/the end of sovereignty thesis without 
sufficient qualification e.g. Walker, Camilleri, Falk, Jim Falk, Negri, Hardt, 
Guehenno, Ohmae, Wriston, Horsman, Marshall, and Bauman.72
Finally, in order to develop a model of sovereignty that, whilst enduring, can 
accommodate both ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’, this thesis turns to
428
the rationalist tradition. Seeking to develop its conceptualization and application, the 
thesis complements disclosure of its partially closed -  partially open ontology through 
natural law, from the outside-in perspective, with disclosure of that same ontology via 
the theologically disclosed interpenetrative-Chalcedonian hermeneutic of Welsh 
proto-nationalism, from the inside-out. This results in a model of what this thesis 
describes as ‘open sovereignty’ which provides the best framework within which to 
conceive sovereignty in the context of European integration/globalization because its 
enduring spatial orientation enables it to be sensitive to continuity whilst its temporal 
orientation enables it to engage with change. In introducing a new inside-out grid on 
rationalism, the thesis makes an important contribution to English School theory, 
suggesting that Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr under-estimated the significance of 
Reformation theology in their definition of realism and rationalism.
Thus it is the contention of this thesis that sovereignty is ongoing and that talk about 
the end of sovereignty/end of the nation-state is consequently unhelpful. Sovereignty 
has, however, been subject to both ‘change by extension’ and ‘change by erosion’ and 
thus the idea that it is not affected by contemporary systemic change is untenable. It 
must be able to cater for an international arena in which the sovereign state remains 
an important player but self-consciously alongside, extra-territorial flows and 
sometimes within transnational networked organisational forms. The ‘open 
sovereignty’, rationalist approach, developed by this thesis, provides the spatio- 
temporal framework within which to rise to this challenge.
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FUTURE DIRECTION OF RESEARCH
This research can be taken forward on a number of fronts.
First, there is room for a more ‘in depth’ comparison between: a) this thesis’ approach 
to change manifest through globalization, defined as the revolution in space and time 
and its associated epistemological logic and b) that associated with Barry Buzan’s 
From International to World Society P  It would be helpful to consider to what extent 
there is a place for drawing the more functional/structural approach of Buzan, 
alongside the moral solidarist approach of Vincent, Dunne and Wheeler, and also the 
epistemologically plural approach associated with this research and that of Linklater, 
Little and Manners. In considering these three different English School approaches 
juxtaposed to each other, however, one is forced to ask whether or not the School may 
be becoming the site of the very fragmentation that Buzan, in his call for reconvening 
the School, suggested it might be the English School’s distinctive contribution to 
avoid?74
Second, in terms of European integration there is need for a comparison between 
those English School approaches that see European integration giving rise to the 
extension of sovereignty and those that see it resulting in the erosion of sovereignty 
and the development of what this research characterises as networked post-sovereign 
governance. In so-doing it would be important to draw networked governance theory 
more into conversation with revolutionism (exploiting the work of chapter 6). In so- 
doing it will be important to ask whether, rather than debating which perspective has 
the most merits, it might be more useful to approach the EU using both the Wightian
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and Linklater-Little approaches to the three traditions, giving equal importance to 
both change by extension and erosion?
Third, the conceptual challenge of regional integration, moreover, is becoming more 
important in the context of the rapid development of other projects beyond the EU. 
There is a special need for a comparative analysis between the EU, the Andean 
Community and CARICOM, through an English School framework both in terms of 
the extension of sovereignty thesis (realism/rationalism) and the erosion manifest in 
the networked governance thesis (revolutionism).
Fourth, there is a need, as ever, to maintain the sharpness of the application of the 
three traditions spectrum by keeping informed of the extent to which revolutionist 
ontology is strengthened either as a result of new developments in terms of global 
economic flows or a developing culture of intervention fuelled by a new 
humanitarianism. Conversely, it is important to have regard for the fact that 
globalization is not necessarily a one way street, mindful of the fact that social 
dislocation on the back of deregulation may precipitate re-regulation: see for example 
the discussions after the 1997-8 East Asian financial crisis. None of this will require 
the development of a new framework over and above that contained in this thesis but 
there will be a need to adjust interpretation through that framework in accordance 
with contemporary developments.
Fifth, in the context of the renewed interest in theology and IR, it is worth reflecting 
in greater detail on the attention afforded Saint Augustine by English School 
definitions of ‘Christian Realism’ and the tendency to define the impact of
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Reformation theology, which actually informed the advent of the modem state 
system, as revolutionist (seeking to overturn the state system) rather than realist or 
rationalist. In doing so there is an opportunity for considering to what extent releasing 
these thinkers from revolutionism might free up revolutionism/world society to play a 
clearer role especially in the context of globalization.
Sixth, from the perspective of Welsh proto-nationalism, specifically, there would be 
great value in providing a more detailed comparison between it and the other very 
much more ‘closed’ forms of Christian nationalism mentioned by this thesis to 
underline its importance, at the same as looking for traditions that overlap rather more 
with it.
1 Marc Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, Globalization: Theory and Practice, ed. Elenore Kofrnan 
and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 113; Marc Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, 
Globalization: Theory and Practice, eds. Elenore Kofrnan and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, 
pp. 168-9; David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 229- 
37; Jackson ‘Introduction’, Sovereignty at the Millennium, p. 4; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Empire, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 325-328; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David 
Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford, 
Polity Press, 1999, p. 5; Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Oxford, Polity 
Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 64; Jean Marie Guehenno, The End o f the Nation-State, 
Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p 57 and Ian Clark, Globalization and International 
Relations Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 70. Also see: ‘decisions and outcomes do 
not correspond with the choices of sovereign wills and are not contained by the boundaries within 
which they operate’. Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End o f Sovereignty? The Politics o f  a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 77.
2 The notion that globalization is essentially about a revolution in time and space, a time-space 
compression, has a very broad basis of support from people coming from a number of different 
theoretical positions: David Harvey maintains that globalization leads to ‘an intense phase of time-space 
compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the 
balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life’; David Harvey The Condition o f 
Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins o f Cultural Change, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284. 
Mittleman claims that ‘[d]riven by changing modes of competition, globalization compresses the time 
and space aspects of social relations’. James Mittleman, ‘The Dynamics of Globalization’, 
Globalization: Critical Reflections, ed. James Mittleman, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1996. Williams claims that ‘globalization presents a different articulation of time and space. Authority 
structures need no longer be fixed to territorial actors’. Marc Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, 
Globalization: Theory and Practice, ed. Elenore Kofrnan Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 117-18. 
Also see: Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, chapters 1 and 2; David Held, 
Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics 
and Culture, pp. 14-16; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in 
international relations’, pp. 146-7; James Der Derian, ‘The Space of International Relations Simulation,
432
Surveillance and Speed’, International Studies Quarterly, 1990, pp. 295-310; Anthony Giddens, Beyond 
Left and Right: The Future o f Radical Politics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4 and Anthony 
Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f  Social Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 
31.
3 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’, Review o f International 
Studies, 2001, pp 476.
4 Brian Porter, ‘Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight’s “International theory’” , The Reason 
o f States, ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 73.
5 Richard Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, presented 
to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, University of Manchester p. 18.
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/
6 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, ‘Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A 
Comparison’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 1992, p. 329.
7 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’, pp. 484-485.
8 In employing this approach the thesis engages in a project not dissimilar to that of Buzan in: From 
International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure o f  Globalisation, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. It differs significantly, however, in the sense that it 
engages with globalization defined in terms of a spatio-temporal revolution and connects with its 
specific challenges through employing the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum.
9 In terms of a renewed interest specifically in theology within the English School please see: Scott M. 
Thomas, ‘Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English 
School of International Relations’, International Affairs, Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001; Charles Jones, 
‘Christianity and the English School’, paper presented to the annual convention of the International 
Studies Association at Chicago, 2001; Ian Hall, ‘History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert 
Butterfield and International Relations’, Review o f International Studies 28, 2002, pp. 719-36; Sean 
Molloy, ‘Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight’, European 
Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University 
of Canterbury, 8-10* September 2001, and Roger Epp, ‘The “Augustinian moment” in international 
politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition’.
In terms of the general renewed interest in theology see: Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Religion 
in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York, Macmillan, 2003; John D Carlson Erik C 
Owens, The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics, Washington DC, 
Georgetown University Press, 2003; Samuel P Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 
72, (3), pp. 22-169; Samuel P Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and Remaking o f World Order, 
London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion, The Missing Element o f  
Statecraft, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; John L Esposito and Michael Watson, Religion and 
Global Order, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000; KR Dark, Ed. Religion and International 
Relations, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001; Scott M. Thomas, ‘The Global Resurgence of Religion and 
the Study of World Politics’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 1995, pp. 289-299; 
Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era, ed. Prof. 
Luis Lugo, London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Daniel Philpott, ‘The Challenge of 
September 11 to Secularism in international relations’, World Politics Vol. 55, October 2002, No 1; 
Daniel Philpott, ‘The Religious Roots of Modem International Relations’, World Politics, 52, no 2 
2000, pp. 217-222; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern 
International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies, 2000, Vol 29, No 3. (Special Edition on Religion and IR) containing essays such 
as Vendulka Kabulkova, ‘Towards an International Political Theology’ and Miroslav Volf, 
‘Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social 
Environment’. Also please note new organisational developments, The International Centre for Religion 
and Diplomacy: www.icrd.org and The Ethelburga Centre: www.ethelburgacentre.org.uk
10 Beyer, Religion and Globalization, London, Sage Publications, 1994.
11 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; R. B. J. Walker, ‘State 
Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, International Studies Quarterly, 1990, p. 
447; Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 139, pp. 332-333, and p. 336; Guehenno, The End o f  the Nation- 
State, especially chapters 2 and 4; Ohmae, The End o f the Nation State: The Rise o f Regional 
Economies: How New Engines o f Prosperity are Reshaping Global Markets, London, Harper Collins, 
1996, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Kenichi Ohmae, ‘Putting Global Logic First’, The Evolving 
Global Economy: Making Sense o f the New World Order, ed K. Ohmae, Harvard, Harvard Business 
Review, 1995, pp. 130-132; V. Spike Petersen, ‘Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial
433
Remapping in the Context of Globalization’, Globalization: Theory and Practice, p. 12; Bauman, 
Globalization, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation State, London, Harper Collins, 1994 
and Walter Wriston, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty, New York, Charles Scribner’s sons, 1992.
12 Martin Wight, Systems o f  States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 129-130; Martin 
Wight, International Theory: The Three Tradition, London, Continuum, 2002, pp. 1-3; Alan James, 
‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, Sovereignty At the 
Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, pp. 38-40; Georg Sorensen, ‘Sovereignty: 
Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, Sovereignty at the Millennium, p. 170; Hidemi 
Suganami, ‘Sovereignty, intervention and the English School’, presented to 4th Pan-European 
International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury, pp 2-3. 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/ and Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 309.
13 James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, pp. 42-44 and 
Alan James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ Review o f International Studies, 1984, p. 11.
14 Sorensen, ‘Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, p. 173; Hans 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 312.
15 Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical 
Landscape’, Sovereignty At the Millennium, p. 42; Clark, Globalization and the Theory o f  International 
Relations, p. 74 and James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International 
Society’ pp. 35-36.
16 Wight, Systems o f States, pp. 129-130; Wight, International Theory, pp. 1-3; Suganami, 
‘Sovereignty, intervention and the English School’, pp 2-3.
17 Clark, Globalization and the Theory o f  International Relations, p. 71.
18 Initially, the sovereignty of the contracting people was invested in an individual and he was thus 
conceived to be a servant of the contracting parties although not a contracting party himself. In order to 
be the bearer of sovereignty he did not surrender his own sovereignty see Neil MacCormick, 
Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p. 123.
19 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European 
Constitutional Order’, Political Studies, 1996, p. 523; also see Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘The Liberal 
State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe’, The History o f European Ideas, 1989, Vol. 10, No 6, pp. 
689-703.
20 James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 48.
21 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 21. This is not to say that quasi-state sovereignty cannot be used 
by rulers for the purpose of consolidating power, see Christopher Clapham, ‘Sovereignty and the Third 
World State’, Sovereignty At the Millennium, pp. 103-104.
22 Ibid., p. 103.
23 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, p. 238.
24 R. Tudur Jones, The Desire o f Nations, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 1974, p. 20.
25 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, 
Blackwell, 1998, pp. 47-8 and Alan Milward, The European Rescue o f  the Nation State., London, 
Routledge, 1992, p. 18.
26 Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle’, 
International Organization 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 310; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalization In Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities o f Governance, Second 
Edition, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 164; Stephen Gill, ‘Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double 
Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s’, International Political Economy: Understanding Global 
Disorder, ed. Ed Hettne London, Zed Books Ltd, 1995, pp. 93-94 and Weiss, Linda, The Myth o f  the 
Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p. 192.
27 Hirst and Thompson identify room for new taxes in the near future on property and energy see 
Globalization in Question, pp. 221-222. Also see: Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Global Markets and National 
Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle’, p. 310; Weiss, The Myth o f the Powerless State, p. 191 
and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, Global Transformations, pp. 269-270.
28 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age o f Globalization, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1995, p. 49 and Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision 
Course or Virtuous Circle’, International Organization, vol. 52, no 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 301, p. 309.
29 Benjamin J Cohen, ‘The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of international Monetary Co­
operation’, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, ed. Frieden
434
and Lake, Bedford/St Martins, Boston/New York, 2000, p. 248; Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Global Markets and 
National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle’, p. 306.
30 Sassen, Losing Control, p. 49; Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision 
Course or Virtuous Circle’, International Organization, vol. 52, no 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 301, p. 309.
31 Approached from the outside-in, the legal status o f sovereignty, and again its disinterest in relative 
power constraints, can be seen negatively by reference to constitutional independence. Approached 
from the inside-out the legal status of sovereignty, and its obliviousness to relative power constraints, 
can be seen positively by reference to the social contract.
32 The following demonstrate ontological closure either through an under qualified approach to 
abstracted negative sovereignty or through a commitment to structure and the timeless sovereign state. 
James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 39; James, 
‘Ground Rule or Gibberish’, p. 11; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 312; Jackson, 
‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape’, p. 10; Sorensen, 
‘Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, pp. 170-171 and Waltz, Kenneth 
N, Theory o f International Relations, New York, Random House, 1979, pp. 93-95.
33 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; Walker, ‘State 
Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 447; Negri and Hardt, Empire, pp. 139, 
332-333, 336; Guehenno, The End o f  the Nation-State, especially chapters 2 and 4; Kenichi Ohmae, 
The End o f the Nation-State, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Ohmae, ‘Putting Global Logic First’, The 
Evolving Global Economy, pp. 130-132; Peterson, ‘Remapping in the Conflict of Globalization’, p. 12. 
Bauman, Globalization, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation State and
Walter Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty, New York, Charles Scribner’s sons, 1992.
34 The legal thesis that sees sovereignty as an enabling precondition rather than a power ‘seems to 
imply an “essentialist” concept of sovereignty, immune to historical change: the attributes of 
sovereignty exist in perpetuity and produce a single form of state’. Ian Clark, Globalization and 
International Relations Theory, p. 71.
35 Alan James, The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society, Sovereignty 
at the Millennium, p. 41.
36 Sorensen, ‘Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, p. 171.
37 The irony of this, given the rooted and historical identity of the English School is clearly 
demonstrated in the following: ‘Unlike neorealism, which largely confines itself to the international 
system pillar, takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over units, 
English School theory is much more inside-out, than outside-in. International society is constructed by 
the units, and particularly by the dominant units, in the system, and consequently reflects their 
domestic character (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 95) Buzan, From International to World Society: English 
School Theory and Social Structure o f Globalisation, p. 95.
38 Alan James, ‘Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 46.
39 The problem with the 100% definition of sovereignty on the basis of constitutional independence is 
that constitutional independence is increasingly no more absolute than power. This is obvious in 
relationship to the EU but also the Andean Community and CARICOM for instance. Daniel Philpott 
makes the point about partial sovereignty in the following terms: ‘Absoluteness is a measure of the 
scope of affairs over which a sovereign body governs within a particular territory. Is it supreme over 
all matters or merely some? .. .The government of France is supreme in defence policy but not in trade, 
which it governs jointly with other European Union members as prescribed by EU law’. Revolutions in 
Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2001, p. 19. Indeed one does not just have to look at regional integration to see sovereign states that do 
not have exclusive, constitutionally separate jurisdiction over all competencies. Those sovereign states 
that have a Compact of Free Association with their former colonial master, the United States: the 
Marshal Islands, Palau and the Federal States of Micronesia, are constitutionally tied to varying 
degrees to the US both with respect to their internal and external sovereignty. Critically, however, 
whilst these constitutional ties exist, neither state has surrendered either all of its internal or all of its 
external sovereignty. The three states remain sovereign by upholding partial internal and partial 
external sovereignty. Similarly a number of former British colonies remain constitutionally tied to 
Britain which provides their highest court of appeal through the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council: Jamaica, Trinadad and Tobago, Mauritius, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, St Lucia, Grenada, St 
Vincents and the Grendines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Kribati. All of 
these polities, however, are nonetheless sovereign.
40 The stark inability to deal with change is striking because it is a criticism that is usually directed at 
neorealists with their particular strand of positivism and associated ontological closure. On its inability
435
to deal with change see e.g. Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the study of International 
Relations’, p. 12.
41 Given the comments made earlier about the divide between internal and external sovereignty 
shadowing a divide between high and low politics, it is interesting to note the passage of a colony to 
independent statehood, not only happens at a specific moment of time, it is also a thoroughly high 
political event at which government representatives raise and lower flags amidst much pomp and 
circumstance. It is, therefore, quite unlike the process of European integration which happens in a 
rather more gradual, functional and piecemeal manner across many years.
In light of the difficulties with the internal-external sovereignty divide, it is interesting to reflect on 
some observations made by Ian Clark when reviewing Alan James’ Sovereign Statehood. Clark 
observes, ‘Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of 
which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and 
independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should 
not decently enquire’. Ian Clark, ‘Making sense of sovereignty’, Review o f International Studies, 1988, 
p. 303. Later Clark returns to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the 
relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, not divorced from 
power. In the course of invoking the distinction between internal and external sovereignty ‘James 
reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal standing as contrasted with the notion of 
sovereignty as physical capability: ‘sovereignty is a matter of law and not of stature’ (p. 40). This does 
not mean that physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 
‘sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities’, (p. 41), although, at the end of the 
day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities’ (p. 41). This is a less than lucid section of 
otherwise careful and workmanlike study’. Ibid., p. 305.
42 For more information about the division between internal and external sovereignty in the English 
School and its impact on the School’s capability to conceptualize change please see Appendix 1.
Having stressed the centrality of the English School and its historic figureheads, it is important to note 
that one of the best contemporary examples of fractured sovereignty is manifest in the work of Stephen 
D. Krasner, which, whilst not traditionally located in the English School, has in recent years become 
increasingly closely associated with it. (See especially Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1999 chapter 2.) Krasner claims that there are four views of sovereignty: 
‘Interdependence sovereignty’, ‘Domestic sovereignty’, ‘Vattelian sovereignty’ and ‘International legal 
sovereignty’ see: Ibid., pp. 9-25 and Stephen D Krasner, ‘Rethinking the sovereign state model’, 
Empires Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics, eds. Michael Cox, Tim 
Dunne and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 17- 42.
Interdependence sovereignty pertains to the ability of the state to control movement of money and ideas 
across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the authority structures in states that sustain 
behaviour regulation. This depends on a) acceptance of authority and b) the level of control the state 
can actually exercise. Effective states have strong domestic sovereignty, whilst failed states have none. 
Vattelian sovereignty, meanwhile, refers to the right of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
polity. Finally, international legal sovereignty pertains to the equality of all sovereign states regardless 
of their size and power, on the basis of their recognition and consequent membership of the 
international community. Crucially these different perspectives are potentially independent. ‘The rules 
institutions and practices that are associated with these four meanings of sovereignty are neither 
logically nor empirically linked in some organic whole'. Ibid., p. 21.
Whilst it is important to break aspects of sovereignty down into bit sized chunks, whose fate one can 
readily follow, Krasner’s approach has the effect of abstracting features away from the sovereign state. 
These features do not exist apart from state sovereignty. To really understand sovereignty, one must 
understand the phenomenon with respect to which the above provides different perspectives. We are 
not confronted by four autonomous characteristics. They are all related to the same reality. Thus 
contrary to Krasner, it is indeed the contention o f this thesis that the four sovereignties that he describes 
are ‘linked to some organic whole’ and that failure to recognise this will lead to distorted understanding 
of sovereignty and thus the international arena, e.g. the ‘constitutional independence’ definition 
produces an artificially closed models of sovereignty that cannot deal with change.
43 Indeed, to the extent that it lacks a social contracted territorial people there are some parallels 
between the EU and quasi-states on which basis one might assert that supranational EU jurisdiction 
could be described as a ‘quasi-state like’ sovereignty. Weiler expresses the aspiration that the EU 
should evolve into an interest rather than demos based polity, J. H. H. Weiler, ‘European Neo­
constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order’, pp. 525-533.
436
44 Moravcsik, 1993, p. 507; Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Power From Messina to Maastricht, London, UCL Press, 1998, P. 22. For a critique of this position 
see: Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions’, p. 27 and Matlary p. 7.
45 Thomas Christiansen, ‘Reconstructing Space: From Territorial Politics to European Multilevel 
Governance’, Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, 
Macmillan, 1996. p. 54.
46 Williams, ‘Rethinking sovereignty’, p. 119 and Clark, Globalization and Theory o f International 
Relations, p. 79.
47 The notion that globalization is essentially about a revolution in time and space, a time-space 
compression, has a very broad basis of support from people coming from a number of different 
theoretical positions: David Harvey maintains that globalization leads to ‘an intense phase of time-space 
compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the 
balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life’; David Harvey, The Condition o f  
Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins o f Cultural Change, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284. 
Mittleman claims that ‘[d]riven by changing modes of competition, globalization compresses the time 
and space aspects of social relations’. James Mittleman, ‘The Dynamics of Globalization’, 
Globalization: Critical Reflections, ed. James Mittleman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder Colorado, 
1996. Williams claims that ‘globalization presents a different articulation of time and space. Authority 
structures need no longer be fixed to territorial actors’. Marc Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, pp. 117- 
18. Also see: Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, chapters 1 and 2; David 
Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture, pp. 14-16; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing 
modernity in international relations’, International Organisation, 1993, pp. 146-7; James Der Derian, 
‘The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 1990, pp. 295-310; Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future o f  Radical 
Politics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4 and Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal o f 
Social Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 31.
48 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 13-14 and p. 43.
49 John Laughland, The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins o f the European Idea, London, 
Warner Books, 1998, p. 177.
50 Please note that the fact that extra-territorial flows may be beyond the direct onto-constitutional 
reach of the sovereign state, does not mean that they are necessarily beyond their indirect reach which 
can be asserted through co-operating sovereign states. A good example of this is provided by chapter 
7’s consideration of capital regulation.
51 Sassen, Losing Control, p. 31.
52 Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian intervention and world politics’, and Paul 
Taylor, ‘The United Nations and International Order’, The Globalization o f  World Politics, ed. John 
Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society, Oxford University Press, 2000 and James Mayall, The New 
Interventionism 1991-4: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
53 Geoff Mulgan, Connexity: How to Live in a Connected Worlds London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, p. 
3. Guehenno is also very clear that globalization has introduced the age of the network, e.g. ‘we should 
speak on the global level, of aggregates of networks linked together, like the interlinked rings that are 
the symbol of the Olympic Games’. The End o f  the Nation-State, p. 56.
54 Ibid., p. 60.
55 Ibid., p. 55. This multi-dimensional characteristic is widely recognized e.g: Sassen, Out o f  Control, 
p. 31, Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, p. 249; Axford, The Global System, p. 150; James N. 
Rosenau, ‘Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World’, Re-imaginging Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 1998, in The Global Transformations Reader, pp. 182-3; Hardt and Negri, Empire, 
p. 340.
56 Ibid. Also see: Castells, Manuel, The Rise o f the Network Society: the Information Age: Economy 
Society and Culture, Vol. 1, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, pp. 500-509.
57Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations’, 
International Organisation, 1993, p. 139 and 169. Although the thesis uses the window provided by 
Ruggie’s post-positivist critique of sovereignty because of the clarity of the image provided by the 
notion of the unbundling of territoriality and because of its historical focus that resonates with the
437
historical approach of the English School, the point is made that this represents one example of many 
post-positivist critiques of IR (see chapter 2) which have the effect of deconstructing (unbundling) 
sovereignty. See R. B. J. Walker ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 
457, p. 459 and p. 461; Marlene Wind, ‘Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational 
Institutionalism’, Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, 
Macmillan, 1996; Robert Cox, ‘Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: 
reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics, ed. by James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, p. 138; Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 80; V. Spike Petersen, ‘Shifting 
Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization’, Globalization: 
Theory and Practices, Elenore Kofrnan and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996 and Der Derian , ‘The 
Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed’, p. 297.
58 Williams clearly comes to terms with the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization and the fact 
that this takes us beyond interdependence. In his mind, however, this seems to dissolve the state and 
there is some doubt as to whether it should continue. (Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, p. 118-9) It 
is the contention of this thesis, however, that the striking reality about the spatio-temporal revolution is 
not the new temporality per se, but the new temporality in the context of an enduring spatial 
orientation. It is about an ontological revolution that does not replace the old ontologies so much as 
complement them with new ontologies. To this extent one need not be ambivalent about the ongoing 
reality of sovereignty but this need not involve one relaxing back into a model of interdependence. 
The new ontologies do not make the significance of constitutional independence irrelevant (Ibid., p.
119) but they do mean that the legal tradition must be aware of its onto-constitutional diminution.
59 Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996; Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Religion in International 
Relations: The Return from Exile, New York, Macmillan, 2003; Beyer, Religion and Globalization, 
London, Sage publications, 1994; Samuel P Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and Remaking o f 
World Order, London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion, The 
Missing Element o f  Statecraft, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; Scott Thomas, The Global 
Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
1995, p. 289; John L Esposito and Michael Watson, Religion and Global Order, pp. 17-18; Sovereignty 
at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era, ed. Prof. Luis Lugo, 
London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Ken Dark, Religion and International Relations, 
Macmillan, 2000 and Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Special Issue: Religion and 
International Relations, 2000, Vol. 29, No. 3.
60 Daniel Philpott, ‘On the Cusp of Sovereignty’, Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and 
International Politics in the Post Cold War Era, ed. Luis E. Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers INC, 1996, p. 48; Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Tradition, London, 
Continuum, 2002, p. 14 & p. 234; Donald Mackinnon, ‘Natural Law’, Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays in the Theory o f International Politics, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 74-88; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in 
World Politics, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 28-29; Martin Wight, Systems o f States, pp. 116-117 and 
Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 63.
61 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Augustine and Christian Realism’, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 
London, Faber and Faber, 1953, p. 115; Sean Molloy, ‘Bridging Realism and Christianity in the
International Thought of Martin Wight’, presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations
Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury p. 9,
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/enalishschool/; Charles Jones, ‘Christian Realism and the Foundations of 
the English School’, presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10
September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. pp. 9-20, 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/; Herbert Butterfield in Herbert Butterfield: Writings on 
Christianity and History, ed. CT Mclntire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 125 and Roger 
Epp, ‘The “Augustinian moment” in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the 
reclaiming of a tradition’, The Aberystwyth Papers, The University College of Wales, Department of 
International Politics 1991.
62 Ivo D. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension o f Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations, 
Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 235-6; Guehenno, The End o f the Nation-State., p. 65; 
Marc Williams, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, p. 118; Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 91; V. 
Spike Peterson, ‘Shifting Ground(s: Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of 
Globalization(s)’, pp. 15-16 and Richard Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and
438
the Domestication of Global Life’, International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian, 
London, Macmillan, 1995, p. 101.
63 Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, pp. 447-449.
64 Darel E. Paul, ‘Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in International Relations’, 
Review o f International Studies, 1999, 25, p. 217 and Jack Donnelly, Realism and International 
Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 81.
65 Ibid., pp. 87-89 pp. 95-96.
66 Axford, The Global System, p. 37. See further exploration of the giveness of preferences in Judith 
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Ideas and foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework’, Ideas and 
Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, p. 4.
67 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What State’s Makes of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
p. 449.
68 For more detailed analysis please see Appendix 1.
69 Roy E. Jones, ‘The English school of international relations: a case for closure’, Review o f  
International Studies, 1981.
70 The following demonstrate ontological closure either through an under qualified approach to 
abstracted negative sovereignty or through a commitment to structure and the timeless sovereign state. 
James, ‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, p. 39; James, 
‘Ground Rule or Gibberish’, p. 11; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 312; Jackson, 
‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape’, p. 10; Sorensen, 
‘Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, pp. 170-171 and Waltz, Theory o f  
International Politics, pp. 93-95.
71  •Again please note that the fact that extra-territorial flows may be beyond the direct onto- 
constitutional reach of the sovereign state, does not mean that they are necessarily beyond their indirect 
reach which can be asserted through co-operating sovereign states. A good example of this is provided 
by chapter 7’s consideration of capital regulation.
72 Camilleri and Falk, The End o f Sovereignty, pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; Walker, ‘State 
Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, p. 447; Negri and Hardt, Empire, p. 139, pp. 
332-333 and p. 336; Guehenno, The End o f the Nation-State, especially chapters 2 and 4; Kenichi 
Ohmae, The End o f the Nation-State, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Kenichi Ohmae, ‘Putting Global 
Logic First’, The Evolving Global Economy, pp. 130-132; Peterson, ‘Remapping in the Conflict of 
Globalization’, p. 12; Bauman, Globalization, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation State 
and Walter Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty.
73 Buzan, From International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure o f 
Globalisation, 2004.
74 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’, p. 488.
439
APPENDIX 1
THE THREE TRADITIONS,
DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY &CHANGE
The main body of the text engages with the tendency for the English School to invoke 
the division between internal and external sovereignty and makes the point that this 
has made for an effectively closed model of sovereignty which undermines the 
capacity of the three traditions to engage with change. One can, however, obtain 
greater clarity about the reality of the closed nature of English School sovereignty - 
and the irony of it, given the School’s commitment to being historically rooted and 
thus sensitive to change - by exploring the background/origin of the division. It is the 
purpose of this appendix to rise to this challenge, demonstrating how a commitment to 
a holistic conception of sovereignty that can accommodate change from the inside-out 
as well as the outside-in has been compromised with the consequence that sovereignty 
is reified in a way that undermines its capability to engage with transformations. It 
will then make the case for a renewed, holistic English School model of sovereignty 
that can engage with change.
HOLISTIC SOVEREIGNTY
In the English School there are clear grounds for suggesting that internal and external 
sovereignty should be treated - at least in some senses - as a whole. Indeed, two of the 
greatest influences on the author of the three traditions, and ‘godfather’1 of the English 
School, Martin Wight, were people who engaged with sovereignty holistically, 
mindful of both its interdependent internal and external character. Lest anyone should 
be tempted into thinking that Grotius (who was of special significance for Wight, 
since he was selected to be the symbolic head of the rationalist - Grotian - tradition), 
was solely concerned with sovereignty from a narrowly international perspective, 
Wight observed that ‘in Grotius there is more about sovereignty as a principle of 
internal organization than as the mark of membership of international society 
Grotius had in fact a holistic approach to sovereignty, engaging with both its internal 
and external dimensions. The person who perhaps achieves the most perfect balance 
for Wight, however, is Machiavelli. ‘The only political philosopher of whom it is 
possible to argue whether his principal interests was not in the relations between 
states rather than -  or even more than -  the state itself, is Machiavelli. With him, the 
foreign and domestic conditions for the establishment and maintenance of state power 
are not distinguished systematically; and this alone -  without other reasons -  would 
have justified his being annexed, by detractors and admirers alike, as the tutelary hero 
of International Relations’.1" Machiavelli was, as such, not merely made the symbolic 
head of realism (the Machiavellian tradition) but also the founder of international 
relations per se.
Writing more recently, Robert Jackson provides an important perspective on the 
fundamental unity of sovereignty in Wight’s thought through consideration of the 
notion of the ‘good life’. He claims that one should not interpret Wight’s plea for the 
study of international theory as indicative of the fact that the domestic and 
international realms should be divorced from each other. It is not a case of the good
440
life residing ‘within’ and crude anarchic survival residing ‘without’. ‘There would be 
no point in external security if Leviathan afforded little or nothing of domestic value. 
Here is the underlying morality of realism. To repeat, the state is a perfect association 
which significantly lessens the necessity of transcendental political association or 
even merely substantial international co-operation’.1V Later he continues: ‘If there 
were no basis for the good life in states, there would be no point in their survival. In 
other words, international theory is part of the theory of the state, not separate from it, 
just as, for example, diplomacy, international law and armed forces are part of the 
means of good government’/  Thus with respect to the division between internal 
(good life, political theory) and external sovereignty (survival, international theory), 
Jackson observes: ‘Although each facet can of course be distinguished analytically 
and theorised separately, neither is ontologically independent o f the other' f  (Italics 
added). In light of this it is interesting to note that it was Jackson who, in the context 
of examining third world states, later went on to argue that it was important to 
recognise that polities should not just be assessed for sovereignty negatively (external 
sovereignty) but also positively (internal sovereignty)/1
This holism makes sense given the fact that an historically rooted approach - which is 
what the English School seeks to provide - should be open to change, from any 
direction, be it from the inside-out or from the outside-in.
DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY
It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst there is a good basis upon 
which to affirm the interdependence of the internal and external aspects of 
sovereignty, much English School scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the 
latter to the extent that this it has effectively been cut off from the low politics arena 
of change associated with internal sovereignty/111 The basis for this development has 
been informed, at least in part, by a combination of a) a theoretical ambition and b) an 
apparently favourable environment. This appendix will now consider each in turn, 
exploring their interaction.
a) THEORETICAL AMBITION
Martin Wight’s foundational British Committee essay ‘Why Is There No International 
Theory’ is not defined primarily in terms of the goal of making a divide between 
internal and external sovereignty but it arguably had this effect. Specifically, it set out 
to champion the importance of international theory through a comparison with 
domestic political theory that suggested that the failure/neglect of the former was 
directly related to the success/profile of the latter. Wight set out his argument in 
robust terms. ‘The principle that every individual requires the protection of a state, 
which represents him in the international community, is a juristic expression of the 
belief in the sovereign state as the consummation of political experience and activity 
which has marked Western political thought since the Renaissance. That belief has 
absorbed almost all the intellectual energy devoted to political study. It has become 
natural to think of international politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics .. .and 
to see international theory in the manner of the political theory textbooks, as an 
additional chapter which can be omitted by all save the interested student. The 
masterpiece of international politics is the system of the balance of power, as it 
operated from the time of Elizabeth down to that of Bismarck; but if we ask why the 
balance of power has inspired no great political writer to analysis and reflection, the 
answer surely is that it has flourished with the flourishing of the modem state, and has
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been seen as a means to that end’.lx International theory was thus very much 
subordinated to political theory.
In International Theory, meanwhile, Wight made a very similar observation. ‘The 
development of the sovereign state implied also the development of the modem 
states-system or modem international relations (diplomacy, war, international law, 
international institutions etc), but this was treated as a by-product or corollary of that 
sovereign state itself. The crystallization of the state was what excited the best minds 
at that time, and they gave political philosophy that concentration on the state which it 
has never since lost’.x Thus once again international theory was very much 
subordinated to political theory.
Wight highlighted the subordination of international to political theory in 
contemporary scholarship by referring to two of its practical consequences on 
academic research. In the first instance, even those who apparently were committed to 
international theory allowed domestic theory to cast its shadow through the fact that 
the international arena was only deemed worthy of consideration from a very 
domestic perspective. Although, in an important sense, scholars like Morgenthau 
based their entire work on the international arena, they built their study narrowly 
around the concept of national interest. Wight’s desire was to study the international 
system as a whole in general terms rather than merely through the parochial grid of 
national interest.™ In the second instance, and more frustrating, was the fact that many 
scholars, who might otherwise have contributed to the development of international 
theory, were allowing themselves to be distracted by concerns about the integration of 
states. ‘Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of 
building a bigger and better state -  a European Union or an Atlantic Community or an 
Arab Union, without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of 
inter-state politics precisely where they were’. There was a need, Wight contended, 
for a sense of perspective and priority. First, in terms of perspective, even if this 
integration project was successful it would not change the structure of international 
relations per se. Second, in terms of priority, in the absence of a coherent international 
theory, allowing the energy of the best minds to be distracted by a tentative 
experiment in European integration seemed to be part and parcel of the inappropriate 
objective of investing greatest effort in seeking to understand domestic theory and the 
good life. It suggested that the international domain only became interesting when 
injected with elements of domestic politics that gave it a ‘good life’ capability. It 
seemed to be symptomatic of the notion that ‘the division of international society into 
separate states is a temporary phase, emerging out of the medieval unity ...and 
destined to be replaced by a world state’.xn Scholars must, however, refuse to be put 
off by the lack of ‘good life’ capability that the international arena has to offer and 
take it seriously on its own terms.
The impact of this celebration of international theory, whose poor fortunes were 
provocatively shown to be negatively related to those of domestic political theory, had 
the effect of raising the profile of former against the latter. In championing the 
fortunes of international theory in this way, Wight inevitably put something of a 
wedge between the approaches to sovereignty associated with the two sets of theory, 
internal sovereignty, which he primarily associated with domestic political theory and 
external sovereignty, which he primarily associated with international political theory. 
Thus, it is the contention of this appendix that whilst Wight was right to see a close
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relationship between internal and external sovereignty, which Jackson has helpfully 
highlighted (and indeed embraced in his own work), the impact of Wight’s unpacking 
of his theoretical ambition for IR, resulting in his effective concentration of external 
rather than internal sovereignty, laid the foundation for the relationship to be 
compromised in practice.™1
b) AN APPARENTLY ACCOMODATING ENVIRONMENT
This appendix suggests that Wight was able to effectively concentrate on external 
sovereignty apart from internal sovereignty, with the result his model of sovereignty 
in IR became increasingly reified, on account of the fact that, although a rooted, 
empirical, historian who believed in change, examination of his work suggests that he 
thought the possibility of sovereignty being significantly impacted by change from its 
internal dimension extremely remote. This commitment to ‘inside-out’ continuity can 
be seen by examining his reflections on the role of economic versus political change. 
Critically Wight first attributed priority to the high politics rather than low 
politics/economic processes and then significantly constrained the potential for 
political change.
i. THE ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR CHANGE
One gains the clear impression when reading Wight that he thought that the economic 
engine for integration, ‘the spirit of commerce’,X1V did not have the wherewithal to 
deliver, certainly in the short to medium term. In this regard Wight’s comments about 
the relationship between the high levels of interdependence during the late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century and the outbreak of the First World War are very 
relevant. ‘The great discoveries led to the economic unification of the world, and the 
completion of a world market in the nineteenth century. There was wide belief that 
political unity would follow naturally. It is surprising how often contemporary 
publicists compared the Victorian peace, particularly the armed peace of 1871-1914, 
to the Pax Romana, overlooking the essential contrast between a single imperium and 
a dubious concert of quarrelsome great powers’.xv Given that instead of securing 
greater unity the 1871-1914 period gave rise to the First World War and that levels of 
interdependence had since then in any event fallen dramatically, it seemed clear that 
economic factors were unlikely to deliver political unity and that even if 
interdependence did increase again it would continue to be subjected to political 
decisions which could always thwart any emerging unity.
One specific example of the limitations of transformation in IR driven by economic 
development can be seen by referring to Wight’s comments about sanctions whose 
efficacy depended upon change manifest in growing interdependence. ‘In the 
nineteenth century sea power gave a deceptive impression of providing political 
stability; economic blockade seemed the decisive weapon of the First World War; the 
League was built upon the expectation that economic sanctions could keep the world 
in order’. But, ‘the world was not yet so interdependent economically, nor was sea 
power so effective strategically, that it could bring pressure uniformly on the world’s 
surface’.XV1 Between the late nineteenth century and the time at which Wight was 
writing, moreover, the levels of interdependence had of course fallen.
ii. THE POLITICAL ENGINE FOR CHANGE?
This appendix will view the impact of the priority of the political on Wight’s 
approach to change from two perspectives, demonstrating how both constrain the
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actual possibilities for change. In the first instance it will consider how very weak 
some of Wight’s claims for politically driven change actually were. In the second 
instance it will demonstrate how in Wight’s thinking the possibility of dramatic 
political change, having briefly arisen in the immediate post-war world, soon became 
very remote.
I. POLITICAL LOGIC CONSTRAINS VISION OF CHANGE
One can obtain a helpful perspective on the political bias in Wight’s appreciation of 
transformation - in a way that actually limits the nature of the change in question - by 
considering his definition of revolutionism and some of its anomalies. The traditional 
Wightian arrangement of the three traditions spectrum services transformation from 
the unqualified sovereignty of the sovereign state pole within realism through to the 
qualified sovereignty of rationalism and then on to the demise of sovereignty in the 
post-sovereignty pole of Dantean revolutionism. There is on the way, however, 
something of a problem with the part of revolutionism that comes before the Dantean 
section, namely Kantian revolutionism. According to the above logic Kantian 
revolutionism should describe a more qualified form of sovereignty than does 
rationalism. In truth, however, Wight defines Kantian revolutionism as a development 
beyond rationalist international society through the provision of added principles of 
commonality to the state system which strategically do not necessarily have the effect 
of securing the erosion/qualification of sovereignty.
For example, the notion that Mazzini’s vision of a world divided into self-determining 
nation-states makes him a revolutionist because he argues all states should be national 
and self-determining is like saying that because all sovereign states have submitted to 
the principle of sovereignty they can all be classified in the revolutionist category 
when in reality, in and of itself, this particular commonality could provide grounds for 
their all being defined as realist.xv" Similarly, the notion that a Protestant league 
constitutes the erosion of the sovereign state does not follow. To be sure, if all nations 
were of the same strain of Protestantism then there would be some things about which 
they may not disagree but, in the absence of a supranational one world Protestant 
executive, the states would undoubtedly still find much about which they could come 
into conflict. Furthermore, to the degree that the ‘constraints’ in view are the result of 
Protestant commonality which constitutes part of the identity of the states concerned, 
there would be no sense of the sovereign states being eroded on account of a common 
Protestantism because their conduct would not be checked against their will.xv,n 
Indeed, as noted in chapter 9, given that it was the Reformation that actually paved 
the way for the break-up of the Respublica Christiana and advent of the modem states 
system, Protestantism can make a good claim to have inaugurated the modem states 
system and thus international relations consisting of the presence, and not the 
subordination of, the sovereign state.
If states could only be eroded through narrowly political developments, the 
emergence of a system based on greater political commonality than the more minimal 
forms of international society associated with rationalism would surely give them a 
good claim to have generated a form of the world society associated with 
revolutionism? If, however, one first considers the status of sovereignty (i.e. is it 
eroded or not?), and, second subscribes to a broader conception of the potential means 
by which a sovereign state can be changed, one can see the very limited nature of the 
erosion, if any, potentially posited by some manifestations of this kind of
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revolutionism e.g. Mazzini . If the three traditions is represented as a spectrum from 
unqualified sovereignty, to qualified sovereignty, to the demise of sovereignty, then 
early revolutionism should show the state engaging with a transnationalism whose 
impact is to significantly undermine sovereignty which late revolutionism will 
completely deconstruct. (Similarly, if the three traditions is viewed as a spectrum 
from unqualified nation-state sovereignty, to qualified nation-state sovereignty and an 
emerging supranational sovereignty, to the ultimate demise of nation-state sovereignty 
and triumph of supranational sovereignty, then early revolutionism should show the 
advanced demise of nation-state sovereignty ahead of its complete demise - and the 
complete triumph of revolutionist sovereignty - in the extreme expressions of 
revolutionism). A partially ontologically open manifestation of sovereignty in 
rationalism would actually provide a more advanced expression of sovereignty and 
change - either by erosion or extension - than a putative revolutionism based on 
Mazzini or a Calvinist protestant league.
II. POLITICAL LOGIC CONSTRAINS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
CHANGE
One can see, however, that the political bias in Wightian thought actually also curtails 
change by restricting the window for transformation. Specifically, in Wight’s 
thinking, serious change depended upon the coincidence of a viable alternative with a 
truly dreadful option. Such a condition, he maintained, could facilitate the 
revolutionist decision of the kind spoken by Kant (see especially endnote xx) and 
existed during the four years when the Americans alone had the atomic bomb - a 
period when ‘it was reasonable to assert that the states-system was ripe for 
unification, the world ripe for world-govemment’.x,x Writing in 1958, when both 
superpowers commanded nuclear weapons, the possibilities of transcending the states 
system seemed remote.xx
ENTER SYSTEMIC CHANGE! THE WIGHT LEGACY
Having considered Wight’s cautious approach to transformation in IR, it is important 
to confront the great irony that, although history often justifies pessimism, the Third 
World War that he predicted™ did not materialise and instead, globalization - drawing 
on low political processes - has since propelled the world with great speed in a very 
much more revolutionist direction. Had Wight any notion of the very significant 
changes that were just around the comer he might have qualified his position rather 
more. This then prompts the question, how did those carrying Wight’s legacy engage 
with the realities of globalization and regional integration that became so powerfully 
manifest in the years following his death?
In considering English School engagement with change after Wight, it is helpful to 
look at the way in which Hedley Bull carried forward Wight’s legacy as economically 
driven transformation - especially European integration - became more evident. 
Although Bull recognized the importance of trade, he did not appear to think that 
economics should be treated as an autonomously significant factor in international 
relations. It should be - as in the case of Wight - very much subject to politics. In this 
regard he was deeply critical of what he described as the neo-idealist tendency of the 
1970s to stress economic flows apart from the sovereign state. ‘The widening of the 
agenda of world politics to include greater attention to economic, social and cultural 
matters did not mean, as Nye and Keohane argued, that “transnational relations” were 
depriving the states system of its autonomy, but on the contrary that the states system
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was spreading its tentacles to bring areas of “transnational relations” within its grip 
that had previously been left to the private sector. Possession of scarce resources was 
a source of power to militarily weak states only for so long as militarily strong states 
chose not to use their force. More generally, the power or influence exerted by the 
European community and other civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic 
environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control’.™1
Bull’s perception of the relative unimportance of economic vis-a-vis high political 
factors translates directly into his understanding of European integration. ‘I do not 
find it helpful to approach the issue by beginning with what seems to me the purely 
theoretical question whether or not the Europe of community visionaries needs to 
possess military power if  it is to be an effective actor in international affairs. “Europe” 
is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one; the 
Europe with which I am concerned is the actual one of state governments, in which a 
minor role is played, chiefly as instruments of cooperation among governments, by 
various committees, assemblies and secretariats bearing the designation “European”, 
including those of the EC among others’.™1
The above quotation makes two principles apparent. First, the logic of economic 
imperatives is very much subject to that of high political-military logic. Integration 
projects can take place and seem to develop new actors, but in a world whose 
structure is fundamentally determined by politico-military concerns, there must be 
something very inessential/minor about those actors. Real/significant actorhood 
remains with those who control military concerns, which the EU did not. Second, 
there is actually a restriction on potential political changes for whilst Bull rejects 
changes in actorhood via the functionalism of Jean Monnet he also rejects the 
successful application of political logic, in the tradition of Altierio Spinelli et al, to 
this goal. The reason would seem to relate to his understanding of the role of national 
identity. ‘There is no supranational community in Western Europe but only a group of 
nation-states (moreover, if there were a supranational authority in Western Europe, 
this would be a source o f  weakness in defence policy rather than a strength; it is the 
nation-states o f Western Europe -  France, Germany, Britain -  their capacity to 
inspire loyalty and to make war -  that are the sources o f its power)'. (Italics 
added).™v Thus, as in the case of Wight, the potential for systemic change arising 
from low political/economic developments would appear to be entirely subject to 
transcending, higher, given political realities and, once again, as in the case of Wight, 
the actual likelihood of high political transformation -  on this occasion because of the 
centrality of the sovereign nation-state -  seems remote.
FIRST PRINCIPLE POLITICAL DECISION?
The fact that Bull, contemplating a significantly more globalized world than Wight, 
did not engage with the possibility that systemic transformation, driven by low- 
politics economic developments, could change the states system, suggests that, whilst 
he was committed to history,xxv and thus change, there were certain kinds of change 
he thought very unlikely and maybe even impossible. Indeed, when one accounts for 
both the use of Kant to suggest that, at the end of the day, political decision is what 
really determines the future (see Wight, especially endnote xx) and the conviction that 
the nation-state alone can sustain political loyalty (see Bull), it would seem that within 
the heart of the early English School, there was something like a first principle 
conviction that economic imperatives were simply incapable of bringing change.™'1
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At the very least one can state that Wight and Bull thought that: a) economically 
driven change was not particularly significant and b) the opportunities for political 
transformation were actually very limited, and that this enabled them to engage with a 
model of sovereignty that was effectively reified in the sense of being cut off from the 
key source of domestic openness associated with the domain of internal sovereignty.
The above facilitates a very limited view of change. Mindful of both the priority of 
the political and the effectively closed nature of sovereignty in the Wightian system, it 
is very interesting to observe that political imperatives for change in the international 
system have tended to have an absolute and immediate or fairly immediate impact, 
whereas economic imperatives have a gradual impact. Consider for example Alan 
James’s account of change as a colony moves at a specific instance, literally a second 
of time between 23.59 pm and 00.00 midnight to being a fully independent sovereign 
state. One moment it is not sovereign, the next moment it is fully sovereign. Given 
that the change of decolonisation does not happen over many years, witnessing the 
gradual development of new actors and the erosion of others, but rather over a short 
period of time, there is no need to conceptualise such changes as a process. In the 
context of decolonisation, secession or unification, sovereignties are gained or lost as 
wholes at specific moments. If one could eliminate the need for gradual change, one 
could, in some senses, effectively deal with sovereignty as a reified whole. In reality, 
however, as well as recognising the need to be able to engage with changes that effect 
sovereignty at specific moments in time, e.g. decolonisation at midnight on May 19th 
2002, one must also recognise the need to be able to deal with changes that impact 
sovereignty gradually over a process of time and consequentially the imperative for a 
holistic conception of sovereignty that can cater for change from the inside-out as 
well as the outside-in.
PERSPECTIVE
In drawing this discussion to a close, it is useful to consider two observations from 
scholars who have questioned the English School approach to sovereignty.
i. ROY E. JONES: ENGLISH SCHOOL SCIENCE!?
Mindful of the priority of the political and the consequentially effectively closed 
nature of sovereignty in the Wightian system, it is at this stage possible to obtain an 
appreciation of the reason why Roy E. Jones ironically associated English School 
ontology with that of science.xxvu To the degree that early English School scholars 
believed that the high political issues were the most important, there is a sense in 
which they invoked the ceteris paribus condition that underpins modem science, 
reducing the complexity of the world by effectively setting aside internal bases for 
change. In so doing they were like the scientist who seeks to isolate certain variables 
in a laboratory context for the purpose of doing science. This, however, is not 
appropriate for an approach that wishes to be rooted and historically sensitive. Thus, 
whilst the traditional English School rejected ahistorical, scientific American IR, for 
philosophical reasons that resulted in it giving priority to the political, it has ended up 
with an ontology that is not so dissimilar.
447
ii. IAN CLARK: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY
Mindful of the need for holism to see change, it is interesting to note Clark’s 
expression of concern about the division between internal and external sovereignty 
back in 1988. Reviewing Alan James’ Sovereign Statehood, Clark observed: 
‘Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in 
terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in 
supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the 
student of international relations should not decently enquire’.XXV1" Later Clark 
returned to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the 
relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, 
not divorced from power. ‘In the course of invoking the distinction between internal 
and external sovereignty ‘James reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal 
standing as contrasted with the notion of sovereignty as physical capability: 
‘sovereignty is a matter of law and not of stature’ (p. 40). This does not mean that 
physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 
‘sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities’ (p. 41), although, 
at the end of the day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities’ (p. 41). 
This is a less than lucid section of otherwise careful and workmanlike study’.XX1X For 
all the reasons given in this research, Clark had every right to be concerned.
CONCLUSION
Endowed with the three traditions spectrum, its commitment to history and its 
generally cautious approach, the three traditions presents an extremely relevant 
framework within which to come to terms with sovereignty in the context of change. 
This capability, however, has been compromised because of the effective 
implementation of a division between internal and external sovereignty which cuts 
sovereignty in IR off from an important source of change. In order to engage with the 
changes in view there is a need for a renewal of the English School, as championed by 
this thesis, involving its embracing a new holism that can cater for bottom-up, low 
political/economic change (the domain of internal sovereignty) and top-down, high 
political change (the domain of external sovereignty).
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APPENDIX 2
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, GOVERNANCE & 
THE CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH SCHOOL
Although the implications of the divide between internal and external sovereignty 
have dominated and undoubtedly informed the lack of English School engagement 
with governance theory and European integration, it is important to note that in recent 
years there have been some significant changes. These have been helpful in the sense 
that they have facilitated greater engagement with change but less than helpful - as the 
main body of the text suggested (hence their treatment in an appendix) - at dealing 
with sovereignty in the context of that change. This appendix will consider one 
example of ES engagement with change in the context of European integration which 
does not see this change in terms of the member states whose status is ongoing (Dietz 
and Whitman) and one example of ES engagement with change in the context of 
European integration which does posit the demise of the sovereign nation-state but 
provides no framework within which to conceptualise the process of that demise 
(Wasver).
1. Dietz and Whitman
A recent approach to European integration which engages very much more with the 
possibilities of change than earlier investigations into European integration is that 
presented by Thomas Dietz and Richard Whitman. This, however, is not particularly 
useful for the purposes of defining a model of revolutionism that actually unbundles 
sovereignty because it does not engage with the transformational impact of flows on 
the sovereign state. Although it certainly does not represent an example of positivist 
regime theory, the Dietz and Whitman approach has some parallels in the sense that 
its focus on the connections between states (society) is such that they do not give 
close attention to the impact of these flows on the sovereign state. To the degree that 
there is an assumption that connections flow between states, this approach can be 
read as having the effect of reifying the state, at least to some degree. Dietz and 
Whitman’s focus on the connections (society) between actors rather than the 
connections and the actors is almost certainly a function of the traditional English 
School predisposition to focus on international society informed by the divide 
between internal and external sovereignty (see chapter 3 and Appendix 1). The 
reification of the state is also assisted by a commitment to the principle that if allowed 
to develop in an unconstrained manner world society/revolutionism will undermine 
international society/rationalism which, in their judgement, would be inappropriate.1
2. Waever
Ole Waever, drawing on the work of Adam Watson, meanwhile, has developed 
understanding of European integration by making reference to the notion of ‘empire’ 
and its expressions across the centuries. Historically empire has tended to present a 
form of rule through concentric circles that has extended from: ‘direct rule’ in the 
centre; to ‘dominion’ in which subject communities have a measure of internal 
autonomy but no external autonomy; to ‘hegemony’ where states have complete 
internal autonomy but are either controlled or influenced externally; to ‘sovereign 
states’ where polities are entirely independent. There is thus an important measure of 
flexibility, decentralisation and subsidiarity in the imperial model.
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Engaging directly with the functional developments that have provoked the 
specialisation that has called into being multi-dimensional governance, Waever 
contends that the decentralised rule associated with concentric circles would seem to 
be coming of age once again because the centralised rule associated with the modem 
state has become too expensive. ‘Throughout the 1980s, the order of the day has been 
deregulation, flexibilisation and privatisation. In the private sphere, firms have 
undertaken divisionalisation, decentralisation and franchising’.1 In this context the 
suggestion is that ‘ [structural trends in political economy could make suzerainty and 
soft empires possible options, although not necessarily the models to be emulated 
around the world, nor options inherently inferior to centralised national states’.11
Mindful of the decentralised, concentric nature of imperial rule, Waever introduces a 
distinction between ‘radial’ and ‘territorial’ political power. ‘Empires are about radial 
not territorial power; the former are differentiated, the latter homogenous’.1V Waever 
continues, ‘both classical empires and some modem federations like the EU take the 
radial, concentric circles form, while both centralised nation-states and some 
federations (the USA, Germany) are territorial and homogenous power units. The 
concentric-circle features of the three contemporary power centres of Europe are 
therefore better visualised through the lens of “empires” than federations/
Waever’s contribution through his consideration of ‘empire’ is significant for 
providing a model that engages with change. Helpful perspective on this capability 
can be seen by considering his rationale for developing his approach against that of 
regime theory which ended up focusing on increasing connections between enduring 
sovereign state actors. The purpose of adopting an English School approach was 
precisely because it would engage with a form of transformation that would not take 
the endurance o f the sovereign state fo r  granted. This basic sense of openness is 
confirmed by a commitment to a measure of constmction. ‘The English School, by 
introducing the elements of time and meaning, thereby opens up analysis to more than 
just the mechanical laws governing relations between sovereign states. We still study 
“power politics”, but not in an abstract world of physical forces; it is re-inserted into a 
general history of human cultures and polities’/ 1
In true revolutionist style Waever’s account of change actually involves his rejecting 
the notion of sovereignty. His rationale for doing-so is best understood by reference to 
his critique of Michael Doyle’s definition of empires which states that they ‘are 
relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective 
sovereignty of other political societies’. The trouble with this definition, Waever 
contends, is that it treats ‘societies’ as given and constant units which is problematic 
‘because when one moves towards the imperial end, it is the empire as such that 
becomes a political unit with a centre and to varying degrees rules this larger space 
and acts as a unit towards the external world. It is a mode of political organisation 
extending over an area which combines a particular mix of central authority and local 
powers. To define it as the (unequal) relationship between central and peripheral units 
is to interpret empires through the lens of sovereign equality; as a deviation from 
some privileged norm’/ 1 The benefits of the empire approach are that ‘it ensures that 
we avoid analysing the contemporary constellation of power in terms of the 
straitjacket imposed by assumptions of sovereign equality, a move which would 
seriously compromise our ability to understand the emergent political pattern’/ 111
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Later he observes: ‘Instead of envisioning a world of geographic states, borders, and 
expanses of pink, green and yellow on the map, we have to think in terms of spots, 
degrees of control, and subordinate centres at lower levels, which can accommodate 
each other without demanding “equality” and without recognising any “sovereign” 
authority’.1X
It is not the purpose of this appendix to suggest that it is not helpful to consider the 
rise of governance through the model of empire completely apart from sovereignty. 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, as it seeks to come to terms with the 
capability of the three traditions to engage with sovereignty and change, the simple 
rejection of sovereignty generates a radical disjunction rather than explaining the 
process of changed
1 Dietz, Thomas, & Whitman, Richard, ‘Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English 
School -  Scenarios for an Encounter’, Journal o f Common Market Studies, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 
l ,p .  54.
" Ole Waever, ‘Europe’s Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security,’ 
International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, eds. Rick Fawn and 
Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 247. 
jii Ibid., p. 248.
iv Ibid., p. 226.
v Ibid., p. 246.
" Ibid., p. 221.
™ Ibid., p. 226.
™ Ibid.
1X Ibid., p.240. It is interesting to note that, whilst Waever’s work on European integration draws on 
Watson’s reflections on empire, Watson’s own reflections about European integration (noted by 
chapter 4) seem to talk of it in is terms of the extension of sovereignty rather than the unbundling of 
sovereignty. ‘In Europe we are witnessing a strong upsurge, or revival, of confederal tendencies 
towards major voluntary limitations of the independence of its member states’. He goes on to talk about 
‘this reaction in favour of supranational authority’. Adam Watson, The limits o f Independence: 
Relations between states in the modern world, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 3-4. The Union which the 
federalists seek involves the gradual but steady surrender of the freedom of action of its once 
independent member states, externally and internally, until they become little more than autonomous 
province ceremonially still dressed in the trappings of sovereignty.’ Ibid. p. 34.
x Another recent publication which makes a number of references to European integration is Barry 
Buzan’s From International to World Society? These comments constitute tantalizingly brief 
reflections that consider different possibilities but never pursue them into detailed study. Sometimes he 
writes of the EU simply as an intense form of international society (121, 211) whereas at others he 
makes it clear that its solidarist intensity is such that it can result in the transformation of the actors 
concerned (92, 211). Whether this should be translated into a new state (change by extension) or the 
unbundling of the state (change by erosion) is not clear. His reference on page 203, which fits into the 
conventional cosmopolitan definition of revolutionism gets closest to defining unbundled sovereignty 
in the tradition of governance. ‘Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as holding legal 
and political status independently, not as a gift from either of the others. Individuals and firms would 
thus become subjects of international law in their own right. Humankind has not yet seen a world 
society in this sense, though the EU may be heading in that direction’. From International to World 
Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure o f  Globalisation, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004.
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APPENDIX 3
THE IDENTITY BETWEEN WALES AND 
CHRISTIANITY
Between 450-600 AD ‘Christianity and the life of the emerging nation had become so 
tightly interlaced as to be virtually indistinguishable, and for nearly a millennium-and- 
a-half Welsh identity and religious affiliation became totally entwined’.
Prof. D. Densil Morgan1
‘From the outset the Christian religion seemed to be part of the essence of 
Welshness’.
Prof. Glanmour Williams11
The close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity, which profoundly 
impacted the definition of Welsh proto-nationalism, has its basis in approximately 
fifteen hundred years of history. Christianity played a crucial role in the formation of 
Welsh identity on two counts. First, as Gwynfor Evans observes, the Welsh language, 
and thus Welsh identity, emerged between the 4th and 7th centuries at the very time 
when Christianity was taking hold in the land of Wales.111 Second, at this same time 
Welsh identity was strengthened by virtue of its distinction from that of its neighbours 
in modem day ‘England’ who were the initially heathen Anglo-Saxons.lv Religious 
distinction was sustained, moreover, when Anglo-Saxon England adopted 
Christianity, since, despite experiments with Celtic Christianity, the nation became 
predominantly Roman Catholic from the Council of Whitby in 664. Wales, 
meanwhile, maintained the Celtic Christian tradition. This distinction went to the very 
heart of Welsh identity partly because of the bold way in which Tittle Wales’ rejected 
the powerful Catholic Church’s attempt, through St Augustine, to enforce itself on the 
nation as it had England/
The late Phil Williams put it like this:
‘Perhaps the first expression of nationhood representing the whole peninsular of 
modem Wales was the convocation of bishops that met in 602 before going to greet 
Augustine on the banks of the Severn. It is claimed that this meeting took place in 
Llangoed, and if so Llangoed Hall can be regarded as the site of the first National 
Assembly. ...Augustine failed to greet the Welsh bishops with sufficient respect, and 
the full unity with the Catholic Church was delayed for 166 years’/ 1
In 786 Wales’ bishops finally accepted the Roman date for Easter, but made no other 
significant concessions to Catholicism until the arrival of the Normans/1
When the Normans came they sought to take Wales out of the Celtic world and into 
Latin Europe, introducing changes which impacted all areas of life including 
church/111 Whilst the Norman period generally witnessed the attempted suppression of 
the Celtic tradition, however, Wales resisted valiantly and, contrary to earlier times 
when, although not ruled from abroad, there was no single national government, it
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was during this era that the Welsh princes sought after united national government. 
This witnessed the celebrated expression of Wales and Welsh identity through the 
leadership of Owain Glyndwr. Between 1400-8 Glyndwr expelled the Anglo- 
Normans, united Wales and strategically took Welsh church governance from 
Canterbury, restoring it to St David’s.,x Again religion was a key basis for identity 
distinction which both animated the quest, and formed the foundation, for 
independence.
The close relationship between Wales and Christianity however, arguably became 
even more intense in the context of the denial of political freedom after the Act of 
Union in 1534 and the translation of the Bible into Welsh. The Act of Union, seeking 
to generate a strong cultural joining between England and Wales, ‘prohibited all 
“sinister usages” of the Welsh language henceforth, in any public sphere’.x The 
language of governance and the law courts thus became English. An exception, 
however, was made for the churches where it was hoped that the translation of the 
Bible into Welsh would provide a surer means for the engagement of the Welsh with 
Protestantism.xl
‘The Welsh Bible of 1588 (along with the Welsh Book of Common Prayer of 1567) 
ensured that the only official and public use to which Welsh might be put was 
religious: its civil status taken by the Act of Union, was restored by the 1588 Bible, 
but transferred to a spiritual plane’. This was of enormous strategic significance for 
Welsh identity which was in an important sense spiritualised by the Elizabethan 
linguistic division of labour. ‘[T]he association of language and religion gave Welsh 
something of the odour of sanctity, making it a symbol and a tabernacle of a separate 
national-religious identity’.xn
The spiritualisation of Wales and the Welsh language, inherent in this identity, is 
demonstrated powerfully by the following statement from the Rev. William Roberts. 
‘When the world is spoken of on the Sabbath, then let care be taken that one speaks of 
it in English, lest our ancient Welsh tongue be sullied by such a usage’.xin
Such was the strength of the relationship between Wales, the Welsh language and 
Christianity that, ‘The revival of Welsh identity became identified with evangelical 
religion, most especially Nonconformism, which, if it was conscious of the Welsh 
national past, was perceived as being a break with that past, and as the creating of a 
new, vibrant and essentially Protestant Wales. ...By 1885, three-quarters of the 
population of Wales were members of Nonconformist churches, the majority of which 
used Welsh as their sole language of worship’. In this context; ‘Being Welsh was 
within a hairsbreadth of meaning the same as being a Christian. It was difficult to 
describe national characteristics without referring to Christianity’.x,v ‘In the 
nineteenth-century vision, Wales is considered primarily as socio-religious unity, in 
the Wales as Church paradigm’.xv
The nature of Welsh history, especially its close relationship with the language, 
informed the development of Welsh proto-nationalism whose foundations were laid in 
the mid to late nineteenth century by Rev Michael D Jones, Principal of the 
Congregationalist college at Bala and the Methodist writer, Emrys ap Iwan finding 
their initial expression in Cymru Fydd and then later in Plaid Cymru. DH Davies in 
his history of Plaid Cymru notes the very considerable influence of Christianity and
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non-conformist ministers in particular.XV1 Indeed, four of the early presidents were 
devout Christians, Lewis Valentine™1 was a Baptist minister, Saunders Lewis™" was 
a nonconformist who rather unusually became a Catholic whilst president of Plaid, 
Prof. JE Danielsxlx was actually a professional theologian and a minister and Gwynfor 
Evans who was the president of the Union of Welsh Independents nonconformist 
denomination.™ This laid the foundation for the intense involvement of theology in 
the definition of Welsh nationalism cited by Prof. R Tudur Jones™1 and Dorian 
Llywelyn in the body of chapter 9. ™"
Bearing the association between Welsh identity and Christianity in mind, it is not 
surprising that the creation of a National Assembly for Wales should have provoked 
further academic reflection on this theme and is the introductory point of departure of 
Pope’s Religion and National Identity.™‘"
1 D Densil Morgan, ‘The Essence of Welshness”?: Some Aspects of Christian Faith and National 
Identity in Wales, c 1900-2000’ Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 1700-2000, ed. 
Robert Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2001, p. 139.
Glanmour Williams ‘The Welsh and their Religion’, Cardiff, 1991, p. 14.
III Gwynfor Evans, The Fight for Welsh Freedom, Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 2000, p. 17.
IV Gwyn A. Williams, When Was Wales: A History o f  the Welsh? London, Penguin, 1991, pp. 43-44.
The Anglo Saxon contrast gave rise to an important source for Welsh identity even before Wales 
existed as a nation through its use by the British monk Gildas (540 AD). Gildas saw the history of the 
British (Celtic Church) through the prism of Israel, whilst the Anglo-Saxons were classified as the non- 
Israel, ‘heathens’, giving rise to the basis for an identity between Wales and the Kingdom of God. 
Dorian Llywelyn describes this identity as the ‘Wales-Israel’ paradigm see: Llywelyn, Dorian, Sacred 
Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality, Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press, 1999, pp. 80-91.
v Gwyn A Williams, When Was Wales, pp. 43-44.
V1 Phil Williams, The Psychology o f Distance, Cardiff, Welsh Academic Press, 2002, p. 23.
™ . I b i d -
v111 Gwyn A Williams, When Was Wales, p. 62, & pp. 68-68.
1X Peter Beresford Ellis, The Celtic Revolution: A Study in Anti-Imperialism, Y lollfa Cyf, Talybont, pp.
77-78.
x Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 47.
X1 Indeed, quite apart from the language of the Bible, Anglican Churches were required by statute to 
conduct their services in Welsh in those places where Welsh was the dominant language, see Geraint 
Tudur, ‘Howell Harris and the Issue of Welsh Identity’, Religion and National Identity: Wales and 
Scotland c l 700-2000, p. 55.
301 Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 48. Also see, Beresford Ellis, The Celtic Revolution, pp.
78-79.
X1" Quoted by R. Tudur Jones ‘Yr Eglwysi a’r Iaith yn Oes Victoria’, Lien Cyymru, 19 (1996) 165.
Trans by Ibid., p. 51. On the role of the ‘language of heaven’ see also. WP Griffith, ‘Preaching Second 
to No Other under the Sun’: Edward Matthews, the Nonconformist Pulpit and Welsh Identity during 
the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, Religion and National Identity, pp. 61-83.
Xlv Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People, p. 49. 
xv Ibid., p. 50.
XV1 ‘The high proportion of nonconformist ministers among the party’s members reflected their 
attachment to the chapel-going tradition of Welsh speaking Wales. Out of a sample of 28 leading party 
figures, there were 14 Calvinistic Methodists, 8 Congregationalists, 2 Baptists, 2 Anglicans and 2 
Roman Catholics. Nationalists held their meetings, as one member put it, in ‘secluded chapel vestries’ 
and not in workmen’s institutes or upstairs rooms in public houses...’ D. Hywel Davies, The Welsh 
Nationalist Party 1925-45, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1983, p. 205.
The close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity is readily demonstrated in the following 
comment from Kenneth O. Morgan regarding Plaid Cymru. ‘The Welsh culture and the Christian
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APPENDIX 4
SOVEREIGNTY IN WELSH PROTO-NATIONALISM
Some might respond with surprise to the assertion that Welsh nationalism has 
relevance to the conceptualisation of state sovereignty given that it has often sought to 
avoid using the term. This appendix will first examine the basis for suggesting that 
Welsh proto-nationalism has no interest in sovereignty (Part 1) before considering the 
actual basis for a very clear relationship between the two (Part 2).
PART 1: SOVEREIGNTY, COMMUNITY AND WELSH NATIONALISM
The rejection of sovereignty is implicated in the common reference point found in 
neo-medievalism which John Osmond argues generates what he describes as an 
organic, Aristotelian emphasis on roots and the ‘bottom-up’. This perspective - which 
can be equally well attributed to the Celtic worldview - celebrates grounded, local, 
subjective relationships with the environment both human and physical.1 Rejecting 
the British state tradition with its quest for splendid monistic definition from the 
outside-in, Welsh identity is far more concerned with the community from the inside- 
out." If one starts from the most immediate community and works outwards one soon 
discovers that there are a whole series of communities on differing levels that come 
together to constitute what Saunders Lewis termed that ‘community of communities’, 
Wales.111 Thus construed Wales was, Lewis claimed, one of the old European nations 
of the ‘essentially pre-national age’ of the Respublica Christiana which offered the 
nation a far greater measure of autonomy than that given to Wales as a member of the 
United Kingdom. This was, however, critically less than the complete autonomy 
associated with the materialistic and highly statist nationalism of the modem era.
It would be possible to locate many expressions of the bottom-up, decentralized 
tradition of Welsh proto- (and indeed contemporary) nationalism which find classic 
expression in the oft used characterization of Wales a ‘community of communities’. 
For the purpose of obtaining a brief over-view, however, this appendix cites two 
examples one from the late 19th century and one from the 20th.
The leading 19th century Welsh nationalist and President of the Congregationalist 
College at Bala, Michael D Jones, wanted Wales to become politically independent 
but was very clear that he did not want Wales to pursue centralised ‘scientific’ 
statehood. In his judgement, as R Tudur Jones observed, this would become ‘a 
menace to precisely those values which have given Welsh life its distinctive social 
flavour ...And so in his thinking, the principle of centralization, of nationality, was 
balanced by the principle of localization’.lv
Celebration of the local is also reflected in the work of the Welsh nationalist Baptist 
(and then later Quaker) poet Waldo Williams. In his thinking the import of the local 
is such that it is through the local that one encounters the national. In William’s 
thinking, Llywelyn explains: ‘[t]he Kingdom is built up in and through the specific, 
the concrete and the local. In Waldo’s terms, there is no brotherhood, unless 
individual, specific people live practically ...Only in the space of the bro -  the place 
of one’s own neighbourhood -  may national identity be made real and experienced 
...Wales as place and as nation can only be experienced in the local’.v To underline
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this important point that goes right to the heart of Welsh proto-nationalism’s 
decentralized ethic, Llywelyn later continues, ‘there is for Waldo no opposition but 
mutually necessary complementarity between the local and the national,. . . ,VI
The depth of commitment to decentralised community, meanwhile, supposedly 
negatively related to sovereignty, is also seen in Roger Tanner’s article ‘National 
Identity and the One Wales Model’. In a list of Welsh characteristics he includes 
‘“Brogarwch” (love of locality), “Cymdogaeth” (good-neighbourliness) ...strong 
kinship ties, a tradition of home ownership, scattered and small-scale close-knit 
communities ...The result of these [and other features] is a society of warm, intimate, 
radical communities, which inspires a love of country in both Welsh and English- 
speaking Welshmen alike. Perhaps “Cydymunedaeth” (literally “co-communityism”) 
or some other word could be popularised as summarising the social aspects of the 
Welsh identity’. vu
The Welsh conviction that authentic community identity must necessarily derive from 
the bottom-up, from a subjective rootedness in community, results in great criticism 
of the perceived source of the objectivism which cuts British identity off from its 
roots, the sovereign British state/111 It is suggestive of a legal shell, the foundation of 
an outer boundary, comprehension of which requires an outside perspective, and an 
objective position from which one can survey the whole nation. This is not really 
consistent with the notion of having an internal, subjective posture within a nation 
which, whilst a cohesive community in one sense, is actually a mass of many 
contingent communities. As a result of its concerns about sovereignty, Welsh 
nationalism usually avoids the language of sovereignty. Collapsing its conception of 
sovereignty into a narrow British model, defined in terms of the destruction of roots, 
the rhetoric of sovereignty has not been attractive in most Welsh nationalist circles.1X
The perceived negative relationship between sovereignty and community and the 
celebration of the latter in favour of the former can be seen in Richard Wyn Jones’ 
article entitled ‘Care of the Community’, which is deeply critical of the place of 
sovereignty within the British polity. He laments that many of the Welsh Liberals of 
the 19th century were taken in by this alien notion. ‘[T]heir political thinking never 
escaped from the shackles of parliamentary sovereignty and the unitary state despite 
all their romantic blather about the hen and wlad and its gwerin’.x The same was also 
true for many twentieth century Welsh Socialists, no doubt because of the modem 
objectivism which underpinned their creed. ‘[Ultimately, Labour and the Left, like 
the Liberals before them, fetishized parliamentary sovereignty and the unitary state’/ 1
PART 2: CHAMPIONS OF A WELSH SOVEREIGNTY
The above consideration of Welsh proto-nationalism reveals an agenda that has been 
all about distancing the Welsh approach from that of Britain. To the extent that British 
identity celebrates sovereignty Welsh identity must not! In reality, however, whilst 
the rhetoric of national sovereignty has not been attractive to much of Welsh 
nationalism, the reality of their agenda has not concurred with this abstinence in any 
way, unless you subscribe to a very narrow Jean Bodin - Thomas Hobbes definition of 
sovereignty which includes the centralisation of power/control/1
Perhaps the most dramatic admissions of the desire of Welsh proto-nationalism for 
sovereignty can be found in its aspirations in the international arena where it sought 
objectives that were wholly at variance with an absence of sovereignty. Plaid in the
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1920s-30s contended that Wales should be granted Dominion status within the British 
Empire and be welcomed into the League of Nations.™1
Whilst Dominion status involved a certain institutionalised deference to Britain, this 
restraint did not change the fact that those nations with Dominion status had their own 
governments, foreign ministries and defence forces and could not be forced down a 
political avenue against their will. To this extent they must consequently be conceived 
as the bearers of sovereignty. Similarly membership of the League of Nations was the 
preserve of sovereign states. Its founding Covenant specifically undertook ‘to protect 
and preserve ...the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members’ (Article 10)XIV (Italics added).
Rather more recently Gwynfor Evans wrote passionately of Wales’ right to 
membership of the United Nations. ‘Forty countries in the UNO, most of them new, 
have a smaller population than Wales. Iceland, whose population is smaller than 
Cardiff s is placed next to India in the General Assembly. The representatives of 
Wales would sit between Venezuela and Yemen, which came into existence during 
the last century and a half. It is outrageous that Wales, an old European nation whose 
civilisation goes back to Roman time, is excluded from the international 
community’.xv Again one of the conditions of membership of the United Nations is 
that a state is sovereign. Such is its importance that it features right at the beginning of 
the UN Charter in Article 2 (7) which enshrines the principle of the equal sovereignty 
of all Members.™ Indeed such is the identity between the UN and sovereignty, as 
seen in chapter 3, that accession is recognised as often being the first key international 
authentication of a polity becoming sovereign.xvn
Less dramatically, but nonetheless importantly, Welsh proto-nationalism also 
expressed objectives in relationship to Europe that were not consistent with the denial 
of sovereignty. Long before the advent of the European Economic Community, 
Saunders Lewis, inspired by the Respublica Christiana, advocated the creation of a 
European supranation that would provide participating nations a healthy measure of 
autonomy. It would be enough to prevent the suffocation and control of the kind 
Wales endured in its relationship with England but less than the complete autonomy 
that led to the materialistic and highly statist nationalism of the modem period.™11 The 
granting of this measure of autonomy would critically result in the nations concerned 
having international personality, and an inner core of competencies pertaining to that 
personality over which they would or could not generally be overruled. This would 
produce an arrangement not unlike that later sought by the SNP in its EU strategy of 
‘sovereignty in Europe’ or Plaid’s own, recently amended, ‘full national status’ 
strategy. Both these approaches would, if implemented, have resulted in Scotland and 
Wales being able to engage in the intergovemmentalism of the Union with respect to 
those issues still determined by consensus. Those states would obtain sovereignty to 
the extent of consensus competencies.XIX
CONCLUSION
It would seem that many Welsh nationalists have associated sovereignty with 
centralisation and top-down control. In truth, however, from the perspective of IR, 
sovereignty has nothing to do with centralisation or decentralisation which are 
decisions facing every sovereign state about the structure of its government. One 
sovereign state might be centralised another highly decentralised. Welsh proto­
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nationalism clearly sought after sovereignty but for the purpose of seeking after a 
decentralised polity.
I To some degree the significance attributed to the medieval view is the result of the work of Saunders 
Lewis whose conversion to Catholicism gave him a very high regard for medievalism. This 
controversial departure from his roots, however - he was the son of a non-conformist minister and was 
himself a non-conformist when he became leader of Plaid Cymru, converting whilst in office -  did not 
cause Welsh nationalism to cease to be Protestant. (Williams, Gwyn A. When Was Wales: A History o f  
the Welsh? London, Penguin, 1991, p. 284.) Indeed Williams argues that Lewis’ Catholicism was a 
reason why he was pushed from the presidency in 1939. (Ibid., p. 284.) Also see: D. Hywel Davies, 
The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-45, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1983, pp. 198-200 and Laura 
McAllister, Plaid Cymru: The Emergence o f  a Political Party, Bridgend, Seren, 2001, p. 47.
II Osmond, John, Creative Conflict, Llandysul, Gomer Press (and London, Routledge), 1977, p. 172, p. 
247 and p. 250.
III loan Bowen Rees, Government by Community, London, Charles Knight and Co, 1971, p. 209.
lv Jones, R. Tudur, The Desire o f  Nations, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 1974, p. 187. 
v Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality, 
Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 164.
" Ibid., p. 165.
Y11 Roger Tanner, ‘National Identity and the One Wales Model’, Planet: The Welsh Internationalist, 
April/May 1973, pp. 32-33.
yi" Laura McAllister, ‘The Perils of Community as a Construct for the Political Ideology of Welsh 
Nationalism’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 33, No 4, Autumn, 1998, p. 508.
McAllister’s article is beneficial to this research to the extent that it helps to demonstrate the centrality 
of the concept of community to Plaid thinking which underpins its worldview and thus approach to 
sovereignty. To the extent that she acknowledges this tradition in order to be critical, however, some 
might question whether reference to this article is helpful. In response to this, though, one must 
recognize that McAllister criticizes Plaid’s deployment of ‘community’ from the perspective of 
electoral success. Community has not helped Plaid at election time. Whether that is the case or not has 
no bearing on the spatio-temporal facility of the cultural lens provided by theologically disclosed 
Welsh proto-nationalism and its capacity to come to terms with globalization.
1X Richard Wyn Jones, ‘The Council of the Isles’, Planet 136, August September 1999, p. 77.
This is not to say that others have not happily spoken of the need for Wales to become a sovereign 
state. See the following as an example: ‘Welshmen must strengthen the bond of brotherhood between 
them that they may create a sovereign State of their own to which Welshmen can offer unembarrassed 
allegiance’. R. Tudur Jones, The Desire o f  Nations, p. 205. Standing outside Welsh proto-nationalism, 
examining sovereignty in the twenty-first century, in the context of the 2003 Plaid Cymru leadership 
contest, the non-conformist minister, the Rev. Rhodri Glyn Thomas, Assembly Member for 
Carmarthem East and Dinefwr began to celebrate the virtues if sovereignty describing himself as a 
‘sovereigntist’ Rhodri Glyn Jones, ‘Sovereignty without Separation’, Agenda, Institute of Welsh 
Affairs, Cardiff, Summer 2003, pp. 39-40. (It is interesting to note an ongoing relationship between 
Plaid and non-conformity even in later modem Welsh nationalism.)
x Richard Wyn Jones, ‘Care of the Community’, Planet: The Welsh Internationalist, 109, p. 17.
xi Ibid., p. 18.
xn It is worth pointing out at this stage (as has been noted elsewhere) that the Welsh academic who 
christened the ‘English School’, was of the opinion that sovereignty should be understood in terms of 
centralization and the negation of constitutionalism. ‘An achievement of the liberal tradition is to have 
constructed a notion, and structure, of statehood which is the antithesis of sovereignty. The liberal state 
was inspired by a passion to regulate, even do away with sovereigns. Roy E. Jones, ‘The English 
school of international relations: a case for closure’, Review o f International Studies, 1981, p. 6. 
xm Davies, The Welsh Nationalist Party, p. 93.
Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in world Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape’, 
Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999. p. 24. 
xvXV Gwynfor Evans, Fighting fo r Wales, Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 1991, p. 156.
Although not part of the development of early Plaid Cymru, and thus Welsh proto-nationalism, the 
curious nature of Plaid’s position in relationship to sovereignty continues. It was eloquently 
demonstrated during the 2001 General Election campaign when Plaid Cymru’s Westminster leader,
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Elfyn Llwyd MP was interviewed by Andrew Rawnsley on Radio 4’s ‘Westminster Hour’. Mr Llwyd 
said that Plaid would like to see Wales having membership of the United Nations but was not looking 
for Wales to become a sovereign state. Mr Rawnsley then asked Mr Llwyd how many states were 
members of the United Nations were not sovereign to which Mr Llwyd replied that he thought there 
were a few. Mr Rawnsley then informed Mr Llwyd that there are none because one cannot be a 
member of the United Nations unless one is a sovereign state.
Rhodri Glyn Thomas AM and Adam Price MP have interestingly since called for Plaid to embrace 
sovereignty whilst rejecting the quest for full independence. They argue that this circle can be squared 
via the category of UN membership called ‘free association’ (see chapter 3) with respect to which a 
state is sovereign but continues to have constitutional ties to larger polities. See Rhodri Glyn Jones, 
‘Sovereignty without Separation’, pp. 39-40.
XVI Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in world Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape’, Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1999. p. 24.
xv" Alan James, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ Review o f  International Studies, 1984, p. 11. 
XV111 Davies, The Welsh Nationalist Party, p. 115.
x,x Laura McAllister, Plaid Cymru: The Emergence o f a Political Party, pp. 149-150.
462
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agnew, John and Corbridge, Stuart, Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and 
International Political Economy, Routledge, London, 1995.
Akyuz, Yilmaz and Comford, Andrew, ‘International Capital Movements: Some 
Proposals for Reform’, Managing the Global Economy, ed. Michie and Grieve 
Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Akyuz, Yilmaz ‘Taming International Finance’, Managing the Global Economy, ed.
Michie and Grieve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Alter, Karen J. ‘Challenges to the WTO’s new dispute resolution system’, 
International Affairs, Volume 79, Number 4, July 2003.
Anderson, James and Hall, Stuart ‘Absolutism and Other Ancestors’, The Rise o f the 
Modern State, ed. James Anderson, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
‘The Modernity of Modem States’, The Rise o f the Modern State, ed. James 
Anderson, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
Ashley, Richard, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the 
Domestication of Global Life’, International Theory: Critical Investigations, 
ed. James Der Derian, London, Macmillan, 1995.
Axford, Barrie, The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture, Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1995.
Bakker, A. F. P. International Financial Institutions, Harlow, Addison Wesley 
Longman Ltd, Open University of the Netherlands, 1996.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Globalization: The Human Consequences, Oxford, Polity Press 
in association with Blackwell, 1998.
Begg, Fischer and Dombusch, Economics, London, McGraw Hill, 1987.
Beresford Ellis, Peter, The Celtic Revolution: A Study in Anti-Imperialism, Talybont, 
Y Lolfa, 1997.
Beyer, Religion and Globalization, London, Sage Publications, 1994.
Boucher, Daniel, The EU Defined: A Confederal Definition o f the European Union, 
MA Thesis, (unpublished), 1994.
Boucher, David, Political Theories o f  International Relations, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998.
Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John, The European Union as a Global Actor, 
London, Routledge, 1999.
Bull, Hedley, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International Politics, ed. Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, London, 
Macmillan, 1977.
‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 1982, Vol. 21, No 1.
‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002. 
and Watson, Adam, The Expansion o f  International Society, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1984.
Burgess, Michael, Federalism and Federal Union: Political Ideas, Influences and 
Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987, London, Routledge, 1989. 
Butterfield, Herbert, Christianity and History, London, G Bell and Sons, 1949. 
Christianity, Diplomacy and War, London, The Epworth Press, 1962.
463
Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History, ed. CT Mclntire, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979.
Barry Buzan, ‘From international system to international society: structural realism 
and regime theory meet the English school’, International Organization, 47, 3, 
Summer 1993.
and Little, Richard International Systems in World History: Remaking the 
Study o f International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
and Little, Richard, ‘Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual 
Project and What to do About it’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
2001 .
‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’, Review o f 
International Studies, 2001, 27.
From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social 
Structure o f  Globalisation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Camilleri, Joseph and Falk, Jim, The End o f  Sovereignty? The Politics o f a Shrinking 
and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992.
Capie, Forrest, Currency Controls: A Cure Worse Than the Problem? London, The 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 2002.
Cargill Thompson, W. D. J. The Political Thought o f  Martin Luther, Brighton, 
Harvester Press, 1984.
Carlson, John D, Owens, Erik C. The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and 
International Politics, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003. 
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f  
International Relations, 2nd edn, New York, St Martins Press, 1946.
Castells, Manuel, The Rise o f  the Network Society: the Information Age: Economy 
Society and Culture, Vol. 1, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001.
The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 2: The Power o f  
Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997.
Christiansen, Thomas, ‘Reconstructing Space: From Territorial Politics to European 
Multilevel Governance’, Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. 
K. E. Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996.
Clark, Ian, ‘Making sense of sovereignty’, Review o f  International Studies 1988.
Globalization and International Relations Theory, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998.
Cohen, Benjamin J. ‘The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of international 
Monetary Co-operation’, International Political Economy: Perspectives on 
Global Power and Wealth, eds. Frieden and Lake, Bedford/St Martins, 
Boston/New York, 2000.
Cooper, Robert, The post-modern state and world order, London, Demos, 1996.
Cox, Robert, ‘Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualisation of world order: 
reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. by James N. Rosenau 
and Emst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Cox, Michael, Dunne, Tim and Booth, Ken, Empires, Systems and States: Great 
Transformation in International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001.
Cristi, Renato, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, Cardiff, University of 
Wales Press, 1998.
Crowe, Brian, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?, International 
Affairs, Vol. 79, No 3, May 2003.
464
Cutler, Claire A. ‘The Grotian tradition in international relations’, Review o f  
International Studies, 17, 1991.
Dark, K. R. ed. Religion and International Relations, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001.
Davies, D. Hywel, The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-45, Cardiff, University of 
Wales Press, 1983.
David Dessler, ‘Constructivism within a positivist social science’, Review o f  
International Studies, 1999, 25.
Der Derian, James, ‘The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance 
and Speed’, International Studies Quarterly, 1990, 34.
‘Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations’, Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, 1988, Vol. 17. No 2.
Daniel, Deudney, ‘Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism’, The 
Return o f  Culture an Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Freidrich 
Kratochwil, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
Dietz, Thomas, & Whitman, Richard, ‘Analysing European Integration: Reflecting 
on the English School -  Scenarios for an Encounter’, Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 1.
Dicken, Peter, Global shift: Transforming the World Economy, Paul Chapman, 
London, 1998, The Global Transformations Reader, eds. Held and McGrew, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000.
Donelan, Michael, The Reason o f States, ed. London, George Allen and Unwin,
1978.
Donnelly, Jack, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000.
Drane, John, Introducing The New Testament, Oxford, Lion Publishing, 1986.
Duchacek, Ivo D. The Territorial Dimension o f Politics: Within, Among and Across 
Nations, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986.
Dunne, Tim, Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998.
Einzig, Paul, Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe, London, Macmillan, 1965.
Epp, Roger, ‘The “Augustinian moment” in international politics: Niebuhr, 
Butterfield, Wights and the reclaiming of a tradition’, Aberystwyth, The 
University College of Wales, Department of International Politics 1991.
‘Martin Wight; International Relations and the Realm of Persuasion’, Post- 
Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in IR, Michigan, eds. F. A. Beer and Robert 
Hariman, Michigan State University Press, 1996.
‘The English school on the frontier of international society: a hermeneutic 
recollection’, The Eighty Years Crisis 1919-99, Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and 
Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999.
Esposito, John L, and Watson, Michael eds. Religion and Global Order, Cardiff, 
University of Wales Press, 2000.
Evans, Andrew, ‘Forced Miracles: The Russian Orthodox Church and Postsoviet 
International Relations’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002.
Evans, Gwynfor, Fighting for Wales, Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 1991.
Evans, Tony, and Wilson, Peter, ‘Regime Theory and the English School of 
International Relations: A Comparison’, Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies, 1992.
Forsyth, Murray, Unions o f States: The Theory and Practice o f Confederation, 
Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1981.
465
Forsyth, Murray, Keens Soper, Maurice and Savigear, Peter, The Theory o f 
International Relations, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970.
Friedman, Thomas, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, London, Harper Collins, 1999. 
Ferguson and Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics, 
Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
Garrett, Geoffrey, ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or 
Virtuous Circle’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No 4, Autumn 1998. 
Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983.
Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences o f  Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
Beyond Left and Right: The Future o f Radical Politics, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1994.
The Third Way: The Renewal o f  Social Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, 
Blackwell, 1998.
Gill, Stephen, ‘Globalization, market civilization, and disciplinary neoliberalism’, 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 24 1995.
‘Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 
1990s’, International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, ed. 
ed. Hettne London, Zed Books Ltd, 1995.
Gilpin, Robert, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, Realism and its 
Critics, ed. Robert Keohane, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Goldstein, Judith, and Keohane, Robert O. ‘Ideas and foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework’, Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political 
Change, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993.
Grader, Sheila, ‘The English school of international relations: evidence and 
evaluation \  Review o f International Studies, 1988, 14.
Gray, John, False Dawn: The Delusions o f Global Capitalism, London, Granta 
Books, 1998.
‘Global utopias and clashing civilizations: misunderstanding the present’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 74, no 1, January 1998.
‘The era of globalisation is over’ Terror in America Essay 2, New Statesman, 
24 September 2001.
Greenwood, Christopher, ‘International law and the “war against terrorism’” , 
International Affairs, 2002, Volume 78, Issue 2.
Griffith, W. P. ‘Preaching Second to No Other under the Sun: Edward Matthews, the 
Nonconformist Pulpit and Welsh Identity during the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, 
Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 1700-2000, ed. Robert 
Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2001.
Guehenno, Jean Marie, The End o f the Nation-State, Minneapolis, University of 
Minneapolis, 1993.
Gunton, Colin, The One, The Three and The Many, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.
Hampsher Monk, Ian, An Introduction to Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1992.
Haas, E. B., The Uniting o f  Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces 1950-57, 
Stanford California, Stanford University Press, 1968.
Hall, Ian, ‘Review article: Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the 
English School’, International Affairs, Vol. 77, 3, 2001.
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio, Empire, London, Harvard University Press,
2000.
466
Harvey, David, The Condition o f Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins o f  
Cultural Change, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989.
Hedetoft, Ulf, ‘The State of Sovereignty in Europe’, National Cultures and 
European Integration, ed. Staffan Zetterholm, Oxford, Berg, 1994.
Held, David, Political Theory and the Modern State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989. 
and David, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999. 
Henderson, David, Anti-Liberalism 2000: The Rise o f the New Millennium 
Collectivism, London, IE A Occasional Paper 115, 2001.
Hetherington, David, Economic Management o f Resources: A Critique o f  Classical 
Economics, Centre for Migration and Development Studies, The University of 
Western Australia, 1996.
Hettne, Bjom, ed. International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, 
London, Zed Books Ltd, 1995.
Hinsley, F. H. Sovereignty, New York, Basic Books Inc, 1966.
‘The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations between States’, ed. WJ 
Stankiewicz, In Defence o f Sovereignty, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1969.
Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame, Globalization In Question, The International 
Economy and the Possibilities o f Governance, Second Edition, Polity Press, 
Oxford, 1999.
Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1991:
Howe, Geoffrey, ‘Sovereignty and interdependence: Britain’s place in the world’, 
International Affairs, 66, 4, 1990.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash o f Civilizations and Remaking o f World Order, 
London, Touchstone, 1998.
Hurrell, Andrew, ‘Society and Anarchy in the 1990s’, B. A. Roberson ed. 
International Society and the Development o f  International Relations Theory, 
London, Pinter, 1998.
Hutton, Will, The State We're In, Great Britain, Johnathan Cape, 1995.
Inayatullah and Blaney, ‘Realizing sovereignty, Review o f international Studies, 
1995,21.
Markus Jactenfuchs, ‘Conceptualising European Governance’, Reflective 
Approaches to European Governance, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, 
Macmillan, 1996.
Jackson, Robert, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
‘Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life’, Millennium: Journal 
o f International Studies, 19, 1990.
‘Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape’, Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Political 
Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.
and James, Alan, eds. States in a Changing World, Oxford, Clarendon, 1993. 
and Sorensen, Georg, Introduction to International Relations, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
James, Alan, ‘Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?’ Review o f  International 
Studies, 1984.
‘The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, 
Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.
467
Jameson, Fredric, ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, The 
New Left Review, 1984.
Foreword to The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, by Jean- 
Francois Lyotard, trans Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press 1994.
Jones, Rhodri Glyn, ‘Sovereignty without Separation’, Agenda, Institute of Welsh 
Affairs, Cardiff, Summer 2003.
Jones, Richard Wyn, ‘The Council of the Isles’, Planet 136, August September 1999.
‘Care of the Community’, Planet: The Welsh Internationalist, 109.
Jones, Roy E. ‘The English school of international relations: a case for closure’, 
Review o f International Studies, 1981.
Jones, R. M. ‘Language in God's Economy: A Welsh and International Perspective’, 
Themelios, Vol. 21 No 3, April 1996.
Jones, R. Tudur, The Desire o f Nations, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 
1974.
‘Christian Nationalism’, This Land and People eds. Paul H. Ballard and D. 
Huw Jones, Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, Cardiff,
1979.
Jones, Geraint Tudur, ‘Howell Harris and the Issue of Welsh Identity’, Religion and 
National Identity: Wales and Scotland cl 700-2000, ed. Robert Pope, Cardiff, 
University of Wales Press, 2001.
Jorgensen, Knud Erik, ‘Introduction: Approaching European Governance’, Reflective 
Approaches on European Governance, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, 
Macmillan, 1995.
Kedourie, Elie, ‘Religion and politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight’, British 
Journal o f International Studies 5, 2, 1979.
Kelly, Ruth, ‘Derivatives: A Growing Threat to the International Financial System’, 
Managing the Global Economy, eds. Michie and Smith, Oxford, Oxford 
University, 1995.
Keens-Soper, Maurice, ‘The Liberal State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe’, The 
History o f European Ideas, 1989, Vol. 10, No 6.
Keohane, Robert O and Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence, Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1977.
and Nye, Joseph S. ‘Realism and Complex Interdependence’, Perspectives on 
World Politics, eds. Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton, 
Beckenham, Croom Helm Ltd, 1981.
‘The Analysis of International Regimes’, Regime Theory and International 
Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1995.
and Hoffmann, Stanely, ‘Conclusion: Community politics and institutional 
change’, in W. Wallace ed. The Dynamics of European Integration, London, 
Pinter, 1990 The Politics o f  European Integration: A Reader, ed. Michael 
O’Neill, London, Routledge, 1996.
Janine Kissolewski, ‘Norms in international society English School meets 
constructivists’, presented to BISA Annual Conference, 18-2 December 2000, 
Bradford University http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/.
Kitson, Michael and Michie, Jonathan, ‘Trade and Growth: A Historical 
Perspective’, Managing the Global Economy, ed. Jonathan Michie and John 
Grieve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Klom, Andy, ‘Mercosur and Brazil, International Affairs, March 2003.
468
Korten, David, When Corporations Rule the World, London, Earthscan, 1995. 
Krasner, Stephen D. ‘Westphalia and All That’, Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. 
Goldstein and Keohane, Cornell University Press, 1993.
‘Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights, Regime Theory and International 
Relations, eds. Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, Oxford, Clarendon, 1995. 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1999.
‘Compromising Westphalia’, International Security, Vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 
1995), in The Global Transformations Reader, eds. Held and McGrew, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000.
‘Rethinking the sovereign state model’, Empires Systems and States: Great 
Transformations in International Politics, eds. Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and 
Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Kohr, Leopold, The Breakdown o f Nations, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1957.
Kubalkova, Vendulka, ‘Towards an International Political Theology’, Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, 2000, Vol. 29, No 3.
Lamont, Norman, Sovereign Britain, London, Duckworth, 1995.
Lane, Patrick, ‘The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Crack in the 
Comerston?’ Globalisation and International Trade Liberalisation: Continuity 
and Change, ed. Martin Richardson, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000. 
Laughland, John, The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins o f the European 
Idea, London, Warner Books, 1998.
Lauterpacht, Eli, ‘Sovereignty - Myth or Reality’, International Affairs, 73, 1, 1997. 
Leach, Rodney, Europe: A Concise Encyclopedia o f  the European Union from  
Aachen to Zollverein, London, Profile Books, 1998.
Levitt, Malcom and Lord, Christopher, The Political Economy o f  Monetary Union, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000.
Lewis, Saunders, Principles o f Nationalism, Plaid Cymru, 1975.
Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns o f Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-one Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984.
Linklater, Andrew, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International 
Relations, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990.
Richard Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International 
Relations’, presented to BIS A Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, 
University of Manchester, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/
Luther, Martin, ‘The Ordinance for a Common Chest of the Town of Leisnig’, 
Luther’s Works Volume 45, The Christian and Society //, ed. Walker Brandt, 
General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1962.
‘Treatise on Good Works’, Luther’s Works Volume 44: The Christian in 
Society /, ed. James Atkinson, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, 1966.
‘Treatise on Good Works’ Luther’s Works Volume 44: The Christian in Society 
/, ed. James Atkinson, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, 1966.
Appeal to the German Nobility Luther’s Works Volume 44: The Christian in 
Society /, ed. James Atkinson, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, 1966.
Llywelyn, Dorian, Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in 
Welsh Spirituality, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999.
Loriaux, Michael, ‘The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and 
Moral Action in International Relations Thought’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 1992.
469
Lynch, Peter, Minority Nationalism and European Integration, Cardiff, University of 
Wales Press, 1996.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, by, trans 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester, Manchester University Press 
1994.
MacCormick, Neil, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State’, Political 
Studies, Vol. 44, 1996.
Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Giandomenico, Majone, ‘A European Regulatory State?’ J Richardson ed., European 
Union: Power and Policy Making, London, Routledge, 1996. 
ed. Regulating Europe, London, Routledge, 1996.
Manners, Ian, ‘The Missing Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism 
and World Imagination in Extra-national Studies’, Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies, Vol. 32, 2003.
Manning, C. A. W. The Nature o f  International Society* London, G Bell and Sons 
Ltd, 1962.
Mayall, James, - The New Interventionism 1991-4: United Nations experience in 
Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996.
- ‘Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination’, Sovereignty at the Millennium, 
ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.
McAllister, Laura, ‘The Perils of Community as a Construct for the Political 
Ideology of Welsh Nationalism’, Government and Opposition. Vol. 33, No. 4, 
Autumn, 1998.
Plaid Cymru: The Emergence o f a Political Party, Bridgend, Seren, 2001. 
Mecham, Michael, ‘Mercosur: a failing development project?’ International Affairs, 
March 2003.
Menon, Anand, ‘From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq’, International Affairs 80,
4, 2004.
Mittleman, James, ‘The Dynamics of Globalization’, Globalization: Critical 
Reflections, ed. James Mittleman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder Colorado, 
1996.
Milward, Alan, The European Rescue o f the Nation State, London, Routledge, 1992. 
Mlinar, Zdravko, Globalization and Territorial Identities, Aldershot, Avebury, 1992. 
Molloy, Sean, ‘Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of 
Martin Wight’, European Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan- 
European International Relations Conference, University of Canterbury, 8-10th 
September 2001. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/
Monnet, Jean, ‘A Ferment of Change’, Journal o f Common Market Studies Vol.l: 
1963, pp.204-9 and 210-11, Document 11 in Michael O’Neill, The Politics o f 
European Integration: A Reader, London, Routledge, 1996.
Moore, Mike, ‘Multilateralism and the WTO’, Globalisation and International Trade 
Liberalisation: Continuity and Change, ed. Martin Richardson, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2000.
‘WTO/FORSEC Trade Policy Course for Pacific island countries, Fiji, March 
5th 2001. www.wto.org/english/news e/newsOl e/fiii e.htm 
‘The WTO: What is at stake?’ 5th John Payne Memorial Lecture European 
Business School London, March 12th 2001.
www.wto.org/english/news e/spmm e/spmm54 e.htm
470
Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From 
Messina to Maastricht, London, UCL Press, 1999.
Morgan, D. Densil, The Span o f the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales 
1914-2000, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999.
‘The Essence of Welshness”?: Some Aspects of Christian Faith and National 
Identity in Wales, c 1900-2000’ Religion and National Identity Wales and 
Scotland c 1700-2000, ed. Robert Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press,
2001 .
Morgan, Kenneth O, Rebirth o f a Nation: Wales 1880-1980, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press/University of Wales Press, 1982.
Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
Mulgan, Geoff, Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World, London, Chatto and 
Windus, 1997.
Mumford, Lewis, The Condition o f Man, London, Martin Seeker and Warburg Ltd, 
1944.
Murray, Alastair, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and
Cosmopolitan Ethics, Keele, Keele University Press, 1997.
Neibuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, 
New York, Charles Scribners, 1932.
‘The Illusion of World Government, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 
London, Faber and Faber, 1953.
‘Augustine and Christian Realism’, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 
London, Faber and Faber, 1953.
‘Ideology and Scientific Method’, Christians Realism and Political Problems, 
London, Faber and Faber, 1953.
Empires: Recurring Patterns In the Political Order, London, Faber and Faber, 
1959.
Nicholls, David, Deity and Domination: Images o f God and the State in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Routledge, 1994.
Nicholson, Michael, ‘The Enigma of Martin Wight’, The Review o f International 
OECD, How the OECD promotes the rule o f law, Paris, OECD, 1998.
Offe, Claus, ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics’, Social Research, Vol. 52, No 4, Winter 1985.
Ohmae, Kenichi, ‘Putting Global Logic First’, The Evolving Global Economy: 
Making Sense o f  the New World Order, ed. K. Ohmae, Harvard, Harvard 
Business Review, 1995.
The Borderless World, London, Collins 1990. K. Ohmae, The End o f  the 
Nation State, 1995.
The End o f the Nation State: The Rise o f Regional Economies: How new 
engines o f prosperity are reshaping global markets, London, Harper Collins, 
1996.
O’Neill, Michael, The Politics o f European Integration: A Reader, London, 
Routledge, 1996.
Osmond, John, Creative Conflict, Llandysul, Gomer Press (and London, Routledge),
1977.
Welsh Europeans, Seren, Bridgend, 1995.
O’Sullivan, Noel, ‘Political integration, the Limited State and the Philosophy of 
Postmodernism’, Political Studies, Vol. 41, 1993.
Panitch, Leon, ‘Globalisation and the State’, The Socialist Register, 1994.
471
Paul, Darel E., ‘Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in 
International Relations’, Review o f International Studies, 1999, 25.
Petersen, V. Spike, ‘Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping 
in the Context of Globalization’, Globalization: Theory and Practice, ed. 
Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996.
Petito, Fabio and Hatzopoulos, Pavlos, Religion in International Relations: The 
Return from Exile, New York, Macmillan, 2003.
Philpott, Daniel, - ‘On the Cusp of Sovereignty’, Sovereignty at the Crossroads: 
Morality and International Politics in the Post Cold War Era, ed. Luis E. 
Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 1996.
‘The Religious Roots of Modem International Relations’, World Politics, 52, 
no 2, 2000.
Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.
‘Usurping the sovereignty of sovereignty’, World Politics, 2001.
‘The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in international relations’, 
World Politics Vol. 55, October 2002, No 1.
Pijl, Kees van der, ‘The Second Glorious Revolution: Globalizing Elites and 
Historical Change’, International Political Economy: Understanding Global 
Disorder, London, Zed Books, 1995.
Pierre, Jon, ‘Understanding Governance’, Debating Governance: Authority, Steering 
and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
Pierson, Paul, ‘The New Politics of the Welfare State’, World Politics, 1996, 48 (2). 
Pinder, John, European Community: The Building o f a Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1991.
Polkinghome, John, Science and Providence, London, SPCK, 1994.
Pope, Robert, ‘Introduction’, Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 
1700-2000, ed. Robert Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2001.
Poret, Pierre, ‘Current Legal Issues Facing Central Banks’, OECD, May 1998.
www.oecd.org/daf/investment/legal-instruments/codes.htm 
Porter, Brian, ‘David Davies: a hunter for after peace’, Review o f International 
Studies 1989.
- ‘Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight’s ‘International theory’, The 
Reason o f  States, ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin,
1978.
Rees, loan Bowen, Government by Community, London, Charles Knight and Co, 
1971.
Reich, Robert B. The Work o f Nations: Preparing Ourselves for Twenty First 
Century Capitalism, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1991.
Rhodes, R. A. W. ‘The Hollowing out of the State’, Political Quarterly, 56.
Rieger, Elmar and Leibdried, Stephen, ‘Welfare State Limits to globalization’, 
Politics and Society, Vol. 26, no. 3, September 1998.
Robertson, David, ‘Link Issues and the New Round’, Globalisation and 
International Trade Liberalisation: Continuity and Change, ed. Martin 
Richardson, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000.
Rosenau, James N. ‘Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World’, Re- 
imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, eds. 
Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1998.
472
‘Governance in a Globalizing World’, The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate, ed. David Held and Anthony 
McGrew, Oxford, Polity Press, 2000.
Rosenberg, Justin, The Empire o f Civil Society : A Critique O f the Realist Theory o f  
International Relations, London, Verso, 1994.
Rothstein, Robert L. ‘On the Costs of Realism’, Political Science Quarterly, 1972.
Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in 
international relations’, International Organisation, 1993.
Sampson, Anthony, The Money Lenders: Bankers in a Dangerous World, Great 
Britain, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981.
Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age o f Globalization, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995.
Schluter, M. and Lee, D. The R Factor, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1993.
Senyk, Sophia, ‘The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values 
versus Nationalist Doctrines’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30, No 4, 2002.
Slim, Hugo, ‘Dithering over Darfur?’ International Affairs, Vol. 80, Number 5, 
October 2004.
Smith, Anthony D. National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991.
Nations and Nationalism in A Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.
Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and Beyond’, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. 
eds. S Smith, K Booth and M Zalewski, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996.
Spinelli, Alterio, The Eurocrats, 1966.
Strange, Susan, The Retreat o f the State: The Diffusion o f Power in the World 
Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Sorensen, Georg, ‘Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution’, Sovereignty 
at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Political Studies 
Association, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.
Soros, George, The Crisis o f Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered, Little 
Brown and Company, London, 1998.
Suganami, Hidemi, ‘Sovereignty, intervention and the English School’, presented to 
4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, 
University of Kent at Canterbury. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/
Tanner, Roger, ‘National Identity and the One Wales Model’, Planet: The Welsh 
Internationalist, April/May 1973.
Taylor, Paul, ‘The United Nations and International Order’, The Globalization o f  
World Politics, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001.
Tawney, R. H, Religion and the Rise o f  Capitalism, West Drayton, Middlesex, 
Penguin Book, 1926.
Thomas, Scott M. ‘The global resurgence of religion and the study of world politics’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 24, 2, 1995.
‘Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical 
sociology of the English School of International Relations’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001.
‘Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of 
Religion and the Transformation of International Society’, Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies, 2000, Vol. 29, No 3.
Thompson, Kenneth, Moralism and Morality in Politics and Diplomacy, Lanham 
MD, University Press of America, 1985.
473
Thompson J. E. and Krasner, Stephen D. Global Transactions and the consolidation 
of sovereignty’, eds. E.O. Czempiel and J.N. Rosenau, Global Change and 
Theoretical Challenges, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1989.
Touraine, Alaine, ‘An introduction to the study of social movements’, Social 
Research, Vol. 52, No 4, Winter 1985.
Vincent, R. J. ‘Grotius, Human Rights and Intervention’, in Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990.
Volf, Miroslav, ‘Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological
Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies, 2000, Vol. 29, No 3.
Wasver, Ole, ‘Europe’s Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall 
European Security’, International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and 
Order Reconsidered, ed. Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan,
1996.
‘Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue’, B. A. 
Roberson ed. International Society and the Development o f International 
Relations Theory, London, Pinter, 1998.
Wade, H. W. R. ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’, Cambridge Law Journal, 1955. 
Wallace, William, ‘Less than a federation, more than a regime: the Community as a 
political system’, Policy Making in the European Community, H Wallace, W 
Wallace and C Webb, London 1983.
‘Rescue or Retreat? The Nation-State in Western Europe’, 1945-93, Political 
Studies, Vol. 42, 1994.
‘The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox’, Sovereignty at the 
Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies Association, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1999.
Walker, R. B. J. ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 1990.
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Walter, Andrew, World Power and World Money: The Role o f Hegemony and 
International Monetary Order, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1991.
Walt, Stephen M. ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 1991, vol. 35 no 2, June 1991.
Waltz, Kenneth N, Theory o f International Relations, New York, Random House,
1979.
Waring, Luther Hess, The Political Theories o f Martin Luther, New York, G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1910.
Watson, Adam, The limits o f Independence : Relations between states in the modern 
world, London, Routledge, 1992.
The Evolution o f International Society: A Comparative historical Analysis, 
London, Routledge, 2003.
Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660, 
London, Duckworth, 1975.
Wedgwood Benn, David, ‘Neo-conservatives and their American critics’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 80, Number 5, October 2004.
Weiler, J. H. H. ‘European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the 
European Constitutional Order’, Political Studies, 1996.
474
Weiss, Linda, The Myth o f the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global 
Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998.
Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’, International Organization 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in 
International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond, 
eds. Paul R Viotti and Mark V Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999.
Social Theory o f International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. ‘Pluralists or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: 
Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies, 1992, Vol. 21 No 3.
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000.
and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian intervention and world politics’, The 
Globalization o f World Politics, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2001.
Williams, Glanmour, ‘The Welsh and their Religion’, Cardiff, 1991.
Williams, Gwyn A. When Was Wales: A History o f the Welsh? London, Penguin,
1991.
Williams, Marc, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’, Globalization: Theory and Practice, eds.
Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996.
Wistrich, Ernest, The United States o f Europe, London, Routledge, 1994.
Wight, Martin, ‘Russia, the Church and the West’, Ecumenical Review 1, 1948.
‘What makes a good historian?’, The Listener 17 Feb 1955.
‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in 
the Theory o f International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
Systems o f States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977.
‘An anatomy of international thought’, Review o f International Studies, 1987, 
13.
Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand, Leicester, Leicester 
University Press 1978.
International Theory: The Three Tradition, London, Continuum, 2002.
Wind, Marlene, ‘Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational 
Institutionalism’, Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. K. E. 
Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996.
Woods, Ngaire, ‘Order, Justice, the IMF and the World Bank’, Inequality, 
Globalization and World Politics, eds. Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Wriston, Walter, The Twilight o f  Sovereignty, New York, Charles Scribner’s sons,
1992.
475
